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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents an empirical qualitative analysis of the planning policy reforms and 
austerity measures enacted under the Cameron-led Coalition and majority Conservative 
Governments 2010-2016. The conceptual framework is developed by drawing on a neoliberal 
structure-agency approach, with a specific focus on how externalised ‘structural’ planning 
neoliberalisations impact on local planning authority departments and planner’s internalised 
‘agency’ in England. The research is based on 40 semi-structured interviews with planning 
managers representing a diversity of rural-urban and regional contexts across England. The 
guiding rationale is that  the particular scope, scale and temporal context of austerity, localism 
and planning reforms in England post-2010 represents more than a neoliberal ‘business as 
usual’ approach, but rather forms a more fundamental set of post-crisis changes to the 
professional roles of public planners and objectives of the planning system more generally, in 
line with wider attempts at state restructuring during this period. The argument is made that 
the reallocation of responsibility and risk through such reforms has been key to the unfolding 
state restructuring in England post-2010, with planning further becoming both a punch bag 
for, but also agent of, neoliberalisations in England. However, that despite being conscripted 
into a stronger practice context of deregulation and austerity, the institutional positioning and 
professionalism and ethics of planners means that planning agency ‘is in many respects the 
last line of defence to space itself being neoliberalized’ (Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014, p. 357).  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction and Research Context 
 
This research project is concerned with how local authority planners in England have been affected by 
national planning reforms and austerity measures since 2010. The research takes as its starting point 
the argument made by Taylor-Gooby (2012, p.62) that the Coalition Government’s social policy 
‘objective is to set the UK on a trajectory of permanently lower spending, lower debt and market-led 
growth. Future pressures on the state will be contained through a shift of responsibility in many areas 
from state to private providers, citizens or the community. Market principles will permeate social life to 
a greater extent than at any time since the inception of the modern welfare state’. This project examines 
this social policy approach specifically in relation to public sector local government planning practices. 
 
The overall argument presented is that localism, a central plank of planning reforms in this period, and 
austerity, represent part of a broader neoliberal state restructuring strategy. One which aims to transfer 
state functions, but not necessarily powers or funding, to market, voluntary and community actors, and 
promote entrepreneurial, managerialist and individualist discourses and practices within public 
institutional services and delivery. This follows one dominant view in the planning literature that 
‘[n]eoliberal responsibilisation involves the offloading of responsibility from the formal institutions of the 
state to individuals, communities and localities in the name of self-reliance and resilience’ (Davoudi and 
Madanipour, 2015, p. 95). It is further argued that these shifts in responsibility and risk from the 
national to the local scale, through policy agendas such as localism and public sector austerity, form the 
most significant characteristic of the Cameron-led Coalition and Conservative Governments 2010-2016.   
 
This narrative presents the argument that the neoliberal reallocation of responsibility and risk through 
such reforms has been key to the unfolding state restructuring in England post-2010, with planning 
further becoming both a punch bag for, but also necessary agent of, neoliberalisations in England. That 
is planning is blamed as a bureaucratic barrier to neoliberal ideals of efficiency and growth, but that 
such neoliberalisations through policy and fiscal reforms are dependent on such planners to ‘make the 
system work’ despite the contradictions of free-market development processes (negative externalities) 
and political dissatisfaction through myriad competing agendas from spaces and places that need 
housing, employment, infrastructure, green spaces and leisure provision from their built environment. 
The institutional positing of public planners within local government and their relationship with elected-
members and the corporate management of the council puts them in an important position to influence 
land-use planning decisions, whilst their professional and ethical training means that they are likely to 
place a strong value on concepts around community, amenity, public interest and sustainability. The 
assertion is therefore made that, despite planners being conscripted into a stronger practice context of 
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deregulation and austerity post-2010, their institutional positioning and professionalism mean planning 
agency is both facilitating neoliberal reforms to land-use planning but is also simultaneously ‘in many 
respects the last line of defence to space itself being neoliberalized’ (Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014, p. 
357). It is this trade-off that provides the ‘structure-agency’ divide/conflict for planning practitioners. 
 
This sets up the overarching neoliberal structure-planning agency theoretical framework utilised in this 
research. However, the emphasis on national policy and austerity reforms means that the focus here is 
more on these ‘structures’ and the impact of these ‘external forces’ on agency; rather than a specific 
study of planning agency per se. In other words, agency is evaluated here only in relation to how it has 
been impacted by such structures. A more focused evaluation of planning agency was beyond the scope 
of this study, given the emphasis on collecting data from a diversity of Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) 
across England; however, research investigating these issues with an orientation towards ‘agency’ and 
an accompanying methodology would neatly complement the findings presented in this thesis.   
 
Before moving on it is worth briefly outlining what is meant by the term ‘neoliberalism’ at the outset as 
it forms the main theoretical lens for this project. At its most basic level, neoliberalism can be defined 
as ‘a modified form of liberalism tending to favour free-market capitalism’ (Oxford Dictionary.com). The 
history and traditions surrounding the development of the neoliberal philosophy are complex and have 
been the subject of entire books (See Harvey, 2007). However, for the purposes here, a simplification 
is sufficient to outline that the intellectual roots of neoliberalism are often seen to rest with Friedrich 
August von Hayek and Milton Friedman as part of the Mont Pelerin Society founded in 1947 that sought 
to defend and promote classic economic liberal theory; and the economic group of German 
Ordoliberals (closely associated with the University of Freiburg post-WW2) that similarly championed 
competitive free markets supported by a strong state institutional framework. These economic and 
academic groups both criticised the ‘socialist’ forms of state planning that dominated Western 
governments during the period at the height of the Keynesian Welfare State consensus - that lasted 
between approximately between 1945-79. The political application of neoliberal political economy, 
however, is associated with the election of Margret Thatcher as Prime Minister in the UK in 1979 and 
Ronald Reagan as the President in the United States in 1980. Since then neoliberal political economy 
has become commonplace across the world and forms a main plank of economic globalisation, 
particularly through the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). In other words, neoliberalism has become a hegemonic mode of discourse that has ‘pervasive 
effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way 
many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world’ (Harvey, 2007, p.3).  
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More specifically, according to David Harvey, neoliberalism is in the first instance ‘a theory of political 
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade’ (2007, p.2). From this perspective, the role of the state is 
to create and preserve an institutional framework that supports these practices. It also asserts that 
state intervention, beyond creating and supporting these market rights, must be kept to a bare 
minimum because ‘the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market 
signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions 
(particularly in democracies) for their own benefit’ (ibid). The overall consequences have been an 
increase in deregulatory measures, privatisation, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social 
provision. As such, these processes of ‘neoliberalisation’ since the 1970s have entailed much ‘creative 
destruction’ of both prior institutional frameworks (such as the Keynesian ‘welfare state’) and broader 
societal ‘divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and 
thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the heart’ (Harvey, 2007, p.3).  
 
Neoliberalism as a political philosophy or theory of political economic practices (political economy) is 
important for understanding how ‘state-market-society’ relations have been (re)structured under such 
processes since the 1970s. It is a widely used theory in the social sciences across a number of disciplines 
to assist with structural explanations of changes to the relationship between government, citizens and 
the market. Neoliberalism is also dominant in the academic planning theory and literature as a force 
shaping urban development, land rights, capital/resource exchanges, policy reforms amongst others. 
In sum, neoliberal thought and practices have had a significant influence on government policy and the 
English planning system since the 1970s. Most relevant here is that neoliberalism is understood as the 
ideological driver behind the reforms enacted post-2010 that form the empirical focus of this project. 
  
The subsequent sections in this chapter will outline the necessary contextual information for the reader 
to make sense of the wider national economic and planning policy context 2010-2016 that ‘frames’ this 
research. Firstly, Section 1.1 presents the overall statement and purpose of the research project. Then 
Section 1.2 outlines the national economic and political context that resulted in the UK Government 
adopting austerity as an economic policy. Finally, Section 1.3 introduces the National Planning Policy 
Framework (2012) and Localism Act (2011). Together these set the stage for the proceeding chapters. 
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1.1 Statement and Purpose of the Research Project 
 
From the outset, it is worth stating that the period 2010-2016 was a dynamic, chaotic and controversial 
time for planning in England, particularly in the first three years of the Coalition Government. The 
challenge is therefore to present a coherent and necessarily selective account of the key changes, but 
without oversimplifying the complex and contested reality. The context of neoliberal planning policy 
reforms and austerity for local planning authorities (henceforth LPAs) in England 2010-2016 forms the 
theoretical, institutional, disciplinary, spatial and temporal ‘boundaries’ of the project respectively. The 
dual austerity and policy reform components of this research are not mutually exclusive; they were 
both pursued simultaneously by the Coalition during this period, and austerity is also a type of national 
economic fiscal reform comparable to the legislation/policy reforms enacted on the planning system. 
In practice the austerity measures and policy reforms enacted heavily overlapped across time/space.  
 
Furthermore, whilst this was a period of coalition between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in 
government, the specific focus on planning was an agenda mainly driven by Conservative thinking and 
policy, primarily outlined in the Green Paper Open Source Planning (Conservative Party, 2010) 
developed before the 2010 General Election. As Allmendinger and Haughton (2014, p. 32) explain, 
‘[d]espite the need to accommodate the Liberal Democrat Party’s political agenda, the Coalition 
Agreement explicitly endorsed Open Source Planning and the Big Society concept’. The Lib-Dems 
focused greater attention on other core areas of their 2010 manifesto when negotiating the Coalition 
Agreement; centring on political reform (such as the ‘alternative voting’ electoral system referendum) 
and educational support (such as a ‘pupil premium’ to support further study). Therefore, the conjecture 
is made that the Conservatives dominated the thinking and policy on planning reform during this period. 
 
These policy goals are therefore attributed here primarily to the (former) key Conservative cabinet 
members Prime Minister David Cameron, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne and 
Communities Secretary of State Eric Pickles and Greg Clarke as the drivers behind planning system (and 
austerity) reforms. In respect to austerity reforms, however, the Conservatives and Lib-Dems were 
more broadly in agreement over the need for significant budget reductions across the Coalition 
Parliamentary period, and this was reasonably uncontested within their respective leadership in the 
Coalition Agreement and much of the Parliament. Without providing a more comprehensive political 
account (which is beyond the scope of this thesis), it is sufficient to contend that the Liberal Democrats 
challenged some of the ‘hard edges’ of Conservative policy within the Coalition but did not lead them. 
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It also needs to be stated that although this research focusses specifically on the Coalition and majority 
Conservative Governments under the leadership of Cameron 2010-2016, this period is porous at either 
end, and necessitates reference to the previous Blair/Brown New Labour administrations 1997-2010 
and the incumbent post-EU referendum May-led Conservative Government (July 2016 -). The empirical 
focus is also specifically on England rather than the UK. This is to avoid confusion with the devolved 
national contexts of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales and the (subtle) differences between their 
respective planning systems. This project draws the line before Brexit began to dominate domestic and 
foreign policy within the UK Government post-2016. In some cases, however, key planning changes that 
happened after the research context will be discussed, such as the 2017 Housing White Paper Fixing 
the Broken Housing Market and the revised 2018 NPPF, but these will only be discussed to the extent 
they are necessary for understanding and explaining the trajectory of the Cameron-led governing era. 
 
Additionally, whilst this is primarily a research project drawing on the perspectives and theories from 
the disciplines of planning and urban development, it is also specifically interested in the broader 
economic, political and geographical dimensions that form the context for planning and development 
activities and touches on contemporary political issues of democracy and spatial justice in England.  
 
The research rationale is that the particular scope, scale and temporal context of austerity, localism and 
planning reforms in England post-2010 represents more than a neoliberal ‘business as usual’ approach, 
but rather forms a more fundamental set of changes to the objectives of the planning system and role 
of public planners to align with wider governing attempts at public sector state restructuring. However, 
as an important caveat, the contention that the Cameron-led governing period 2010-16 amounts to 
more than a neoliberal business as usual approach is a deliberately critical position taken by this 
research; this position is not argued to be a claim to knowledge nor is it something that is being explicitly 
looked for in the empirical data, but rather forms a specific critical interpretation by the researcher. The 
research aim is more open and exploratory as it seeks to evaluate the extent to which, and how, 
structural programmes of reform have affected planning practices within English LPAs post-2010. 
 
Based on these overall aims and objectives, this project has four guiding research objectives (herein 
labelled as ROs) and six main research questions (herein RQs) that are as follows:  
 
RO1) To present practitioner evaluations of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF, 2012), 
planning policy deregulations and performance targets 2010-2016. 
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RO2) To present practitioner evaluations of the Localism Act (2011) and governance shifts to ‘economic’ 
and ‘community’ localism 2010-2016.  
 
RO3) To present practitioner evaluations of the effectiveness of the latest period of planning reforms in 
relation to their professionalism and ethics (planning structures and agency) 2010-2016. 
 
RO4) To present practitioner evaluations of public planning under austerity in relation to the diversity of 
local contexts, structures and geography of LPA planning across regions in England 2010-2016.  
 
RQ1) In what ways have local planning authorities experienced, and responded to, the planning system 
reforms and policy deregulations introduced by the central government since 2010? 
 
RQ2) What has localism meant in practice for local planning authorities and their relationships with 
local communities?  
 
RQ3) What have national planning policy reforms and localism post-2010 meant in practice for the 
economic and collaborative approaches of LPAs to strategic planning and housing policy and delivery?  
 
RQ4) In what ways have local planning authorities experienced, and responded to, the demands of 
austerity (urbanism/governance/localism) as imposed by central government since 2010?  
 
RQ5) What are the financial/budget and capacity/resilience pressures on planning services, and how do 
they relate to the impacts of austerity on local authorities (landscapes of antagonism) more generally?  
 
RQ6) To what extent have austerity logics been internalised or resisted by local authority planning 
managers? How have these austerity measures shaped LPA practice cultures and structures?  
 
The remaining Sections 1.2 and 1.3 in this chapter present the contextual information needed to situate 
the research rationale, aim, objectives and questions that have been outlined at the start of this project. 
The beginning of the story for this project is the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, which sent global financial 
markets into crisis and necessitated state governments rescue the systemic ‘toxic’ debt accrued by their 
banking sectors. This shift from a private market debt crisis to a national public debt crisis paved the 
way for contemporary austerity policies in 2010, resulting in the subsequent expenditure reductions 
across national and local government and the public sector and particularly impacting planning services.            
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1.2 The Global Financial Crisis and UK ‘Age of Austerity’ 
 
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (henceforth GFC) started as a subprime mortgage crisis in the US 
housing market (Skidelsky and Fraccaroli, 2017). American banks were issuing mortgages so readily that 
even ‘sub-prime borrowers’ could access a loan. These loans were then put into the financial markets 
as ‘securities’. These securities comprised financial instruments called Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs), which mixed low quality (subprime) housing mortgage debt and with high quality debt, such as 
US Treasury bills, that seemingly offered low risk and high reward. When the housing bubble burst, the 
CDO market imploded as sub-prime borrowers began to default on their repayments, and house prices 
began to plummet. The banks stopped lending to each other and customers for fear of insolvency, and 
this perpetuated a ‘credit crunch’. This US crisis became a ‘global’ crisis because of the strong 
interconnections between national financial markets trading securities and lending to each other, 
particularly impacting the UK and rest of the EU. It is not the intention here to recount and analyse the 
events leading to the 2008 GFC (Mirowski, 2013), but rather to provide a summary context to austerity. 
 
In response to the GFC, the HM Treasury, along with national finance ministries across the globe, made 
a series of financial interventions to maintain the stability of the UK banking sector. These interventions 
supported four broad aims; 1) to protect depositors in banks suffering insolvency or a severe decline in 
market confidence; 2) to maintain liquidity to allow banks to pay due claims and outstanding 
borrowings; 3) to ensure that banks whose failure would threaten the overall financial system would 
have sufficient capital to cushion them from losses caused by further deterioration in the financial 
markets; and 4) to encourage banks to lend to creditworthy borrowers (NAO, 2017). A 2009 NAO report 
‘Maintaining financial stability across the United Kingdom’s banking system’ argued that “if the support 
measures had not been put in place, the scale of the economic and social costs if one or more major UK 
banks had collapsed is difficult to envision. The support provided to the banks was therefore justified, 
but the final cost to the taxpayer of the support will not be known for a number of years” (p. 8).  
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Table 1 – Summary of HM Treasury support provided to the UK Banking Sector Bailout 2007-2010: 
 
These ‘bailout’ support measures (see Table 1) exclude the wider interventions undertaken to support 
the economy during this period, such as the Bank of England’s (BoE) Quantitative Easing Programme, 
which provided adjustments to economic monetary policy (NAO, 2017). Two main types of support 
were provided; the first was the Provision of guarantees and other non-cash support. These items were 
the Credit Guarantee Scheme, Special Liquidity Scheme and Asset Protection Scheme, as well as various 
other guarantees and indemnities provided to UK banks. The second type was the Provision of cash in 
the form of loans to the FSCS and insolvent banks to support deposits, and the purchase of share capital 
The National Audit Office (2017) summarises the support the HM Treasury provided to the banking 
sector during the bailout predominantly throughout the period 2007-2010 following the GFC:  
 
• Recapitalisation of Lloyds Banking Group (Lloyds) and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) through 
a series of transactions eventually acquiring 83 per cent of RBS (but 68 per cent of the voting 
rights) and 41 per cent of Lloyds (of both ordinary shares and voting rights). 
• Lending money to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) so it could guarantee 
customer deposits of up to £50,000. The limit has been increased since then, most recently 
in January 2017 it was increased to £85,000. 
• Lending directly to insolvent banks so they could repay customer deposits of over £50,000, 
including to London Scottish Bank, Dunfermline Building Society and the Icelandic Banks – 
Heritable, Kaupthing Singer and Friedlander, and Landsbankinn. 
• Nationalising Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley (B&B) to protect their depositors and 
facilitate the orderly unwinding of their obligations and HM Treasury’s guarantees. 
• The Special Liquidity Scheme, introduced in April 2008 and lasting until January 2012, to 
increase the liquidity of UK banks. It was a Bank of England (BoE) scheme, supported by a 
HM Treasury guarantee, under which banks swapped assets for more liquid Treasury Bills in 
return for a fee. 
• The Credit Guarantee Scheme, introduced in October 2008, to help restore investor 
confidence in bank wholesale funding by guaranteeing certain unsecured debts in return for 
a fee. The scheme closed in 2012. 
• The Asset Protection Scheme, announced in January 2009, to protect assets on banks’ 
balance sheets. RBS and Lloyds initially agreed in principle to join, but in the end only RBS 
joined. The scheme closed in 2012. 
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in RBS and Lloyds. The peak support total of £1,029 billion guarantees and non-cash support has fallen 
significantly to £12 billion, and the £133 billion peak total cash provided has been reduced to £46 billion, 
by 31st March 2017 (NAO, 2017). The GFC and banking bailouts created the antecedent economic and 
political conditions for the UK Government and EU to embed the orthodoxy for austerity measures.   
 
Important here is that post-2010 the global financial/banking crisis was being recast as a Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, one supposedly caused by profligate national government spending during the ‘good times’ that 
now had to be paid for through ‘controlling’ public spending. In this narrative, neoliberal ‘austerian’ 
political elites and economists argued the ‘moral’ dimension that austerity is the natural price to pay - 
akin to the hangover that results from a good party. For Blyth (2013), this strategic reframing of the 
banking crisis into a public debt crisis represents the ‘Greatest Bait and Switch in Human History’.  
 
In a 2009 speech in Cheltenham, David Cameron, then leader of the opposition Conservative Party, 
outlined his economic position for a Conservative government should they achieve power following the 
2010 General Election:  
 
“We need a complete change of direction. I’m not just talking about changing one group of 
Ministers for another. Or one set of policies, plans and proposals for another. I’m talking about a 
whole new, never-been-done-before approach to the way this country is run. Why? Because the 
world has completely changed. In this new world comes the reckoning for Labour’s economic 
incompetence. The age of irresponsibility is giving way to the age of austerity. Labour’s Debt Crisis. 
The highest borrowing in peacetime history. The deepest recession since the war. Labour are spent. 
The money has run out. Now some people say: let’s get through the recession, let’s get through 
the election we can keep on spending more, keep on borrowing more, and deal with the debt crisis 
later. Wrong - seriously wrong. The alternative to dealing with the debt crisis now is mounting 
debt, higher interest rates and a weaker economy. Unless we deal with this debt crisis, we risk 
becoming once again the sick man of Europe. Our recovery will be held back, and our children will 
be weighed down, by a millstone of debt. So this is no time for business as usual” (Cameron, 2009, 
no page, emphasis added). 
 
Cameron’s speech potentially represents the discursive start of the contemporary austerity agenda in 
UK politics, and can be seen as a precursor to the creation of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
in 2010 by the Coalition to make independent fiscal judgements and assess its plans. The GFC provided 
the ‘crisis’ conditions that necessitated the UK Government enact economic policies measures for 
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significant public spending cuts as a means to stabilise the national budget deficit. Despite the pressing 
need for some form of economic state intervention, a political dimension to austerity can be seen 
through Cameron’s attempt to attribute the blame for the debt crisis, and subsequent need for 
cutbacks, to the ‘irresponsibly high’ spending and borrowing of the New Labour Governments (1997-
2010). Here some commentators focus attention on the ‘political opportunism’ of austerity (Jabko, 
2013, Gamble, 2015), whilst others emphasise the role of political elites in reviving and ‘doubling-down’ 
on neoliberal political economy following questions over its legitimacy post-2008 GFC (Peck et al., 2012).      
 
1.2.1 Austerity Measures and the UK National Debt and Deficit 
 
In order to make sense of the academic literatures and debates around austerity, it is first necessary to 
provide the main definitions and concepts that are widely used by economic and social commentators, 
and which are often misunderstood, or deliberately obfuscated, within public discourse on the subject.  
 
Austerity policy and reform is referred to throughout this project and forms a core focus for the 
theoretical and empirical analysis developed in the subsequent chapters. As such, it is necessary to have 
a precise definition. In economics, ‘austerity measures’ can be understood as: 
 
‘A set of economic policies aimed at controlling the budget deficit by reducing government 
spending. Such measures are usually implemented when the ratio of national debt to GDP has 
reached an unsustainable level and a country is on the verge of defaulting on bond obligations. 
Austerity measures can include spending cuts and tax increases’ (Oxford Dictionary of Economics, 
2017, p. 25). 
 
Whilst in the academic literature, Blyth (2013) defines austerity as ‘a form of voluntary deflation in 
which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices and public spending to restore 
competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state's budget, debts, and deficits. 
Doing so, its advocates believe, will inspire “business confidence” since the government will neither be 
“crowding-out” the market for investment by sucking up all the available capital through the issuance 
of debt, nor adding to the nation’s already “too big” debt’ (p. 2). 
 
One significant, but less obvious, issue for understanding political and economic debates on austerity 
is the distinction between the national debt and deficit. These terms have different meanings, although 
they are often misunderstood or used interchangeably in public discourse or for political expediency.  
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The difference between national debt and the government deficit is as follows: 
 
‘[National debt is] the debt of a country’s government. This may be owed to residents (internal debt) or 
foreign lenders (external debt). If national debt is held by foreigners, the whole of the interest and 
redemption payments are claims on national resources. Where the debt is held domestically, the real 
burden of debt is only the deadweight losses due to the taxes needed to service it. The government 
budget deficit is the difference between receipts and expenditure in a given year, and is equal to the 
increase in national debt’ (Oxford Dictionary of Economics, 2017, p. 349). 
 
Put simply, the budget deficit is the excess of a government’s total expenditure over its income 
measured annually; whilst the national debt is the total amount of debt owned by a country’s 
government at any given time. The budget deficit has to be met by borrowing, which increases the 
government’s national debt. As outlined, one way a government can reduce its budget deficit is to 
implement austerity measures, that is, introducing government spending cuts to reduce the 
governments’ total expenditure in relation to its income. Expenditure cuts simply refer to reductions in 
government spending that are either already happening, or more commonly that have been announced 
in the Spring/Autumn Treasury Budget statements. As the former Chancellor of the Exchequer (2010-
2016), George Osborne often claimed the need to restore a ‘balanced budget’, which ‘occurs when total 
government receipts and expenditure are equal. There is thus no need for additional government 
borrowing so government debt remains constant’ (Oxford Dictionary of Economics, 2017, p. 30).     
 
The following tables 2-3 and figures 1-2 highlight the changes in the UK national debt and budget deficit 
over the time period of the Coalition/Conservative Governments. They show that the budget deficit as 
a percentage of GDP has decreased significantly from 10.1% in 2009/10 to 2.4% in 2016/17. However, 
they also show that the national debt has increased from 69.9% of GDP in 2009/10 to 86.7% in 2016/17. 
So it should be noted that reducing the budget deficit does not straightforwardly mean reducing the 
national debt, despite the terms being used interchangeably in public discourse or for political effect. 
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 Table 2 – UK Government Debt (Financial and Calendar Years) 2009/10 -2015/16:  
 
(ONS Statistical bulletin: UK government debt and deficit: September 2017). 
 
Table 3 – UK Government Spending Deficit (Financial and Calendar Years) 2009/10-2015/16: 
 
(ONS Statistical bulletin: UK government debt and deficit: September 2017). 
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Figure 1 – Government Gross Debt as a percentage of GDP (Financial Year) 1995-2017:  
 
 
(ONS Statistical bulletin: UK government debt and deficit: September 2017). 
 
Figure 2 – Government Net Borrowing as a percentage of GDP (Financial Year) 1995-2017:  
 
 
(ONS Statistical bulletin: UK government debt and deficit: September 2017). 
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The relevance of these definitions and distinctions are outlined here as a reference point for the reader 
before the main debates are presented. So called ‘Austerian’ economists argue that the national deficit 
must be reduced to restore private sector ‘confidence’ and hence their investment, which acts as the 
driver of the economy. In contrast, ‘Keynesian’ economists argue that government spending should be 
increased during a recession. This approach means that the budget deficit is deliberately increased and 
run at a higher level in the medium term, because this is necessary to temporarily ‘fill the gap’ created 
by reduced private sector activity and investment, and to stimulate the markets and aggregate demand 
that will ultimately restore economic growth. It is from this time that the government can then reduce 
spending and focus on deficit reduction. This position is often summarised by Keynes’ statement in 
1937 that “The boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury”.    
 
These (simplified) austerian and Keynesian economic positions essentially differ over the most effective 
timing of austerity measures within economic cycles, and thus the impact they will have on economic 
growth in terms of boosting or stagnating recovery. The economic  cycle (also called the business cycle 
or trade cycle) is the rise and fall of economic growth that occurs over time, and is comprised of four 
phases; expansion, peak, contraction and trough. These four phases characterise the ‘boom and bust’ 
economies typically experienced under advanced capitalism and have a strong impact on countries.  
 
One of the core arguments against austerity is that reductions in government spending and/or higher 
taxes during recessionary condition, associated with the contraction and trough phases in the business 
cycle, serve to exacerbate the reductions made by private investment and further slowdown and 
discourage economic activity. The counter argument to austerity is thus for economic stimulus during 
recessions; by temporarily increasing government spending to boost demand and investment as a 
means to compensate for the cyclical shortfall in private sector activity/investment within the business 
cycle. Stimulus policy can be defined as ‘an increase in the public deficit, aimed at sustaining aggregate 
demand and hence aggregate output and employment’ (Skidelsky and Fraccaroli, 2017, p. xvii). 
 
Suffice to say, austerity measures were chosen by Osborne and the UK Treasury, and public spending 
cuts were implemented across the government and public sector. As will be discussed, local authorities, 
and particularly the planning departments within them, were subjected to severe government spending 
cuts to their funding under the Coalition Parliament 2010-2015. The deepest spending reductions were 
frontloaded in the first couple of years but persisted to varying degrees throughout this period. The 
impacts of these austerity cuts on LPAs and planners forms three main research questions in this project.     
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At this stage we also need to understand what is meant by government ‘expenditure’. Government 
expenditure ‘consists of spending on real goods and services purchased from outside suppliers; spending 
on employment in state services such as administration, defence, and education; spending on transfer 
payments to pensioners, the unemployed, and the disabled; spending on subsidies and grants to industry; 
and payment of debt interest’ (Oxford Dictionary of Economics, 2017, p. 228). It also includes the net 
out payments from one level of government to another, such as central government grants to local 
authorities. However, these expenditures do not all have the same objectives and recipients, nor yield 
the same returns (See figure 3 for a breakdown of UK Government Expenditure by sector for 2016-17).  
 
Figure 3 – United Kingdom Government Expenditure 2016-17 by Sector (Total £772 Billion): 
 
(HM Government Treasury Budget 2016).   
 
There are central distinctions between the three main types of government expenditure that are often 
not explicitly addressed in political discourses and public debates on austerity measures. These are 
Current Expenditures, Capital Expenditures and Transfer Payments. It is sufficient for the purposes here 
to note that current spending is expenditure on wages and services that are short term and have to be 
renewed each year to sustain the needs of the population. Capital spending is spending on physical 
assets like roads, bridges, hospital buildings and equipment, which is long term with regards to its 
repayment (Economics Online Fiscal Policy). Transfer payments include state pensions, unemployment 
and other social security benefits. These types of expenditure can be thought of as funding the different 
elements of a society, each having a different but important role, and each subject to different cutbacks.  
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Keynesian economists advocating stimulus economic policy, as opposed to austerity measures, contend 
that recessionary periods in the business cycle are the most suitable time to borrow to invest in capital 
spending projects, because they can take advantage of low interest rates, utilise resources that would 
otherwise remain idle and stimulate economic activity. Therefore, government revenue from taxation 
need only cover the current spending on an annual basis, and not borrowing for capital spending: 
 
‘Public finance theory makes a clear distinction between current and capital spending. A sound 
rule is that government should cover its current or recurring spending by taxation, but should 
borrow for capital spending, that is, investment. This is because current spending gives rise to no 
government-owned assets, whereas capital spending does. If these assets are productive, they pay 
for themselves by increasing government earnings, either through user charges or increased tax 
revenues’ (Skidelsky and Fraccaroli, 2017, p. 145).  
 
Therefore, whilst it may be prudent to apply austerity measures to reduce government current 
expenditure during recessionary conditions as a means to reduce the budget deficit, it may be equally 
prudent to accept a certain level of budget deficit surplus to boost capital expenditure and stimulate 
economic growth. These nuances often get obfuscated in popular political and public austerity debates.  
 
Finally, we need to clarify what is meant by the terms ‘economic policy’ and ‘economic growth’, given 
that both are repeatedly referred to in academic and policy debates and throughout this project. 
Economic policy is ‘the set of controls used by the government to regulate economic activity…broadly 
classified into three areas: fiscal policy (issues related to taxation, government spending, and public 
deficit), monetary policy (interest rates and inflation), and trade policy (tariffs and trade agreements)’. 
Economic growth is defined as the ‘persistent increase in per capita aggregate output and in the 
aggregate physical capital per worker in an economy’ (Oxford Dictionary of Economics, 2017, p. 157-9).  
 
Data on UK government debt and deficit is collected by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) and is 
frequently published in statistical bulletins. The EU government deficit and debt statistical bulletin is 
published quarterly in January, April, July and October each year, to coincide with when the UK and 
other EU member states are required to report on their deficit (or net borrowing) and debt to the 
European Commission. These provide a comprehensive resource for monitoring and reporting the debt 
and deficit levels of the state governments that comprise the EU. Although austerity has been a 
significant economic policy issue across the EU, the focus is on the UK for the purposes of this study.  
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Some background information on EU fiscal policy is also necessary here to understand the broader 
context and restrictions on member states which influence the UK context. The member states of the 
EU are obliged to avoid ‘excessive budgetary deficits’ under Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. The Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure within the Maastricht Treaty 
sets out two criteria and reference values with which EU member state governments should comply. 
The first is ensuring a deficit (net borrowing) to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio of 3%. The second 
is ensuring a debt to GDP ratio of 60% (ONS Statistical bulletin: UK government debt and deficit: 
December 2017). These two criteria reference values are used by the European Commission when 
assessing the UK’s debt and deficit performance against the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
The main points from the ONS December 2017 Statistical Bulletin are as follows:     
 
• General UK government gross debt was £1,786.3 billion at the end of December 2017, which 
is equivalent to 87.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) and 27.7 percentage points above the 
reference value of 60% set out in the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure; 
• General government gross debt first exceeded the 60% Maastricht reference value at the end 
of 2009, when it was 64.1% of GDP; 
• General government deficit (or net borrowing) was £39.4 billion in 2017, a decrease of £19.0 
billion compared with 2016; this is equivalent to 1.9% of GDP, 1.1 percentage points below the 
reference value of 3.0% set out in the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure; 
• 2017 is the first time the government deficit has been below the 3.0% Maastricht reference 
value since 2007, when it was 2.6% of GDP. 
 
(ONS Statistical bulletin: UK government debt and deficit: December 2017). 
 
Following the literature, the argument is developed that austerity is also a political project (Streeck and 
Schäfer, 2013) as well as a ‘technical’ expert economic project. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
European Commission (EC) and European Central Bank (ECB), the “troika”, and Germany, all had high 
stakes in the proposed policy solution; the former to restore faith in neoclassical economics and 
neoliberalism that had been shaken by the GFC, and the latter to protect their export-based economy 
and position within the EU hierarchy. Similarly Osborne and other austerian economists (strategically) 
used the example of Greece as a warning of what happens when government debt nears default levels 
and as a justification for austerity measures in the UK and EU. The contention that austerity is as much 
political and ideological as economic in nature, particularly in the UK, is a recurring theme throughout 
this thesis. As a comparison to situate the UK context, figure 4 highlights the government national debt 
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to GDP ratio for a selection of European Union member states and the EU average over the period 
2000-2015. This shows that the UK national debt occupies the middle ground close to the EU average, 
however, was at no point during this period in a comparable debt position to Greece, Italy and Portugal:  
 
Figure 4 – European Member State Government Debt as a percentage of GDP 2000-2015  
 
 
(Eurostat, 2017).  
 
The political motivations for state restructuring as an objective of austerity policy were almost explicitly 
outlined by elite figures during this period (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011, Lowndes and Pratchett, 
2012). In his speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet in November 2013, then Prime Minister David 
Cameron outlined the government plan to reduce the national deficit in the short term; however, the 
pretext was his administration’s intention to build a ‘leaner’ and ‘more efficient’ state for the future:  
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“Let’s be clear. The single biggest threat to the cost of living in this country is if our budget deficit 
and debts get out of control again. If interest rates and mortgage rates start to soar, the increase 
in cost of living will far outweigh the impact of any increase in government spending or indeed 
reduction in taxation. This government is not prepared to let that happen. We have a plan – and 
we are carefully implementing that plan. Already we have cut the deficit by a third. And we are 
sticking to the task. But that doesn’t just mean making difficult decisions on public spending. It 
also means something more profound. It means building a leaner, more efficient state. We need to 
do more with less. Not just now, but permanently. It can be done. Consider these facts. There are 
40 per cent fewer people working in the Department for Education - but over 3,000 more free 
schools and academies, with more children doing tougher subjects than ever before. There are 
23,000 fewer administrative roles in the NHS - but 5,000 more doctors, with shorter waiting times. 
So you can have a leaner, more efficient, more affordable state that actually delivers better results 
for the taxpayer” (Cameron, 2013, emphasis added). 
 
Strong government austerity discourses led many critical social commentators on the political left to 
argue that such measures in the UK are as much a political agenda by the government as a technical 
one based on economic theory and evidence. The Guardian (Friday 12th June 2015) published an open 
letter from Ha-Joon Chang, Thomas Piketty, Mariana Mazzucato, and other academic signatories, to 
the then Chancellor George Osborne warning of the dangers of playing politics with the UK economy:     
 
“The chancellor’s plans, announced in his Mansion House speech, for “permanent budget surpluses” are 
nothing more than an attempt to outmanoeuvre his opponents. They have no basis in economics. 
Osborne’s proposals are not fit for the complexity of a modern 21st-century economy and, as such, they 
risk a liquidity crisis that could also trigger banking problems, a fall in GDP, a crash, or all three…It is 
irresponsible for the chancellor to take such risky experiments with the economy to score political points”.   
 
These wider economic and political debates renewed academic attention on ‘post-crisis’ neoliberalism, 
specifically deployed here to refer to the contemporary austerity measures enacted following the 2008 
GFC and the ‘rescaling’ policies towards localism post-2010 discussed further in the next chapter. 
Attention can now move away from the European and UK macro-level context to consider the more 
specific impact of austerity measures on English LPAs in the next section.  
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1.2.2 UK Public Sector Austerity and Local Authority Planning 
 
The Cameron-led governing era was marked by a public sector austerity agenda that ostensibly sought 
to reduce the national debt/deficit and restore confidence, investment and growth in the UK economy 
following the 2008 GFC. In the UK context, public sector funding (expenditure) cutbacks impacted upon 
a range of public sector services (health, education, policing, etc.) and central government departments 
in Whitehall that extended far beyond the tighter focus here on local councils and planning services. 
 
Nonetheless, austerity in practice has meant almost a 40% reduction in LG budgets since 2010 (NAO, 
2014). There has been a 37% fall in central government funding to local authorities (LA), and a 25% fall 
in LA’s income, both in real terms, between 2010-11 and 2015-16 (NAO, 2015, p. 3). Moreover, it has 
been the LAs themselves that have had to make up for this shortfall in funding, primarily through 
efficiency savings, increased revenue generation and/or service retrenchment. These changes to the 
financial settlement of English LG have resulted in the general context of pressures to make fast and 
deep savings whilst also maintaining statutory and front-line public services. Furthermore, whilst LAs 
have been the target of the deepest government public spending cuts in relation to the relatively more 
protected national education and healthcare expenditure, within local councils it is the planning and 
development services that have received the largest real term reductions in budget spend (NAO, 2015).  
 
Council ‘Planning and Development Services’ are typically comprised of eight component areas; these 
are: 1) Building control; 2) Development Management; 3) Planning Policy; 4) Environmental Initiatives; 
5) Economic Development; 6) Community Development; 7) Economic Research; 8) Business Support; 
with the specific combinations and departments for these functions varying across councils. Figures 5 
and 6 highlight the funding pressures facing planning departments in relation to other LA service areas.  
 
LAs in England receive funding from four main sources. The first and primary funding source is from 
central government called the Revenue Support Grant (RSG), which is a general funding pot calculated 
using various formulae to assess the needs and costs of service provision within a specific council 
locality. The second source of funding is from local business rates. The third is from special or specific 
government grants provided to fund ring-fenced programmes or functions. The fourth source of 
funding is through council taxation. Depending on their position, LAs can also generate smaller short 
term revenues from the sale of assets, through service fees and penalty charges, external trading 
accounts or transfers from accumulated reserves (Fitzgerald and Lupton, 2015). 
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Figure 5 – Change in English Local Authority Budget Spend by Service Area 2010/11 – 2014/15  
 
Source: UK National Audit Office (2015): ‘A Short Guide to the NAOs work on local authorities’.  
 
Figure 6 – English Local Authorities’ Budgets by Service Area in 2014-15 (£Billion)  
 
Source: UK National Audit Office (2015): ‘A Short Guide to the NAOs work on local authorities’. 
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Government austerity cuts have significantly reduced the provision of the RSG to LAs. This is to the 
extent that councils are expected to be financially ‘self-sufficient’ at the local level in time for the 
expressed total government removal of RSG funding in 2020. Austerity measures have also reduced 
both the number and amount of funding grants and streams provided by the government to local 
councils. In practice, this has resulted in LAs needing to develop and expand their local business rates 
and tax bases to meet the funding budget shortfall and achieve self-sufficiency in the short to medium 
term. It also means that far more emphasis is placed on generating increasing revenue from alternate 
and recurring sources, such as service fees and asset sales, than previously was the case pre-2010.    
 
In this context, LAs will have to become more ‘entrepreneurial’ to raise revenues and be thrifty with 
their spending and resources. This practice change in LG approach is termed here as ‘commercialisation’ 
(a key concept discussed in Section 5.1 in the Austerity Analysis Chapter). This is partly based on the 
support offered by the Local Government Association (LGA) to councils to achieve more efficiency and 
income generation under the heading ‘commercialisation’ on their website and within the 2017 report 
‘Enterprising councils: Supporting councils’ income generation activity’; ‘As funding shrinks exploring 
new ways to maximise incomes is essential. In order to protect valuable frontline services and ensure 
positive outcomes for local communities councils are increasingly thinking through a more commercial 
approach to their activities. These innovative councils are using their assets wisely, trading services with 
others across the public and private sectors, and selling commodities to generate income’ (LGA Online). 
 
The term commercialisation, however, is not being applied as a concept to LPAs in its strict literal sense 
as ‘the process of managing or running something principally for financial gain’ (Dictionary.com). Rather 
the point is to indicate that LPAs are having to act more commercially than they did before the pre-
2010 austerity measures, not that they have become fully commercialised public services. This term is 
similar in definition to being entrepreneurial as ‘characterized by the taking of financial risks in the hope 
of profit’ (ibid). Entrepreneurialism is a theoretically loaded term; however, it is increasingly being used 
in the planning literature (along with marketisation and commercialisation) to highlight the stronger 
emphasis placed on local government and planners to adopt more ‘business-like’ and ‘riskier’ practices 
to respond to austerity (See Raco and Moreira de Souza, 2018, Raco, 2018, Beswick and Penny, 2018).  
 
This section has outlined the macro economic and political context of austerity following the 2008 GFC. 
It has introduced some of the key definitions, positions and concepts that are needed to understand 
the academic literature on austerity, as well as set up the context for research questions 4, 5 and 6 and 
the subsequent Austerity Analysis Chapter 5. However, austerity reform only represents half the story 
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in this project, the other half examines the parallel planning policy reforms enacted by the Cameron-
led Governments 2010-16. The next section does the same for reforms to the English Planning System.     
 
1.3 Reforming the English Planning System Post-2010 
 
The overall purpose of this section is to introduce the political rationales, context and technical details 
behind some of the key planning reforms introduced under the Cameron-led Governments 2010-2016. 
Specifically it seeks to provide the context and details surrounding the introduction of the 2011 Localism 
Act and 2012 National Planning Policy Framework (herein NPPF). This is because they form the specific 
focus of research objectives and questions 1, 2 and 3 respectively. As such, this section sets up the 
(policy) context for the subsequent empirical data analysis in the Planning Reform Analysis (Chapter 4). 
 
Even before the Conservative Party came to power in 2010 with the Liberal Democrats in a Coalition 
Government, one of their stated core policy objectives was to reform the planning system in England. 
Conservative Party discourse on planning at that time was outlined in the 2009 Conservative Green 
Paper ‘Open Source Planning’ (OSP), which stated that the planning system was ‘broken’, ‘inefficient’ 
and ‘adversarial’. OSP provided the intellectual foundations for the 2012 NPPF by making the case that:  
 
“The planning system is vital for a strong economy, for an attractive and sustainable environment, and for 
a successful democracy. At present, the planning system in England achieves none of these goals. It is 
broken…To establish a successful democracy, we need participation and social engagement. But our 
present planning system is almost wholly negative and adversarial. It creates bureaucratic barriers 
rather than enabling communities to formulate a positive vision of their future development. Many local 
politicians and council officers have tried to make the current system work, but as power over planning 
has been taken away by Labour from locally elected representatives and given to bureaucrats in 
Whitehall and in regional government, so the mistrust of the planning system has grown along with an 
increase in protest and in the use of judicial review…Given the scale of the problems we face, piecemeal 
reform of the planning system is simply not an adequate response. Only a radical reboot is going to deliver 
the planning system that we need to succeed in the years to come” (2009, p.1, emphasis added). 
 
For the Conservative Party, OSP successfully ‘problematized’ the existing centralised and regional 
planning approach developed under the New Labour Governments 1997-2010 and paved the way to 
present ‘the solution’ through their own reform agenda that took the form of the NPPF and localism. 
The government’s view on the main problems was outlined in the 2012 Planning Reform policy paper:      
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‘Sometimes planning decisions can take too long. This can slow down or prevent people building new 
homes, creating new places and bringing disused or neglected land and buildings back into productive 
use. We need to ensure that the planning rules or poorly managed planning processes do not 
unnecessarily prevent or delay development. We want to simplify planning approval processes and make 
our policies and guidance simpler and easier to follow’ (DCLG, 2012, p.1).      
 
This political motivation to ‘speed-up’ planning decisions to more effectively facilitate development 
took on the language of ‘streamlining’ and ‘simplifying’ the planning system. Based on the definitions 
of the words streamline to ‘make (an organization or system) more efficient and effective by employing 
faster or simpler working methods’ and simplify as to ‘make (something) simpler or easier to do or 
understand’; the intended objectives of the NPPF was to make the planning system both faster and 
more accessible by reducing and consolidating the numerous existing ‘thousands of pages’ of national 
planning policy statements and guidance into a concise guiding framework comprised of 50 pages.  
 
A more detailed account and insight into the Conservative Party political discourses behind the need 
for planning reform in the UK can be seen in a joint article published in September 2011 by then 
Chancellor George Osborne and Communities and Local Government Secretary of State Eric Pickles:   
 
“Planning reform is key to our economic recovery...sticking with the old, failed planning system puts 
at risk young people’s future prosperity and quality of life. No one should underestimate our 
determination to win this battle…Since the planning system was established in 1947, it has grown 
inexorably more complicated. Between 2005 and 2010, Whitehall issued some 3,250 pages of 
guidance. As central prescription has burgeoned, the process has become more and more 
wasteful…Today, planning delays cost the economy £3bn a year…In a global economy, where skills 
and capital are more mobile than ever, our planning system is a deterrent to international 
investment, and a barrier to the expansion of home-grown enterprise. When planning acts as a 
brake on growth, and on the much needed new jobs and new businesses, reform is imperative. 
Current policy runs to thousands of pages, much written in technical detail. There is nothing 
democratic about a system that makes it virtually impossible for communities to understand how 
important decisions are made…Reforming a slow and inefficient planning system will be good news 
for the small business looking to expand; for the young family hoping for more affordable house 
prices; and for the community wanting to decide on their own future. This is our opportunity to 
unlock the new investment and new jobs the country needs. We cannot afford to miss it” (Pickles 
and Osborne, 2011, no page, emphasis added).     
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This article demonstrates the emerging government policy thinking behind the reforms that eventually 
translated into the NPPF (2012) and Localism Act (2011) during this period. However, the twin political 
and national policy aims to both simply planning decision-making to support (economic) development 
and empower local communities to become more involved in planning processes soon created evident 
practical tensions between different planning stakeholders. In practice the pro-development and 
housing policies in the NPPF sit uneasily with the political narrative of localism, leading to new critical 
debates over how, where and by whom power is mobilised within and through the planning system, 
themes that are returned to later. The next section focuses specifically on the NPPF as national policy.   
 
1.3.1 The National Planning Policy Framework (2012) 
 
The purpose of this part is to familiarise the reader with some of the key policy provisions in the NPPF. 
There is less academic literature specific to the NPPF (compared to broader agendas such as localism) 
and so this part is necessarily closer to a brief ‘policy review’ than a critical discussion at this stage.    
 
In the ministerial forward to the adopted 2012 National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), the then 
Minister for Planning Greg Clark subsequently confirmed the government’s position that the ‘purpose 
of planning is to help achieve sustainable development’ (p.i). This meant that the ‘golden thread’ 
running through all planning policy and decision-making activity should be a ‘presumption in favour of 
sustainable development’. Clark further explains the government’s expectation that “Development that 
is sustainable should go ahead, without delay – a presumption in favour of sustainable development 
that is the basis for every plan, and every decision” (p.i). Paragraph 14 (p. 4) outlines the national policy 
requirements to meet this (henceforth) ‘presumption’ as the purpose of planning in England.  
 
NPPF paragraphs 13 and 15 respectively clarify what this presumption means for planning practice: ‘The 
National Planning Policy Framework constitutes guidance for local planning authorities and decision-
takers both in drawing up plans and as a material consideration in determining applications’; and that 
‘Policies in Local Plans should follow the approach of the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development so that it is clear that development which is sustainable can be approved without delay. 
All plans should be based upon and reflect the presumption in favour of sustainable development, with 
clear policies that will guide how the presumption should be applied locally’ (DCLG, 2012, p.3-4).   
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The rationale behind the presumption is a desire to speed-up the planning system by ensuring that 
decisions are ‘positive’ so that sustainable development can be ‘approved without delay’. However, a 
joint article by Pickles and Osborne (2011) explains the need to balance growth and conservation 
through the presumption, addressing one of the core ideological sticking points in Conservative politics:  
 
“The aim of a National Planning Policy Framework is simple. The draft brings together the policy and 
principles that guide decisions about how our country should grow. It reduces policy from more than 
1,000 pages to under 100, and will pave the way for swifter, clearer decisions. In recent years, planning 
has come to be seen as a tool to say ‘no’ to growth; as a means to delay and block. This government will 
change that. Instead of stopping development, we want to support the right development. At the heart 
of the framework is a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’. This means the answers to 
proposals for responsible, careful growth should be ‘yes’, unless there are strong reasons to the 
contrary…The idea that presumption in favour means that growth will be able to take place wherever, 
whenever and however is false. Protections for the green belt, for National Parks and Areas of 
Outstanding National Beauty continue. The framework insists on high environmental standards and 
good design. Poorly-designed and poorly-located development is in no-one’s interest” (emphasis added). 
 
In terms of national policy reforms with regard to housing, the NPPF Section 6 outlines the national 
policy approach to ‘delivery, choice and quality’. Most significant is paragraph 47, which explains the 
national requirements on LPAs to ‘boost significantly the supply of housing’. It outlines that LPAs should 
‘use their evidence base to ensure that their Local Plan1 meets the full, objectively assessed needs for 
market and affordable housing in the housing market area’, as well as ‘identifying key sites which are 
critical to the delivery of the housing strategy over the plan period’. Further LPAs must ‘identify and 
update annually a supply of specific deliverable sites sufficient to provide five years worth of housing 
against their housing requirements with an additional buffer of 5% (moved forward from later in the 
plan period) to ensure choice and competition in the market for land’ (DCLG, 2012, p. 12-14).  
 
Furthermore, for market and affordable housing, LPAs need to ‘illustrate the expected rate of housing 
delivery through a housing trajectory for the plan period and set out a housing implementation strategy 
for the full range of housing describing how they will maintain delivery of a five-year supply of housing 
land to meet their housing target’ (ibid). An additional footnote explains that to be considered 
                                                          
1 Local Plan – ‘A plan for the future development of a local area, drawn up by the local planning authority in 
consultation with the community. In law this is described as the development plan documents adopted under the 
Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. A local plan can consist of either strategic or non-strategic policies, 
or a combination of the two’ (NPPF, 2012, p.68). 
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‘deliverable’, sites need to be available and offer a suitable location for development now, with a 
‘realistic prospect’ that the housing will be delivered on the site within five years, and that the particular 
site is ‘viable’ for development. The sum of these national policy requirements outlined in paragraph 
47 are referred to as ‘five-year land supply’ (5YLS) and ‘objectively assessed needs’ (OAN) for shorthand.   
 
These policy details will be important context for the subsequent analysis of the empirical data; but 
suffice to say now that this effectively ‘localised’ responsibility for housing targets and delivery to LPAs. 
National policy reform to place emphasis on ‘viability’ presents one of the most significant changes 
because it effectively brought developer profits into the frame of planning policy, meaning that local 
policy-compliant planning obligation was now open to negotiation on a site-by-site basis. The elevation 
of the status of development viability considerations within national planning policy and associated 
responsibilisation of local councils to ensure ‘viable’ development marks the strengthening of the 
economic dimension of sustainable development and planning deregulation under the Cameron era.  
 
In terms of the more general context, the NPPF seeks to direct growth and development into existing 
urban city and town centres, specifically maintaining ‘sequential test’ policy (Paragraph 24), with LPAs 
and local plans being required to ‘recognise town centres as the heart of their communities and pursue 
policies to support their viability and vitality’ (Paragraph 23). This focus on promoting the vitality of core 
urban areas is balanced by requirements to protect Green Belt and high-grade natural environments, 
as well as conserving key heritage sites. On this point, paragraph 115 explains that ‘Great weight should 
be given to conserving landscape and scenic beauty in National Parks, the Broads and Areas of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty, which have the highest status of protection in relation to landscape and 
scenic beauty’. Furthermore, to promote sustainable development in rural areas, ‘housing should be 
located where it will enhance or maintain the vitality of rural communities’ and LPAs ‘should avoid new 
isolated homes in the countryside unless there are special circumstances’ (Paragraph 55). However, 
other national policy deregulation such as permitted development often jarred against these objectives. 
 
In this respect, the core principles of the NPPF effectively seek to promote and increase development 
where it is already happening, or has happened historically, and to protect natural areas where 
development has not happened and would cause harm to the existing landscape. Other developments 
that do not fall into these existing urban or environmental and heritage conservation areas effectively 
became ‘negotiable’ with regards to planning permission; so long as it can be demonstrably shown it is 
a ‘sustainable development’ that can meet material concerns for design, transport, flood risk, climate 
change and pollution outlined in the ‘core planning principles’ (Paragraph, 17) then it was acceptable.      
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Crucially, section 1 of the NPPF is concerned with building ‘a strong, competitive economy’. It explains 
that ‘[t]he Government is committed to ensuring that the planning system does everything it can to 
support sustainable economic growth. Planning should operate to encourage and not act as an 
impediment to sustainable growth. Therefore significant weight should be placed on the need to support 
economic growth through the planning system” (Paragraph 19). As such, LPAs should plan ‘positively’ 
and ‘proactively’ to meet the development needs of businesses and support ‘an economy fit for the 21st 
century’. Essentially fostering a positive, responsive and flexible approach to development is the key 
political objective of the NPPF as national planning policy. These government rationales and policies for 
planning will subsequently be compared to SP experiences and responses (herein E&Rs) to the reforms.     
 
The understanding of the planning system as an excessive regulatory barrier to development, outlined 
in Open Source Planning (2009), is addressed in the NPPF through the requirements that ‘Investment 
in business should not be over-burdened by the combined requirements of planning policy expectations’. 
To this end, ‘Planning policies should recognise and seek to address potential barriers to investment, 
including a poor environment or any lack of infrastructure, services or housing’, and be ‘flexible enough 
to accommodate needs not anticipated in the plan and to allow a rapid response to changes in economic 
circumstances’ (Paragraph 21). These changes attempted to link planning more closely to the business 
cycle/markets than previous national policy, particularly through an emphasis on development viability. 
 
In summary, the NPPF marked a return to a neoliberal ‘roll-back’ deregulatory approach to national 
planning policy than the previous ‘roll-out’ regional and spatial planning approach under New Labour 
1997-2010. The NPPF simply aims to set out the more abstract core objectives of the planning system 
in the form of a simplified and flexible aspatial framework. The NPPF policy objectives for economic 
development and conservation had the potential to clash, however, with the parallel national localism 
agenda that claimed to make planning more participatory through ‘empowering’ local communities. 
The actual links between the NPPF and localism as simultaneously developed and implemented national 
policy agendas are somewhat complex and messy; however, both had the broad aims to simplify and 
rescale planning activity and to promote economic growth with an emphasis on housing. It should be 
noted that unlike the NPPF, the Coalition localism agenda was a policy applied more widely to the public 
and voluntary sectors than to just the planning system; however, the 2011 Localism Act was specifically 
couched in statutory planning. The next section moves on to examine the reforms towards ‘localism’. 
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1.3.2 The Localism Act (2011) 
 
On coming to power in May 2010, the Coalition Government began to craft and implement their ‘Big 
Society’ (herein BS) and ‘localism’ policy agendas that they claimed formed the heart of their governing 
philosophy. The history and development of these political concepts is long in the UK, and this section 
cannot do justice to the numerous contributions and nuanced interpretations that have led to the 
particular brand of Coalition BS and localism developed post-2010 (although see Ishkanian and Szreter, 
2012, for an introduction to the 'Big Society Debate' as a new agenda for social welfare). It is enough to 
state that the development of the Coalition’s BS agenda paved the foundations to craft their position 
on ‘localism’; so whilst the research focus here is not on the BS per se, it does provide a significant 
antecedent context/position for examining the developing forms of state-market-citizen relations and 
state restructuring in the UK post 2010 under the auspices of localism (and later ‘devolution’ agenda).      
 
A growing political undercurrent for ‘decentralisation’ as a means to address the historically centralised 
settlement of the UK governmental architecture had been developing on the political left and right for 
at least the last three decades in its contemporary guise and within political debates. This support for 
decentralisation from the political right is potentially explained by the close links between neoliberal 
ideology and forms of ‘localism’ (discussed in Chapter 2) that values the market, civil society and 
community groups as the building blocks of effective governance over state institutions; as well as 
drawing on the traditional Conservative philosophy of Edmund Burke and the “little platoons” of family, 
church, and local community that make up our individual experiences of ‘society’ and provide the 
foundations for their ‘best life’. Whilst on the political left support for decentralisation potentially 
developed from concerns over equitable representation aligned with traditions of democratic socialism. 
Notwithstanding these different political traditions and philosophical positions behind appeals to 
‘localism’, the main point here is that it had gained cross-party support as a governing agenda by 2010.  
 
There were also other more pragmatic and specific reasons that the Cameron-led Conservative Party 
from 2005-2016 sought to adopt a related ‘Big Society’ narrative. Just after the Conservative Party had 
suffered their third consecutive General Election loss to the New Labour Party (1997, 2001 and 2005), 
MP Theresa May argued that the UK population had come to view them as the “nasty party” and that 
they would have to change this image to win the next election. At this time in 2005 David Cameron was 
elected as leader of the Conservative Party, and he sought to develop his form of more traditional 
‘compassionate conservative’ as a means to remove this negative image and reconnect with the UK 
electorate. This was a difficult task because, following the Conservative Governments 1979-1997, 
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‘[e]conomic liberalism has permeated the Conservative Party to such an extent that it has undermined 
the core values of Conservatism. Thatcherism was an essentially free-market creed which destroyed 
respect for the past and created a society in which no one could be sure of their place’ (Evans, 2008, 
p.291). The main point is that whilst Cameron considered himself a ‘Thatcherite’, he needed to pursue 
(at least the image of) a social reform agenda that could return to traditional Conservative values. Thus 
the development of the BS agenda satisfied both Cameron’s need for a free-market neoliberal political 
economy (see Corbett and Walker, 2013) and reformed social image valuing Conservative traditions of 
‘family, church and community’ (for more on this see Dorey, 2007, Buckler and Dolowitz, 2012).   
 
Indeed, Jacobs (2015) argues that whilst the majority of critical scholarship on the Big Society that views 
it as a rationale to legitimize both a reconfiguration of the welfare state and an austerity programme 
to reduce government debt are helpful interpretations, these accounts only partly provide an 
explanation for the appeal of ideological agendas such as the BS to politicians and political parties. He 
argues that whilst BS is part of the rationale for austerity and welfare reform (as well as localism), it also 
provides ‘a discursive setting for politicians to address societal anxieties by offering a navigable route 
for the future’; one whereby ‘[a]lthough the Big Society agenda has been roundly derided, its Manichean 
morality tale offers assurance at a time when politics is being reshaped by neoliberal ideology, changing 
media practices and globalization processes’ (p. 25). In this interpretation, BS is also a governing 
strategy that is ‘conveying authority in an era of uncertainty’, and especially following the 2008 GFC. 
 
Having very briefly touched upon the antecedent conditions that led to the specific adoption, 
development and implementation of the compassionate conservatism/BS agenda by Cameron from 
2005 onwards, the remainder of this section focusses specifically on the actual practices of the post-
2010 localism agenda and statutory 2011 Localism Act by the Coalition (for more on the Conservative 
Party and the Big Society see Ellison, 2011). Importantly, whilst the BS agenda was quickly discredited 
within UK political and public discourse, and largely fell out of use by the end of 2013, the related 
localism agenda remained a core policy throughout and beyond the Cameron Governments 2010-2016.   
 
It is also worth noting that towards the second half of the Cameron-led Governments (circa 2014-16), 
the localism policy agenda began to expand from its initial focus on communities and neighbourhood 
governance in line with BS thinking, towards a broader one of English devolution to core city/regions 
and administrative economic areas in the form of newly developed combined authorities. These sub-
regional core economic areas could negotiate bespoke agreements with the government for greater 
local funding and decision-making autonomy across a number of policy areas (including housing, 
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infrastructure, transport, health, education, etc.) in the form of ‘devolution deals’. This ‘devolution 
agenda’ built on the groundwork of the immediate Coalition policy shift from a regional to a neoliberal 
localist economic strategy post 2010 that prioritised ‘natural’ market geographies, termed Functional 
Economic Areas (FEAs), through Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). Similar to the BS, whilst the 
devolution agenda also does not form a core focus in this research per se, it still provides necessary 
context for understanding the changing policy landscape under the developing ‘community/council’ 
and ‘economic/sub-national’ localism agendas implemented during this period. This project therefore 
makes the distinction between the development of parallel and emerging ‘community’ and ‘economic’ 
localisms under the Cameron-led governments (which together form the focus of analysis Sections 4.2). 
 
1.3.3 Coalition ‘Community’ Localism  
 
Post-2010, the Coalition’s ‘localism’ agenda, enshrined in policy through the 2011 Localism Act, was 
pursued simultaneously alongside the NPPF; but it had a number of subtly different political purposes 
and objectives. One of the long-standing challenges to the speed of the planning system in England, 
and therefore to development, is community resistance. As such, the promise of localism was intended 
to empower local communities to take greater ownership over development within their localities, as 
a potential means to stem some of the local political resistance around development (Bradley, 2015).     
 
Despite the localism agenda being claimed as a ‘radical reform’ of local empowerment that broke with 
previous centralised approaches, pressures for wider community participation in planning have been 
steadily building in England since the 1969 Skeffington Report. This context of increasing calls for forms 
of community governance framed the background for both the previous New Labour’s ‘New Localism’ 
(Stoker, 2004, Lodge and Muir, 2010) and the latest iteration of localism developed by the Coalition 
Government (Painter et al., 2011, Evans et al., 2013, Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). More critically, 
however, localism as a policy supported the Conservative politics of deregulation and a smaller ‘smarter 
state’ (Lowndes and Gardner, 2016) in favour of the private sector, third sector voluntary organisations 
and local communities. Localism had the additional advantage of distinguishing the Coalition politically 
from the top-down ‘centralised’ and ‘bureaucratic’ approach of New Labour that they ‘problematised’.    
 
Some of the main provisions in the Localism Act need to be briefly outlined here to set the context for 
the subsequent analysis of ‘localism in practice’ (Section 4.2). The most important of these here is the 
flagship policy of the Localism Act 2011 that granted legal provision for neighbourhood planning:   
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“Neighbourhood planning will allow communities, both residents, employees and business, to 
come together through a local parish council or neighbourhood forum and say where they think 
new houses, businesses and shops should go – and what they should look like. These plans can be 
very simple and concise, or go into considerable detail where people want. Local communities will 
be able to use neighbourhood planning to grant full or outline planning permission in areas where 
they most want to see new homes and businesses, making it easier and quicker for development 
to go ahead. Provided a neighbourhood development plan or order is in line with national planning 
policy, with the strategic vision for the wider area set by the local authority, and with other legal 
requirements, local people will be able to vote on it in a referendum. If the plan is approved by a 
majority of those who vote, then the local authority will bring it into force” (Plain English Guide to 
the Localism Act, 2011, p. 12). 
 
The rationale for neighbourhood planning was expressed as “Instead of local people being told what to 
do, the Government thinks that local communities should have genuine opportunities to influence the 
future of the places where they live…This will help people take advantage of the opportunity to exercise 
influence over decisions that make a big difference to their lives” (ibid, p.12, emphasis). The subtle but 
important wording is ‘opportunity’ and ‘influence’, which contrasts with strong government rhetoric 
and neighbourhood planning group’s beliefs in the power of their plans when developed in practice. 
 
Neighbourhood planning created the potential for conflict, because the Localism Act represented the 
first time local communities had been provided with statutory rights in the planning process. Previously 
local communities could make ‘parish’ or ‘community’ plans to address local issues, although these 
could be largely ignored by councils and developers (Gallent and Robinson, 2012). Now LPAs had to 
manage the new dual opportunities and pressures to negotiate an ill-defined ‘duty to support’ and  
guide their communities through localism and adopt a pro-growth and housing position to comply with 
the NPPF (these issues are discussed in the analysis and formed key practice challenges for planners). 
 
It is also important for this section to outline the provisions the Localism Act made for local government 
more generally (RQ2). In terms of ‘empowering’ councils, the 2010 Green Paper on Decentralisation 
‘Control Shift’ made provisions for LAs to enact a ‘General Power of Competence’ for activities previously 
deemed ultra vires (‘beyond one's legal power or authority’):  
 
“We will therefore introduce a new general power of competence which gives local authorities an 
explicit freedom to act in the best interests of their voters, unhindered by the absence of specific 
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legislation supporting their actions. No action – except raising taxes, which requires specific 
parliamentary approval – will any longer be ‘beyond the powers’ of local government in England, 
unless the local authority is prevented from taking that action by the common law, specific 
legislation or statutory guidance. We will give the general power of competence real meaning by 
allowing councils specifically to: • carry out any lawful activity; • undertake any lawful works; • 
operate any lawful business; and • enter into any lawful transaction” (Conservative party, 2010, 
p.14, emphasis added).   
 
The Plain English Guide to the Localism Act (2011) further expresses the government rationale that the 
general power of competence is intended to promote cost savings and innovation in council services:  
 
“Local authorities’ powers and responsibilities are defined by legislation. In simple terms, they can only 
do what the law says they can. Sometimes councils are wary of doing something new - even if they think 
it might be a good idea - because they are not sure whether they are allowed to in law, and are 
concerned about the possibility of being challenged in the courts. The Government has turned this 
assumption upside down. Instead of being able to act only where the law says they can, local authorities 
will be freed to do anything - provided they do not break other laws…The new, general power gives 
councils more freedom to work together with others in new ways to drive down costs. It gives them 
increased confidence to do creative, innovative things to meet local people’s needs” (p. 4). 
 
It is worth noting that the Localism Act also legislated for three ‘Community Rights’ (See the Community 
Right to Challenge, Community Right to Bid and Community Right to Build); however, these have not 
been outlined here because they were not a research focus for the data collection or analysis in this 
study. The next section moves on to outline the interrelated and developing ‘economic’ localism agenda. 
 
1.3.4 Coalition ‘Economic’ Localism  
 
Localism also represented a new scalar approach to economic policy. The Coalition Government set out 
the basis for their economic strategy in the 2010 White Paper ‘Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s 
Potential’. In the ministerial forward, then Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg explained the need for the 
geographical and sectoral rebalancing of the UK economy, and moving away from reliance on the state 
and public sector for employment towards more sustainable private sector investment, employment 
and growth. This ‘new’ kind of growth would allow the whole country to thrive through realising their 
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potential, which was apparently stifled by centralised government but will flourish under localism. In 
terms of planning practice, this approach effectively reemphasised its economic development function. 
 
The key government message was that localism means local leaders need to take ownership over the 
future economic development in their localities through developing their own solutions in partnership 
with businesses, rather than relying on the government for support or to tell them what they need to 
do. This governing approach stands in stark contrast to the centralised hierarchical, interventionist and 
performance-based approach taken by New Labour 1997-2010, particularly for local government and 
planning (these issues will be further discussed in relation to the empirical data in Analysis Chapter 4):     
 
“[P]aying down the deficit is only part of the story. We must also create the conditions that will 
help business and get the economy growing. As we do, there is an important question we must 
ask ourselves: what kind of growth is it we want? Governments of the past have contented 
themselves with growth concentrated heavily in some areas of the country but not others, and 
within a limited number of sectors…Our ambition is to foster prosperity in all parts of the country, 
harnessing the great potential across the range of industries in the UK…we must rebalance our 
economy, ensuring that growth is spread and prosperity shared...We are creating local enterprise 
partnerships to bring together business and civic leaders to set the strategy and take the decisions 
that will allow their area to prosper. These partnerships will be equipped to promote private sector 
growth and create jobs locally…we are also investing in a £1.4 billion Regional Growth Fund over 
the next three years, which will help areas which depend too heavily on the public sector for jobs, 
helping create more sustainable private sector employment. This Fund…will help generate new 
opportunities in these parts of the country…Our aim is powerful local communities, working with 
government, allowing the whole country to thrive. That begins with a new kind of growth: one that 
benefits us all” (Clegg, 2010, p. 3, emphasis added). 
 
In a speech to the Local Government Summit in January 2012, Eric Pickles further outlined what the 
government expect from local councils and businesses under localism, and how the new Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) fit into and can deliver this agenda for renewed and long-term growth:     
 
“There is no greater responsibility, no higher priority for this Government than to get the nation 
back on track towards renewed, long-term, sustainable growth…Now in the past, supporting 
growth might have been seen as a job for the Treasury and Business Department. But we simply 
don’t have that luxury today…Not least because localism and growth are two sides of the same coin. 
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You can’t engineer, can’t manufacture growth through nationally-dictated plans and blueprints. 
However well-meaning, however expertly devised, Regional Development Agencies simply didn’t 
deliver…Instead of trying to impose growth from Whitehall, we want to encourage and celebrate 
local leadership, ingenuity, and enterprise. Instead of the public sector going solo, we want to get 
councils and entrepreneurs working together…Local Enterprise Partnerships put civic leaders and 
local entrepreneurs in the driving seat as never before…This means making tough decisions and 
putting the cash where it can make the biggest difference – not where it’s most expedient, or will 
appease the most people…To a great extent, what happens in your area next is in your hands. 
We’ve binned the guidance, the strictures, the blueprints. As local leaders – whether in business 
or the Town Hall – for the first time in decades – you’ve got a clear run. Your communities are 
looking to you to lead. To shape the future of your local economies…Above all, there is no point 
clinging to the old levers and approaches. The world has changed. Nobody’s going to try and force 
a solution on you. Nobody’s going to stop you pursuing your own” (emphasis).      
 
This section has presented a very brief and necessarily selective account of the rationales, contexts and 
policy details for the major planning reforms of the NPPF and Localism (Act) that have shaped planning 
practices post-2010. The purpose has been to both familiarise the reader and to set up the thesis. 
 
Overall this thesis is comprised of six main chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the research project, 
context, overall argument and conceptual framework (neoliberal structure-agency). Chapter 2 presents 
a thematic literature review on neoliberalism, austerity and planning reform. Chapter 3 discusses the 
methodology and research design used to collect and analyse the empirical data that underpins the 
analysis (comprised of 40 semi-structured interviews with LG planning managers (henceforth PMs) 
from a range of rural-urban and regional contexts across England). Chapters 4 and 5 present an analysis 
of the empirical data on national planning reforms and austerity for council planning and planners 
respectively. Chapter 6 summarises the research findings, limitations and the future research agendas.  
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Chapter 2 - Framing Theory and Applied Literature Review  
 
This theory and literature review chapter is divided into five thematic sections that individually and 
collectively develop the overall ‘theoretical framework’ and outline the analytical concepts used as the 
lens to interpret the empirical data presented in the subsequent analysis (Chapters 4 and 5). The first 
section discusses neoliberal structures and planning agency in relation to austerity localism to set up 
the overarching conceptual focus of the research. The second section draws on governmentality theory 
to discuss government programmes of reform as governing attempts to shape individual conduct and 
regimes of practice. The third section addresses theory on power and politics in relation to planning 
through depoliticisation and post-political theory. The fourth and fifth sections present the ‘applied’ 
literatures on neoliberalism and austerity governance and planning reform respectively, as well as some 
of the main arguments. Together each of the thematic section present the framework (see Table 4).   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw on the relevant theories and literatures that can help ‘frame’ this 
research project and outline how they can be applied to provide insights to this study. Some of the 
theories discussed here are ‘high-level’ abstractions that seek to explain broad phenomenon in the 
social sciences and others can be considered more ‘applied’ literatures on specific planning issues and 
cases. The reviews on neoliberalism and structure-agency, governmentality and post-political theories 
respectively (Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3) are intended to provide a more complex theoretical basis for 
understanding the changes to planning practices post-2010. Whilst the later reviews on neoliberal 
austerity governance and neoliberal planning reforms respectively (Sections 2.4. and 2.5) present a 
more mid-level and applied theory more specific to planning and local government to understand these 
issues. It has obviously not been possible to provide a comprehensive account for each of these theories 
and related literatures here but rather a thematic review of each is presented to inform the analysis.  
 
It is not argued that these theories necessarily fit well together (or with subsequent empirical data), nor 
that other explanatory frames could not have been equally applied to this type of study. Researchers 
from similar or different professional and disciplinary backgrounds may have likely chosen a different 
framework, but these resonated with the researcher’s understanding and interpretations of the 
literature, empirical data and current practice landscape (the researcher’s positionality/world view and 
the challenges in operationalising high-level theory are further discussed in the methodology chapter). 
And whilst each of these theories are not sufficient on their own to explain the numerous and complex 
changes to the planning system and planners under the Cameron Governments 2010-2016, collectively 
they can provide a framework and the various conceptual tools to develop analytical explanations here. 
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These explanatory theories and literatures can help to explain the different findings and complex 
influences that planning policy and austerity reforms are having on LPAs and planning managers. The 
rationale for this hybrid approach, which applies a selective rather than wholesale approach to theory, 
is based on the conviction that ‘there is no one planning theory that we can assimilate and take into 
practice. Instead, there are a range of competing ideas and theories that will, to greater or lesser degrees, 
correspond to our values and views of the world’ (Allmendinger, 2017, p. 27). These theories provide 
insights for understanding reforms but are not sufficient on their own to explain the empirical data and 
changes to planning. They are useful here in so much as they can shine a different light on the rationales 
and outcomes of neoliberal programmes of reform that attempt to rearticulate the role of public 
planners in England post-2010. The next few paragraphs takes each of these explanatory theory in turn.   
 
Neoliberalism is conceptualised here as a dominant ‘thought collective’ (Dean, 2014) influencing 
advanced political economies across the globe as an art of government, but variegated, context-specific, 
emergent and experimental in its policies and practices (Peck, 2010). It is not argued to be a strategic 
and coherent hegemonic structure, seamlessly implemented by elites, but a structural theory that can 
explain the broader trajectories and rationales behind UK state-market restructuring processes. More 
specifically, it conceptualises neoliberal ideology as a technology for governing the population through 
the instillation of the economic logics of markets, competition, efficiency, managerialism, consumer 
choice, financial autonomy, individual responsibility and risk, entrepreneurialism, and the promotion of 
self-governing subjects to meet these ends. Whilst neoliberal theory on its own cannot explain the 
competing rationales and complex processes within national and local politics in specific concrete cases, 
it can provide the background to broader changes to planning that unfold within and across local spaces.       
 
Governmentality theory is used to examine individual ‘conduct of conduct’ and the tensions between 
freedom of action and the manipulation of behaviour through powerful discourses that normalise the 
dominant logics of institutions and societies through the art of governing. It is useful for conceptualising 
a more fine-grained analysis of agency, and the governing forces that seek to shape what constitutes 
‘rational’ action for certain individuals, social groups and institutions. The rational conduct expected of 
planners by the government can be evaluated through their policy reforms/agendas targeted at 
efficiency, performance, participation and growth that together form the wider ‘regimes of practice’.     
 
Post-political theories highlight how the political can be bypassed in contemporary planning practices, 
explaining the dissatisfaction that planning is ostensibly more open to participation, but also becoming 
more tightly controlled to support elite/neoliberal agendas. It can provide explanations for broad 
45 
 
strategies aimed at limiting, displacing, deferring or diffusing political debate and opposition (‘dissent’) 
in development processes and within decision-making structures, whilst also claiming democratic 
openness and public consensus. This has strong resonance within the contested nature of local planning 
and development processes and can help defend democracy through challenging ‘consensus’ politics 
and depoliticization; which serves to concentrate decision-making power within powerful elite and 
technocratic stakeholder groups, but whilst claiming to be representative of the broader public interest. 
 
In sum, neoliberal and governmentality theory can provide conceptualisations for power structures and 
their impacts on individual agency; whilst post-political and depoliticisation theorisations can highlight 
the underlying political dimensions behind the competing interests and agendas of stakeholders. That 
is to say, each explanatory theory develops a different analytical lens for evaluating the empirical data.    
 
Table 4 presents the ‘theoretical framework’ developed in this chapter; however, an important caveat 
is that this has been developed primarily as an organising heuristic for the researcher to orientate the 
research approach and as a tool to present the reader with a visual codex for the literature review, 
rather than claiming any theoretical contribution which was not the intention of this template. This also 
applies to Section 2.6 and Figure 7 which are only intended to sketch out the relationship(s) between 
these national reforms and the local government experiences and responses investigated in this project.  
 
Table 4 – Theoretical Framework  
 
Level of 
Theory 
(abstract-
practical): 
Theory / Literature / Discipline Rationale and justification for inclusion in 
research theoretical framework: 
 
 
 
Framing /  
Meta theory 
 
Structure-Agency 
(emphasis on externalised 
structures of policy and austerity 
reforms on internal practices) 
and the Power relations between 
national and local government 
for shaping planning agendas.  
 
 
Overarching theme of planning structures 
that work to shape the experiences and 
responses of planners to reforms at the local 
scale. This leads to power relations between 
those that have the power to set the agenda 
and the autonomy of agents to promote, 
conform or resist their structural settings.  
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Intermediary 
/ Explanatory 
theory 
 
 
 
 
 
Neoliberalism 
 
Governmentality 
 
Post-Politics & Depoliticisation 
 
 
Neoliberal theory provides the structuring 
politics / ideology behind planning reforms 
and broader state restructuring processes. 
Governmentality helps explain relationships 
between structures and agency through 
attempts to govern individual conduct. Post-
politics highlights the circumventing of local 
democracy through political attempts to 
manufacture consensus / displace dissent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applied / 
Concept 
theory 
 
 
 
Austerity Localism 
Austerity Urbanism/Governance 
Austerity Realism 
Progressive Localism 
Empowerment 
Conduct of Conduct  
Regimes of Practice 
Landscapes of Antagonism  
New Public Management  
Sedimentation  
Ideational Power 
Responsibilisation/Risk 
Capacity/Resilience 
Consensus/Dissent  
Depoliticisation 
Growth-Dependent Planning 
Public Interest/Trust 
Statecraft 
 
 
Derived from the higher meta and mid-level 
explanatory theory, these practical applied 
theories and concepts are used as the ‘tools’ 
to evaluate and analyse the empirical data.  
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The theoretical framework has divided the literature review material into the meta ‘framing’ theory, 
the intermediate ‘explanatory’ theory and the ‘applied’ theory based on concepts. The proceeding 
sections move on to further develop the different insights offered by these theories/concepts to both 
frame the project and evaluate and analyse the empirical data. The next section begins this task by 
starting to develop the theoretical (power) relationships between the structures of neoliberalism 
manifest in national reforms and what these means for forms of local planning agency on the ground. 
 
2.1 Neoliberal Structures and Planning Agency: Planning under Austerity Localism   
 
The purpose of this section is to begin to develop the theoretical relationships between (neoliberal) 
power structures and planning agency (professionalism/autonomy) under the conditions of austerity 
localism post-2010 that forms the overarching theme of this thesis. It also develops the main argument 
in this chapter that public planning and planners have increasingly become captured as facilitators of 
neoliberalism in the UK; however, that planners are also part of the fight back against neoliberalisations.    
 
The starting point for this section is the work of Healey and Barrett (1990) arguing for a relational 
structure-agency approach to understanding land and property development processes. In this seminal 
work, agency was broadly understood as the strategies, interests and actions of the various agents 
involved in the development process, including landowners, investors, developers, consultants, public 
planners, politicians and community groups. Whilst structure was understood as the organisation of 
political and economic institutions and activity, and the values around land, property, buildings and 
environments, which frames the decision-making of agents. This work demonstrated how combining 
both structural and agency accounts could uncover more holistic understandings of the development 
process, whereby the development industry is ‘actively involved in its own reconstitution’ whilst at the 
same time ‘being driven to restructure by external pressures’ (p. 90). A structure-agency approach will 
be applied to this research in order to evaluate how public planners negotiate and reconcile the post-
2010 structures of austerity localism with their practices of professional autonomy to enact change(s).     
 
The ‘Strategic-Relational Approach’ developed by Bob Jessop and Colin Hay builds on initial structure-
agency approaches through an attempt to understand ‘the recursive nature of this relationship; that 
particular structures, in a variety of ways, privilege some forms of agency, while agents reflect on the 
nature of the structures confronting them in selecting their courses of action. In addition, agents might 
also examine their own nature and capacities and alter their own identities in the light of their 
understanding of the structural context. In turn, agents can influence structures, but their capacities to 
do so are unequal, given the ‘strategically selective’ nature of structures which operate to reinforce some 
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actions and discourage others’ (Valler et al., 2013, p. 151-2). This acknowledges the crucial role of power; 
more specifically, the power relations explained through structure-agency have clear implications for 
theorising how externalised government reforms are internalised by LG institutions and planning actors.  
 
Dowding (2008) discusses the essential element of the relationship between structure and agency as 
one of role development in system theory accounts as developed by Parsons (1952) in The Social System:  
 
‘Individuals create understandings of their role in society by internalizing standards that they have 
learned by seeing other structured behaviour. The structure has a two-fold ‘binding in’: first, an 
internalizing of the standards of conformity that has instrumental or expressive value to the person and, 
second, through the structuring of the reactions of others to the agent’s conformity with the standards 
expected of his role. Value patterns are thus created by the reactions of people; first, in how they see 
their own roles and, secondly, in how others view that role and how they view the agent’s view of that 
role. The latter also reacts to the agent’s playing of the role through negative and positive sanctions, 
which then modify the agent’s future playing of the role’ (Dowding, 2008, p.27).  
 
Such understandings assist conceptualisations of the role of PMs in internalizing and promulgating the 
‘standards of conformity’ for their planning department and staff under the structural conditions of 
austerity governance. As a structure, austerity reform places new expectations on the roles and ‘role 
development’ of planners to respond to and operate effectively within a new environment; however, 
the agency of PMs and planners also shape how these structures are implemented and potentially 
reworked within specific contexts. In order to evaluate the autonomy of planning agents, however, we 
need to consider conceptualisations of power that mediate their specific ‘acting spaces’ (Grange, 2013). 
This links to the work of Erving Goffman on ‘action spaces’ in the sociology literature (Goffman, 1997).   
 
Morriss (2002) poses the question ‘why do we need concepts of power?’. He conceptualises power in 
the general sense of ‘the capacity to bring about effects’ and presents the threefold answer that we 
want to know the ‘practical’, ‘moral’ and ‘evaluative’ contexts of power. The practical context is the 
capacity of ourselves and others to achieve desired outcomes; the moral context is whom to hold 
responsible for outcomes that affect the interest of others; and the evaluative context, when judging 
social systems, is to what extent they provide their citizens with freedom from the power of others and 
the power to meet their own wants and needs. These practical, moral and evaluative contexts of power 
are useful tools for explaining the different forms of power planners have influence over in practice(s).  
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For Lukes (2005 [1974]), there are three dimensions of power; the first dimension is the power to 
achieve desired goals by prevailing over the opposition of others, the second dimension is imposing a 
desired agenda on others, and the third dimension is ‘influencing their desires, beliefs and judgements 
in ways that work against their interests’. These conceptualisations relate to the ‘subjects’ of power 
(those actors or agents that are subjected to it) and the ‘sources’ of power (those actors or agents who 
have or who exercise power). It is argued here that public planners are both ‘sources’ and ‘subjects’ of 
power; they are not ‘dominated’ or ‘powerless’ in the traditional sense of ‘subjects’ of power, but their 
actions are constrained by powerful interests that exercise power over their policy objectives and 
financial settlement. These conceptualisations of power relate to theories of structure and agency, 
specifically where power is located and how it operates by mediating the relationships between actors. 
 
Much academic work has been dedicated to overcoming the structure-agency divide in social theory, 
particularly the work of Anthony Giddens on ‘duality’ and ‘structuration’ (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 
1984). For Dowding (2008), however, ‘the agency-structure divide is false’, and those disciplines and 
theorists that give more weight to structure over agency and vice versa primarily represent different 
uses of language and emphasis rather than any significant analytical distinction in their approaches. 
Similarly, the conceptual framework developed here does not perceive there to be an agency-structure 
divide in substantive analytical terms; it does not distinguish the structures of neoliberal policy reforms 
from the agency responses of LG PMs. Agents respond in relation to their structural and local contexts, 
but their actions also shape these contexts, as so they are largely symbiotic and mutually co-dependent. 
 
Similarly in the political studies literature, Glynos and Howarth (2008) argue that the ‘the radical 
contingency of social structures and human agency – their structural incompleteness – discloses new 
ways of understanding both their character and their mutual intertwining…an approach developed 
around different sorts of logics – social, political and fantasmatic – goes some way to steering a different 
course between a pure thick descriptivism that focuses principally on individual beliefs and desires on 
the one hand, and a concern with causal laws and mechanisms on the other’ (p.155). This intertwining 
relationship means austerity localism logics can be analysed as structural forces over agency in practice.   
 
The complex relationships between national structures (reforms) and local agency (practices) can be 
viewed through neoliberal theory. Brenner and Theodore (2002) contest pure neoliberal ideology 
claims that market forces will consistently operate according to set laws regardless of where they are 
enacted geographically. Instead they highlight “the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal 
restructuring projects” that are “produced within national, regional, and local contexts defined by the 
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legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political 
struggles”. These factors assist in understanding the production of “actually existing neoliberalism” 
through evaluating “the path–dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited 
regulatory landscapes and emergent neoliberal, market–oriented restructuring projects at a broad 
range of geographical scales”. Each successive wave of neoliberal reform paves the way for the next 
level of restructuring, highlighting “the path-dependent character of neoliberal reform projects” 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p. 349). These ‘neoliberal’ practices did not emerge in the post-2010 UK 
context, rather layers of preceding myriad neoliberal policies and initiatives created the foundations for 
the latest wave of reforms following a series of ideological continuations and breaks since the 1970s. 
 
Brenner et al. (2010) argue that whilst examples of neoliberalism are found all over the world, the actual 
concrete practices and forms of neoliberalism are contingently produced through interaction with the 
specific antecedent political, economic and social conditions, the ‘inherited landscape’. Neoliberalism 
therefore can be understood to constitute a spatially variegated set of contested processes, rather than 
a single coherent project that is aspatial. In this context, Blanco et al. (2014) explain that it is “important 
to guard against totalising explanations that reduce the local to a political strategy of 
neoliberalisation…which impose a false coherence onto emergent and uneven practices across distinct 
economic, political and social contexts” (p. 3135). Therefore, attention must be given to both the 
structural and universal position of neoliberal ideas and practices within global discourses, and the 
context-specific agency found in the localities that neoliberal practices are being produced or contested.  
 
In terms of viewing ‘neoliberalism’ as a structural context, Harvey (2007) outlines the neoliberalisation 
of societies is characterised by reduced restrictions on business operations, extended property rights, 
privatisation, deregulation, the erosion of state-supported economic safety nets, devolution of central 
government, uneven economic development and increasing social polarization and inequality. For 
Harvey (2007), the central contradiction of neoliberalism is that whilst its core objective is to produce 
a minimalist state with society directed by the market economy, this requires complex legal, judicial, 
financial and regulatory state frameworks. Planning is one of these necessary regulatory state 
frameworks. This contradictory reality means that neoliberalism ironically seeks to strip back planning 
systems whilst also relying on them to maintain a state-led neoliberal political economy. This highlights 
the uneasy relationship between state neoliberal ideology and forms of land-use planning regulation.   
 
The context of contemporary neoliberalisation across the western-world has been shaped by the forces 
of economic globalisation and international capital mobility, which prioritises new scales and spaces of 
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competition as capital and business becomes increasingly ‘footloose’ and clustered in key urban nodes 
within the world economy (Harvey, 2007). The basic argument goes that cities that want to attract 
company headquarters, factories or infrastructure capital etc. have to make their bids more attractive 
than the other ambitious cities they are competing with nationally and globally. One way to win this 
contest is to convince private businesses that the local city governance and public managers will play a 
role in the goal of securing revenue and helping to get certain projects implemented as members of 
public-private partnerships, rather than traditional bureaucratic regulatory role in urban development. 
 
According to Harvey (1989), these shifts towards urban entrepreneurial governance is a response to 
extending capitalist forces under globalisation. Sager (2013) builds on this understanding that ‘[u]rban 
entrepreneurialism aims at creating conditions conducive to capital accumulation within a city’s 
boundaries. This means adoption of pro-growth policies and new institutional structures of urban 
governance, expecting local officials to be enterprising, risk-taking, inventive, and profit motivated in 
their entrepreneurial role. The way cities operate is changed towards business-like strategies, alliances 
to achieve urban competitiveness, and public-private partnerships’ (p.132-3). These specific governance 
and policy responses to the pressures of economic globalisation are broadly interrelated with the 
emergence of neoliberal political economies across advanced liberal democracies since the 1970s. 
 
In this context, a ‘neo-liberal policy is one that is promoted by neo-liberal regimes and implies a shift 
from government to (partly) private strategies, or a conversion from publicly planned solutions to 
market-orientated ones, or at least the serving of private companies and their favoured customers’ 
(Sager, 2013, p.129). These policies aim to elevate administrative efficiency, entrepreneurialism, and 
individual economic freedoms over democratic political steering from the state and forms of public 
collectivism. More specifically, Sager (2013, p. 153) highlights the characteristics of neoliberal ideology 
and policies to reform urban planning that most concern critical planning theorists (and practitioners):  
 
• ‘One-dimensional concentration on efficiency and economy in neo-liberal policy 
recommendations.  
• A predilection for private, competitive, and market-orientated solutions to urban problems, 
that is: 
o Search for development strategies that create profitable investment opportunities, 
and organizational frameworks that mimic markets and force actors to compete; 
o Scepticism to year-long participatory processes preparing for political compromises 
rather than economically sound decisions. 
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• Lack of a democratic agenda beyond consultation that elicits information from clients and 
consumers, and widespread privatization that reduces transparency and thus weakens the 
inhabitants in their capacity as well-informed citizens.  
• Indifference to concerns for unequal treatment, exclusion, segregation, and distributional 
questions: Private goals of profitability are given higher priority than social goals of improving 
the living conditions of the economically deprived’. 
 
The key issue is that neoliberal policies therefore extend the privileged position of private business, 
investors and affluent communities whilst disadvantaging and polarising poorer sections of society. 
Furthermore, neoliberal policies will only support environmental protection and mitigation to the 
extent that people are willing to pay for policies with such outcomes. Finally, the increasing private 
sector management and funding of urban development leads to a contraction of the political sphere, 
with private actors less vulnerable to political criticism and citizen lobbying. In contrast to neoliberal 
conceptions of planning, ‘the aim of public planning is to treat people as citizens with political roles, 
rights, and agendas – not only as entrepreneurs and recipients of service’ (Sager, 2013, p. 155).  
 
Critical planning theory resists the capture of planning as only an enabler of development, because such 
a role detracts from the important social and environmental contributions that planners can make to 
their locality (Fainstein, 2010, Rydin, 2013). Fordham (1990) cautioned that the planning system is 
designed to regulate private developers, highlighting the problems with transferring planning functions 
to the private sector through privatisation and out-sourcing strategies as giving planning over to one 
sectoral interest concerned with profit-making. These potential challenges to planning professionalism 
/ practices (agency) are more pronounced under the competitive economic structures of neoliberalism. 
 
Despite the strong links between neoliberal political economies and the structuring contexts of planning 
(discussed later), there are still critical debates surrounding the useful of neoliberal theory to explain 
local contextualised policies and strategies. In the academic literature, theoretical and empirical 
accounts of neoliberalism have been increasingly subject to emerging critiques concerning the 
contested nature, analytical value and explanatory power of the concept (Le Galès, 2016, Storper, 2016). 
 
Among these critiques are concerns with the tendency of neoliberal narratives to over-state the 
strategic coherence of neoliberal projects, whilst underplaying the explanatory capacity or existence of 
alternative political projects (Blanco et al., 2014). Policy attempts at local scale neoliberalisations will 
interact with competing political agendas, such as nationalism and conservatism, which can produce 
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significant local variations that cannot simply be explained through a neoliberal lens. The plurality of 
factors shaping local governance regimes can therefore be overlooked. Such neoliberal meta-narratives 
suffer from an ‘analytical disconnection’ as they move from the macro-level economic, social and 
political drivers of change, to the ‘messiness’ of local urban politics and practices that are crucial for 
explaining micro-level accounts (Blanco et al., 2014). This sets up the challenge of exploring structure 
and agency through local neoliberalisations given the complexity of competing local factors/contexts.   
 
As a result, explanations of neoliberal regimes remain somewhat divorced from broader accounts of 
the local state and urban change. However, the role of the local state in fostering or resisting neoliberal 
strategies is crucial, facilitating or resisting the implementation of neoliberal policy and practices at the 
local scale through situated agency. Indeed, ‘the radical restructuring of the local state and its 
redefinition as a sponsor and agent of enterprise and growth was integral to the success of neoliberal 
programmes from the 1980s onwards, alongside the reconfiguration of local state–society relations 
through the extension of economic ideas and practices into social and cultural relations’ (Blanco et al., 
2014, p. 3131). Neoliberal ‘roll-out’ programmes of reform seek to make the local state an accomplice 
to such reforms, particularly through changing LG from ‘facilitators’ to ‘enablers’ of growth; however, 
by failing to fully engage with these micro-level processes, institutions and actors, structural neoliberal 
accounts remain somewhat detached from ‘actually existing’ neoliberal explanations ‘on the ground’. 
 
Thus the complex interplay between the structural forces of neoliberalisations on the planning system 
through national policy reforms and austerity and the situated agency of LG planners is critical for 
understanding how programmes of reform are implemented, constructed or reworked in space/place.     
 
Similarly, Newman (2014) argues that theories that situate neoliberalism within a governmentality 
framework (discussed in the next section) can present ways to conceptualise LG not simply as the 
subject to dominant top-down forces, but rather themselves being implicated in strategies of 
‘governing at a distance’ and the resignification and re-articulation of neoliberal discourses at the local 
scale. In such cases, the agency of LAs is acknowledged through their role as ‘incubators of new 
possibilities’ that can blend and adapt, or establish alternatives to, neoliberal logics: 
 
“Local governments play an active role in strategies for governing populations by installing ‘economic’ 
logics of calculation (constituted through discourses of markets, efficiency, responsibility, consumer 
choice and individual autonomy) and strategies for promoting ‘self-governing’ subjects. The temptation 
is to see local authorities as the passive victims of global and national forces. Yet local authorities may, 
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through their own policy agendas, be crucial actors in producing, reproducing, reworking and 
reconstituting neoliberalism” (Newman, 2014, p. 3294-5).  
 
Newman (2014, p. 3297) also cautions that “different enactments of neoliberalising projects take place 
in a contradictory field of political forces (‘landscapes of antagonism’) that cannot be reduced to systems 
of party political representation and party-specific ideologies”. Crucially, LAs can mirror the dynamics of 
the state by “seeking to extend their own reach through new governmentalities and forms of expertise 
while seeking to displace the contradictions they face—including those of austerity politics—onto their 
‘partners’ as well as onto local citizens. It is in this sense that local governments can be seen as 
‘mediating’ processes of neoliberalisation” (Newman, 2014, p. 3303). Therefore LAs are not necessarily 
passive or resistant to neoliberalism in any particular circumstance; they can experience and respond 
to reforms in a number of ways based around their own specific ‘landscapes of antagonism’ formed by 
their local politics, economy, partnerships, goals, communities and other local ‘contextual’ factors. 
 
Having discussed some of the relevant high and mid-level theorisations on neoliberal structure-agency, 
it is now worth reviewing some of the more applied empirical studies in the literature that relates most 
closely with this research and demonstrates how local institutions and agents respond to reforms in 
practice; before lastly unpacking what and whom is meant by ‘planning’ activity and ‘planners’ as agents.   
 
Austerity is conceptualised here as a neoliberal government policy structure intended to reformulate 
LG institutions and planning agency. One of the key theoretical positions in the contemporary academic 
literature on austerity post-2008 GFC is the ‘austerity urbanism’ developed by Jamie Peck (2012) in the 
US context. According to Peck, the emergent features of austerity urbanism are leaner local states, 
rollback redux, fire-sale privatisation, placebo dependency, risk-shifting rationalities, tournament 
financing, and austerity governance (2012, p.648-9). Each of these features are interrelated in practice 
as responses to urban governance restructuring; however, the key focus here is ‘austerity governance’:  
 
‘Extended forms of management by audit and ‘rule by accountancy’ will be consolidated, both between 
scales of government and within individual municipalities. Beyond the immediate effects, not to be 
under-estimated, of continuing budgetary shortfalls and intramural struggles over the apportionment 
of cuts, protracted subjection to fiscal stringency will likely become an indirect driver of ongoing 
organizational transformation. This strengthens the hands, internally, of the cadre of fiscal 
disciplinarians, restructuring advocates, change-managers, consulting auditors and local state 
entrepreneurs, whose license to act (decisively) is reinforced by austerity-budgeting Realpolitik. The 
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opponents of this ascendant class of fiscal change-makers, on the other hand, can be maligned and 
marginalized as advocates for special interests, defenders of turf or apologists for the status quo’.  
 
The concepts of ‘austerity urbanism’ and ‘austerity governance’ (Peck, 2012) have formed a strong 
research agenda in the academic literature (Tonkiss, 2013, Mayer, 2013, Davidson and Ward, 2014, 
Tabb, 2014, Di Feliciantonio, 2016, Stanley, 2016) and for evaluating the empirical data in this thesis.  
 
In their study, Davies and Blanco (2017) explored the processes of variegated local neoliberalisation 
through the framework of urban regime theory and austerity urbanism, using a comparative case study 
of six cities in Spain and the UK. They found that in the two UK cases of Cardiff and Leicester, the 
governance strategies operated within the doctrine of ‘austerity realism’, ‘where cuts are implemented 
in a spirit of realpolitik due to statutory constraints and for lack of any perceived political alternative’ (p. 
1524). In contrast, they found many examples of contentious politics and ‘new urban activism’ in Spain, 
which could provide a platform for resistance to austerity and regime formation within local governance 
structures. These remained muted in the UK, explained by the link to the legacies of industrial collapse 
and trade union defeats in the 1980s. According to Davies and Blanco (2017), ‘Cardiff and Leicester had 
stable ‘austerian realist’ regimes, political cultures in which national government sets the rules, no 
mainstream social actor refuses austerity and resistance has little direct impact’ (p. 1529). As such, 
‘austerity realism’ provides another core ‘concept’ theory to evaluate the empirical findings in this study 
and underscore the political context for LAs and planners operating in the UK post-2010.   
 
The city cases in Spain demonstrated that the devolved regional structures and local traditions around 
church-influenced social care and insurgent cooperatives worked to mediate the politics and 
temporality of austerity. Such differences were subtler in the UK context, based on the tempo of cuts 
and the durability of collaborative institutions established previously by New Labour. In the UK cases, it 
was argued that ‘Austerity has been largely interiorised into the logics, assumptions and everyday 
practices of state and non-state actors through the combination of strong central direction, weak 
regionalism, weak contentious politics and the dependency culture of municipality on centre’ (p. 1530). 
These ‘austerity regimes’ were considerably more robust in UK urban governance than in the more 
diverse contexts of Spanish cities. Leading Davies and Blanco (2017) to argue that ‘cities and regions 
are ‘institutional forcefields’ producing convergence, differentiation and hybridisation in patterns of 
austerity urbanism and mediating top-down neoliberalisation in significant ways’ (p. 1530). Such studies 
highlight the importance of contextual factors for shaping local responses and outcomes despite being 
targeted by similar structural neoliberalisation policies through variegated local structures and agency.   
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Similarly, Fuller (2017) adopts a ‘Pragmatist Sociology’ framework to explore the construction and 
deployment of ‘discursive institutions’ under austerity using the case study of an English city council. 
He found that these discursive institutions seek to control the behaviour of actors and reduce internal 
contestation, with the intention of legitimising austerity programmes. From this perspective, austerity 
has been implemented in a cumulative manner reflecting the ongoing deliberation, justification and 
agreement required to generate consensus around the responses necessary to manage cutbacks, which 
become characterised through contestation. Such discursive institutions represent an attempt to shape 
consensus and agency at the local level. In this context, the ‘critical task for senior politicians and 
managers has been to justify austerity measures to the broader council and local population’; whereby 
the ‘main strategic priorities are geared towards economic development and supporting vulnerable 
communities, with service retrenchment judged on their relevance to these priorities’ (2017, p. 753).  
 
This discursive construction of austerity by national government as a necessary task to be undertaken 
across the public sector by management actors was translated into a local narrative that presented 
market values as both as a solution to cuts and more importantly a way forward for the organisation in 
the contemporary age of austerity. In these national and subsequent local reform narratives, change is 
framed as inevitable and couched in positive terms of doing ‘more with less’ by developing strategies 
to make services more ‘commercially viable’ and supporting a ‘business approach’ for the council.   
 
In Fuller’s case study, the council’s corporate plan worked to naturalise austerity in ‘positive terms’ by 
relating the creation of a more efficient organisation to the delivery of beneficial social outcomes. In 
practice, however, the consolidation of corporate strategy production at the very senior council level 
represents ‘congruence to state restructuring through (disparate and uneven) new public management 
practices since the late 1970s, characterised by organisational centralisation and hierarchies through 
the primacy of a managerial culture’ (Fuller, 2017, 756). In achieving these ends, senior management 
have been able to lose their more ‘negative’ staff through cutbacks, and subsequently seek to select or 
employ new managers and officers that have the ‘right values’ to perform under austerity governance.   
 
Fuller argues that this concern for ‘more entrepreneurial officers’ is an important organisational change 
mechanism designed to ‘reorient the long-term culture of the organisation’ (p. 758). Crucially, Fuller 
(2017) highlights the role of ‘senior management to constantly reconfirm austerity institutions’ (p. 759) 
in response to everyday critiques; and concludes that the devolved risk for implementing austerity to 
city governments has led to senior managers and councillors formulating discursive institutions, based 
57 
 
on market and bureaucratic values, which seek to ‘guide the daily practices of officers’ (p. 761). In this 
way, local agents are doing the ‘work’ of neoliberalism by reproducing austerity within local institutions.  
 
Finally, to further develop this neoliberal-structure-planning-agency conceptualisation, the definition 
and scope of what and whom counts as ‘planning’ and ‘planners’, along with the conceptual/normative 
and practical objectives that these activities/agents seek to achieve needs to be briefly discussed.  
 
On the first point, as Campbell et al. (2014) explain, the work of planning and the job title of ‘planner’ 
is not limited to those that hold a professional qualification or membership of the professional body in 
the UK; and that in the academic and professional literature the actual activities of planning can be 
broadly defined as ‘spatial governance’ (Healey, 1997a) and ‘critical thinking about space and place as 
the basis for action or intervention’ (RTPI Education Institute, 2003, para. 4.17) respectively (p.56). This 
means that ‘At its most narrow, planning may be viewed as those statutory tasks undertaken by 
professional planners, at its widest, planning concerns any intervention or action associated with space 
and place and is not restricted to the activities of “planners” but includes policy makers, politicians, as 
well as civil society. Even those engaged in planning disagree as to its scope’ (Campbell et al., 2014, 
p.47). So whilst the specific unit of analysis in this study is LPA planning managers, overall the researcher 
understands ‘planning’ and ‘planners’ in this broader sense as the activities and agents (inter)connected 
to wider processes operating within and between national and local political and civil society spheres. 
 
On the second point, these definitions concerning the scope of planning are more than just academic 
semantics but relate more fundamentally to the professional autonomy and wider role/position of 
planners in development processes and society; because ‘[a] narrow perspective results in much being 
ruled as beyond the remit of planning (and planners), while a broader perspective suggests that little 
differentiates planning from public policy and politics. Linked to this is a continuum of aspiration, moving 
from a limited concern with the maintenance of existing procedures and practices, through to an 
ambition that planning can contribute to wider social transformation’ (Campbell et al., 2014, p.47). The 
autonomy/capacity/ability of planners to enact wider agendas based on their professional training and 
skills, and crucially ethical values, rather than the diktat of structural policy and financial reforms gets 
to the heart of contemporary debates concerning the crisis of ‘trust’ and perceived decision-making 
‘legitimacy’ of planners and the wider planning system (Swain and Tait, 2007, Tait, 2011, Tait, 2012).  
 
These debates on the role of planning/planners and trust in the system are mediated by normative and 
practical concerns over what the objectives of planning should be when there is critical debate over the 
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actual existence and continued relevance of broad notions for planners serving the ‘public interest’ 
(Campbell and Marshall, 2002, Tait, 2016), and particularly what is meant by the term ‘public’: 
 
‘[M]uch of the debate in planning literature on the public interest revolves around the concept of 
interests and particularly the mechanisms by which we might reconcile individual and collective 
interests…[but] it has also tended to downplay the significance of the ‘public’ dimension of the concept. 
What and who is ‘the public’ to which the concept is attached, and to what extent is ‘the public’ a 
universal or delimited group? To what extent can we define a ‘public sphere’ that enables us to conceive 
of a public interest? What does it mean to participate in the public sphere, and how does it shape our 
identity and actions? These are questions that are not asked as frequently with respect to the public 
interest and its legitimating function within planning, yet are clearly crucial’ (Tait, 2016, p.339). 
 
These important theoretical and normative debates aside, the conjecture is made here that planners 
still rationalise their professional role in relation to a broad notion of ‘public interest’ that is a signifier 
of their ethical commitment to society and the environment and made concrete through their local 
practice setting and personalised understanding of what this means for the future of places and people.  
 
This is the planning ‘agency’ that is conceptualised as part of the ‘fightback’ against structural neoliberal 
reforms and ideological politics (Shepherd, 2017) that positions planners as ‘barriers to growth’ and 
serves to ‘deprofessionalise’ their practices through policy deregulations and financial and performance 
controls. On this last point, academics and professional bodies also have an important role to play, 
along with practicing public planners, to demonstrate the wider ‘value’ of planning as an important and 
worthwhile activity that can and does support other sectors in the economy (Adams et al., 2016). 
 
This section has introduced the main argument in this chapter (and theme of the thesis) that planning 
and planners have increasingly become captured as facilitators of neoliberalism in the UK post-1980, 
and that the post-2010 structural context of ‘austerity’ and ‘localism’ has furthered served to make the 
planning system and planners more complicit in achieving neoliberal objectives through these agendas. 
However, it has also shown that neoliberalisations are highly mediated by the local contexts they are 
implemented within, and this is where various attempts at reform can be challenged through the 
professional autonomy of public planners to form part of the fightback against neoliberalisations. The 
next section continues this argument by outlining the potential insights of governmentality theory for 
evaluating ‘programmes of reform’ that seek to change individual ‘conduct’ and ‘regimes of practice’.    
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2.2 Government Programmes of Reform and Individual Conduct: Governmentality Theory 
 
One way to comprehend the relationship between neoliberal structures and planning agency is through 
the lens of Foucauldian ‘governmentality’ theory. Such theories can explain the governing programmes 
and tools used to shape individual conduct, and the potential for free individuals to exercise autonomy.  
 
The purpose of this section is to outline how neoliberal-informed governmentality conceptualisations 
of governing the ‘conduct of conduct’ and ‘regimes of practice’ can be applied to explain the role of 
planning agency in relation to power and structural neoliberal governing ‘programmes of reform’, such 
as localism and austerity. In overview and relevant to this research, a governmentality perspective can 
inform evaluations of how one of the intended recipients of austerity reform, LG PMs, have internalised 
and implemented the externalised neoliberal logics associated with ‘entrepreneurial governance’ 
(Harvey, 1989), ‘New Public Management’ (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994) and ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 
2012) into their agency (conduct of conduct) and departmental practice cultures (regimes of practice). 
 
Foucault’s 1978-9 lectures on ‘the birth of biopolitics’ (Foucault et al., 2008) investigated the (then 
developing) subject of neoliberalism. They presented neoliberalism as not just a doctrine for the 
government of states or economies, but as intimately tied to the governing of the individual towards a 
particular manner of living (Read, 2009). Foucault understands the two forms of ‘classical’ and ‘neo’ 
liberalism as sharing the understanding of man as an ‘economic subject’ as the basis of politics, that of 
‘homo economicus’. In contrast to classical liberalism, Foucault argues that neoliberalism ‘extends the 
process of making economic activity a general matrix of social and political relations, but it takes as its 
focus not exchange but competition’ (Read, 2009, p.27). The shift from exchange that underpins 
classical liberalism to the pre-eminence of competition under neoliberalism marks one key distinction. 
Neoliberal ideology seeks to transform individuals into homo economicus subjects governed by their 
individual interest, investment and competition over the minimal strictures of the collective or legal 
principles of society or the state. Therefore, for Foucault, the term ‘governmentality’ refers to the 
‘ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, 
that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power’ (Rose et al., 2006, p. 86).   
 
Foucauldian governmentality theory explores the specific and complex attempts to exercise power 
through governing strategies and programmes of reform that seek to shape human conduct(s). From 
this perspective, the activity of ‘government’ is conceptualised in broad terms; ‘Government is any more 
or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, 
employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working 
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through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and 
with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes’ (Dean, 2010, p. 18). 
 
A governmentality perspective recognises that ‘a whole variety of authorities govern in different sites’ 
and in ‘relation to different objectives’ rather than seeing any single body, such as the state, responsible 
for managing the conduct of citizens; a perspective that then raises the questions, ‘Who governs what? 
According to what logics? With what techniques? Towards what ends?’ (Rose et al., 2006, p.85). It also 
highlights that understanding how people and society are governed individually and collectively in the 
present requires turning away from grand theories, such as the neoliberal state or globalisation, to 
examine the seemingly normal concrete practices shaping rationalities within advanced liberal societies:  
 
‘[W]e need to investigate the role of the gray sciences, the minor professions, the accountants and 
insurers, the managers and psychologists, in the mundane business of governing everyday economic 
and social life, in the shaping of governable domains and governable persons, in the new forms of power, 
authority, and subjectivity being formed within these mundane practices’ (Rose et al., 2006, p. 101).   
 
A central concept in governmentality theory is the understanding and framing of government activity 
as the ‘conduct of conduct’ (henceforth conduct for shorthand). In essence, governing through means 
of conduct involves various attempts to deliberate on and to direct human conduct through specified 
governing ‘programmes of reform’. It is the attempt to modify how certain actors think, behave and act 
in relation to a given situation or context so that they become ‘self-governing’ agents that are working 
towards desired government objectives. Indeed for Larner (2000, p.6), ‘Neo-liberalism is both a political 
discourse about the nature of rule and a set of practices that facilitate the governing of individuals from 
a distance’. Governmentality theory thus seeks to connect questions of government, politics and 
administration to the human spaces of individual actors, a scale which neoliberal research has been 
criticised for paying insufficient attention; neoliberal governmentality can bridge structure and agency.  
 
Specifically, governmentality theory demonstrates that just as ‘practices of the self’ can be used as 
governing instruments in the pursuit of political, social and economic goals, they also can express the 
autonomy of the ‘ethical self’ which can provide resistance to imposed forms of government. In this 
sense, practices of the self can also take the form of ‘counter-conducts’, whereby agents reject the 
ways in which their conduct is trying to be governed towards enacting a specific rationality. This is why 
attempts at governing conduct will result in relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and 
outcomes. The self is not a passive actor and will have his or her own ethical rationalities and discourses.   
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For example, LG planners may exercise their ‘counter-conduct’ through professional and ethical 
concerns for public interest and sustainable development, which potentially sit uneasily with the forms 
of governmentality attempting to reshape their conduct, such as neoliberal growth agendas. In this 
context, planning for the ‘social is increasingly colonised by the economic criteria of efficiency, 
competition and productivity, and measured by cost-benefit analyses. These criteria have come to define 
the rules of the game and shape the conduct of all conducts' (Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015, p. 87).  
 
The individual attempting to be governed, however, has agency as a ‘locus of freedom’. As free actors 
it is possible for them to think and act in a variety of ways, sometimes in ways unforeseen by those 
trying to govern them. In this sense, the government can only structure the ‘field of possible action’ 
available to free actors as a means to alter their own conduct through ‘self-governing’ practices. 
Therefore, the ability for individuals to exercise freedom and their capacity to think and act is a danger 
to attempts to govern, and hence to powerful actors implementing programmes of reform. In advanced 
liberal democracies, governments have to achieve their ends through democratic process, meaning 
that free actors can decide to think and act in a number of different ways either supporting or rejecting 
dominant governing rationality. The statecraft of governmentality is to convince free actors that their 
interests are aligned or served by the ones elite actors are attempting to implement through reforms.  
 
In the UK, advanced liberal governments must seek to govern their populations through utilising their 
individual freedoms to (re)shape their conduct towards specific rationalities or ends. For LG planners, 
state austerity policy was an attempt to shape their conduct towards self-practices of efficiencies, 
retrenchment and revenue generation to support neoliberal rationalities of self-sufficiency and growth. 
As free actors, planners could still decide to think and act in different ways as a ‘counter conduct’ to 
austerity; however, their ‘field of possible action’ had been tightly structured and circumscribed by the 
government to leave few alternative opportunities to act in other ways. As such, they were only ‘free’ 
to change their conduct accordingly to respond to austerity, they still made the (Hobsons) ‘choice’ but 
their conduct had been governed to those ends. Thus, ‘conduct’ provides a strong framework for 
attempts to evaluate the internalised planning cultures and practice changes in response to austerity.   
 
Governmentality programmes of reform attempt to promote forms of ‘self-government’ through which 
individual agents question and ‘problematize’ their own conduct in relation to a dominant rationality. 
The objective is for individuals to govern themselves through these rationalities, and therefore become 
‘responsibilized’ (Hastings et al., 2015, Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015) for continuing the ‘programmes 
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of reform’ articulated by powerful actors to achieve their desired governing objectives. Planning theory 
highlights that governmentality perspectives can assist explanations of how neoliberal objectives are 
achieved through local practices; ‘Foucauldian governmentality helps focus analytical attention on the 
mechanisms through which neoliberalism guides and shapes the conduct of organisations and 
individuals, such as planners, and the selectivities involved in how they create or draw on a range of 
formal and informal techniques of government’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2014, p. 36).      
 
A further key concept in governmentality theory relevant to this research are ‘regimes of practice’ and 
their related ‘mentalities of government’. Regimes of practice (herein RoP) refer to the organised 
practices through which we are governed and through which we govern ourselves. They involve 
practices for the production of truth and knowledge comprised of multiple forms of practical, technical 
and calculative rationality, and are subject to programmes that attempt to reform the existing RoP. RoP 
can be understood as institutional practices in the form of the routinized and ritualised way actors do 
things in certain places and at certain times; as such they can be considered the organisational or 
practice cultures, discourses, rationalities and norms that govern the actions of individuals within them.   
 
Dean (2010) explains that within any given society there are a large but finite number of intermeshing 
‘regimes of practice’ that involve and link up particular institutions, such as the ‘criminal justice system’, 
‘health system’, ‘social welfare system’ and so on. In this project, the broader RoP investigated is the 
‘planning system’ in England post 2010 as (re)shaped by policy and austerity programmes of reforms. 
Powerful agents acting as ‘government’ seek to ‘problematize’ existing RoP as a means to implement 
programmes for their reform, this has been a common feature of governing the planning system in 
England over the last three decades (Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014, Allmendinger and Haughton, 2013).   
 
As the main objects and agents of the planning system, ‘planners’ are the targets of programmes of 
conduct and regime reform. In this way, planning and planners are invested with ‘multiple programmes 
that employ certain types of knowledge to reform or radically challenge their operation, to reorient them 
to new goals and objectives, and to act upon the desires, aspirations, needs and attributes of the agents 
within them. Regimes of practices, while having a material and institutional locale, exist in the milieu of 
thought, one feature of which is these programmes of the reform of conduct’ (Dean, 2010, p. 32).   
 
The related ‘mentalities of government’ asserts that thinking is a collective activity and emphasises the 
ways in which the thinking involved in practices of government is implicit and embedded in language 
and technical instruments. Such thinking is not readily examined and is relatively taken for granted, that 
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is to say, it is not usually open to question by its practitioners. Here the ‘analysis of government is 
concerned with thought as it becomes linked to and is embedded in technical means for the shaping and 
reshaping of conduct and in practices and institutions. Thus to analyse mentalities of government is to 
analyse thought made practical and technical’ (Dean, 2010, p. 27). In this context, a governmentality 
lens demonstrates how the austerity ‘mentality’, expressed through language (‘Crisis’, ‘Deficit Deniers’, 
‘Living within our Means’, etc.) and financial policy, is made practical and technical by reshaping how 
thought operates within organised ways of doing things, through planners conduct and LPA regimes.  
 
Whilst RoP exist within the milieu formed by the mentalities of government, they are not reducible only 
to this milieu; that is, whilst LPA RoP exist within neoliberal mentalities of government, such regimes 
cannot be reduced to the thought and practices of neoliberalism. RoP have their own logics or ‘strategy’ 
that are irreducible to the explicit intentions of any one actor, but nonetheless have an orientation 
towards specific ends and purposes. The distinction should be made between the strategy of RoP and 
the programmes that attempt their reform, they challenge them but do not become their raison d'être.   
 
For Foster et al. (2014), such neoliberal programmes of reform seek to govern conduct by offering new 
opportunities for local agency (such as through the localism agenda), however, within a constrained 
field of possible action (NPPF) that emphasises personal risk and responsibility for the consequences 
(the ‘neoliberal citizen’ can be replaced with the ‘neoliberal local authority planner’ for our purposes):   
 
‘[T]he neoliberal citizen is imbued with a seemingly enhanced capacity and responsibility for managing 
choices and decisions around a number of issues formerly managed directly by the state. Yet, the same 
citizen is at the same time disciplined through formal and informal systems of government which 
function to imbue the individual with an equally enhanced capacity to incur the risk of making the ‘wrong’ 
choices, given that the consequences of their actions are to be borne by the subject alone’ (p. 232).   
 
In the context of austerity, LG planners had no choice but to respond through efficiency, retrenchment, 
and revenue growth strategies, because the risk of inaction was local state failure (Bailey et al., 2015). 
This context was both the financial and growth ‘responsibilisation’ (Hastings et al., 2015) and ‘discipline’ 
driving organisational culture change for LPAs and SPs; a precarious context that has termed been 
‘austerity localism’ (Featherstone et al., 2012). It is here that planners are effectively ‘captured’ and 
forced to do the ‘work’ of neoliberalism by extending its logics through their self-governing practices.   
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Neoliberal governing reforms attempt to create a ‘new regime of truth’ for individual conduct. Here as 
Foucault explains ‘Homo economicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself’ (Read, 2009, p. 28). 
Neoliberalism as a form of governmentality is a ‘technology of the self’ and particular subjectification 
of the individual, which normalises the ideas of entrepreneurship, investment and risk not just within 
the economic spheres of the market but across the whole of society; so that ‘[s]tates, corporations, 
individuals are all governed by the same logic, that of interest and competition’ (ibid, p. 35). Therefore 
the scope for collective political solutions around ‘public interest’ and ‘common good’ associated with 
democracy are replaced by individualised market solutions under neoliberal regimes (Brown, 2006).   
 
In this respect, neoliberal ‘actors’ are indifferent towards prescriptive ideas, and so it is not necessarily 
the dominant rationales that limit the individual but rather the privileging of self-interest that curtails 
efforts for collective transformation. In other words, ‘[i]t is not that such actions are not prohibited, 
restricted by the dictates of a sovereign or the structures of disciplinary power, they are not seen as 
possible, closed off by a society made up of self-interested individuals’ (Read, 2009, p. 36). Neoliberal 
discourses, such as ‘there is no alternative’, position agents within an individualised competitive market 
system of governing, limiting the possibility for other forms of subjectivity, conduct and freedom.  
 
In this context, Read (2009, p. 35) argues that ‘any criticism of neoliberalism as governmentality must 
not focus on its errors, on its myopic conception of social existence, but on its particular production of 
truth…the manner in which the fundamental understanding of individuals as governed by interest and 
competition is not just an ideology that can be refused and debunked, but is an intimate part of how our 
lives and subjectivity are structured’. This highlights the structural power of neoliberalism over agency.  
 
This section has highlighted the insights of governmentality theory in relation to this study. It has argued 
that neoliberal programmes of reform aim to shape the ‘conduct of conduct’ and ‘regimes of practice’ 
of planners and LPAs respectively towards ‘self-governing’ mentalities that (re)produce austerity and 
growth logics. It is in this respect that planners are doing the ‘work’ of neoliberalism as its agents of 
reform, but that can also challenge these structures through ‘counter-conduct’ thought and practice. 
This theory helps to further develop the overall neoliberal structure-agency framework in this research. 
The next section moves on to discuss the role of political power in planning through post-political theory. 
 
2.3 Politics and Power: Depoliticisation and Post-Political Theory 
 
The purpose of this section is to draw on depoliticisation and post-political theory to set the scene for 
subsequent evaluations of the extent to which externalised and internalised neoliberal planning logics 
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are transforming the structures and agency of planners towards a narrower focus on the management 
of growth and away from ‘traditional’ political objectives around the roles of ethics, democracy and 
distribution in planning. This specifically follows the contention of Allmendinger (2016, p. 8-9) that:  
 
‘Planning and planners have become ‘part of the problem’ in the sense of withdrawing into a 
managerialist worldview: planning has become about the management of growth and is no longer 
concerned with the distributional, ethical or political questions that underpin debates about the 
objectives and future of planning. In this sense planning is part of the new consensus politics, in that it 
has become depoliticized and deploys empty phrases such as ‘urban renaissance’, ‘spatial planning’ and 
‘sustainable growth’ in order to appeal to a wide range of interest’.   
 
One normative argument in this section (and throughout the wider thesis) is that we need to ‘criticize 
particular relations of power and to identify and evaluate alternatives…driven by a commitment to 
human freedom and political equality: to the idea that people should have a hand, and that they should 
have a roughly equal hand, in helping shape the terms that govern their existence’ (Hayward and Lukes, 
2008, p.9). Planning should be one way that different stakeholders each have a roughly equal hand in 
shaping the development of their homes, communities and public spaces. Following Foster et al. (2014), 
politics should not only be conceived as debate and resistance to power, but as the (re)production of 
political reason that ‘rationalises’ how states govern their own affairs and those of their population. 
From this perspective, we need to critically deconstruct elite political discourses/rationalities in order 
to develop the production of alternative political reasoning. This is why planners have a potentially 
important role to play in promoting political equality and developing alternatives through their 
professional capacities and skills. This is why these theories of power and politics are included in the 
theoretical framework, that is because such theories help explain the uses and abuses of political power. 
 
One important way that power and politics interact in practice is through depoliticisation strategies. 
The literature on depoliticisation can be divided into three related strands (Fawcett and Marsh, 2014). 
The first strand concerns the relationship between a politicised political class that seek to further their 
own interests and a depoliticised, neutral bureaucracy (civil service). The second strand argues that 
regulatory governance structures and institutions can protect policy areas from political interference 
in which decisions are made for partisan or short-term electoral reasons. The third strand concerns the 
way that a depoliticisation strategy is pursued by politicians and the government to strengthen their 
position by shifting responsibility onto other actors and thus reducing their own accountability. It is this 
third strand that is the most relevant to this project in relation to the UK localism and austerity agendas. 
66 
 
From this perspective, Foster et al. (2014) conceptualise “depoliticisation as central to the rolling out of 
new forms of power and regulation associated with neo-liberal governmentality” which is “at all times 
an inherently political act, involving an extension rather than a retraction of political space” (p. 226-7).    
 
In this literature, depoliticisation creates the façade of ‘rolling back’ the state, but whilst neoliberal 
governmentality allows the state to ‘roll out’ its agenda paradoxically increasing central control. The 
‘removal’ of both politics and the state through depoliticisation strategies represents an illusion, but 
the shift in responsibility and risk onto technocratic and local actors is real. Depoliticisation is a strategy 
for powerful actors to protect themselves from criticism for decision-making whilst also retaining and 
exercising some control over the intended outcomes. Indeed, Burnham (2001) explains characteristics 
of depoliticisation governing strategies as ‘the process of placing at one remove the political character 
of decision‐making. State managers retain arm's‐length control over crucial economic and social 
processes whilst simultaneously benefiting from the distancing effects of depoliticisation. As a form of 
politics it seeks to change market expectations regarding the effectiveness and credibility of policy‐
making in addition to shielding the government from the consequences of unpopular policies’ (p. 127).    
 
One contemporary example is the depoliticisation of housing through expert techno-managerial politics 
of control. The quantitative measures of objectively assessed need and five-year land supply outlined 
in the NPPF since 2012 are examples of such ‘techniques’ that attempt to remove the politics from local 
housing debates, through technical demographic and econometric calculations that provide an ‘answer’ 
in the form of a specified number or supply of housing. The process of removing the politics from highly 
charged and complex policy areas such as housing can be seen as a form of depoliticisation, as 
politicians seek to shift the need for housing development into technical arenas based on scientific 
quantified calculations that are more difficult to argue against through a subjective/qualitative value-
based rationality. Essentially the argument is that transferring decision-making to experts outside of 
the political sphere will lead to better policy free from short term politics and complexity (Crouch, 2016). 
 
Post-political theory on planning focusses on the series of techniques that defer and displace debate 
into other managerial or technical (post-political) arenas. Post-political strategies ostensibly project the 
appearance of public openness and ‘consensus’, whilst limiting, displacing, deferring or diffusing 
opposition to development and growth (Allmendinger, 2017). Post-political theorists draw a crucial 
distinction between the ‘political’ as the public space of decision-making for society, and ‘politics’ as 
the practiced power dynamics between political actors and institutions involved in policy-making 
(Swyngedouw, 2011, Swyngedouw, 2014b). The main argument here is that planning has shifted from 
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attempting to uphold the political through balancing stakeholder positions in the public interest, to 
supporting techno-managerial politics and delivering national policy. For more detailed overviews of 
different post-political traditions and their application to planning, see the following volumes (Rancière, 
1999, Žižek, 2000, Mouffe, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2014a, Metzger et al., 2014, Allmendinger, 2017). 
 
Applied to planning, post-political theories help explain the contradiction between the increasing levels 
and opportunities for public involvement but growing dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the system. 
Public dissatisfaction with these ostensibly open and inclusive techniques for decision-making, which in 
practice often amount to the management of planning and the political, has resulted in the search for 
alternative arenas to become involved and have their views heard. For Allmendinger (2017, p. 193), the 
‘outcome of this situation is a growth in political activity outside of planning as those who wish to engage 
with planning are forced into other arenas, most notably the courts and national-level political lobbying’. 
In this broader sense, neighbourhood planning can be viewed through a post-political lens because of 
its claims to give local people more control over housing within their area, but within a strict pro-
development framework, which is given legitimacy and consensus through a local referendum. The 
local politics of dissent is displaced into a tightly circumscribed and technical plan-making exercise that 
often requires the assistance of experts to ensure communities conform to the wider goals of national 
policy to achieve a made neighbourhood plan (Parker and Salter, 2016b, Wargent and Parker, 2018). 
 
Post-political theory also assists in explaining the specific techniques and tools of planning that have 
been used to displace political questions into technical and managerial arenas controlled by experts: 
‘Techniques such as environmental impact assessment suggest a scientific tool or method that can guide 
decisions and provide ‘an answer’ separate from the subjective, complex, sub-optimal and messy world 
of politics. The reality is that such apparently apolitical approaches are, in fact, deeply political in the 
choices around the scope and methodology and the emphases and assumptions necessary’ 
(Allmendinger, 2017, p. 193). Some contemporary examples (that are discussed later) are the shift in 
emphasis from democratic considerations of planning obligations to techno-financial development 
‘viability’ and political questions around public needs/types with calculations for ‘how much’ housing. 
 
Indeed, Allmendinger and Haughton (2012) go even further by arguing that the spatial planning system 
in England should be analysed as a form of ‘neoliberal spatial governance’. They argue that spatial 
planning is underpinned by a post-political context, in which conflict and dissent in the planning system 
is strategically choreographed into ‘consensus’, in order to speed-up development as part of a pro-
growth agenda. In this way, the important development decisions have already been made and 
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participation is used to gain support for the decision (build consensus) or (re)framed around smaller 
issues to deflect attention away from what has already been decided. As such, the potential spaces for 
democratic debate and dissent, the ‘political’, are closed down making the decision ‘post-political’:  
 
‘Rather than accept the mainstream view that presents spatial planning as a progressive change…there 
is a danger that the resulting planning system is not so much an empowering arena for debating wide-
ranging societal options for future development, as a system focused on carefully stage-managed 
processes with subtly but clearly defined parameters of what is open for debate. This system gives the 
superficial appearance of engagement and legitimacy, whilst focusing on delivering growth expedited 
through some carefully choreographed processes for participation which minimise the potential for 
those with conflicting views to be given a meaningful hearing’ (ibid, p. 90). 
 
Putting these political theories into a planning context, whilst planning theory has long questioned the 
extent to which planners can operate as neutral actors working for the ‘public interest’ (Campbell and 
Marshall, 2002), there remained an understanding that planners could counter certain systemic biases 
in capitalist regimes through their professional practices and by forging collaboration. In contrast to this 
view, ‘[p]ost-political analyses point to a conscious and deliberate role for planners in not just supporting 
but also rolling out and helping constitute strategies of depoliticization…the changing role of planners 
from a progressive function, underpinned by agreed values and an apolitical self-perception, to a 
narrower, partisan, pro-growth and development sensibility’ (Allmendinger, 2017, p. 192).  
 
Closely aligned to these post-political theories is the power and capacity of planners in relation to other 
development and built environment stakeholders. The goes back to the framing role of theory on power, 
particularly as a long-standing and highly debated concept in planning theory (Forester, 1988, Flyvbjerg, 
1998). Fainstein and Campbell (2012, p. 9) explain the role of power in planning theory, and how the 
increasing recourse to a plurality of competing vested interests serves to bound the agency of planners:  
 
‘Unlike some other professionals, planners do not have a monopoly on power or expertise over their 
object of work. They operate within the constraints of the capitalist political economy, and their urban 
visions compete with those of developers, consumers, politicians, and other more powerful groups. 
When they call for a type of development to occur, they do not command the resources to make it 
happen. Instead, they must rely on either private investment or a commitment from political leaders. 
They also work within the constraints of democracy and bureaucratic procedures. Moreover, their 
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concerns may have low priority within the overall political agenda. Thus, despite the planning ideal of a 
holistic, proactive vision, planners are often restricted to playing frustratingly reactive, regulatory roles’. 
 
In this context, planning theory has acknowledged the limits to planning power in the past few decades, 
and has sought to redefine the role of planners as ‘facilitators’ or ‘mediators’ through collaborative 
planning theory (Innes and Booher, 1999, Healey, 2003), or as ‘critical pragmatists’ (Forester, 2013), 
rather than technical experts or professionalised autonomous agents of change. In practice, planning is 
often a ‘tug of war’ between capitalist and community interests’ dependent on conflict, bargaining, and 
the mobilisation of political resources, the results of which are indeterminate in advance (Stone, 1993).  
 
Post-political theory forms one critical response to the dominance of collaborative planning approaches 
in planning theory over the past two decades; based on the interpretation that ‘collaborative’ planning 
‘now seeks to supress dissent through the vain and managed search for consensus’, but also broadly to 
presents ‘a critique of contemporary planning policy and practice in general’ (Allmendinger, 2017, p. 
193-4). This is because the government reform of planning, in line with other elite stakeholder interests, 
have attempted ‘the colonization of the political’ through the ‘politics of the singular’ by choreographing 
discourses of homogeneity through terms such as ‘community’ and inclusive rhetoric of partnership 
and consensus to justify the way planning issues are managed and developments approved. This 
context increasingly forces planners to deal with fundamental political issues of ‘difference’ and 
alternative priorities as technical issues of management through politics (such as the five-year supply). 
 
Overall, depoliticisation strategies seeks to limit and control democratic involvement and opposition, 
but through transferring decision-making power for complex and contested policy away from political 
accountability to technical experts and scientific rationality; thus making decisions ‘depoliticised’ but 
importantly not apolitical. This is in contrast to the more disguised means of displacing dissent or 
manufacturing ‘consensus’ highlighted by post-political theory. Despite their different theoretical 
traditions, theorists of both depoliticisation and post-politics argue that the decline of politics has been 
too easily accepted and that these strategies are often strategically used to support powerful interests, 
such as a neoliberal growth agenda. As a result, those people who wish to engage in debates on deeper 
fundamental political issues, and that question the achievement of consensus, effectively become 
alienated from politics. However, their antagonism has not be removed from planning, it has just been 
displaced. In this respect, stakeholders must find expression elsewhere outside of the formal system(s).   
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Arguably, the most contemporary state depoliticisation strategies are the austerity and localism policy 
agendas under the Cameron-led governments; that is, a governing strategy to shift the responsibility 
and risk for economic growth and public service provision to the local scale away from the government, 
whilst still retaining political control ‘at one remove’ through national policy and funding settlements. 
 
This section has presented a concise review of the depoliticisation and post-political (planning) theory 
most relevant to this research. It has argued that powerful elite depoliticisation and post-political 
strategies have further served to make planners complicit in the neoliberalisation of planning in England, 
through transferring responsibility for political decisions into the technocratic sphere and attempting 
to achieve ‘consensus’ that masks the plurality of stakeholder positions and broader dissent; however, 
that planners have an important role in resisting such agendas that work against the ‘public interest’.  
 
Having briefly outlined the contributions of the framing and explanatory theories used in the theoretical 
framework, the next two sections 2.4 and 2.5 seek to further develop the relationships between 
neoliberalism and austerity governance and planning reform respectively as the key focus of the thesis.   
 
2.4 Theorising Neoliberal Austerity Governance  
 
This review section on neoliberal austerity governance makes two core and related arguments. Firstly, 
that austerity has managed to revive and renew the international legitimacy of neoliberalism following 
the 2008 GFC. Here the case is made that although the Cameron-led Governments implemented 
significant fiscal policy public expenditure cuts, this has not been accompanied by any meaningful 
departure from the pre-crisis UK growth model based on a neoliberal political economy approach that 
helped to cause the GFC. The combination of bolstered post-crisis UK growth model and withdrawal of 
public redistributive mechanisms demonstrates how austerity has paradoxically assisted to ‘rescue’ 
neoliberalism (Peck et al., 2012). Secondly, that austerity is creating a more unequal and responsibilized 
society in England. The socio-spatial implementation and consequences have been multifaceted and 
uneven across the UK, with much critical research focussing on the uneven redistributional impacts for 
(already) relatively disadvantaged people and places (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, Hastings et al., 2017). 
 
Firstly, following Peck (2012, p.651), ‘[a]usterity has become a strategic space for the contradictory 
reproduction of market rule, calling attention to the ways in which neoliberal rationalities have been  
resuscitated, reanimated, and to some extent rehabilitated in the wake of the Wall Street crash of 2008-
2009’. Similarly in the UK context, Taylor-Gooby (2012) and Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) quickly 
identified the political relationship between austerity and ‘state restructuring’ under the Coalition 
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Government. The academic literature highlights the strong relationship between neoliberalism and 
contemporary forms of austerity politics (notwithstanding that austerity has a long history that pre-
dates neoliberalism). Indeed, for Peck (2012), ‘the most recent rounds of austerity programming are 
wired into the central nervous system of the neoliberal project’ (p.639), however, these reforms are 
exacerbated because they are building on an ‘already neoliberalized institutional landscape’ (p.631).  
 
Furthermore, Whiteside (2016) argues that ‘the history and hegemony of neoliberalism is intrinsically 
intertwined with that of austerity’, and that post-2008 ‘the politics of austerity are entrenching, 
reasserting, and unrolling processes of neoliberalization at global, national, and urban scale’ (p. 361). 
Farnsworth and Irving (2018) come to a similar conclusion that as a result of austerity, neoliberalism 
‘has been pursued with renewed strength and vigour since 2010’, and that whilst ‘the limits to neo-
austerity’s legitimacy may be more exposed [since the 2008 GFC], there is less indication that neoliberal 
solutions to economic problems are on the wane’ (p. 17). Arguably, the ideological/political logics driving 
neoliberal and austerity policies have proved increasingly mutually beneficial since the 1970s and GFC.   
 
In this post-crisis context of austerity in the UK, Berry (2016, p. 110) argues that ‘the growth model 
supported by policy elites in the post-crisis period sustains patterns of wealth distribution similar to those 
which pertained in the pre-crisis period, albeit with inequality arguably more pronounced as financial 
and property wealth remains largely intact while earnings are held down and redistributive mechanisms 
are withdrawn”. This forms one of the key normative and democratic arguments in this research, that 
austerity has punished the most disadvantaged and further entrenched the uneven social and spatial 
geography of England, but whilst remaining committed to a neoliberal growth-model that caused the 
crisis and primarily serves the interests of a select few privileged people and places across the country.  
 
The moral and power dimensions of austerity are starkly outlined by (Streeck, 2011) that the ‘average 
citizen will pay – for the consolidation of public finances, the bankruptcy of foreign states, the rising 
rates of interest on public debt and, if eventually necessary and still possible, for another rescue of 
national and international banks – with his or her private savings, with cuts in public entitlements, with 
reduced public services and, one way or another, with higher taxes’. The impacts of austerity on 
geographical patterns of planning and development will further exacerbate the pressures on local 
citizens to pay (through taxes) or make do without a range of public services or infrastructure projects. 
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One of the most relevant theoretical contributions to this research is the work on ‘austerity urbanism’ 
by Peck (2012). It provides an important foundation for conceptualising the interplay between parallel 
‘austerity’ and ‘localism’ reforms as variegated neoliberalisations that shape LPAs E&Rs across England: 
 
‘The neoliberal proclivity for downloading, by way of responsibility dumping and devolved discipline, 
assumes an increasingly radical and regressive form in an environment of austerity, as both budget cuts 
and responsibility for their management is handed down to local authorities, actors and agencies—
where the capacity to respond is uneven at best…many will suffer twice, first from the localization of 
economic decline and then from the devolution of budget cuts’ (Peck, 2012, p.631-2).  
 
‘Neoliberal austerity measures operate downwards in both social and scalar terms: they offload social 
and environmental externalities on cities and communities, while at the same time enforcing unflinching 
fiscal restraint by way of extra local disciplines; they further incapacitate the state and the public sphere 
through the outsourcing, marketization and privatization of governmental services and social supports; 
and they concentrate both costs and burdens on those at the bottom of the social hierarchy, 
compounding economic marginalization with state abandonment. Traditionally, ‘localism’ has been 
regarded as normatively benign, even implicitly progressive in some instances; today, it has become a 
pressure point for some of the most pernicious consequences of late neoliberalization’ (ibid, p. 650-1). 
 
Local council responses to austerity have been similar across the UK, European and US contexts. In the 
context of LG in the Netherlands but with general application, Overmans and Noordegraaf (2014) find 
that ‘[f]our responses can be identified for managing austerity: decline, cutbacks, retrenchment, and 
downsizing’ (p.99). They also found whilst ‘[r]hetorically, [local] governments are innovative. In reality, 
however, fiscal measures that tend towards stability are most often used’ (ibid); underscoring practical 
challenges for developing transformative rather than reactionary LG approaches to austerity localism.  
 
With these theoretical positions in mind, attention now turns to theory on the specific impacts of 
austerity on LPAs in England post-2010. Gardner and Lowndes (2016) raise the ‘austerity puzzle’ that 
between 2010-2015 English LGs have lost more than a third of their funding, yet they have continued 
to provide and commission a wide range of statutory and discretionary services. This puzzle is 
prominent in the debates between critical perspectives that view austerity as a policy fundamentally 
restructuring the welfare state (Taylor-Gooby, 2012) and new institutionalism accounts of ‘resilience’ 
(John, 2014). For Gardner (2017) such contrasting narratives ‘begs a question about the nature and 
extent of austerity-related change to our public service institutions’ (p. 150). Based on these literatures, 
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the concepts of LG ‘capacity’ and ‘resilience’ are developed as a main research theme (RQ5). The 
academic journal Local Government Studies symposium on ‘Local Responses to ‘Austerity’’ (2015, 
Volume 41, Issue 4) provides one of the key sources of literature most relevant to this research project. 
The remainder of this section will deal with the key debates developed in this symposium as a way to 
set up some key theories and concepts applied to examine the empirical data and analyse the findings.     
 
Bailey et al (2015) explain that LG across the UK are experiencing a period of crisis created by the 
austerity measures introduced by the Coalition since 2010, with the level of cuts being more severe in 
speed and depth than under the Conservatives in the late 1970s/early 1980s. They contend the harsh 
treatment of LG under austerity could simply be the consequence of government according higher 
priority to other services areas, such as healthcare; although that the more credible view is that the 
high level of cuts for LG were intentional because they fitted neatly with wider policy objectives, such 
as localism and state restructuring. In this sense, the political aim was to reduce dependence on central 
government, whilst simultaneously increasing LG fiscal autonomy and responsibility for promoting 
growth and social protection. The latter being particularly salient because recessions typically have a 
worse impact on the poor, unemployed and sick, as well as more deprived regions (Bailey et al., 2015).  
 
The political aspiration to reconfigure the role of (local) government is evident in a multitude of central 
government initiatives since 2010. Although this is most clearly expressed in the Localism Act 2011, the 
2010 Spending Review was not only about cuts but also the deregulation of LG, both as an end in itself 
but also with consideration to encouraging innovation (Bailey et al, 2015). The themes of devolution 
and state restructuring have been evident within all areas of Coalition policy outputs since 2010; 
including free schools/academies in education, privatising the NHS in healthcare, and new freedoms 
and responsibilities for LG. One of the key goals of austerity localism has been to provide more space 
for the private and voluntary sectors and communities in service provision. These changes have created 
both a multitude of challenges but also new opportunities and possible ways of working for LG. In order 
for local councils to manage such large funding cuts, however, controversial political decisions “have to 
be made about how to allocate the cuts between functions or services” in which there “is clearly 
potential for strategic choices to have quite different distributive impacts” (Bailey et al, 2015, p. 576).      
 
Bailey et al. (2015) present two conclusions about LG responses to austerity. The first conclusion is that 
strategies to respond to fiscal crisis are still evolving; with many of the responses implemented in the 
early period of austerity that proved initially successful, such as efficiency and back-office savings, 
becoming increasingly unsustainable and insufficient over time. As a result, “Front-line services will face 
74 
 
more significant cuts in the coming years. These cuts will be more visible to the public and are likely to 
impact most adversely on those on lower incomes as they rely most heavily on these services. In that 
sense, we have yet to really see the distributive impacts” (p.579). The second conclusion is that LG is 
operating in “an increasingly risky and uncertain environment” through which councils will struggle to 
support their communities as the central government reduces its funding and welfare obligations and 
future local income sources become more uncertain. In this context, such “risks imply greater variation 
between authorities and inequality of outcomes in future” (p. 579).   
 
Overall, the challenges facing LG in England is the combination of significant cuts to council finances 
coupled with the increasing demand for services, which has resulted in “unprecedented ‘budget gaps’ 
in council budgets” (Hastings et al, 2015, p. 601). This practice-based context has created polarised 
views about the resilience and future role of LG. As such, two competing narratives on the future of LG 
have emerged in the literature; one a positive story of ‘adaptation and survival’ and the other a negative 
one of ‘residualisation and marginalisation’ (Hastings et al, 2015).   
 
The ‘adaptation’ narrative emphasises the historic and contemporary capacity of LGs to survive periods 
of austerity through adaptations that do not fundamentally challenge the core aspects of its nature and 
purpose. This narrative asserts that “austerity presents some opportunities for creative, entrepreneurial 
activity which will allow the sector to remain a strong and signiﬁcant part of the local state” (Hastings 
et al, 2015, p. 603). This is particularly the case as councils are forced to become more innovative in 
hard times. This narrative is closely linked to the ecological conceptualisations of ‘resilience’ whereby 
biological life must adapt to changes in their environment or risk extinction (Shaw, 2012). This position 
also posits that the new powers and responsibilities accorded to councils by the localism agenda has 
created new opportunities for them to develop bespoke strategies for managing austerity. 
 
In contrast, the ‘marginalisation’ narrative makes the case that LG capacity will become weakened to 
such an extent that it can only provide the most basic levels of service provision to an increasingly 
restricted segment of the most vulnerable in the community. From the marginalisation perspective, 
Hastings et al (2015) explains, “the adaptations made by local government amount to substantial, 
fundamental changes which will lead to a retrenchment in the signiﬁcance and centrality of local 
government to the citizenry, as well as in its capacity to deliver social and economic programmes which 
are not simply ameliorative” (p. 603-4). This position is more critical and emphasises the “accelerating 
trend towards the privatisation, marketisation and commodiﬁcation of service provision”; one that 
understands localism as “an instrument for implementing budget cuts…as part of the larger process of 
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state retrenchment associated with neo-liberal development” (ibid p. 603). These further shifts in 
responsibility for economic development to local councils are also understood as an additional burden. 
 
The common theme in both the adaptation and marginalisation narratives is that there is much worse 
to come from austerity in the immediate future (Hastings, et al, 2015). Most commentators agree that 
the responses to austerity and strategic decisions of LAs in the next five-year period 2015-2020 will be 
critical in shaping the future of LG in the UK (a core theme in this research in relation to planning). 
Beyond meta-debates over LG resilience and futures, the literature identifies three main strategies that 
LAs have used to respond to austerity; these are a mix of ‘Efficiency’, ‘Retrenchment’ and ‘Investment’.  
 
The first strategy, efficiency savings, are actions that seek to reduce the cost of council services without 
changing the service level for the community, so that the level and quality of front-line services are not 
obviously compromised as a result of cutbacks. These measures predominantly involve restructuring 
and reductions in ‘back-office’ support functions, such as human resources, management ‘delayering’ 
and staff reductions and implementing more effective debtor management (Hastings et al, 2015). The 
efficiency measures approach was the most common in the early stages of austerity; however, over 
time the avenues for efficiency savings have become exhausted as all the ‘easy’ savings are made, 
meaning that there is “a substantial shift from efficiency to retrenchment in later austerity” (p. 608).   
 
The second strategy, retrenchment, is the action of reducing the role, or completely withdrawing the 
responsibility, of the council for the range and level of its service provision; transferring them onto 
either the entire community or specific population groups. Examples include reducing or withdrawing 
funding and grants for local youth organisations, arts and culture, public libraries and park maintenance. 
This is because as LG budgets become increasingly stretched and strained, resources and services have 
to be rationed according to more selective criteria of ‘need-based assessment’ within the community. 
Such retrenchment strategies often rely on a greater contribution from outside agencies and the local 
community to make up the shortfall in reduced council services. This is not entirely a new trend as the 
diminishing role of local councils has been ongoing since the 1980s emphasising the ‘enabling’ LG that 
commissions rather deliver services and enters into partnership with other sectors and agencies. 
However, the extent of retrenchment in the face of severe cuts presents a real danger of local councils 
becoming a marginalised player even at the local scale. The limits to efficiency strategies and 
implications of retrenchment raises questions over the capacity for ‘adaptation’ (Hastings et al, 2015).     
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The third strategy, investment (or prevention), aims to reduce the demand for or cost of council services 
in the future, through “the realignment of some capital and revenue resources towards ‘prevention’ or 
‘invest to save’ activities” (p. 615). Examples include investing in assisted living technology, designed to 
assist with independence and thus reduce expensive forms of social care for the council in the future 
(Hasting et al, 2015). The investment strategy has been the least utilised response to austerity, because 
investment is a long-term approach that will have little impact on the necessity for immediate savings. 
These shifts from early efficiency savings to service retrenchment during the later phases of austerity 
underscores the challenges for LG to continue to ‘weather the storm’ (Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013).   
 
This research follows the literature in regard to the need to understand the context of LG post-2010 as 
“the intersection between the austerity and localism agendas” (Hastings et al, 2015, p. 617). This is why 
‘austerity localism’ (Featherstone et al, 2012) forms a key analytical concept in this research as a lens 
into the intersection between the austerity and localism agendas for local planning practices. Moreover, 
Hasting et al (2015) explain that the decisions taken by central government to manage national fiscal 
pressures, such as austerity and localism, can be seen as part of “a project to ‘shape the conduct’ of 
local government by requiring it to behave more entrepreneurially; to take on more responsibility for 
economic growth and the distribution of beneﬁts; and to take on new risks in relation both to the 
demands placed on services such as social care and for balancing budgets” (p. 618). In this context, they 
add a third ‘Responsibilisation’ narrative to the academic debates; one that can be characterised as a 
neoliberal ‘technology of government’ that more accurately captures the trajectory of LG in England. 
In this narrative, the purpose of the state is the governance of conduct in which responsibility for 
tackling economic and social problems is transferred from state institutions to local institutions and 
citizens. Therefore neoliberal ‘responsibilisation’ forms another key analytical category in this research.  
 
In their analysis of expenditure data by services area for councils in London, Fitzgerald and Lupton (2015) 
found that the largest percentage cuts have come in the ‘discretionary services’ that councils are not 
obligated to provide by law. In this context, the local resources that councils can draw on is critical, such 
as a strong community and voluntary sector, to deliver more than the statutory services and provision. 
They further argue that the concept of ‘sustainability’ should also be considered as well as ‘resilience’ 
when evaluating whether council adaptations are positive based on their potential long-term impacts:   
 
“Organisational elasticity and nimbleness in its various forms may arguably not be sufﬁcient, in these 
times, to ensure that the needs of local citizens are met, nor even that local authorities can survive in 
the long term. Could ‘resilience as transformation’ even provide a cloak of optimism behind which 
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damaging, undemocratic and unsustainable reforms to the role of local government can be made in the 
belief that ‘all will be well’ if only organisational resilience can be maximised?” (ibid, p. 583).  
 
Here Fitzgerald and Lupton (2015) found LG responses to austerity in London broadly demonstrated 
organisational strength and adaptation consistent with the resilience narrative (Shaw, 2012). However, 
that this framing may obscure the weakness that “capacity has been reduced, another shock of the 
same nature could not be absorbed again and, therefore, the ability of local government to fulﬁl its 
purpose of serving local need in the long term has already been diminished” (p. 598). They therefore 
argue that it is crucial to assess the resilience of communities, based on how they can meet their needs 
with reduced or withdrawn support from council services, and not just the resilience of LAs; because 
families with children under five, young people aged 16-24 and older people with care needs are the 
three foremost group users of LG services that carry the greatest social risk from service retrenchment.  
 
For Kennett et al. (2015), ‘[t]he depth, breadth and nature of the ‘great risk shift’, as well as the impact 
of the crisis and austerity and responses to them, are localised and translated unevenly between and 
within cities, and across different household types depending on the congruence of specific historical, 
political and policy legacies, socio-economic profiles and risk factors’ (p. 624). Therefore the literature 
suggests that the antecedent contexts of councils in England will play a significant role in determining 
the localities that ‘sink or swim’ in the new system of ‘austerity localism’ (Featherstone et al., 2012).   
 
In the socially and spatially uneven context of post-crisis austerity localism, where responsibility and 
risk are devolved to the local and household scale, “the role of individual and household resources, and 
assets (established owner occupation, savings, private pensions), as well as social capital and informal 
networks, becomes increasingly important” (Kennett et al, 2015, p. 640). This means that the future is 
likely to become increasingly precarious for the most vulnerable as individual and public resources are 
eroded and governments absolves itself of responsibility. In this respect, “it is increasingly cities, local 
administrations and partnerships that will have a crucial role in shaping, generating and innovating local 
economic and social policies” (ibid p. 640) to mitigate the most harmful impacts of the ‘risk shift’. These 
debates set the foundations and concepts for the empirical data and analysis presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Overall this section has argued that austerity has managed to ‘revive’ the international legitimacy of 
neoliberalism following the 2008 GFC; with the Cameron-led Governments implementing significant 
fiscal policy public expenditure cuts as part of a need to reform according to a crisis discourse; however, 
without any meaningful departure from the pre-crisis UK growth model based on a neoliberal political 
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economy approach that helped to cause the GFC. It has also argued that austerity is serving to further 
entrench the existing unequal geography of the UK, because austerity localism has served to devolve 
responsibility and risk for public service provision to the local scale, further embedding pre-existing 
patterns of socio-spatial inequality. These issues are further explored in the empirical analysis chapters. 
The next section continues in the same manner by theorising neoliberalism and UK planning reforms. 
 
2.5 Theorising Neoliberal Planning Reform 
 
This review section on neoliberal planning reform makes two core and related arguments. Firstly, that 
planning systems and planners have been subjected to consistent reforms under neoliberal regimes; 
continuously being targeted by powerful elite discourses that problematize planning as a constraint on 
growth which needs to ‘reformed’ in order to become an enabler of economic development. Secondly, 
that these ideological critiques driving neoliberal planning reforms are flawed because they underplay 
or ignore the existing and entrenched underlying challenges of elite interests and land politics that lie 
at the heart of planning and development processes and that goes beyond the formal planning system. 
 
Firstly, Lord and Tewdwr-Jones (2014) highlight the overall challenge that across ‘a 15-year period 
(1997–2012) England has witnessed a remarkable five waves of legislative planning reform. On each 
occasion, the discourse used by politicians has been one of a necessity to “fix” the system on the grounds 
that it is a chronic obstacle to growth’ (p.348). Similarly, Allmendinger and Haughton (2014, p. 29) 
question the prevailing state of planning reforms associated with neoliberalism in recent decades:    
 
‘Planning in England is subject to periodic upheavals. Perhaps there never was a period of stable 
planning regulation – but what seems undeniable is that planning reform is now with us on a near 
permanent basis, as incoming political administrations seek to modernise, reform or ‘deregulate’ 
planning. Partly this seems to be a feature of our neoliberal times’.  
 
This trend towards continuous planning reforms as a means to promote economic development has 
also been prevalent in other advanced liberal economies that operate a neoliberal political economy. 
In the Australian context, Ruming and Goodman (2016) detail how a broad coalition of core business 
groups, the development industry and neoliberal ideologues have developed a national narrative that 
positions urban planning as a barrier to economic growth. The result has been that ‘a public and policy 
discourse has emerged that sees planning policy as restricting and constraining economic performance’, 
creating a context where the ‘need for greater efficiencies has become so widely accepted that state 
governments are now engaged in a seemingly endless round of system reviews and reform’ (p. 72).   
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National planning systems are the target of neoliberal governments and private sector interests 
because planning forms one of the strongest regulatory tools to manage property, development and 
land rights in the interest of national legislation and the public. In the UK, the right to development 
(permission) remains nationalised under the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act and separated from 
the rights of private ownership of land and property. This means that planning is a strong national state 
regulatory tool for shaping land and property development beyond the role of the capitalist free-market 
economy. However, the central belief underpinning the neoliberal project is that the governing of 
society is most effectively achieved through the free-market and a distrust of the state (Hall, 2011). 
 
Since neoliberalism achieved political hegemony in the 1980s, UK states to various degrees have been 
on the trajectory of attempting to govern society more aligned with market principles and through 
community/voluntary actors, particularly moving away from the modernist, rationalist, hierarchical, 
bureaucratic and administrative approaches characteristic of the post-war welfare state (Healey, 
1997b). In sum, planning as a form of state regulation is antithetical to neoliberal elites because it 
‘distorts’ markets and imposes on the liberty of individuals to develop their land and property according 
to their own interests. Whilst this is a simplification of positions, it sets the general tone of the debates. 
 
One position in the literature that seeks to explain the shift towards consistent planning reforms is 
Allmendinger and Haughton (2013). They argue that the persistent attempts for planning reform by UK 
Governments represents the continuous but unsuccessfully search for the “perfect market supportive 
scalar and institutional fix” (p. 10) for delivering state strategies underpinned by neoliberalism. This 
assumption that an ideal scale of governance exists can potentially explain the frequency of changes 
made to planning. Post-2010 localism is only the latest iteration of a political attempt to find the scale 
most supportive to the current government objectives of deregulation, responsibilisation and growth.     
 
In the context of this research, the ‘rescaling’ of the planning system post-2010 has taken the form of 
abolishing regional governance and creating 39 Local Enterprise Partnerships in an attempt to find the 
‘natural’ scale for economic functions and to empower market actors. Similarly neighbourhood 
governance has been prioritised as the site of local democracy through the 2011 Localism Act, whilst 
cities and city-regions have been recast as the most appropriate scale for urban economic governance 
through combined authorities and devolution. However, Allmendinger and Haughton (2013, p.20) 
criticise the ‘unrealistic expectations over the ability of any newly empowered scale of governance, such 
as regions, city-regions, or neighbourhoods, to provide a ‘silver bullet’ solution to longstanding planning 
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problems’. It is argued here that under neoliberal political economies, state strategies for rescaling and 
deregulating planning are the only options available to elites without accepting and addressing the 
more fundamental underlying problems created by operating a neoliberal and financialised land and 
property market as issues that lie at the very heart of planning and development processes in the UK.  
 
Having outlined the main position taken/arguments adopted by the researcher based on the literature, 
the remainder of this section is divided into two parts outlining the relevant theory on Neoliberalism 
and Post-2010 Localism in 2.5.1 and Neoliberalism and Planning Reforms in 2.5.2 respectively. 
 
2.5.1 Neoliberalism and Post-2010 Localism  
 
Post-2010 localism is conceptualised here as a neoliberal political state strategy with the broad 
objectives of rescaling and deregulating the UK planning system as part of a wider state restructuring 
agenda associated with austerity. This part therefore reviews some of the critical academic literature 
on ‘localism’ most relevant to this project and highlights its close relationship with neoliberal ideology.    
 
Firstly, Evans, Marsh and Stoker understand localism as ‘an umbrella term which refers to the devolution 
of power and/or functions and/or resources away from central control and towards front-line managers, 
local democratic structures, local institutions and local communities, within an agreed framework of 
minimum standards’ (2013, p.405). However, localism as a concept and policy is ambiguous, and is 
often used to refer to the virtues of undertaking any activity at the local scale. Indeed the management 
of people at the local scale; local interests and views being used to inform local policy; local groups 
formed around their experiences under the spatial division of labour; and the variable implementation 
of public policy are all forms of ‘localism’ (Clarke, 2013). Furthermore, one core belief underpinning 
localism is that the local scale is inherently more ‘democratic’, ‘efficient’ or ‘environmental’ than other 
spatial scales; however, the literature highlights that it is problematic to make any assumptions about 
how governance is likely to operate at different spatial scales (Purcell, 2006), because scales and spaces 
are not static entities but fluid, relational and ‘socially produced’ (Massey, 2005, Herod, 2010).      
 
The close relationship between localism and neoliberalism is highlighted by Rogers (2015). He explains 
that the ‘local’ is preferred in neoclassical (neoliberal) economics because of the assumed efficiency 
created though competition based on valuable local knowledge of people, places and circumstances 
(market information). According to Hayek, the actors that have the best local information will be in the 
best position to make decisions about how to use resources most efficiently. This economic rationale 
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for the virtues of the local is implicitly drawn on in the argument that local people understand their 
locality and public services best (in economic terms they have the best information), and hence they 
are the most appropriate actors to make decisions about how to use resources efficiently. In contrast, 
the state cannot comprehend the complexity of such diverse information. Post-2010, the Coalition 
embraced the benefits of localism in terms of efficiency, previously evident in their Green Paper Control 
Shift (2009) that contrasted the ‘inefficient state’ with ‘vibrant localities’ that were being restrained. In 
this context, ‘the [Localism] Act’s rationale resonates with the neoliberal conception of the local through 
this emphasis on the relative efficiency of the local in comparison to centralised systems of management’ 
(Rogers, 2015, p.6). However, the Coalition also framed this position in terms of local ‘empowerment’.  
 
Similarly, Layard (2012) argues that the Coalition presented localism in terms of local decision-making 
being prioritised over other scales of governance; however, despite this rhetoric, the provisions within 
the Localism Act (2011) “retain considerable national hegemony over local decision-making, both in 
what the Act requires and in the provisions and policies that it leaves untouched” (p. 134). The politically 
undefined use of the terms ‘local’ and ‘community’ (deliberately) allows localism to be presented as 
universally empowering when in practice initiatives are fragmented. Furthermore, the Coalition has not 
justified why the local should be the preferred site for decision-making, and therefore “Localism is a 
normative claim that requires justification” (p. 134). For Layard (2012), the core principle set out in the 
National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) that development should be approved unless it is 
‘demonstrably unsustainable’, “clearly ousts local decision making” (p. 138, original emphasis) and, as 
LPAs are materially bound to the NPPF, “Localism in planning terms is highly limited” (p. 139). In this 
context, the Localism Act and NPPF are more than ‘soft spaces’ of neoliberalism, but rather are “hard 
policy” (Layard, 2012) which formalises in legal and material terms the national government rationale 
of pro-development localism into a concrete legal understanding of what localism is to mean in practice.    
 
Furthermore, Hildreth and Bailey (2013) argue the Coalition emphasis on ‘rebalancing the economy’ as 
part of a ‘localised’ growth strategy aims to reduce the ‘overdependence’ of parts of England on the 
public sector and subsequently facilitate the conditions necessary for them to enable private sector 
growth. Thus the Coalition introduced neoliberal economic supply-side reforms to the planning system 
as a means to incentivise business and housing growth and promote efficient markets. These planning 
reforms were couched in terms of community empowerment, however, critical commentators argue 
that localism was primarily a cloak for policy deregulation and market-led growth (Allmendinger, 2016).  
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In the context of development geography, but with significant resonance to UK planning reforms post-
2010, Mohan and Stokke (2000) explain that decentralisation should be understood as part of a broader 
market strategy; one which divorces the ‘technical’ questions of economics from the ideological 
concerns of ‘politics’, so that “the logic of the market is presented as natural”. From this perspective, 
“Decentralisation in its neoliberal guise treats the local as a functional, economic space with policies 
designed to increase the efficiency of service delivery. In this sense the market is seen as a universal 
principle without any ‘geography’…Decentralisation simply facilitates the efficiency of these nested local 
economies” (p. 251). However, decentralisation on its own will not necessarily bolster local economies 
and services across England, rather localism may further entrench the unequal economic geography.    
 
In a similar vein, Ercan and Hendriks (2013, p.423) present three main critiques of localism. Firstly, the 
localist goals of decentralisation and devolution cannot always equate with improved democratisation, 
and even when services and responsibilities are devolved to the local level, this does not automatically 
mean that it is accompanied by greater power or resources. Secondly, localism often fails to empower, 
and can further entrench, the position of the marginalised within local communities by exacerbating 
the existing inequalities and unequal power relations in favour of those with high social capital and 
influence at the local level. Thirdly, localism is inward-looking and parochial, which reduces policy 
debates to the confines of the local and thus removes scope for discussion and public debate on wider 
policy issues such as climate change and social justice. These remain important policy challenges for 
any national government attempting to develop a more progressive localist governance framework.  
 
Moreover, localism as a policy concept is an ‘empty signifier’ without being placed within a specific 
socio-economic context. Once it is situated it can take on many forms. For example, Taylor explains two 
types of ‘politics of turf’ that represent forms of localism (Clarke, 2013, p. 494). The first type, the ‘class 
politics of location’, is when local homeowners with children in the local schools become politically 
active in their neighbourhood. This happens to protect the existing use-value against (economic) 
development that may impact upon their vested interest in the neighbourhood, such as on house prices, 
local infrastructure and service capacity. The second type, the ‘territorial politics of location’, happens 
when locally dependent households and businesses form growth coalitions to defend the locality from 
disinvestment caused by shifting market forces in the economy. The class politics can be considered a 
conservative form of localism through which the ‘local’ is being defended against development, more 
typically associated with nimbyism and reactive community and neighbourhood planning groups. The 
territorial politics is an economic localism where the local is promoted as site of investment and 
opportunity in response to internal social pressures and external national and global economic factors. 
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These can be seen through the marketing attempts by Local Enterprise Partnerships and devolved city-
regions to attract private sector investment, as well as by some LAs and towns struggling to attract 
inward investment/development. In sum, there are different types of ‘localisms’ (and for development).     
 
In the academic literature, critical commentators argue that beyond the claims of local ‘empowerment’, 
the reality of the Coalition Government’s localism agenda is an extreme restructuring of social welfare, 
local government and public sector finances (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011, Lowndes and Pratchett, 
2012, Jacobs and Manzi, 2013); increasing responsibility for service delivery being directed away from 
the state towards the private sector, third sector and local communities (Ishkanian and Szreter, 2012); 
and the continuation of neo-liberal governance (Corbett and Walker, 2013, Davoudi and Madanipour, 
2013). In such critical accounts, the positive and inclusive government rhetoric of ‘empowerment’ and 
‘rebalancing the economy’ through localism are expressed through the responsibilisation for risk and 
reward at the local scale at best; and at worse a politics of ‘abandonment’ that promotes the ‘self-help 
ideology’ more aligned with welfare in the US (Davies and Pill, 2012). This research takes this position.       
 
For Featherstone et al. (2012), Coalition Government “localism is being mobilised as part of an ‘anti-
state’, ‘anti-public’ discourse to build support for an aggressive round of ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism” and 
“a direct challenge to state intervention, regulation and the public sector to create a right-wing 
restructuring of Britain”; which forms “part of a broader repertoire of practices through which the 
government has constructed the local as antagonistic to the state and invoked it to restructure the public 
sector. We term this project austerity localism” (p. 177-8). This demonstrates the Coalition construction 
of an austerity localism agenda to support a broader neoliberal right-wing restructuring of the state. 
 
Similarly, Williams et al. (2014) argue that the Coalition Big Society and localism agendas have been 
consistent with neoliberalism and have discursively manoeuvred the traditional responsibilities of 
government into the shadows, and transferred them onto local councils, communities and businesses. 
For them, the problematic assumption “that decentralisation will somehow empower communities to 
get the services they deserve masks not only a neglect for structural inequalities between and within 
communities, but also a political strategy that delegates risk, responsibility, and accountability from 
central government onto new subjects – local government, and private sector and local community 
organisations” (p. 2802). Likewise, Wilks-Heeg (2011) argues that “the financial settlement imposed on 
English local authorities is best seen as the core of a radical and highly risky attempt to engineer a 
particular form of localism from the centre”, whereby the Coalition political agenda was to convince the 
general public that the “responsibility for high-profile local service cuts rests with local authorities 
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themselves” (p. 649). Whilst Bradley (2015) also contends that the Coalition “state strategy of localism 
seeks to harness the benefits of collective participation while limiting its impact on the current political 
settlement” (p. 97). Therefore post-2010 localism is conceptualised here through a neoliberal lens.    
 
For Tait and Inch (2015, p. 4), ‘the Big Society and ‘localism’ represent an attempt to articulate a vision 
capable of sustaining the neoliberal settlement in an era of austerity, one that is replete with 
contradictions that reveal wider lessons about the political potential and limitations of the local in the 
current conjuncture’. Similarly, Kisby (2010) argues the Coalition vision of a ‘Big Society’ based on 
empowering communities, redistributing power from the state to citizens and promoting a culture of 
volunteering is badly flawed because it ‘overlooks the crucial role that needs to be played by the state 
in promoting social justice, which is vital to the development of active citizenship and vibrant 
communities…the Big Society is largely about ordinary citizens doing their bit to keep the free market 
going in an era of austerity’ (p.484-6). This also links localism with austerity as related neoliberal policies. 
In these ways, localism is consistent with the broader neoliberal political agenda of the Coalition 
Government to reduce the role of the state and promote economic growth under state restructuring.  
 
However, despite critical accounts of Coalition localism and austerity being developed within the 
framing of neoliberalism, the potential for counter-hegemonic forms of ‘progressive localism’ are also 
highlighted in the literature. Featherstone et al. (2012) contrast the reality of Coalition localism with 
the potential for forms of ‘progressive localism’, comprised of community strategies that are outward-
looking and create positive relationships between places and social groups negotiating global processes. 
Such progressive localisms are not merely defensive but expansive in their geographical reach and build 
on a ‘politics of place’ (Massey, 2007), which work to “reconfigure existing communities around 
emergent agendas for social justice, participation and tolerance” (p. 179). For Featherstone et al. (2012), 
the terrain of localism should not be ceded to the neoliberal political right. Instead, progressives need 
to intervene and contest how localism is being politically constructed and practised, and how existing 
forms of localism can be reworked and extended to determine “alternative political projects” as part of 
left-wing political agendas (p. 179-180). This means that “it is imperative that geographers engage 
critically and creatively with the way localism is being articulated in different geographical and political 
contexts” (ibid, p.181). As such ‘progressive localism’ also form a key concept in the research framework.  
 
In the same progressive spirit, Williams et al. (2014) argue that austerity localism has inadvertently 
opened various ethical and political spaces of interstitial resistance and experimentation against roll-
back neoliberalism. In their words, “there is a matrix of possibilities for ‘progressive’ social and political 
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actors to enact new worlds within the confines of neoliberal governmentality, in some cases 
reappropriating technologies and exploiting political openings created by austerity localism” (p. 2810). 
So whilst Coalition localism clearly has alternative political and economic motives beyond empowering 
local councils and communities, it has also (inadvertently) created new spaces to cultivate forms of 
progressive localism that have the potential to disrupt and challenge existing neoliberalisations. 
However, as Clarke and Cochrane (2013) warn, the ‘geographies of localism are never straightforwardly 
local’; and attempts for counter-hegemonic progressive politics must not become fixated or confined 
within a single spatial scale such as the ‘local’ (Mohan and Stokke, 2000, Purcell, 2006, Rootes, 2013).  
 
The literature shows that the barriers to progressive localism are more than just ‘excessive’ state power. 
Raco (2013) argues that Coalition rhetoric that empowerment is a zero-sum game, with power either 
residing with communities or state bureaucracies, underestimates the complex entanglements that 
have been created by privatisation and the shift from government to governance. During the 1990s and 
2000s, state-led privatization expanded aggressively to the extent that private companies not only took 
control over a diverse range of contracted-out services, but also began to build much of the physical 
infrastructure on which public services are dependent and rent them back to the government. As such, 
a large amount of power now lies outside and beyond state bureaucracies, which hinders the extent to 
which government can actually empower citizens. The Coalition Government deliberately ignores these 
barriers to empowerment, because to do so would be to acknowledge that the planning system and 
state bureaucracies are not the main barriers to democratic engagement as depicted in their rhetoric.    
 
In this context, Raco (2013, p.60) makes the point that ironically “Far from crushing localism, stronger 
state institutions could in fact enable citizen and community activity to flourish”, particularly when 
mobilised to challenge powerful vested interests. Thus for localism to mean anything, it must directly 
engage with power embedded in private sector ‘contractualism’ and the barriers imposed on localities 
and communities by neoliberal privatisation. In this way, ‘the politics of localism is, of course, a politics 
of geography…under the Coalition’s localism agenda there has been a systematic attempt to 
institutionalise inequalities and reduce the extent to which wealthier areas directly support the less 
wealthy through financial transfers…By withdrawing state support and re-defining the planning system 
as a whole, the Coalition government has exposed people and places to market changes that are way 
beyond their control and over which there is little they can actually do…Place-formation is to be left to 
the vagaries of the market…with its focus on sink or swim politics of place and individualism’ (Raco, 2013, 
p.9-12). This geography of ‘sink or swim’ localism post-2010 forms a key focus of the empirical research. 
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Finally, getting to the heart of these critical theories of Coalition localism, and forming one of the core 
themes investigated throughout this study, is that ‘the capacity for local autonomy is asymmetric’. As 
Madanipour and Davoudi (2015) explain, ‘[a] peaceful, prosperous, confident and well-connected 
locality is well-placed to benefit from a process that favours the local. Localism in this context may lead 
to the reconfirmation of the status quo and furthering of existing privileges. In such circumstances, active 
networks and civic enterprises are more likely to be able to fill the gaps left by the withdrawal of the 
state institutions and support. However, if a locality is riddled with conflict, unable to mobilise resources, 
exposed to the dominance of larger players and located unfavourably in the broader political and 
economic processes, localism is likely to find a different meaning. It may well become a trapdoor leading 
to the abandoning of people and places in the face of potentially unsurmountable challenges’ (p. 277).  
 
In sum, the relationship between neoliberal ideology and the Coalition Governments’ particular policy 
articulation of localism post-2010 is strong in the critical academic literature despite the political claims 
for ‘empowerment’. The next part continues this critical review for neoliberalism and planning reforms.    
 
2.5.2 Neoliberalism and Planning Reforms  
 
Moving onto planning system reforms, despite the strong links between neoliberalism and Coalition 
localism in the academic literature, the exact links between neoliberalism and planning more generally 
remain more contested. Arguably the UK state has been underpinned by a neoliberal political economy 
to different extents since the collapse of the post-war settlement throughout the late 1970s and early 
1980s, however it is unclear what exactly this has meant in overall terms for the UK planning system:  
 
‘Various changes and outcomes are seen as part of the neoliberalization of planning, a process that 
started in the late 1970s and early 1980s and has continued ever since. Yet during the decades since this 
neoliberalization of planning allegedly began there have been distinct and rather different emphases. 
While the 1980s witnessed attempts to roll back and deregulate planning, the early 1990s were 
characterised by a strengthening and centralization of planning. Then, the period from 1997-2002 was 
marked by more deregulation rhetoric while the era 2002-2008 witnessed a ‘renaissance of planning’. 
If planning has been neoliberalized then it is not entirely clear what that means or what has been achieved’ 
(Allmendinger, 2016, p. 10, emphasis added).    
 
In this sense, the literature demonstrates that the overall direction, significance and total cumulative 
impacts of neoliberalisations on planning and planners are less than straightforward. Despite varied 
87 
 
and persistent neoliberal programmes of reform to the planning system, there has been ‘no recipe for 
planning but neoliberalism provided the broad parameters and ingredients for its reform. There was and 
can never be a clear neoliberal end game for planning’ (Allmendinger, 2016, p. 205). However, the broad 
parameters for neoliberal reforms involve ‘greater marketization of planning, a more prominent role 
for the private sector in determining policy, the replacement of local discretion in favour of an agenda 
created by a central government–business nexus and the deregulation of state planning with the 
removal of higher strategic levels of planning’ (Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014, p.346). In this respect, 
neoliberal ideology is more a guiding framework outlining the desired overall objectives for planning 
rather than a coherent strategy or ‘end game’. These key issues will be returned to later in the thesis.   
 
The neoliberal explanatory framework developed in this study aligns with the critical commentators 
that argue the planning system created through the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, as part of 
the broader post-Second World War development of a collectivist welfare state, has been replaced by 
variegated forms of ‘neoliberal spatial governance’ developing since the 1980s (Allmendinger, 2016, 
Sager, 2013). This literature is closely aligned to post-political theory that neoliberal planning has the 
broadly defined objective to promote growth and a market state, but whilst also maintaining legitimacy 
through the removal of conflict and alternative political discourses (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012).   
 
In terms of neoliberal strategies more generally, Allmendinger (2017) categorises three processes of 
‘roll-back’, ‘roll-out’ and ‘roll-around’ neoliberalisations. The neoliberal approach enacted under the 
Thatcher Conservative Governments 1979-1990 was broadly ‘rolling back’ the state and emphasising 
the market (Thornley, 1991). For the Blair and Brown New Labour Governments, the approach was one 
of making the state more efficient, particularly through centralised regulatory and performance/target 
management regimes to ‘roll-out’ new forms of neoliberal urban governance (Fuller and Geddes, 2008). 
Under the Cameron-led Coalition and majority Conservative Governments 2010-2016, both roll-back 
deregulation and roll-out neoliberal governance have been pursued in a ‘hybrid’ form of ‘roll around’ 
or ‘roll-with-it’ neoliberalisation (Keil, 2009). It is argued these hybrid approaches to neoliberalisations 
have proved to be a successful governing strategy by blending policy deregulations and central financial 
management with spatial rescaling to achieve different state objectives for restructuring post-2010. 
 
Extending the focus on neoliberalism to evaluating capitalist systems more generally, Prior (2005) 
provides a ‘regulationist’ interpretation of the structural causes of planning system reform in the UK. 
Broadly, the capitalist obsession with endless accumulation generates contradictions that threaten the 
system through perpetuating economic crises. Regulationist (Marxist) and critical (neoliberal) theorists 
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have sought to understand how such systems are successfully ‘reproduced’ despite their inherent 
‘creative destructive’ tendencies, most recently evident in the 2008 GFC. The capitalist systems in which 
crisis tendencies are mitigated are said to be ‘regulated’; the regime of capitalist accumulation survives 
because it is being regulated by social institutions to compensate for market failures. This can explain 
the capitalist/neoliberal contradictory need for planning to mitigate against negative externalities and 
crisis and simultaneous attempts to undermine its regulatory functions as a barrier in the search for 
increased capital accumulation. In this way, planners are also part of the fightback against excessive 
accumulation at the expense of competing social/environmental objectives under neoliberal regimes.  
 
Similarly, Foglesong (1996) identifies two contradictions in capitalism that need to be addressed by the 
state using planning. The first is the ‘property contradiction’ between the private ownership and control 
of land as a ‘commodity’ in a system of property rights, against the ‘socialization’ of land as a collective 
social resource for providing amenities and coordinating essential infrastructure for the reproduction 
of labour. In this way capitalism necessitates a land-use planning system, but at the same time such a 
system threatens the liberty of private property rights. The second is the ‘capitalist-democracy 
contradiction’ in which the market alone cannot create a built environment that can maintain capitalist 
production and therefore needs state intervention through planning. However, such intervention 
creates democratic opportunities for input in planning decisions that goes beyond land and property 
owners. These tensions within the planning system mirror the wider tensions that manifest within the 
prevailing capitalist system. These understandings assist in explaining the constant problematizations 
and reforms aiming to better align state planning within the dominant political economy, but whilst 
also needing to maintain enough planning powers to ‘regulate’ the system. These tensions between 
the role of the state and market under capitalist regimes significantly pre-date neoliberal ideology; 
although under neoliberalism tensions between regulation and development have been exacerbated. 
 
Beyond these ‘structuring’ planning system contexts under capitalist and neoliberal political-economies, 
the literature underscores another key point for this research; that government reforms often deviate 
from their intended objectives as they are translated into local practices as they are mediated by both 
their target actors (LG and planners) and external (quangos/consultants/statutory bodies/communities) 
bodies. Structure-agency theory demonstrates how government legislative and material policy reforms 
can be (re)implemented by agents in specific ways that produce unintended consequences in practice.   
 
For example, previous research on planning reform in England 2001-2010 under the New Labour 
government (Gunn and Vigar, 2012, Gunn and Hillier, 2012, Gunn and Hillier, 2014) highlights the 
89 
 
challenges faced by national government when implementing planning reforms. The complexity and 
mediation of reforms through different institutions and actors means that the ways in which they are 
translated into local practices often deviate from the intended objectives. This leads to the recognition 
that policies are ‘complex and evolving social constructions rather than...concretely fixed objects’ (Peck 
and Theodore cited in Gunn and Hillier, 2012, p. 376). The literature and policy changes suggests this 
has been the case for localism reforms and neighbourhood planning (DCLG, 2016, Parker et al., 2017b).   
 
Specifically, Gunn and Hillier (2012) explored how new policy agendas travel and are adopted through 
the planning system. The ambition for reform started within central government, however, to be 
successful they need to develop ‘the capacity to travel to LPA processes and be recognised and accepted 
by key actors, the new system needed to progress through various networks or assemblages, becoming 
institutionalised into local strategic planning discourses and practices’ (p. 375-6). Thus the aims of 
central government planning reforms needed to be translated through key textual and organisational 
intermediaries and mediators, a process through which some key ideas became lost, others mutated, 
whilst others gained in importance through this translation process (such as viability post-NPPF).   
 
Building on these findings, Gunn and Hillier (2014) found New Labour’s planning reforms in the UK 
2001-2010 intended to create a more proactive, creative and flexible planning culture; however, that 
they increasingly became interpreted by public-sector planners through practice ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’. 
The tensions within the narratives and objectives of the reforms, the continually changing practice 
context, and contradictory advice from multiple intermediaries and agencies led to a lack of practitioner 
proactivity and confidence in their role and confusion over the goals of the broader planning system.    
 
In this context, the intended proactive and flexible goals of the planning reforms were lost and instead 
became interpreted through performance targets by planners. The reform emphasis on performance 
targets, indicators and timescales, along with ‘the focus on a well-identified danger—of not achieving a 
sound plan in the time frame expected, missing identified key evidence requirements or of not meeting 
agreed development management decisions/targets on time and so on— generated anxiety and fear’. 
The culmination of these factors effectively ‘imbued changes to the planning system with a strong sense 
of risk’ (p. 67).  For Gunn and Hillier (2014), this reduced the scope for forms of practitioner reflection, 
flexibility and creativity, leading planners to adopt a ‘risk mentality’. Planners therefore acted in 
precautionary ways, such as seeking greater guidance and delaying strategies for examination in favour 
of more evidence gathering, which countered the government ambition for a more efficient planning 
system and underscored the unintended consequences of the New Labour planning reforms 2001-2010.   
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Beyond these specific practice challenges of reform ‘implementation’, Lord and Tewdwr-Jones (2014) 
argue that if the economists at the British Treasury genuinely wanted to fundamentally reform planning, 
they would need to address ‘the real issues that affect how land is priced and allocated’, the ‘largely 
fixed relationship between landownership and development rights’ and the ‘extremely limited evidence 
of a genuine appetite amongst the public at large for greater democratic involvement in land-use change’ 
(p.355). Instead the conservative nature of the governing elites on both sides of the political spectrum 
results in ‘an almost constant process of piecemeal tinkering rather than wholesale reform’ that typically 
takes the form of shifting the territorial scales of planning (ibid). This literature highlights the crucial 
point that despite strong government rhetoric that the planning system needs to be ‘fundamentally 
reformed’, elites do not necessarily want to reform planning in respect to these more fundamental issues.   
 
Instead, successive governments have focused almost exclusively on ‘piecemeal’ planning reform, 
without explicitly acknowledging that planning is only one part of the problem amongst broader 
political/economic/social/cultural challenges in the UK. The overall picture from the literature is that 
the UK planning system has become a ‘political football’, a sector that every incoming administration 
uses as a means to both explain the previous government failings and highlight their own radical agenda, 
resulting in a ‘bruised sector, used to multiple reforms intended to ‘cure’ a problem that has been ill-
diagnosed’ (Haughton, 2012, p.122). These key issues ‘frame’ the analysis chapter on planning reform.  
 
Overall this section has argued that planning systems and planners have been subjected to continuous 
reforms under neoliberal political economies in response to powerful elite discourses that planning acts 
as a constraint on growth and needs to be reformed to become an enabler of economic development. 
It has also made the case that the ideological critiques driving consistent planning reforms are flawed 
because they underplay or ignore the existing and entrenched underlying challenges of elite interests 
and land politics that lie at the heart of planning and development processes. It has also highlighted the 
potential for ‘unintended consequences’ as structural government reforms are implemented by specific 
actors and places. These issues will be further explored in relation to the subsequent analysis chapters. 
 
Overall this Theory and Literature Review Chapter has introduced some of the key literatures that have 
informed this study and outlined the main ‘theoretical framework’ and concepts that will be used to 
examine contemporary practice changes in LG planning post-2010. The next chapter outlines the 
methodology and research design used to collect and analyse the primary empirical data for the analysis. 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology and Research Design  
 
This purpose of this chapter is to present a summarised overview of the central methodological and 
research design decisions taken throughout this project. It is divided into four main sections. The first 
section develops a reflection on the overarching methodological/theoretical/epistemological approach 
to the research and how these influenced the practicalities of the overall research design. The second 
section outlines the local planning authority (LPA) case selection process. The third section explains the 
rationale behind which planning actors have been targeted for participation in the study. The final 
section discusses the research methods used to conduct the fieldwork and collect the empirical data, 
as well as the outlining coding strategy for sorting and analysing the data. It should be stated at the 
outset that the empirical component of this thesis is underpinned by 40 semi-structured research 
interviews with (senior) management level planners working within LAs across England. Having outlined 
the objectives and structure of this chapter, the next section begins by setting up the overarching 
methodological, theoretical and epistemological approaches underpinning the research design. 
 
3.1 Research Methodology and Epistemology   
 
This section reflects on a number of key methodological issues that have shaped the overall approach 
to the research and that are necessary to address before moving on to discuss how they influenced the 
more practical decisions that informed the research design. These methodological, theoretical and 
epistemological reflections concern; 1) the researcher’s positionality and world view; 2) the challenges 
of connecting (abstract) theory and (empirical) practice; and 3) the trade-off between presenting either 
the nuances around the contextualised cases or broader decontextualized comparisons of the sample. 
It is not claimed, however, that these are the only core methodological challenges facing this study, but 
that together they each represent a key consideration or limitation of the approach to the development 
of this research. The following methodological discussion is necessary to ‘clear the decks’ and explain 
the broader frames of reference that have shaped the overall approach to the research. This is 
necessary at the outset to set up how these broader framings have influenced the more ‘practical’ 
research method issues of how the study was designed and implemented in the proceeding sections.  
 
3.1.1 Positionality and ‘World View’ 
 
The first point to make is that the researcher has a clear positionality as a young, white, male academic 
on the political left; and a specific ‘world view’ that (sub)consciously informs the approach and (critical) 
interpretations of the research. In terms of the researchers’ ‘world view’, one foundational conviction 
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is that neoliberalism is more than a set of market-supportive technical policies, but rather should be 
understood as a fundamental ideological/political attempt to change the very nature of the relationship 
between the state, citizens and market. This world view immediately boxes in the scope of the research. 
Next is the researcher’s conjecture that ‘grounded’ and ‘real world’ practice-based data is significant 
for understanding the world as ‘socially constructed’ by competing actors and interests. Whilst an 
inductive ‘grounded theory’ approach was not specifically operationalised in a pure methodological 
sense; it shaped the overall approach based on the value attached to professional and lived experiences 
of the theoretical and policy concepts being investigated. Finally, the researcher has the belief that 
public planning and development can and should play a key role in socio-spatial justice. Together these 
form the epistemological foundations for a neoliberal structure-agency approach to planning practice. 
 
This world view meant that qualitative research was selected as most appropriate to gain insights into 
‘practice-based’ and ‘lived’ experiences and responses (E&Rs) to the research ‘objects’ of austerity and 
planning policy/localism reforms. It is sufficient to note here that during the early stages of the study, 
a number of potential qualitative methodological approaches were reviewed based on the research 
methods literature (e.g. Corbin and Strauss, 1990, Holloway and Todres, 2003, Flyvbjerg, 2006, Starks 
and Brown Trinidad, 2007, Silva et al., 2014, Farthing, 2015). As such it was decided that a variation of 
‘grounded theory’ would be most the suitable based on the research questions and objectives in this 
study over a phenomenology, discourse analysis or single case study/ethnography approach.   
 
The research design does not rigidly adhere to grounded theory (GT) (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) in a 
pure sense; but instead is informed by this approach to emphasise that concepts about the world 
(theory) should always have their roots (be ‘grounded’) in the ideas voiced by the people whose lives 
and activities are being studied (Cloke et al., 2004). Starks and Trinidad (2007) explain that GT explores 
the ‘six C’s’ of social processes that are causes, contexts, contingencies, consequences, covariances and 
conditions to ‘inquire about how social structures and processes influence how things are accomplished 
through a given set of social interactions’ (p. 1374). A variation of GT was selected over phenomenology 
because the objective is to develop explanatory theory about LG planning that is grounded in specific 
contexts; because ‘[g]rounded theorists inquire about how social structures and processes influence how 
things are accomplished through a given set of social interactions’ (ibid). Similarly, Holloway and Todres 
understand the goal of GT to ‘[d]evelop a theory of how individuals and groups make meaning together 
and interact with each other; of how particular concepts and activities fit together and can explain what 
happens’ (2003, p. 348). This is why the researcher selected methods that engages (talks) with people.  
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Furthermore, the researcher was sympathetic to the position of the participants in having to respond 
to national austerity and policy reforms, and this influenced how they positively responded to the 
interview process. Responses such as “it has been very cathartic talking to you” (SP17) suggest an 
atmosphere akin to a therapy session for the participants to express their professional concerns that 
now formed the day-to-day challenges in their jobs. The benefit for the participants was that they were 
given the opportunity to discuss their practice challenges in a sympathetic way that they might not get 
to with others, whilst the payoff for the researcher was gaining access to insider knowledge about these 
actual practices of planning. The researcher attempted to minimise their influence over the research 
interviews and participants by adopting a measured and non-judgmental tone (akin to a quasi-therapist) 
that acknowledged the challenges for planners in relation to different stakeholders and encouraged 
them to openly discuss their E&Rs. However, it is not claimed that the researcher was a neutral party 
simply collecting objective data, rather the data should be considered as ‘co-produced’ between the 
questions and rationale/position of the researcher and specific understandings and points raised by the 
participants. Overall, this approach was largely successful in building rapport/trust during the interviews. 
 
Moreover, the references made throughout this thesis to LG planning practices ‘post-2010’ under the 
premiership of the Cameron-led Governments is based on the conjecture that this is a ‘transformative 
moment’ for the planning system and public planners in England. It is argued that the national policy 
reforms (NPPF, localism, viability, duty to cooperate, etc.) and financial reforms driven by austerity 
(removal of the Revenue Support Grant, New Homes Bonus, Business Rate Retention, council tax 
restrictions, sale of high value public assets, etc.) in this period signal a continuity and strengthening of 
neoliberal thought and practice over the planning system in England. This does not necessarily mean 
there has been a clear break from previous models of planning (albeit the differences to New Labour’s 
strategic spatial planning are evident), but a significant step change in the expected practice culture of 
planners (Grange, 2014, Inch, 2017) and objectives of the planning system (Ellis and Henderson, 2016, 
Allmendinger, 2016). So already ‘post-2010’ is used here as a loaded term to denote this transformation. 
 
Overall, the methodology and research design forms a qualitative, grounded, inductive and ‘imbricated’ 
approach (Homan, 1991), based on the high value the researcher places on practice-based ‘actually 
existing’ or ‘real world’ accounts of experiences and responses to existing national policy agendas, and 
working within abstract academic and elite normative and theoretical discourses/ideologies. This is also 
based on the researcher’s position as a ‘social constructivist’; that the social world is created by the 
actions of individuals/institutions but shaped by forces that led to adoption of structure-agency theory. 
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3.1.2 Connecting Theory and Practice  
 
Beyond considerations of the researcher’s role and position within the study, there are also more 
generalised questions surrounding the difficulties in applying ‘high-level’ (framing/meta) theory to 
contextualised empirical data. One of the main challenges is the attempt to connect abstract high and 
mid-level explanatory theorisations (whether that be neoliberalism, governmentality, post politics, etc.) 
with inductive ‘grounded’ empirical data on planning practices concerning specific E&Rs within local 
councils. There are important concerns about stretching these theorisations too far to try to explain 
specific events in heavily contextualised local settings, as well as misapplying them to specific findings 
or overstating their fit and explanatory power for planning changes. However, without such higher level 
theory, the empirical data would lack any explanatory frameworks and concepts to situate the findings 
and make sense of ‘real world’ understandings and practices. These concerns form part of wider 
debates around a planning ‘theory-practice gap’ (Alexander, 1997, Watson, 2002, Watson, 2008). 
 
Critically, whilst neoliberal theory provides a useful framework for explaining the meta-narratives and 
trends relating to changes within the UK political economy and the planning system, the actual 
application to the LA cases and empirical interview data can be considered more limited. It is difficult 
to reconcile high-level theory with highly contextualised and specific empirical data, and caution has to 
be taken not to force the data to conform to the theory. This forms a significant tension within 
contemporary research on neoliberalism, and is why many commentators question its analytical value 
to explain context specific actions and events (Birch, 2017). Indeed, Venugopal (2015) goes further in 
arguing that as a concept, ‘neoliberalism has become a deeply problematic and incoherent term that 
has multiple and contradictory meanings, and thus has diminished analytical value’; and questions ‘the 
one-sided, morally laden usage of the term by non-economists to describe economic phenomena…[that] 
serves to signify and reproduce the divide between economics and the rest of the social sciences’ (p.165). 
This was a particular frustration for this researcher, finding that neoliberal theory is valuable ‘generally’ 
for explaining changes to planning but elusive ‘specifically’ for explaining contextual cases and actions. 
 
In presenting a counter-argument, such high-level theories are important because planning, and politics 
and society more broadly, are structured by power relations; and so we need high-level abstract theory 
such as neoliberalism, governmentality and post-politics to assist broader explanations for how power 
operates (e.g. through individual conduct or manufactured consensus) and to what ends (e.g. a market-
led low-regulation state). The fact that there are competing theoretical and critical interpretations that 
provide different explanations for the changes being enacted within the planning system in England is 
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not a considered a weakness but rather a strength of planning theory (Allmendinger, 2017) and other 
(academic) disciplines to explain the ‘real’ world. The fact that this project has adopted an extended 
neoliberal structure-agency approach does not deny, for example, the insights of an alternative post-
structuralist account of the complex changes unfolding in planning/politics/economics in the UK post-
2010. In defending the approach selected, however, it is argued that governing programmes of reform 
are as much ideological/political as objective/technical in necessity and nature; and therefore are 
driven explicitly or implicitly by powerful interests. As such, the blend of theories contributing to the 
theoretical framework heuristic developed here attempt to deal with issues of power in their own way 
to greater or lesser extents; but with the contention that neoliberal ideology shaped the Cameron era. 
 
This research primarily draws on a neoliberal structure-agency informed approach, but also insights 
from governmentality and post-political theory. Again, this is based on the conviction that ‘there is no 
one planning theory that we can assimilate and take into practice. Instead, there are a range of 
competing ideas and theories that will, to greater or lesser degrees, correspond to our values and views 
of the world’ (Allmendinger, 2017, p. 27). Rydin (2010) also makes the case that there is ‘no one planning 
theory’ and that planning researchers should draw on a number of explanatory frames/concepts to 
make sense of the ‘real world’ system. From this perspective, each of these disciplinary theories can 
highlight different traditions and insights for understanding contemporary planning changes, but they 
are not necessarily sufficient on their own (or in different combinations) to explain the range of 
observed empirical data and complexity of social reality (nor should they be fully expected to do this).  
 
3.1.3 Contextualised Cases or Decontextualised Comparisons?  
 
The last challenge discussed here is that given the extensive scope of background information and 
empirical data for each of the 40 cases, it was not possible to present any of the cases with significant 
local details. As such, much of the empirical data presented is essentially ‘decontextualized’ to present 
broader E&Rs, rather than to explain the local ‘contextualised’ specificities for each case. This is one 
methodological trade-off in the research design that prioritised some degree of geographical 
representativeness, and therefore generalisability and comparability, over a more fine-grained analysis. 
 
The subsequent Analysis Chapters draw on the empirical case data to construct a number of general 
propositions and claims about the experiences and responses of planning/planners to austerity and 
policy reform post-2010. This is based on a decontextualization/recontextualisation coding approach. 
The ‘coding framework’ (discussed more in section 3.4) consisted of first phase ‘open-coding’ on the 
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contextualised 40 ‘place-based’ interview transcripts; and second phase ‘focussed-coding’ for the 
decontextualized seven ‘thematic transcripts’ (e.g. a thematic transcript on ‘localism’ rather than for a 
single LPA/PM ‘case’). Once decontextualized ‘themes’ had emerged (such as the shift towards LPA 
‘commercialisation’ under austerity) the data would be re-contextualised by situating the practitioner’s 
E&Rs with their specific rural-urban, political and regional context. As such the approach was based on 
decontextualisation and re-contextualisation rather than a contextualised analysis of each LPA case. 
 
In this respect it was not possible to chronicle the rich details that form the 40 LG cases and sample 
participants in this study in the same way as would be possible for a traditional case study approach 
examining a single or handful of cases. Therefore this research adopted a broader geographical focus, 
necessarily sacrificing depth in exchange for a greater level of representativeness. The rationale behind 
this approach is that both broad and specific studies have strengths and weakness, and each need to 
be developed to complete our understanding of research issues at different scales and grains of analysis. 
Had the study been based upon a single or small number of ‘case studies’, then another approach, such 
as actor-network theory (Rydin and Tate, 2016), would have been more suitable for explaining the 
complexity of local actors involved in implementing, mediating or challenging the objectives of reforms. 
There are a number of excellent case studies on local government austerity (Ahrens and Ferry, 2015, 
Davies and Thompson, 2016, Gardner, 2017, Fuller, 2017), and some emerging broader geographical 
studies (Ferry et al., 2017), in the academic literature. This study seeks to add to these literatures.   
 
The theory and literature review highlighted the challenges involved in trying to explain the relationship 
between neoliberal structures (such as national policy and financial reforms) and the diverse forms of 
agency at the local level (such as council planning practices). There are a number of different structural 
forces, forms of local agency and contextual factors that can produce complex interplays to determine 
the specific experiences and responses (outcomes) of attempts at reforms within space. Figure 7 
sketches out the different inputs that interact to shape the relationships between national level reforms 
and the local government planning experiences and responses investigated in this project. It should be 
noted that this figure is intended to be indicative of the complex interplay between different forces, 
agencies and contexts rather than providing a comprehensive list of factors or attempting to develop a 
‘model’ of responses to reform (See Herrington and Parker [2012, p.482-487, Journal of the Town and 
Country Planning Association, Vol.81, No.11] for a similar attempt to map these dynamics for councils). 
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Figure 7 – Outline factors that shape local experiences and responses to national reform: 
 
 
It seems intuitive here (although not a claim to knowledge) that nothing can be read off about the likely 
E&Rs of an LPA to reform a priori; such as a more reductionist typology based on their rural-urban 
classification, regional context, political control or local economy alone. Instead a more complex set of 
relationships between (competing) factors needs to be considered to do justice to the specific local 
contingency of the case being investigated. Put crudely, every local (planning) authority has diverse and 
unique structuring forces, assemblages of agency (for more on assemblage theory see DeLanda, 2006, 
DeLanda, 2016) and embedded contexts that mean that every place and case is different. Such 
differences can be subtle and nuanced or can be a complete contrast relative to the combination of 
factors that shape other LPAs. The question then becomes, following Blanco et al (2014), can we say 
anything more about the structures of neoliberalism and its impacts on the diversity of local agency?    
 
‘Recognising the significance of context for the logic of the local and the urban poses challenges for how 
we traverse the universal and the particular in studies of neoliberalism. Are we left concluding that 
everywhere is different or can we begin to offer anything else? The challenge here is to develop a 
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comparative critical local governance that can engage with both ‘global discourses’ and contextually 
specific experiences, and which avoids either subsuming all regimes of local governance within an over-
riding logic of neoliberalism or privileging the diversity of local regimes to the extent that we negate the 
hegemonic potential of discourses of neoliberalism’ (Blanco et al., 2014, p.3141).  
 
Whilst this research has not specifically addressed this need for a ‘comparative critical local governance’, 
the research methodology and empirical findings presented here have been sensitive to the problems 
of privileging either structural neoliberal or situated agency accounts for determining wholesale the 
local E&Rs of reforms. Instead it has attempted to present some of the complexity between cases as 
well as the more ‘generalised’ LPA E&Rs and evaluations of structural reform pressures. For example, 
pressures for LPAs to become more commercial and financially self-sufficient in response to austerity 
was broadly shared and evident across all 40 cases, but the details behind the ability of individual LPA 
cases to respond to these pressures was heavily dependent on the different combination of factors that 
allow them to (re)act in different ways, which shaped their overall approach and ‘resilience’ to reform. 
So whilst the focus here emphasises structures, it should be clear that these cannot be separated from 
some consideration of individual agency when examining local experiences and responses to reforms. 
 
Therefore the 40 LPA cases have not been explicitly placed into a typology here because each has a 
different combination of factors whereby structures are filtered and mediated in situated local contexts 
by different agents to produce specific outcomes. Even the descriptive containers used for the LPA 
cases as ‘urban’ or ‘rural’, ‘south east’ or ‘north east’ or ‘Conservative’ or ‘Labour’ masks the messy 
variations and physical and social histories that weave together to shape ‘space’ and ‘place’ (Massey, 
2005). The urban-rural classification, regional geography and local politics applied to LAs here, whilst 
necessary to provide some background to orientate the reader, can at best only provide the reader 
with a limited understanding of the context. Suffice to say a typology based only on such characteristics 
would very likely mask the unique variables that produce specific outcomes within and between cases. 
 
The above methodological discussion was necessary to ‘clear the decks’ and explain the broader frames 
of reference that have shaped the overall approach to this research. This is necessary at the outset to 
set up how these methodological/theoretical/epistemological framings have influenced the more 
‘practical’ research methods issues of how the research was designed and implemented. Having 
developed this groundwork, the proceeding sections in this chapter can move on to discuss the practical 
research design decisions. The next section begins this by outlining the research case selection process.         
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3.2 The Research Cases - Local Authority Selection Process 
 
The objective of this section is to explain the selection process for the LPA research ‘cases’. The first 
central decision in the process was to focus on the case study of the English planning system for the 
practical reason that this study does not seek to present a comparative account of planning systems 
and practices across the UK; which would need to evaluate the similarities and differences between the 
(increasingly) devolved political, legal and (planning) policy contexts of Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland (Morphet and Clifford, 2014, Clifford and Morphet, 2015, MacKinnon, 2015, McKee et al., 2017). 
 
This research project had the advantage that all LAs in England have been subject to national policy 
reforms and austerity measures, albeit to differing extents and with strong geographical variations. 
Therefore, the potential pool of cases was extensive. There are 353 LAs in England. These are comprised 
of 27 county councils, 201 district councils, and 125 single-tier authorities (House of Commons Briefing 
Paper, 2017, No.07104). However, not all of these LAs have responsibility for planning and development 
functions, and so a number would not be suitable for this study. For example, county councils have 
responsibility for health and social care, education and waste planning, but not planning services. 
Instead, planning departments sit within the remit of second-tier district council functions or single-tier 
unitary authorities that encompass all LG functions. The next decision was to exclude London because 
of its unique economic, political and governance status compared to the other eight regions of England. 
This meant that, after excluding the 27 county councils and 32 London Boroughs, the study could 
potentially include the remaining 294 district and single-tier LAs that carry out planning services from 
across the eight regions in England. These decisions set the initial parameters for the LPA case selection.  
 
Figures 7-8 below outline the administrative structure and geography of local government in England. 
From these figures it is worth noting three points: firstly that the Coalition Government abolished the 
former regional government structures covering England in 2010; secondly that the electoral wards 
relate to the boundaries for voting activity for local and national elections which are not relevant to this 
study; and thirdly parish councils, often referred to as ‘community’ or ‘town’ councils, sit below the 
‘primary’ county, unitary and district councils because they do not have the same statutory powers or 
functions. Parish councils are also only found in certain parts of the country and so are not part of the 
study. It is sufficient for the purposes here to note that the objects of the study are district councils and 
unitary authorities because they control planning services within their bounded administrative territory: 
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Figure 8 – Administrative Structure of Local Government in England:  
 
(ONS Online – UK Administrative Geography). 
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Figure 9 – United Kingdom Local Authority Districts, Counties and Unitary Authorities (2017)  
 
(ONS, 2018). 
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The case selection method was based on a blend of judgement/purposive and quota sampling (Farthing, 
2015) that sought to ensure a relatively balanced mix of characteristics between regional distribution, 
rural-urban classification, relatively higher and lower ‘values’ in terms of local economic conditions 
(GVA), demographic and social pressures, administrative structures and size, etc. which together are 
termed here as LPA ‘contextuality’ as a shorthand for their specific mix and combination of these factors. 
In practice this activity relied on LG website desktop research and circling areas on a hard copy map to 
filter through the potential case candidates on a region-by-region basis (e.g. starting in the south-east). 
 
Where one targeted council was unresponsive to a request to participate in the study, the next LPA 
considered most suitable based on achieving a mix of contexts were contacted, and so on (and so also 
influenced by the characteristics of the LPAs that had already agreed to participate within a region). 
This sampling method also extended to the specific individuals that were contacted to participate in 
the study (discussed in section 3.3). Despite these criteria defined by the researcher leading to which 
cases were invited to participate in the study, this was balanced in practice by pragmatic issues of 
gaining ‘access’ to LPAs and key informants. Overall, the majority of councils were responsive to the 
study, with approximately 90 requests for participation translating into 40 research interviews. At this 
point, the researcher ceased inviting local councils to participate in the study in order to avoid collecting 
‘too much data’ than could be reasonably managed within the resource/time constraints of the project. 
 
In deciding on which cases to contact, the researcher utilised three main sources to review the ‘practice 
landscapes’ of local (planning) authorities. The first source was official reports and briefing papers from 
professional bodies such as the Local Government Association (LGA), Local Government Information 
Unit (LGIU), New Local Government Network (NLGN), Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) and Town 
and the Country Planning Association (TCPA). The second source was information from the national 
government Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and individual LG websites. 
The third source was through the practice-based industry magazines ‘Planning’ and ‘Local Government 
Chronicle’. Together these sources provided unfolding ‘real time’ practice-based insights that assisted 
the research design, case selection process, preparation for the interviews and served to supplement 
the academic literature and theoretical framework (Chapter 2). The sampling method and sources also 
addressed the concern to avoid the potential biases of only presenting ‘novel’ cases of responding to 
policy and austerity reforms on the one hand, and on the other presenting a ‘purely random’ selection. 
 
The ONS Rural-Urban Classification (RUC) of Local Authority Districts in England, based on data from 
the 2011 National Census, was used to classify councils for selection and into groupings for analysis 
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(See figure 10). Six are categorised as ‘Mainly Rural’ (West Oxfordshire and Cotswolds, Uttlesford, 
Derbyshire Dales, Huntingdonshire, Ryedale, Ribble Valley). Three as ‘Largely Rural’ (Aylesbury Vale, 
County Durham, Suffolk County). Five are categorised as ‘Urban with Significant Rural’ (Taunton Deane, 
Stafford, Wyre Forest, Cherwell and South Northants, Cheshire East). Sixteen are categorised as ‘Urban 
with City and Town’ (Arun, Bracknell, Leicester, Exeter, Guildford, Lincoln, Rugby, Oxford, Warwick, 
Middlesbrough, Wakefield, Hull, Blackburn with Darwen, Preston, Norwich, Bristol). One was 
categorised as ‘Urban with Minor Conurbation’ (Sheffield), and nine as ‘Urban with Major Conurbation’ 
(Birmingham, South Tyneside, Gateshead, Salford, Trafford, Newcastle, Wirral, Wigan, Rochdale). 
 
Figure 10 – Local Authority 2011 Rural-Urban Classification in England (ONS, 2011)  
 
(source: ONS, 2017). 
 
The RUC for each LPA case has been slightly simplified here to assist categorisation and comparison 
throughout the analysis. The nine LAs that fall under the classifications ‘Mainly Rural’ and ‘Largely Rural’ 
have been classified as ‘Rural’. The five LAs that come under ‘Urban with Significant Rural’ have been 
classified here as ‘Mixed’. The sixteen LAs designated ‘Urban with City and Town’ have been classified 
as ‘Urban’. The final ten LAs designated as ‘Urban with Minor Conurbation’ and ‘Urban with Major 
Conurbation’ respectively are classified here as ‘Major Urban’. Across the total 40 LPAs, 65% represent 
Urban and Major Urban places and 35% represent Mixed and Rural places across England. It can 
therefore be argued that the data set represents a fairly diverse and mixed set of urban and rural LG 
cases, albeit with a slightly stronger urban bias (See figure 11). 
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Figure 11 – Research Cases Numbers and Percentage by Rural-Urban Classification (ONS, 2011)  
 
 
Source: Authors own data. 
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In terms of the regional coverage of the total 40 LG cases that participated in the research, there is a 
slight over-representation of the North West and South East, and underrepresentation of the South 
West and East Midlands regions respectively. The original intention was for an exact distribution of 40 
LAs comprising five cases from across each of the eight regions in England. However, as a result of LG 
response rates and access, the lowest representation is three cases each in the South West and East 
Midlands, and the highest of nine cases in the North West. Figure 12 demonstrates the percentage 
regional distribution of the LA cases. The data set comprises 7 located in the South East (17.5%); 3 in 
the South West (7.5%); 4 in the East of England (10%); 3 in the East Midlands (7.5%); 5 in the West 
Midlands (12.5%); 4 within Yorkshire and the Humber (10%); 5 in the North East (12.5%); and 9 in the 
North West (22.5%) respectively. Overall it was felt this still provided LA regional ‘representativeness’.    
 
Figure 12 – Regional Distribution (Coverage) of Research Cases across England (%)  
 
Source: Authors own data.  
 
Despite the slight imbalances between regional coverage, there is still a good degree of representation 
from all eight regions across England (excluding London). This is important because the claim is not that 
these cases are representative of all LAs across England, but rather to demonstrate that a diverse range 
of geographically located places have been considered when drawing tentative interpretations and 
conclusions from the qualitative empirical data collected. The 40 LG ‘senior practitioners’ (herein SPs) 
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interviewed can therefore provide a diverse picture of the responses to planning under austerity and 
policy reforms since 2010 from a number of rural-urban and geographical regions across England.  
 
In addition, the state of the local economy across each of the research cases provides an important 
antecedent condition when examining incentivised/pro-growth policy reforms and responses to budget 
pressures. The average Gross Value Added (GVA) produced by local economies (NUTS3 areas) in 2015 
provided a rough initial benchmark to assess the economic context for each case in relation to the UK 
average (See figure 13). These NUTS3 areas did not necessarily fit neatly with the cases and often 
represented their wider local economies that masks the economic variations at the scale of local 
councils. However, the researcher was not attempting to determine an exact or scientific definition of 
‘high’ and ‘low’ value councils. Rather the intention was to provide a cursory overview, with the specific 
LG positions clarified through the research interviews. Therefore, the high or low economic ‘value’ 
status attributed to the LG cases was simplistically inferred from the performance of the broader local 
economy to provide context for the research case selection process and preparation for interviews. 
Figure 13 - Average Gross Value Added (GVA) 2015 for NUTS3 Local Areas in England 
 
Source: Authors own graph (data sourced from ONS.GOV.UK).
 3.3 The Research Participants - Local Authority Planning Managers 
 
Following from the LPA case selection process, the purpose of this section is to discuss the decisions 
made around which planning actors (sample) to approach for interviews and why it is necessary to seek 
their specific knowledge. In practice the case and sample selection process were conducted at the same 
time in order to ensure that the researcher could access both an informative LPA case and SP position.    
 
The key informants for this study are senior management level planning practitioners. These positions 
are, however termed, the Head of Planning and Development Management or the Strategic Director 
that is responsibility for planning and other service areas. These actors have been selected because 
they are closely related to both the highest corporate level chief executive and directors running the 
local authority, and hence the overall strategies and principles of the council, as well as the front-line 
delivery of planning services through the management of their department, planning officers and 
resources. The rationale is that this position represents a key intermediary level between the overall 
council strategy and the specific functioning of the planning department. Furthermore, that the role of 
‘planning manager’ (PMs) would also encompass wider relationships with elected members/councillors, 
community groups and partnership organisations. In short, that they would have specific and collective 
knowledge as a professional body or policy group of actors working within the public planning sector.   
 
One underlying assumption is that senior and management level planners would better understand the 
broader corporate and leadership agenda of the council, and as such would have to manage their 
planning services accordingly to respond to austerity and policy reforms. That is to say that PMs are 
understood to represent well-informed decision-making actors, which are responsible for the everyday 
management of their staff and services and delivering wider changes as part of the overall corporate 
agenda. It was anticipated that such actors are the best placed to provide the most planning relevant 
and higher-level council insights into the internal culture changes and external relationships that had 
taken place in response to austerity and reforms 2010-2016. This was based on the reasoning that these 
issues have constituted their main practice concerns on a consistent basis over the previous six years.   
 
So the term ‘senior practitioner’ (SP) is used here as a broad shorthand to refer to an experienced, 
management-level planning practitioner working within LG. These SPs typically had extensive previous 
experience working for a number of LAs and planning services positions, as well as regional government 
agencies, development corporations, or private sector planning services in a number of specific cases. 
Seniority is used here as a proxy for the duration spent working within the planning system, and the 
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understanding of how it has functioned in the past as an important prerequisite for the ability to 
evaluate how it has been changing under the Cameron-led Governments post-2010. As such, the 
selection process for contacting the SP/PMs extended beyond the initial criteria for the cases to provide 
geographical ‘coverage’, to also incorporate their personal planning histories, management status and 
time working in their current role and other LAs, following the judgement/purposive sampling method.  
 
Importantly, the length of time spent as a PM and within the specified LG cases was a key factor when 
sampling for participants. The actors needed to have been acting ‘planning managers’ for at least most 
of this period 2010-2016; with preference given to those actors in the position for a longer duration 
(ideally pre-2010) and within the same LG during this time to make sense of the context and changes. 
These criteria were largely met by the participants, although some exceptions were made for 
distinguished PMs that had worked in a number of LAs under austerity/localism conditions. It was held 
that such actors could provide multiple views of responses within different LG contexts, with the trade-
off that these were still useful given the stated concerns around case and sample representativeness.    
 
The initial search for senior management planners was conducted through locating the ‘organisational 
structure charts’ (or equivalent) found on LG websites. These allowed the researcher to identify all the 
‘key’ actors within the management levels of the organisation and by each service/departmental area. 
Once the most relevant contacts were identified for a number of LG cases within a region, the 
professional networking site LinkedIn was utilised for acquiring background information on previous 
employment histories, roles and councils for contacting potential participants. This allowed each email 
(Appendix A) to be specifically tailored to the named individual being invited to take part in the study. 
These emails explained that because of their personal experiences and current position at council x, they 
would be ideally placed to take part in the research. Although this individual-by-individual approach 
was more time consuming, it proved very effective for gaining specific responses rather than contacting 
a council more generally. In many cases, these emails were followed up and interviews arranged with 
personal assistants as the ‘gatekeepers’, providing clear contacts for ‘chasing up’ potential respondents.       
 
The main research participant criterion was achieved, with all 40 participants in the study holding posts 
at a senior management level within the planning services area of the council. These roles ranged from 
the traditional ‘Head of Planning’ to ‘(Assistant) Strategic Directors of Place Services’ with the remit for 
planning and development services under their portfolio. It is important to note that the (assistant) 
strategic directors held a higher position and played a larger role within the council than the PMs that 
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acted as head of their department. In practice, the researcher was often referred either upwards or 
downwards between these two seniority/management levels by the actors contacted for an interview.  
 
In practice, this trade-off had the upshot of providing a neat balance between the views of more 
strategic level planning actors and those more orientated towards the front-line service delivery. 
However, it also raised the issue over whether or not to treat these actors with analytical distinction. 
The judgement call was made not to explicitly distinguish between these actors on the basis that for 
the purpose of this study each provided important insights for ‘managing’ austerity (Section 5.3) and 
policy reforms, albeit from a range of slightly different corporate and departmental management-level 
perspectives (although see table 5 for a summarised distinction of participant seniority and positions).  
 
In order to protect the identity of the research participants, the quoted extracts used to support the 
analysis only refer to the LG rural-urban classification and regional context as the minimum necessary 
for geographical context and comparison. This will be accompanied by the prefix ‘SP’ as shorthand for 
‘senior practitioner’ and a number from 1-40 which corresponds to the sequential order in which the 
research interviews were conducted. As an example, a quoted extract from the first interview 
conducted would be referenced as follows: (SP1, Urban, South East). The relatively close timing of each 
of the research interviews, conducted over a five-month period between February and July 2016, 
means that the date has not been included with each quotation. After the event, it became evident 
that these interviews were conducted during the final months of the Cameron-led Governments, which 
(inadvertently) provided a neater temporal boundary of planning practice 2010-2016 for the research.  
 
In terms of the overall sample representativeness, the total sample ‘population’ could have extended 
to all senior management planners working within English LAs (excluding counties and London). 
Assuming that each LG has one individual employed as the ‘head of planning services’ for each of the 
relevant 294 councils, then the 40 PMs interviewed that make up the sample in this research potentially 
represent around 13% of this population. It should be noted then that any empirical generalisations 
made about the responses of PMs to austerity and policy reforms is based on the representativeness 
of this specific sample of 40 practitioners in relation to this total population of council PMs in England. 
Again, the research design attempted to mitigate these methodological concerns by ensuring that the 
cases and samples represented a diverse range of contexts. One implicit assumption here, however, is 
that the PMs in specific regions are ‘speaking for’ the specific planning and development contexts within 
their region and the wider population of cases in that part of the country (or rural/urban issues, etc.).   
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Whilst it is acknowledged that LG contexts are extremely variable even within small geographic areas 
(e.g. mix of historical, economic, political, institutional/governance and population conditions) meaning 
that any claims to regional representativeness based on a handful of sample cases is overly reductionist; 
few studies have the resources and access to study the entire population, and as a result a number of 
relatively imperfect empirical generalisations have to be made from the samples and cases and 
extended to the whole. Nonetheless this is a key caveat for the (empirical) claims made in this research.   
 
Indeed, following Guba and Lincoln (1982), the need to generalise findings from samples/cases is 
questionable because ‘it is virtually impossible to imagine any human behaviour that is not heavily 
mediated by the context in which it occurs. One can easily conclude that generalizations that are 
intended to be context free will have little that is useful to say about human behaviour’ (cited in Farthing, 
2015, p. 84). Therefore the E&Rs of PMs to austerity and policy reforms within each LG will necessarily 
be specific to the factors determined by their overall context as these processes are simultaneously 
‘socially constructed’ by the actors within each contextual case setting across the country. So although 
there have been common challenges and themes for LPAs and planners, the researcher is cautious to 
claim any empirical generalisations to a single reality independent of the context. 
 
The challenges around sample ‘validity’ concern the extent to which the research is measuring what it 
claims to be measuring. In the context of this research, to what extent is the researcher really measuring 
the experiences and responses of LG planning managers to austerity and reform? For example, how are 
these separated from their personal sentiments on these subjects (and do these distinctions matter)?  
 
‘If planners are talking about their own actions, for example, do they rationalise their behaviour after 
the event and give a positive version of what went on? Or do they describe what they would ideally have 
liked to do in those situations?’ (Farthing, 2015, p. 82).  
 
Further methodological questions concern the claims to knowledge made based on the empirical data 
set; such as how legitimate is one specific practitioner’s E&Rs compared to the broader sample and case 
population, and how much weight should be given to singular accounts of these reform events? The 
position here is that singular personal/situated experiences of key actors within place have the potential 
to be equally as insightful for the research themes/concepts as the shared experiences that form the 
basis for empirical generalisations, and thus each practice-account is legitimate to their own local E&Rs.  
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The reliability of the interview data also needs to be considered. One potential issue is the uniformity 
of how planners were questioned about their experiences of austerity and policy reforms, because the 
differences in the order, emphasis and specific probes when questioning could potentially influence the 
responses provided by the participant. However, in light of the need to be sensitive to different contexts 
and follow the inductive approach that allowed room for the participants to decide the key themes in 
the first instances of questioning, it is contended that some variation in interview uniformity was 
necessary (discussed more in the next section for the semi-structured interviews and ‘interview guide’). 
 
Moreover, the participants were asked to reflect over the period 2010-2016 so that the data presented 
more than a ‘snapshot’ of what was happening at a particular place and time when the interviews were 
being conducted. The rationale was to try to overcome the snapshot that a single interview provides 
by focusing on changes over this time period. This problem was partially addressed by ensuring that all 
of the research participants had been PMs since at least 2010 (albeit often for different LPAs), and so 
had experienced and responded to austerity and reforms at this level (between the council leadership 
and case officer level) on a routine basis over the target reform period. It is obviously problematic, 
however, to suggest that participants could ‘bracket’ and speak directly to this 2010-2016 period in a 
one-hour interview. This issue was somewhat addressed by the focus on key themes of the NPPF, 
localism and austerity that simultaneously pervaded this period to present the ‘general picture’ in 
specific cases, rather than seeking a comprehensive step-by-step account of events over time. This does, 
however, present another caveat when making claims to the temporal scope of the research findings. 
 
Finally, whilst the research design and analysis does not explicitly divide the 40 participants according 
to their seniority of position, they were informally categorised by the researcher as Level 1 (L1) for 
‘Directors’ responsible for planning services, Level 2 (L2) for ‘Assistant Directors’ and Level 3 (L3) for 
‘Heads’ or ‘Managers’ of planning and development (or equivalent role/title within each of the cases). 
This means that L1 practitioners make up 30% (n12) of the sample, L2 practitioners 20% (n8) and L3 
practitioners 50% (n20) respectively. This distinction may not be accurate, however, given the various 
organisational and hierarchical council management structures and positions, and so should be treated 
with caution when attempting to make formal comparisons between planning management; although 
this potentially presents a future research agenda. Table 5 shows the practitioner codes, employment 
position and local authority context for each of the forty interview participants involved in the study. 
 
 
 
113 
 
Table 5 – Interview Participant Code, Employment Position and Local Authority Context:  
 
Interview 
Participant 
Code (1-40) 
Employment Position (at the time of interview) Local Authority Context (RUC 
and Region) 
SP1      (L1) Director of Planning and Economic Regeneration  Urban, South East.  
SP2      (L1) Shared Strategic Director (responsible for 
Planning services and other functions)  
Rural, South East.  
SP3      (L1) Leader of the Council Urban, South East.  
SP4      (L2) Assistant Director Planning and Building Control Rural, East of England. 
SP5      (L2) Assistant Director Planning and the Environment Mixed, South West.  
SP6      (L1) Director (responsible for Planning services and 
other functions) 
Rural, South East. 
SP7      (L3) Head of Planning Management and Delivery Urban, East Midlands. 
SP8      (L3) Head of Planning and Resource Management  Rural, East England. County 
SP9      (L3) Head of Planning and Regeneration  Mixed, West Midlands.  
SP10    (L2) Assistant Director for City Development Urban, South West. 
SP11    (L2) Assistant Director for Planning and Regeneration  Urban, West Midlands. 
SP12    (L3) Head of Planning and Major projects Manager Urban, South East. 
SP13    (L3) Planning Manager Urban, East Midlands. 
SP14    (L3) Head of Regeneration and Policy Rural, East Midlands.  
SP15    (L3) Head of Planning and Recreation Urban, West Midlands. 
SP16    (L1) Director for Economic Prosperity and Place Mixed, West Midlands. 
SP17    (L3) Head of Planning and Regulatory Services Urban, South East.  
SP18    (L3) Head of Development Rural, East England.  
SP19    (L3) Head of Planning and Development Services Urban, West Midlands.  
SP20    (L3) Head of Strategic Planning and Economy  Mixed, South East.  
SP21    (L1) Executive Director for Economic Development 
and Communities 
Urban, North East.  
SP22    (L3) Head of Development Services Urban, North East.  
SP23    (L3)    Head of Planning and Housing Rural, Yorkshire and Humber. 
SP24    (L1) Service Director for Planning, Transport and 
Highways 
Urban, Yorkshire and Humber.  
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SP25    (L3) Spatial Planning and Environment Manager Urban, North East. 
SP26    (L3) City Planning Manager Urban, Yorkshire and Humber. 
SP27    (L1) Director of Regeneration and Development 
Services 
Urban, Yorkshire and Humber.  
SP28    (L2) Assistant Director Planning and Transport  Urban, North West. 
SP29    (L1) Director of Growth and Regulatory Services Urban, North West.  
SP30    (L3) Head of Regeneration and Housing Rural, North West.  
SP31    (L1) Director of Regeneration, Growth and Prosperity Urban, North West.  
SP32    (L2) Assistant Director for Planning Urban, North East.  
SP33    (L3) Planning Development and Performance and 
Planning Managers (joint interview)  
Rural, North East.  
SP34    (L1) Director of Development Urban, North West.  
SP35    (L3) Head of Planning services Urban, East England.  
SP36    (L1) Service Director for Planning Urban, South West.  
SP37    (L3) Head of Regeneration and Planning Urban, North West.  
SP38    (L2) Assistant Director for Planning and Transport Urban, North West.  
SP39    (L2) Assistant Director Planning and Development Urban, North West.  
SP40    (L3) Head of Planning Strategy  Mixed, North West.  
 
Further research looking in more detail at the role and work of individual planners within the changing 
local government environment of policy and austerity-based reforms could compliment this study. 
Having briefly explained the selection process and rationale for the research cases and participants, the 
next section discusses decisions concerning the empirical data collection and how it was then analysed. 
 
3.4 Research Methods and Data Analysis 
 
Once the target LPA cases and SPs had been identified, contacted and participation had been agreed, 
the next task was conducting the fieldwork and collecting the empirical data. This section outlines how 
the fieldwork was undertaken, and the rationales behind the decisions made during the process, before 
moving on to explain how the empirical data was coded and analysed to present the research findings. 
 
3.4.1 Fieldwork and Data Collection  
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The first research design decision was that qualitative data would be most suitable for answering the 
research questions. The decision was made that the most appropriate tool for uncovering and probing 
participant experiences and responses was semi-structured interviews conducted in person. As a result, 
all 40 of the research interviews were conducted face-to-face with the participant and within their 
respective local authority building where they are employed. Logistically, this meant that the researcher 
would have to plan train travel and accommodation across England to conduct the interviews. The 
upshot was that the researcher could explore the local area and get a ‘feel’ for the socio-spatial context 
before each interview, which added to the understanding of planning issues in place. This observational 
element neatly complemented the desk-based review of local planning policy documents, projects and 
related material that provided the groundwork contextual information before the formal interviews (in 
the form of a well-worn fieldwork notebook which has not been possible to include in the appendix).   
 
The main research method was based on semi-structured interviews delivered using an ‘interview guide’ 
outlining the initial core themes/topics and using ‘open-ended’ questions to explore them. Semi-
structured interviews were chosen to ensure that each interview amounted to more than a rigid 
question set with no room for deviation, nor merely an informal conversation that had no guiding 
structure or themes. The flexibility of this research tool allowed the participant scope to outline their 
own understandings around what has been important to practice, whilst also providing an overall 
coherence and structure to data collection. More importantly for the actual interview process, the 
approach was to treat the interviews as a more relaxed and friendly conversational approach rather 
than a formal process, especially when talking about potentially controversial subjects such as austerity 
and housing growth. This approach was taken to build rapport and show respect to the interviewees 
and their professional lives rather than feeling like they were being used instrumentally to collect data.  
 
There are also some important methodological and practical limits of using semi-structured interviews 
with senior planners to understand changes in local authority practices. Firstly, research interviews can 
be problematic because the informant may have incomplete knowledge or memory. Moreover the 
interviewee ‘will always have subjective perceptions that will be related to their own past experiences 
and current conditions. At best, interviewees will only give what they are prepared to reveal about their 
subjective perceptions of events and opinions. These perceptions and opinions will change over time, 
and according to circumstance. They may be at some considerable distance from ‘reality’ as others 
might see it’ (Walford cited in Roulston, 2010, p. 203). In this respect the informant is not an objective 
“vessel of information” (Cloke et al, 2006) that will provide the ‘truth’ for any given event or subject.   
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Secondly, as Kitchin and Tate (2000) explain, the informant might try to predict what the researcher 
wants to hear rather than articulating their own views. They might therefore provide a response that 
does not truly reflect their understanding or position on an issue which means we ‘cannot always rely 
on interviewees giving truthful and rational statements concerning their intentions or meanings’ (p. 234). 
Furthermore, the interviewee might respond to the questions in any number of problematic ways; 
including ‘misinformation’, ‘evasions’, ‘lies’ and ‘fronts’ (Roulston, 2010, Roulston, 2011, Roulston, 
2014). Especially questions related to the informant’s personal life, work or politics, which means they 
may get defensive or simply repeat the ‘party line’ providing an uncritical ‘official’ account. This is 
pertinent here because austerity and community engagement under localism can be sensitive political 
issues for practitioners. Thirdly there are related issues around power dynamics when interviewing elite 
actors that need to be considered (Cochrane, 1998, Odendahl and Shaw, 2002, Mikecz, 2012). Taken 
together these challenges mean that the interview data must be treated with some degree of caution. 
 
Furthermore, interview methods have been criticised for a number of more practical issues; including 
that the data they produce is too subjective with the researcher too heavily involved in creating the 
data; that the research is difficult to replicate and there is a lack of transparency; that the researcher 
needs to be clear about the contexts in which the research takes place and question the generalisation 
of the findings; that there is only a limited time for interviewees to get views across to the researcher; 
the criticism that interview data is ‘soft’ evidence and extent to which words always convey meaning; 
and perhaps most crucially the challenges around gaining ‘access’ to the right cases and participants. 
 
Despite these methodological and practical challenges of research interviews, they also have a number 
of strengths, including; eliciting the views, perceptions and opinions of respondents; understanding 
actor motivations, expectations and justifications for their actions and how they made certain decisions; 
describing the circumstances and contexts people operate within and extracting their professional and 
personal stories; the ability to build rapport and deal with sensitive issues and topics; being flexible and 
responsive to emerging ideas; explaining processes, complexity and diversity of experiences, viewpoints, 
emotions, social relations, behaviours, etc.; and presenting in-depth explanations of the ‘social world’ 
from the perspective of people studied. The strength of interviews here is they provided practice-based 
appraisals to assess the claims and effectiveness of government policy as it was implemented. 
 
The next main decision concerned how to conduct the interview process. The research design was 
deliberately set up to be inductive, open-ended and co-constructed; so that general questions could 
provide space for a range of practitioner-led responses on the research themes, before posing more 
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specific probing questions (based on the academic literature and/or responses to questioning). As such, 
an ‘interview guide’ was the main tool used to keep the conversation flowing and relevant (Appendix 
C). An interview guide has three core elements (Silva et al., 2014); 1) an Informed Consent Statement 
(discussed below); 2) Grand-tour and Probe questions; and 3) a Closing Statement. The initial ‘grand-
tour’ questions ask the respondent to provide an overview of a major theme being investigated, with 
‘probes’ being used as specific follow-up questions to flesh out details and issues within the major 
themes/concepts. The interviews started with general ‘icebreaker’ questions to ease the participants 
into the discussion before moving on to more detailed, complex, or controversial questions and issues; 
with the sequence adjusted if necessary to suit local context and the flow of the interview. The closing 
statement asked if there were any further issues they would like to discuss or elaborate on, which might 
have been missed or they feel are important for understanding the phenomenon, and then provided a 
final ‘debriefing’ where the participant was thanked for their time and any final details were exchanged.  
 
The research project was designed in accordance with the University of Reading’s Code of Ethics and 
was approved by the Real Estate and Planning departmental ethics board before any fieldwork was 
conducted. An integrated research information and informed consent sheet was verbally administered 
(or read by the interviewee) and then signed for each participant at the start of every interview 
undertaken in the project (Appendix B). This informed the participant of the purpose of the research 
and assured them of data protection compliance and confidentiality in the research output. This meant 
that the decision was made to anonymise the LA cases and SP/PM actors when quoting their 
interpretations as part of these ethical considerations. It was acknowledged that austerity and pro-
growth reforms are often treated as sensitive political subjects within localities, and some actors would 
not necessarily want their personal understandings to be attributed back to them publicly. The rationale 
was that confidentiality would allow these actors to speak more openly and freely about these issues, 
and without the reader losing too much from a more general characterisation of their context.   
 
In practice, research ethics means not pressuring or harming the participant in any way; such as 
interrogating or exploiting them for information; sharing sensitive or embarrassing information about 
them; forcing them to discuss traumatic events; leading them to compare themselves to idealised 
standards/normative theories that they fail to meet; etc. As well as showing respect and honouring 
promises to participants; such as not deceiving or pretending to share beliefs or falsely claiming 
experience to gain confidence; not misrepresenting the topic or purpose of the study to allay suspicion 
and gain access; not promising confidentiality or benefits if you might not be able to keep them; not 
wasting their time by showing up late or asking for background information that is available from other 
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sources; allowing participants to finish their points rather than cutting them off or starting a new 
question as soon as the discussion begins to deviate; and offering to provide the results; etc. These 
were all important ethical considerations when conducting the research interviews for this project. 
 
Next the decision was made to record the interviews using an electronic recording device and to keep 
note taking to a minimum during the process. This was both to fully concentrate on interacting with the 
participants and engage with their views and develop a conversational rather than formal atmosphere. 
All of the participants agreed to be recorded following the explanation of the informed consent sheet. 
 
At this stage, a number of core decisions concerning the nature, scope and style of which questions to 
ask the participants were made through the creation and subsequent revisions of the interview guide. 
In essence, the questions on national planning reforms post-2010 sought to uncover practice-based 
evaluations of the NPPF, policy deregulations and the localism agenda. These initially took the form of 
asking PMs grand-tour questions on how the NPPF or localism has impacted local planning practices in 
their locality, followed by more specific ‘probing’ questions on core policy changes (e.g. on duty to 
cooperate or neighbourhood planning) or other issues raised in relation to their practices. Similarly, the 
questions on austerity started generally and then progressed to specific issues (e.g. resilience/capacity 
issues, shared services and alternative service delivery models, revenue generating strategies to cover 
the costs of planning, etc.). In both cases, the interview guide questions were based on the national 
policy/rhetoric and academic literature/theory outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
The interview guide served as a prompt to navigate the researcher during the process, although it was 
not shown to the participant to ensure it did not influence or (re)direct their responses. It was divided 
into the two main headings on ‘Planning Reform’ and ‘Planning Resources and Budget’ condensed onto 
one-side of A4 paper for ease of use with each containing bullet-points on the key themes/concepts 
(Appendix C). One main concern was not to presuming a priori how LPA cases and SP/PMs from across 
a wide range of geographical and institutional contexts had understood, experienced and responded to 
reforms. Rather than being prescriptive, the questions were designed to be open-ended so that the 
participants could initially decide what was most important about the key themes. Therefore, the early 
questions for each theme were very broad (e.g. “Can you tell me about your experiences of austerity 
and what it has meant for planning practices here?”) so that the researcher was then not directing 
(pigeon-holing) the possible responses of the participant in the first instances of questioning. In this 
respect, the interview guide was deliberately flexible and incrementally adapted during the fieldwork 
process to reflect issues raised by practitioners consistent with the inductive and grounded approach. 
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The combination of a ‘thematised’ interview guide and detailed place-specific notes developed in a field 
notebook allowed for a deeper conversation around general issues that could draw on local examples. 
This approach was effective for demonstrating to the participant that the researcher had ‘done their 
homework’ concerning the particular local planning policy and development context within their LG, 
which more importantly meant that precious time could be focussed on the main issues over context.  
 
The fieldwork generated 40 audio recordings. Whilst a few of the interviews were shorter than an hour 
because of time pressures on the day, a similar number exceeded the requested 1-hour time slot; with 
the shortest interview being 30 minutes and the longest lasting two and a half hours. As the amount of 
primary data collected increased, the decision was made to use a professional transcription agency to 
assist with transcription. The researcher transcribed 15 audio files and the remaining 25 were done by 
the company Transcription Agency; however, the transcriptions not undertaken by the researcher 
personally were rigorously reviewed to ensure that important details had not been missed. In practice, 
some interviews were transcribed in the days immediately after the interviews whilst others had to 
wait during busy periods of fieldwork activity. The empirical data now formed 40 text-based documents. 
 
The research design formed a relatively traditional methodological approach to qualitative research; as 
the objective was to generate primary data on the experiences and responses of PMs across the cases, 
based on examples of local practices, strategies and challenges within and between specific LPAs, as a 
means to develop an overall picture of planning practices under austerity and policy reforms 2010-2016. 
 
3.4.2 Data Coding and Analysis  
 
Now that the primary empirical data had been collected the formal stages of the analysis could begin. 
The first phase of coding comprised ‘open-coding’, which was necessary to sift and sort through the 
mass of empirical transcript data into ‘organising’ or ‘container’ meta-themes. This was conducted 
using the qualitative coding software NVivo in order to manage the large amount of textual data. In 
their original state, the interview transcripts presented the unorganised multiple themes within each 
case that made abstraction and comparison challenging. As such, the first phase of open-coding sorted 
the data from the 40 ‘case’ transcripts into 7 ‘thematic’ transcripts. In essence this meant that instead 
of scanning through each of the 40 case transcripts individually for all references to ‘localism’, a 
decontextualized thematic transcript collated all of the empirical data on localism into one document. 
These thematic transcripts then provided the material for the second phase analytical ‘focussed-coding’. 
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This first phase open-coding was essentially a data management exercise. It allowed the researcher to 
make sense of ‘chunks’ of textual data within the interview transcripts by assigning them to a simplified 
category that succinctly sums up the content of the extract (e.g. ‘housing’). It encompassed all the data 
collected to ensure that nothing was excluded during the early stages of analysis and to avoid attaching 
meaning a priori. Initially the ‘organising’ meta-codes needed to be sufficiently broad and flexible 
enough to represent the largest unit concepts for breaking down and categorising the data. Seven 
organising meta-codes (nodes) were created for this purpose; 1) Austerity and Local Government 
Financial Settlement; 2) Change in English Local Government Planning; 3) Growth, Infrastructure and 
Strategic Planning; 4) Housing; 5) Localism; 6) National Policy Reform; 7) Local Plan-Making, Strategy 
and Uncertainty. These organising themes were broad enough to categorise the interview data 
effectively by theme but required a further level of analytical focussed-coding. These seven organising 
meta-codes were divided into roughly three to four ‘sub-codes’ each that focus more clearly on a 
specific area for analysis (except for ‘Local Plan-Making’ which did not require further subdivision). In 
total, twenty-two sub-codes were created covering the seven main organising codes (Appendix D).    
 
In contrast, the second phase focussed-coding was more selective and theoretically-informed, based 
on the research questions and theoretical framework and the emergent practice-based concepts (e.g. 
‘commercialisation’). This higher level of coding was completed by hand through highlighting and 
annotating the (more manageable) thematic transcripts. This activity was repeated a number of times. 
The first read through was ‘exploratory’ to find the interlinkages and outliers within the organising 
themes and sub-codes. Then subsequent ‘readings’ sought to further develop the key and emerging 
themes within and across the empirical data set. Decisions had to be made here about where to focus 
attention. The researcher had to make a number of judgments at these points to decide which 
information had the most analytical value and what needed to be presented to the reader. However, 
this was a highly subjective task, influenced by the researcher’s positionality/world view. In deciding on 
how to present the key findings, a significant amount of collected data has been omitted. In practice, 
these higher second level coding stages were not linear but a messy back and forth between exploring 
the data and trying to critically interpret meaning within the frames of the research (Chapters 1 and 2). 
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Figure 14 – Approach to Qualitative Analysis using Interview Data: 
 
 
 
Source: https://www.transcriptioncentre.co.uk/blog/2014/6/10/analysing-your-interviews.  
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The approach taken here broadly followed Rubin and Rubin’s (2012) structure of the ‘general stages’ 
involved in qualitative analysis based on interview data (with stages 6-7 dependent on the project):  
 
1) Transcribe and summarise each interview. 
2) Define, find, and mark in the text (code) excerpts that have relevant concepts, themes, events, 
examples, names, places or dates. 
3) Find the excerpts marked with the same code(s) from across your interview transcripts and sort 
them into a single data file – then summarise the contents for each collated coding data file.  
4) Sort and resort the material within each coded data file, comparing the excerpts between 
different sub-groups (sub-codes) – then summarise the results of each (re)sorting. 
5) Weigh up different versions of coded data and then integrate the descriptions from different 
interviewees to create a complete picture.  
6) Combine concepts and themes to generate theory that can explain the descriptions presented - 
constantly testing these ideas by examining them in light of the interviews.  
7) See how far these results generalize beyond the individuals and cases studied in your project. 
 
Within the interview transcripts, ‘concepts’ are ideas often expressed as a single noun or noun phrase 
(e.g. affordable housing) or abstract nouns (e.g. empowerment), which often convey goals, values, 
perceptions, attitudes or represent strategies that frame action for the participants. Similarly the 
‘themes’ are summary statements, causal explanations, or conclusions that offer explanations of why 
something happened, what something means, or how the interviewee feels about a matter. Themes 
normally show the relationship between two or more concepts, where a statement contains words like 
‘because’, ‘therefore’, ‘so that is why’, etc. (or you can translate them into that format) this is likely to 
be a theme connecting concepts (see figure 14 for a visual representation of the approach to analysis).  
 
Now that the core theoretical, methodological and practical approaches to the research have been 
outlined, the next two chapters present the empirical data and analysis. Chapter 4 examines National 
Policy Reform and Local Authority Planning Post-2010 and Chapter 5 does the same for Local Authority 
Planning under Austerity Post-2010. The final Chapter 6 presents the overall Conclusions to the study.  
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Chapter 4 - National Policy Reform and Local Authority Planning Post-2010 
 
“Let me be clear - planning is the single biggest drag anchor on growth and we must deliver 
reform”. 
(Eric Pickles, 2011). 
 
‘[T]he link between power, agency, and responsibility is important. It enables us to keep in focus 
the very question of the difference that agents can make to outcomes and to cast a critical eye 
on attempts by powerful agents to escape their own responsibilities by ‘blaming the system’’. 
(Hayward and Lukes, 2008, p. 12).   
 
This chapter is data-driven focusing on the empirical findings from the 40 research cases. It is divided 
into two main parts on Practicing National Policy Reforms and Planning Deregulation (Section 4.1) and 
Practicing Community Localism and Economic Localism (Section 4.2). These two main thematic areas 
have been selected because they are considered to be the most significant (policy) reforms to the 
planning system and practices under the Coalition and majority Conservative Governments 2010-2016. 
This is notwithstanding austerity which, despite being heavily interrelated in practice, represents a 
major national reform in its own right and is therefore discussed and analysed separately (Chapter 5). 
This chapter is informed by the overarching theoretical framework heuristic and takes a clear critical 
position on national policy and governance structures that seek to reform the planning system (termed 
here externalised neoliberalisations) that shape forms of planning agency and relations to stakeholders.  
 
These two main sections on national policy reform and localism that comprise the body of this Chapter 
4 Planning Reform Analysis specifically relate to research questions one, two and three respectively: 
 
RQ1) In what ways have local planning authorities experienced, and responded to, the planning system 
reforms and policy deregulations introduced by the central government since 2010? 
 
RQ2) What has localism meant in practice for local planning authorities and their relationships with 
local communities?  
 
RQ3) What have national planning policy reforms and localism post-2010 meant in practice for the 
economic and collaborative approaches of LPAs to strategic planning and housing policy and delivery?  
 
Additionally, each section also seeks to address research objectives one, two and three more generally:  
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RO1) To present practitioner evaluations of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF, 2012), 
planning policy deregulations and performance targets 2010-2016. 
 
RO2) To present practitioner evaluations of the Localism Act (2011) and governance shifts to ‘economic’ 
and ‘community’ localism 2010-2016.  
 
RO3) To present practitioner evaluations of the effectiveness of the latest period of planning reforms in 
relation to their professionalism and ethics (planning structures and agency) 2010-2016. 
 
The next section begins by evaluating practitioner experiences and responses to the National Planning 
Policy Framework (NPPF) and other national policy deregulations in relation to local planning post-2010. 
 
4.1 Practicing National Policy Reforms and Planning Deregulation Post-2010 
 
RQ1) In what ways have local planning authorities experienced, and responded to, the planning 
system reforms and policy deregulations introduced by the central government since 2010? 
 
This section is divided into three main parts on Interpreting ‘Simplified’ National Planning Policy and 
Local Plan-Making (4.1.1), Planning Policy Deregulations and Professional Practices (4.1.2) and Boosting 
Planning ‘Performance’: Delivering Speed or Outcomes? (4.1.3) respectively. The overall argument in 
this section follows Ellis that ‘deregulation means that planning is simply less powerful in relation to the 
market and therefore offers fewer opportunities for progressive interventions’ (2015, p.438).    
 
4.1.1 Interpreting ‘Simplified’ National Planning Policy and Local Plan-Making 
 
The Coalition Government’s (CG) core aim to ‘simplify’ the planning system by ‘streamlining’ the 
(perceived) significant amount of national planning policy and guidance, which they argued had been 
developing since the formal inception of town and country planning in 1947 and proliferated under the 
New Labour governments 1997-2010, was one broadly shared by the planning senior practitioners (SPs). 
The findings suggest that they also felt that the planning system had become increasingly complex, and 
so their criticisms of the NPPF was not its stated aims for simplification and streamlining, but ironically 
rather that these policy reforms had actually made things more complicated and uncertain in practice.  
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One example of the ‘unintended consequences’ of increased practice uncertainty following attempted 
simplification was the subsequent need for further government policy clarification on the NPPF through 
the development of associated National Planning Policy Guidance (NPPG), particularly as it became 
evident that the policy ‘framework’ needed to be fleshed-out in particular key areas to better support 
practitioners. This context of uncertainty was exacerbated by the need for planners to operate and 
deliver the new policy reforms whilst simultaneously adapting to a ‘localist’ governance structure far 
removed from the previous regional ‘spatial planning’ approach that had been developing 2001-2010.  
 
The NPPG steadily built-up from 2014 to cover over 50 core ‘guidance’ areas intended to supplement 
the NPPF. However, despite government recognition that they needed to further develop and explain 
their position on national policy, some SPs interpreted NPPG as ‘policy through the back-door’. They 
expressed practical concerns over its weight in decision-making given its less clearly defined material 
status in relation to the NPPF, which was already intended to be flexible and negotiable in practice. One 
main concern was that different planning inspectors had given different weight between ‘core’ national 
framework policy and practice ‘guidance’. This led to the irony that certain parts of the planning system 
had actual become more uncertain and complicated as a result of policy consolidation and deregulation:   
 
“I think my reflection on what happened in 2010, and I think it is probably fair to say that this in 
my view happens every-time there is a reform of planning, is that the government says that they 
are going to make it more straightforward, but what they actually do is make it more 
complicated…I think the National Planning Policy Framework was a good idea, I think it was a 
really good idea to streamline all the numerous planning guidance, regulations and all the rest of 
it at the national level…and of course that’s fine, but then the one document proves not enough 
to be sufficient, so you then start to get lots of additional pieces of Planning Policy Guidance” (SP2, 
Rural, South East).  
 
“[W]hen the Coalition government said that they were going to look at planning and simplify it we 
thought thank goodness for that, but it hasn’t happened has it [laughter]. Simplifying it in terms 
of permitted development, it may have made certain categories of development more permitted, 
but in terms of simplifying the process, it hasn’t. And we have got a multitude of different 
notification processes, and some require prior notification and some don’t, and some are time 
limited and some are not, so planning is ever more complicated” (SP5, Mixed, South West).  
 
“The NPPG, I don’t know why they brought that in, because they had been simplifying all the 
planning guidance since the NPPF, and then to bring in the NPPG, which a lot of inspectors 
interpret as national policy as well, so it is just policy through the backdoor. So they had made a 
good step forward, and I think the NPPF is a good document and a good idea and worked well; 
but then they brought the NPPG which was another whole raft of requirements, which I don’t think 
they really meant it to work that way, but that’s what happened” (SP11, Major Urban, West 
Midlands).  
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It was commonly acknowledged by the SPs that the evolution of the planning system in England since 
the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act had been quite settled for long periods of time, with big gaps 
between key pieces of legislation and amendments to the 1947 Act in 1947, 1971 and 1990. However, 
that this context of planning ‘stability’ had been changing since 2004, following which the temporal 
gaps between key policy reforms and legislative acts were becoming gradually and progressively shorter 
demonstrated by changes in 2004, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016 respectively. This supports 
the planning literature that highlights the relationship between neoliberalism and increased attempts 
at planning reforms in the UK (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2013, Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014).    
 
Indeed, for SP1, the planning system had changed from one characterised by ‘relative stability’ to one 
permanently being subjected to ‘a raft of changes’; a practice context that made it difficult for planners 
to carefully plan for the development of their locality against the background of ‘initiative overload’. 
SPs understood the increasing reforms since 2004 as a symptom of a series of ‘experimental’ policy 
initiatives being implemented to try to tackle individual issues, without there being any real coherent 
government ‘game plan’ for the overall objectives planning system beyond political ‘blunt messages’ 
around the need to increase housing numbers and supporting growth. A situation that was exacerbated 
through the overarching aspatial and permissive NPPF that further perpetuated a context of uncertainty:    
 
“There are all these series of different initiatives, but they are not a series of initiatives that fit into 
a blueprint of ‘this is how we want all of these bits to work together’…[I]t goes back to there being 
this lack of a sense of what we are doing as a country, and as a country what we want from our 
planning system. And the fact that governments of whatever colour it is [political ideology] have 
to keep on coming back and changing it tends to suggest that they don’t really know, and they are 
just in initiative overdrive” (SP1, Urban, South East).  
 
What made this context worse, to the frustration of SPs, was concerns that their professional views 
were being superficially requested by the government through consultations on reform; however, that 
their inputs were not being given due consideration because policy objectives had been predetermined: 
 
“It feels again that things are happening too quickly. The consultations that we have had recently, 
no sooner has one consultation finished, then the technical consultation is out on things that were 
in the previous consultation. Well, you can't tell me that you [government] are going to give due 
consideration to things when you have already made you mind up and coming out with a technical 
consultation” (SP16, Mixed, West Midlands).  
 
This supports the literature that the Coalition Government (CG) had already decided the broad policy 
direction they wanted planning reforms to take to ‘fix’ the system; roughly the deregulation of planning, 
but whilst maintaining some core mechanisms to support growth, heritage and greenbelt preservation 
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and community engagement. However, they needed to give the impression that their approach to 
reform was based on professional consultation as an ‘evidence-base’, regardless of how such evidence 
was actually used in national policy formation. One way this can be explained is through post-political 
theory (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012) as an attempt by elite actors to manufacture ‘consensus’ 
and control the discourse on planning.      
 
Furthermore, government claims that the NPPF would ‘free’ planners from thousands of pages of 
onerous policy regulation and allow them to adopt approaches more suited to their local development 
context is misleading; drawing on depoliticisation theory (Burnham, 2001, Foster et al., 2014), these 
reforms did not necessarily mean or translate into less national government control over local planning:   
 
“[T]he whole tenure of the changes then, through the National Planning Policy Framework, were 
supposed to be about simplification of the planning system, and initially it did seem to do very 
much that. But unsurprisingly, again where something is not quite well articulated you have to 
interpret that through the National Planning Practice Guidance that came out, and then of course 
inevitably in case law as well. So I don’t think really it has changed the whole tenure of planning 
at all, in that we are still subject to government controls over planning in one guise or another, 
but now in large part with things being decided through case law. And that includes things like 
judicial reviews, and I would say appeals as well; because we have had a lot of planning by appeal 
to test out elements of the National Planning Policy Framework and the Guidance” (SP9, Mixed, 
West Midlands). 
 
Here SP9 keenly notes how planning is still subjected to government control, but that the nature of this 
control is less direct/explicit and being conducted/managed/enforced by other actors; such as in the 
development industry (further empowered through a favourable pro-development policy environment) 
and legal system tasked with interpreting and upholding national policy for plan-making and appeals. 
So whilst the deregulated and localist approach to governing ostensibly appeared to stand in contrast 
to New Labour’s more direct forms of control through strict national audit and performance target 
systems, under the CG state power was enacted more subtly ‘at a distance’. The overall ‘rules of the 
game’ were still being controlled by central government post-2010, but planners and stakeholders now 
had slightly improved scope to work within and through the more flexible planning framework. In other 
words, drawing on governmentality theory (Foucault et al., 2008), planner’s ‘conduct of conduct’ was 
still being ‘governed’ (towards acting ‘responsibly’ according to neoliberal ideology), but now within a 
policy context that rhetorical espoused ‘empowerment’ through greater individual and local freedom 
and autonomy. In this way, the NPPF and localism agenda formed a structural context that paradoxically 
both heavily constrained planning agency whilst also opening up new spaces for autonomous action. 
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This marked the complexity and double-edged sword of the NPPF and localism agenda for planners, 
they ostensibly had more room for manoeuvre but were still limited within the confines of national 
policy. Indeed, for Allmendinger and Haughton (2014, p. 48), the CG approach to national planning 
policy was ‘presented rhetorically as a mechanism that empowers local actors, yet it also creates an 
obscured policy space within which different interpretations of the Big Society can be projected: the 
NPPF is both a product of and a process through which post-political planning operates’. In this sense, 
whilst the NPPF arguably achieved its aims of simplifying policy, placing greater emphasis on pro-
development and preservation objectives and increasing the scope for community decision-making in 
planning, its (perhaps deliberate) ambiguity meant that planning and development practices became 
subject to a ‘free-for-all’ where everything is potentially negotiable within the flexible and interpretive 
framework of national policy. This meant that the NPPF could be interpreted differently by stakeholders 
to support divergent planning positions at the local scale and in relation to the same local policy/project. 
 
For SPs, the development of Local Plans, and managing their implementation, is an extremely resource 
and time intensive activity; however, such planning activity is justified on the basis that planning in 
England is still regulated according to a ‘plan-led’ system (Parker and Doak, 2012). Paragraph 12 of the 
NPPF reaffirmed the government commitment to this approach by stating that ‘[t]his National Planning 
Policy Framework does not change the statutory status of the development plan as the starting point 
for decision making. Proposed development that accords with an up-to-date Local Plan should be 
approved, and proposed development that conflicts should be refused unless other material 
considerations indicate otherwise. It is highly desirable that local planning authorities should have an 
up-to-date plan in place’. However, despite the claimed primary role of Local Plans in national policy, 
SPs argued that challenges based on the presumption, five-year supply, objectively assessed need, 
viability and neighbourhood plans could routinely clash, appeal, modulate or override their LPA 
development plans and polices. This has challenged the professional status of planning/planners as the 
flexible, interpretive, and negotiable nature of the NPPF provides greater scope for a variety of different 
interpretations and understandings of the meanings and weight behind national and local policies: 
 
“You know, we have gone from the mountains of guidance and specific details to a much 
slimmer version of that, which again leads people to different interpretations of things. So 
again it is much more of a mine field than it [planning system] was historically…So it is 
much more complex scene, I think, in that period [2010-15]. And I suppose expectations 
have gone up, in terms of a lot more people are expecting to have very detailed 
explanations of the decision-making process, the technicalities behind it, everybody is 
almost an ‘armchair planner’. You know, ‘Actually my interpretation of the NPPF is different 
to yours, so my view is just as valid as anyone else’s’. So I think it has sort of opened up the 
conversation about planning, which has been quite challenging” (SP6, Rural, South East). 
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This has opened up space for greater contestation and debate between different actors, primarily LPAs, 
developers, environmentalists and local communities. This new policy landscape may be welcomed by 
a range of planning theorist for different reasons; for collaborative planning theorist the opening-up of 
(networked) stakeholders to negotiate an agreed position would be a positive intervention (Healey, 
2003, Booher and Innes, 2002), whilst agonistic planning theorist value the contestation and conflict as 
a necessary prerequisite to protect democratic decision-making (Hillier, 2003, McClymont, 2011). In 
this respect, whilst the CG post-2010 reforms have meant that the professional status and role of (the 
traditional ‘rational’) planners is now more susceptible to competing expectations, interpretations and 
stakeholder interests as a result of the system being ‘opened-up’ under the NPPF and localism, the jury 
is still out on whether this represents a positive or negative intervention in the context of neoliberalism. 
 
Such practice changes are important because the ‘plan-led’ system approach is based on the normative 
understanding that ‘good planning’ involves professional planners having a certain degree of influence 
over the types and locations of developments, as a means to regulate their local impacts and manage 
broader concerns for sustainability and interests; however, rather than being empowered, LG planners 
expressed that these national policy reforms had served to undermine their local policy and practices:    
 
“I think the other thing the NPPF has done is actually take a lot of flexibility away from local 
planning authorities; because one of the things that is really evident to me is that in many, 
many circumstances the NPPF trumps local policy. We had a situation in [local authority] 
recently where we had an application that was recommended for refusal by officers, 
refused by members, then went to appeal. And when the inspector’s decision came through 
it read as though it was going to be appeal dismissed, because the inspector agreed with 
many of our judgements about the planning merits of our case. But almost at the end of 
the decision letter he said, “However, I believe this is a sustainable site, and therefore in 
the context of the National Planning Policy Framework I am going to allow the appeal”. So 
I know that the councillors, both here and at [neighbouring local authority], are of the view 
that, you know, in many instances it does not actually matter what decision they make, 
because an inspector is going to come along and give the NPPF far more weight than they 
give local policies and grant planning permission” (SP2, Rural, South East). 
 
In this context, the strength of their Local Plan and/or policy-base was a source of anxiety for planners, 
particularly given the potential to succumb to ‘planning by appeal’. It was acknowledged that local 
policy now needed to be ‘robust’ enough to withstand both high levels of technical scrutiny and legal 
challenges from developers as well as political opposition and resistance from their local communities, 
particularly over housing land supply calculations and allocated figures. These tensions gained greatest 
expression as the ‘chasm’ between government national policy and local planning on the ground:  
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“As soon as somebody says, “We have got this idea to streamline and speed up the planning 
system”, I can guarantee you now the two things it will not do is streamline and speed up 
the planning system; because planning is really complicated. And if somebody says, “I’m 
going to streamline something”, it means they are trying to cut a corner somewhere, and 
planning is something that has got legal challenges at every corner…whatever system we 
operate, it has got to be bomb proof, it has got to be capable of being beserked to the point 
of High Court of Appeal type of challenges that you are going to get from the Gladmans of 
this world. If the system isn’t robust enough, or we end up producing a Local Plan that is 
based on some sort of Memorandum of Understanding from a Combined Authority, but 
actually that isn’t worth anything, it’s like standing on sand isn’t it. So I think that is the big 
thing that is missing for me, there is this huge gap between government setting law and 
the NPPF, all the guidance, and the rest of it, and what they do in [neighbouring council], 
for example, is a massive, massive jump” (SP23, Rural, Yorkshire and the Humber). 
 
“[T]he other big issue I think is that there is this wish, or instruction should we say, that 
councils will produce Local Plans in a timely manner, and the whole process has just gotten 
more and more complicated. And when I see the lists of evidence that we as a local planning 
authority have to produce to back up our Local Plans it really is no wonder that it takes such 
a long time for a Local Plan to be produced. Because again if you don’t have solid evidence 
you are going to get torn to pieces at an examination by the development industry or by 
those that oppose your plan” (SP2, Rural, South East). 
 
“The importance of the certainty of the Local Plan is something…we really prided ourselves 
on, because we have seen neighbouring authorities who have for whatever reason found it 
difficult to get a Local Plan in place. They have had five-year land supply issues and had to 
deal with unwanted applications in unwanted locations and choose very carefully their 
battles with Section 78 appeals. We have certainly seen them approve applications on or 
near the boundary with us and we know they have done it because they know they won't 
stand a chance at appeal; and they haven't got the resources to put into arguing an appeal. 
So that lack of certainty is really key, and the more destabilising of the Local Plan process 
then the more that uncertainty starts to rule, then you get ‘planning by appeal’” (SP16, 
Mixed, West Midlands). 
 
A number of SPs also raised a counter-argument to the government and developer claims of increased 
costs, risk and uncertainty for development projects where an LPA lacks a Local Plan, stating that the 
development industry could often use that as an opportunity to exploit the planning permission system:   
 
“So the fact that we have not got a Local Plan in place has meant that for the development 
industry there is a window of opportunity to exploit to get the planning permissions but not 
necessarily deliver them…we have still got 8,000 planning permissions with permission but 
they [developers] haven’t started yet, because there will be a finite resource to how much 
they want to flood the market because they are protecting their own interests. So, you 
know, we could be churning out planning permissions but they will still only deliver onto 
the market what they think the market will bear without their price share plummeting 
because there is too much choice. So it is supply and demand” (SP6, Rural, South East). 
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The next part moves on to further examine the impacts of wider national planning policy deregulations 
on the (perceived) capacities of planners to shape development through their professional practices.   
 
4.1.2 Planning Policy Deregulations and Professional Practices  
 
This section further examines planning policy deregulations in the form of development viability and 
permitted development rights and argues that these policy structures serve to curtail planning agency.  
 
The formal introduction of development viability into national planning policy through the NPPF as a 
‘material consideration’ was originally claimed as a policy tool to stimulate national economic growth 
following the 2008 GFC; primarily through easing the planning obligations and policy commitments 
placed on a fragile and recovering development industry, so that marginal development projects could 
still be considered ‘viable’. Crudely summarised, viability formed a specific temporal and contextual 
policy reaction to the need for economic recovery through reanimating the development sector in the 
UK; however, despite this specific ‘crisis’ policy justification and the subsequent economic recovery in 
the UK and development sector, viability has since become a permanent feature of the planning system.  
 
It is argued here that viability has become ‘normalised’ because it is consistent with neoliberal ideology 
that seeks to remove state and social claims on market actors. Thus neoliberal elites in the UK, including 
the Cameron administrations, would have wanted to introduce this type of favourable policy context 
for the development sector on a permanent basis anyway regardless of the economic context because 
it fits closely with their governing ideology for state restructuring; however, political appeals to ‘crisis’ 
conditions allowed a form of statecraft that could justify such reforms as a legitimate intervention. Just 
as austerity policy has become embedded into the public sector (McBride, 2016), what started out as 
a ‘crisis’ strategy to restart a ‘dead’ development sector post-recession has become a mainstream 
practice hardwired into the planning system. This has further undermined local (plan) policy obligations.    
 
The case is therefore made that the way viability has been practiced in this period has significantly 
curtailed planning agency, because one of the core roles of LA planning is to negotiate a financial or 
physical contribution from specified developments as a means to compensate for the impact(s) of 
granting permission for new development on the existing community. Such contributions typically take 
the form of affordable housing, infrastructure, or amenity space. The primary policy mechanisms for 
negotiating planning gain is through Section 106 Agreements (S106) and more recently the Community 
Infrastructure Levy (CIL). However, the elevation of viability concerns in national policy since 2010 have 
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effectively undermined the negotiating position of planners to secure public benefits from local 
developments. A central issue of contention is whether a ‘policy compliant’ level of planning obligations 
can be supported by a site-specific development whilst also ensuring ‘acceptable’ return on the project. 
 
The NPPF Paragraph 173 sets out the LPA requirements for ensuring viability: ‘Pursuing sustainable 
development requires careful attention to viability and costs in plan-making and decision-taking. Plans 
should be deliverable. Therefore, the sites and the scale of development identified in the plan should not 
be subject to such a scale of obligations and policy burdens that their ability to be developed viably is 
threatened. To ensure viability, the costs of any requirements likely to be applied to development, such 
as requirements for affordable housing, standards, infrastructure contributions or other requirements 
should, when taking account of the normal cost of development and mitigation, provide competitive 
returns to a willing land owner and willing developer to enable the development to be deliverable’ (p.41).  
 
The academic literature on development viability assessments has raised concerns that developers 
have strategically used (or abused) viability policy to water-down planning conditions and obligations, 
or retrospectively renegotiate or renegade on previous permission agreements. Such ‘strategies’ have 
exploited the expertise asymmetries between well-resourced developers and austere LAs; through 
mobilising complex financial calculations, that are ostensibly legitimised by concealed commercially 
sensitive data, to manage and exploit negotiations with LPAs (Crosby et al., 2013, McAllister et al., 2016).    
 
Additionally, the literature highlights that LPAs have little clear national guidance on how to conduct or 
scrutinise viability; there are no agreed metrics or hard-and-fast rules about what constitutes viability, 
particularly in relation to ‘reasonable returns’ to developers and land-owners and why projects without 
contribution are considered ‘otherwise viable’. Furthermore, even the most accepted professional 
body definition by the Royal Institute of Charted Surveyors (RICS) present much room for subjectivity:   
 
‘Development is viable when its value upon completion exceeds its cost by an amount sufficient to 
compensate the developer for the risk that is borne and the effort that is expended on the project’ (Crook 
et al., 2015, p.2).  
 
‘An objective financial viability test of the ability of a development project to meet its costs including the 
cost of planning obligations, while ensuring an appropriate Site Value for the landowner and a market 
risk adjusted return to the developer in delivering that project…The fundamental issue in considering 
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viability assessments in a town planning context is whether an otherwise viable development is made 
unviable by the extent of planning obligations or other requirements’ (RICS, 2012, p.4 -10).  
 
In this uncertain context, calculating and negotiating viability formed a key practice tension for the SPs; 
however, they also showed sympathy with the risks faced by developers. The general sentiment was 
summed up by SP7 as the challenges between not wanting to be a ‘tax collector’ through planning 
contributions for (local) infrastructure that ‘effectively the government should be paying for’, especially 
where the development industry and land values can’t carry the cost of social provision; and being able 
to determine and secure the most appropriate form of contribution given the lack of standardisation: 
 
“[W]e have been through a massive period of austerity, been through a massive stagnation 
in terms of development delivery, and I don’t want to frustrate development by being a tax 
collector for infrastructure that effectively the government should be paying for…but what 
I don’t want to be doing is actually maybe accepting a viability appraisal which allows a 
developer to get away without paying S106, and then he goes away and buys a better 
Bentley. So the nature of how you negotiate I guess is a complex one…it’s a bit of a dark art 
to viability appraisals in terms of the assumptions that you put into them you can probably 
argue a lot of things; and I think that is another area of work that the government could 
help with by really standardising the nature of how we assess viability. I mean the answer 
to the question is every site is different, every developer is different, every client is 
different…and you are in a position where it is actually very difficult to say what is more 
important, a bit of public open space or an education contribution or an affordable housing 
contribution? Actually what is more important to me is a decent standard of development 
that is going to stand the test of time, that is well designed and decent quality. And then 
there needs to be other ways of providing that social infrastructure, the development 
industry can’t carry it, the values can’t carry it” (SP7, Urban, East Midlands).  
 
Viability particularly strengthened the hands of developers given the wider context of austerity and pro-
development policy reforms. In the context of austerity, LPAs desperate for development as a means 
to generate ‘growth-based’ revenues and financial self-sufficiency were in a very weak position to hold 
out and negotiate policy-complaint levels of planning obligation, with a number being forced to waive 
contributions in many cases ‘simply to get things built’. As SP39 explains, “we don’t have affordable 
housing anyway, because essentially it is negotiated away through viability” (Major Urban, North West).  
 
Overall, viability presented a key practice challenge for all of the PMs to varying degrees, however, they 
were most acutely felt in LPAs with weak market conditions and high social needs. These cases struggled 
with the balancing act between waiving planning contributions as a means to stimulate much needed 
development and future revenues in the form of New Homes Bonus and council taxes, whilst trying to 
secure any community benefits from otherwise economically marginal development projects. This key 
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issue resulted in some ‘low value’ LPAs training staff in development economics to strengthen their 
negotiating position, despite the wider practice narrative of needing to also have realistic expectations: 
 
“[I]n the depth of the recession…for the first couple of years we didn’t get any, or we got 
very little, affordable housing as part of S106 agreements. But because viability is such a 
critical issue for us, we took a decision four years ago to train-up two or three officers on 
development economics….[we] take a firmer line on viability but not being unreasonable. 
We just challenge the developers’ profits and challenge the landowner’s expectations…the 
North-East market context just being a little bit different because of viability and because 
of the need for the public sector to work with development…that means that you have to 
think slightly different around potentially market-led approaches and thinking around 
viability and how can you get benefits from development really…a real message for us that 
we have to remember that viability is more challenging in [council] and that impacts upon 
what you can actually deliver as part of development (SP33, Rural, North East). 
 
Critically, the argument here is not that the development industry could bear the costs and deliver the 
necessary infrastructure requirements of localities; the enormous cost of infrastructure improvements 
and new provision is altogether of national concern, and all built environment actors are facing a tough 
position to fund even their own projects. Rather the evidence suggests that LPAs are in a weaker 
position to negotiate planning contributions on behalf of their communities’ post-2010 because of 
viability considerations, and this has changed the practice culture of planners to adopting a more 
‘pragmatic’ approach to development. This is particularly the case given the reductions in funding from 
central government and the need to demonstrate five-year land supply and objectively assessed need 
as material considerations (that are open to legal challenge by developers). The combination of these 
factors that together undermine obligations created widespread concerns for the SPs about how large 
infrastructure projects and public amenities will be funded in the future. Following neoliberal theory, 
national government have downloaded responsibility and risk for infrastructure and amenity provision 
to the local scale private developers and public planners (and onto communities through localism).    
 
Ironically, the shift towards planners having to accept more development and grant more permissions, 
but whilst not necessarily being able to deliver any greater infrastructure or affordable housing directly, 
means that securing more development consents becomes less important to planners for ‘public 
interest’ reasons although more important for financial and material reasons. It is not the case that 
Section 106 (or CIL) is less important to planners, but rather that these obligations are routinely being 
overridden or ignored based on viability claims and national policy pressures to deliver development. 
Arguably, the absence of strong national and regional government support post-2010 has left a number 
of localities to fend for themselves in negotiating provision more akin to the US (Davies and Pill, 2012).  
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Overall, the argument is made that viability transfers power from the public planner to the private 
developer within the development process; therefore, it can be conceptualised as a form of external 
neoliberalisation that is imposed on planners by the state to accept (yield to) market conditions as a 
key factor in planning decision-making. This is crucial because the planning system and planners are 
disempowered when facilitating developments with an absence of public infrastructure or affordable 
housing is considered a ‘sustainable’ approach to development in national policy (Rydin, 2013).  
 
This period also witnessed more general planning policy deregulation through changes to the General 
Permitted Development Order (GPDO), shaping what Use Classes Order (UCO) changes legally 
constitute ‘development’ and therefore require planning permission. The Town and Country Planning 
(Use Classes) Order 1987 (as amended) puts uses of land and buildings into various categories known 
as 'Use Classes' (Planning Portal). The Use Classes Order specifies groups of uses within which a change 
of use does not constitute development and is therefore permissible without planning permission. For 
example, different categories can change within A1 without the need for planning permission, but they 
cannot change to any of the other Use Classes B, C, D or Sui Generis (see table 6 for an overview). 
 
The Secretary of State has the provision to make a GPDO for advance ‘permitted development rights’ 
for use class changes, which constitute development but do not require permission because it is already 
granted by the GPDO. Relevant to this research, the 2013 GPDO ‘office-to-residential’ permitted 
development rights focussed on providing easier use class conversion from office blocks to housing 
units to tackle undersupply. Again, such national policy attempts to increase efficiency and speed 
through deregulation of the planning process raised a number of potential practical issues for planners.    
 
SP responses to the changes to ‘Permitted Development Rights’ (herein PDRs) were generally mixed; 
typically depending on the existing office stock supply and demand, as well as overall housing supply 
and values within their LA. Councils with high land and development values particularly expressed 
concerns that PD was making it harder to defend employment land from conversion to residential units. 
There was also evidence of rural-urban variation, with rural areas concerned about becoming 
‘dormitory’ if they lost too much employment to housing, and urban areas similarly concerned about 
the balance between the number of job opportunities and residential offering within their boundaries. 
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Table 6 – Guide to the Use Classes Order in England  
 
(Source: Pure Town Planning Online, 2018). 
 
PMs generally expressed two overall concerns in relation to the need for some regulatory ‘control’. 
Firstly, the potential loss of control over employment. In rural LPAs, planners expressed fears that places 
that lose too much employment land to residential will become dormitory, placing greater strain on 
local infrastructure and congestion as people commute outside the area for work. As well as the issues 
around creating isolated developments within the settlement hierarchy and poor landscape impacts:    
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“[W]e have a fair amount of pressure for employment land, and yet we also have permitted 
development rights coming in that will allow that employment land to be used for 
residential without us really having any control over it” (SP2, Rural, South East).  
 
“The biggest impact of permitted development is, given our patch is largely rural, all the 
changes of use particularly farm buildings and others to dwellings; actually, that has had 
quite an impact on our rural areas and our landscape. It has helped deliver because we 
have had tens of them, but they are generally remote locations” (SP18, Rural, East England).  
 
The need to protect industry and employment was also clear for urban authorities, although for slightly 
different reasons. It was argued that change of land-use applications are rarely refused unless there are 
strong planning justification for doing so, such as the need to separate industrial and residential uses:  
 
“It’s a nonsense really of an idea [Permitted Development], and it is sort of based on this 
myth they [government] have that we refuse change of use applications, when we have 
permitted probably over 270 hectares of industrial land for housing. You know, again we 
hardly ever refuse stuff unless it’s bang next to a major employment area, when obviously 
you are trying to safeguard some of the big businesses in [city]…these are big companies, 
like Jaguar for God sakes. So if somebody pitched up and put houses next to them under 
permitted development and they start complaining, we will be the first ones to get a load 
of grief…they [government] are taking away control, and I don’t think that the ideas are 
bad, but they just don’t hit the right spot” (SP11, Major Urban, West Midlands).  
 
Secondly, PMs were concerned with the loss of control over the size, quality and affordable provision 
of the new residential units converted from offices. Indeed, SP36 explained that even though they were 
already keen to promote office-to-residential conversions in the city, the ‘process of sustainability’ for 
affordable housing and space standards was enough to deter developers from taking on such projects. 
The outcome was that PD deregulation improved housing delivery in the city, but at a social cost that 
undermined the commitment to ‘sustainable development’ concerns in local policy and developments: 
 
“In some ways, the office to residential was something that did click, so before that came 
in I remember thinking, ‘Well that’s not going to make much difference in [city] because 
we’re very pro that anyway’. We were very pro office to residential from a policy point of 
view. But what I hadn’t appreciated is by our insistence on affordable housing, space 
standards and having to go through the process of sustainability, that process was enough 
for developers to think ‘not sure’. As soon as the government took that [regulation] off, 
actually there was a lot of interest to do it. So that was an interesting one for me, that one 
did make a difference in [city], but only at the cost of the quality of the housing being built 
and the affordability. But in terms of numbers, yeah, it did contribute about 1,000 extra 
[residential] units…The issue for us was the fact that we had no control over the size of it, 
the quality of it, or the affordable housing. That was the issue. It was nothing about the 
loss of the commercial per se” (SP36, Urban, South West).  
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Concerns over the quality of the new residential units converted from former office blocks, and the 
ability to control the terms of conversion, highlights the nature of local policy deregulation in practice:  
 
“We never really had a problem with losing that office stock [to residential], but what we 
tried to do is ensure that as it was lost, we provided smaller but higher quality 
accommodation, because that is what would meet the needs…we have seen flats built next 
to night clubs, which are just a recipe for disaster in terms of noise disturbance, because 
you weren’t able to get any sleep. We have had certain ones where we have had to serve 
prohibition notices on them. We have certain flats that have been built with no natural light. 
So some flats have been built, not far from here actually, in the basement of a former office 
development, and their only outside light is through a skylight that links up three stories 
above. So if you don’t want any sunlight and very, very little natural light, there’s flat that 
are being built to service that need. We also have ones with no provision for refuse, or bike 
storage, or anything like that. I’m all for increasing housing supply, it’s chronic, we are not 
building enough houses; I don’t think anybody is going to argue with that, but is building 
shit housing really part of the solution?” (SP35, Urban, East England).  
 
For these planning professionals, whilst the moderate increase in housing units facilitated by PDRs were 
generally welcomed in the context of needing to demonstrate supply, the broad sentiment was that 
the overall contribution of such policies to addressing housing undersupply were viewed as negligible 
in relation to the potential costs to the quality of urban environments and additional process complexity:    
 
“In my view, these things [office-to-residential PD] cause far more harm than good; 
because they make no meaningful indent in terms of the overall numbers, but what actually 
they can do on the ground, on a case-by-case basis, is they can really start to mess up your 
townscape. And the creation of a place, or keeping a place as a place, when you can get 
huge imbalances and inappropriate uses in inappropriate locations…It’s making certain 
individuals a lot of money. It is not really tackling the housing crisis in any meaningful way, 
but it is having a real impact in terms of the impact of the environment and the place” 
(SP13, Urban, East Midlands).  
 
“I have some sympathy in terms of doing whatever we can to up the delivery of housing, 
but I’m not convinced…the PD stuff, which sounds good in principle, but actually in terms 
of scale the problem we have got is absolutely huge for the delivery of housing. So allowing 
farmers to convert the odd barn or permitted development offices to residential is a tiny 
solution to a huge problem, and actually all the added complexity and wasted hours 
debating it are such that it doesn’t justify” (SP5, Mixed, South West).  
 
Notwithstanding the practice understanding that there was some form of housing crisis in England, such 
piecemeal deregulatory housing policies to boost supply were understood as tinkering around edges of 
the wider problems in the system rather than tackling housing issues head on in any meaningful way.    
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In sum, the professional agency of planners to shape places is curtailed under viability conditions and 
PDRs enacted as external government policy neoliberalisations. Thus the Cameron-led approach in this 
period can be crudely summarised as ‘less planning, more development’ (Gurran and Ruming, 2016). 
 
4.1.3 Boosting Planning ‘Performance’: Delivering Speed or Outcomes?  
 
This section continues the arguments developed in the previous two sections on national policy reform 
and deregulation by arguing that the ‘speed’ of the planning application process is a poor measure of 
planning ‘performance’ when compared with the quality and sustainability of the new developments 
being produced; countering the neoliberal logic that efficiency is the key objective of planning reform. 
 
Overall, SPs expressed the view that, despite the government fixation, planning application decision-
making speed was often an ‘artificial measure’ of performance. The main arguments made by the PMs 
for this position were that; 1) decision-making speed does not automatically provide any guarantee of 
quality of outcome; 2) that a council’s permission/application refusal ratings would provide a more 
appropriate measure of performance; and 3) that decision speed/target systems often led to ‘perverse’ 
consequences and ‘cheating’ that distorted the actually quality of the service that was being provided: 
 
“[Decision-making speed] that is a very artificial measure, in my view…I can remember the 
old days of Planning Delivery Grant where decision was king; refusal, grant, split-decision 
or whatever, but decision was king on that day. So our refusal percentage was significantly 
higher then than it is now, but we got it out on time. You talk to an applicant, a developer, 
an agent, “Were you happy with your service?”. Well you got your refusal within seven 
weeks and six days, so that’s great, isn’t it? We are ticking our box. “Well, no, because I got 
a refusal”. Or authorities that were issuing letters which were basically saying withdraw it 
or we will refuse it, which is Hobson’s choice. Again, a) that is not a service, and b) that is 
not what people want and that isn’t what development is about. So the speed thing, all the 
developers that I have spoken to, on major applications if you say, “Would you rather have 
a decision within 13 weeks that could be either way, or we can just carry on working with 
you to get an approval which might take 16 weeks”, they will all take that one without fail. 
It is just such an artificial measure” (SP13, Urban, East Midlands).  
 
“[T]he government’s approach to measurements by performance is absolutely time based, 
and is a very poor measure of performance in my view…The objective of the customer is to 
get to the point where they can build something, and that isn’t always the most efficiently 
achieved by just the fastest bit of paper i.e. permission. Many of our applications are built 
within 22 days, because that is the minimum that it can be done in, so well inside any 
government target; but many of our applications are considerably over the government 
target because that is the right thing to do with that particular application, and it’s foolish 
to try and do it quicker than is in anyone’s interest” (SP15, Urban, West Midlands).  
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There was a clear tension for SPs between meeting the imposed national targets for processing an 
application and making a decision (speed) and achieving the best quality of decision and a positive 
outcome for the applicant, mediated by a professional concern with ‘getting it right’. As such, PMs 
embraced the importance of speed as part of providing an efficient ‘customer service’ so that 
development could happen, but strongly rejected that it was the most important factor in the process.   
 
The general sentiment was summed by SP2 that, “I have never disagreed with the idea that we should 
deal with planning applications as quickly as we possibly can, but I will always argue that speed does 
not always necessarily lead to quality” (Rural, South East). For them, planning performance agreements 
(PPAs) were an important tool to mitigate these speed/outcome practice tensions because they put “a 
sensible timescale to major developments that are so important to get right” and counter-act the “lack 
of reality in central government around the complexity of dealing with major planning applications”. 
SP2 highlighted this point through the example of a strategic housing site for 2,350 homes that had to 
be processed according to a nine-month PPA; “we are talking about a major, major site on the edge of 
the biggest town in the Cotswold district, and it’s really important that we get that right and don’t just 
end up with another faceless housing estate on the side of a historic market town” (Rural, South East).  
 
Professional understandings of ‘place-making’ (RTPI), and value of maintaining the historical and design 
character of existing areas through new developments, are the most significant factors for planners 
rather than speed of determination. These tensions over speed and outcomes highlight the competing 
priorities and interests of built environment stakeholders that together need to mobilise their different 
resources, knowledge and skills in the development process (Healey, 1992, Adams and Tiesdell, 2012). 
 
The PMs strongly argued that the speed of the planning application process was not the main or only 
problem, making the case that rather than obsessing over speed, the government should focus more 
on “the percentage of applications approved as the measure of success” (SP 13, Urban, East Midlands). 
In this respect it is more important for the government to try and understand the issues behind and 
reasons why a particular LPA has a prevalent high permission refusal rates; “[t]here are many other 
things that should be focused on, for example there are still many authorities who are absolutely awful 
at actually accepting that the growth is happening and properly planning for it, I would much prefer to 
see planning authorities judged on their ability to do that” (SP15, Urban, West Midlands). For these SPs, 
the government was looking for solutions in the ‘wrong places’, with levels of (eventual) positive 
determination being a more suitable measure of performance. However, the PMs acknowledged that 
speed was consistently given prominence over quality as a metric by government because speed can 
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be quantitatively measured to form statistical performance indicators and used to compare LPAs; 
whereas a ‘qualitative’ measure of planning decision-making performance would be far more complex: 
 
“I can see why government are doing it [focussing on application speed as the best planning 
performance indicator], if you are measuring something nationally, it is very difficult to do 
it on a more qualitative basis” (SP15, Urban, West Midlands). 
 
“[T]his has been a bugbear for years now, I don't know who is telling the government that 
speed is all important. Every time we talk to applicants, whether they be your local agents, 
your individuals, your majors, the one thing they all want is a favourable outcome. Why 
wouldn't you? If you have invested a lot of money in an application the last thing you want 
is a quick decision for refusal. So we have always sought to work with applicants to get the 
right decision for them. Not just get a quick decision. But it is the easy thing to measure; 
that is the trouble, speed is the easy thing to measure. It is very difficult to measure the 
quality of the decision. But here we are again, you know, with government changes based 
around speed, I'm not seeing the evidence that that is the important thing. It is perceived 
to be, but I'm not sure it is…we want to be one of the best performing authorities, but also 
we want to get it right…not just doing things quickly” (SP16, Mixed, West Midlands).  
 
These practice-based accounts underscore the long-standing tension between ‘process’ and ‘outcomes’ 
in planning theory (Fainstein and Campbell, 2012). They question the government’s desire to measure 
planning ‘quantitatively’ through statistics and an ‘instrumental rationality’ model, as opposed to more 
political/technical qualitative ‘value-based’ judgements that are more difficult to objectively measure. 
The main arguments presented here is the pragmatic need to give both process (speed) and outcomes 
(quality) due decision-making weight, regardless of the prevailing national policy and target framework. 
In practice, however, this is difficult for planners working under neoliberal reforms that distrusts the 
local state and seeks to either control them through targets or bypass them through policy deregulation.   
 
Furthermore, SPs also argued that basing planning performance only on speed often led to ‘cheating’, 
‘odd behaviour’ and ‘perverse’ decision-making in practice. In this context, the case was made that 
‘creative practices’ were often used to stall the process until the application deadlines, which resulted 
in higher refusals levels and reduced negotiations/extensions as a means to simply meet the targets:  
 
“[I]t was very clear that, you know, the whole thing about targets was that targets make 
you cheat; and actually what was happening was most of our determinations were 
happening on day 56, so in terms of the planning officers dealing with their caseloads they 
were leaving them all until the eighth week [deadline]. Now whether they could have 
determined them much sooner than that, but it was all on day 56, so there was a huge 
peak of decision-making activity” (SP6, Rural, South East). 
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“[T]hose authorities that tend to get to the top of the government’s performance 
table…they work in a specific sort of way and it works for them. It means they perform very 
well statistically, but they also get a lot of very odd behaviours and a lot of waste in their 
systems, or a huge amount of inefficiency at the same time; because they have a much 
higher level of refusals, they have a much higher level of withdrawn applications, and they 
have overall much less customer satisfaction. And that demand in the system just gets re-
looped and re-fed back into the system elsewhere” (SP15, Urban, West Midlands). 
 
“There used to be all manner of creative practices which we had go on to get things done 
in eight weeks; everything from stopping the clock when you were negotiating something, 
through to not starting it at the beginning of the process, through to effectively not signing 
the decision notice on the day the decisions were actually made. It was all perverse 
outcomes of chasing a target that was eight weeks, but none of the outcomes, I don't think 
anybody would have signed up to any of the outcomes being a preferable outcome…It feels 
like a bit of a throwback to the ‘bad old days’ of the [New Labour] ‘best value’ indicators 
and, you know, the old eight week targets that just produced perverse decision making. Yes, 
you have a quick decision and get refused, but you get a quick decision. Well, how does 
that serve anybody?” (SP16, Mixed, West Midlands).  
 
Overall, these practice accounts highlight the problems with excessive government focus on ‘process’ 
through decision-making speed and efficiency as the measures of effective planning performance, that 
need to be achieved through continuous reforms, against planning outcomes based on professionalism:  
 
‘Any tightening of the time taken to determine planning applications seems to reduce the capacity for 
local authority planners to negotiate, consult, mediate and conduct the activities which allow them to 
add value to the DM process through notions of professional expertise. Indeed, the exercise of such 
discretionary judgement (apparently in pursuit of wider public goals) is seen as intrinsically linked to the 
notions of planning’s professionalism in the UK’ (Clifford, 2016, p. 385-6).  
 
Despite acknowledgment across the board that speed and efficiency are important factors for providing 
a planning ‘service’, the desire for good quality planning outcomes linked to planners professional skills, 
such as high quality design standards, as well as reaching an acceptable positive determination for the 
client, was viewed as far more important to PMs than the time taken to make a decision on an 
application. Therefore the abolition of the performance-based audit and target systems for LG/LPAs by 
the Coalition can be viewed as a positive reform to planning under localism; however, the overarching 
central government demand for ‘speed’ and ‘efficiency’ has not changed post-2010. Instead different 
carrot-and-stick incentives have replaced the previous formalised targets, such as the threat of an LPA 
being placed into ‘special measures’ for consistently missing speed targets over a two year period. Thus 
successive UK governments have given ‘process’ prominence in the form of LPAs processing a planning 
application in 8 weeks for a ‘minor’ and 13 weeks for a ‘major’ application; despite the local evidence 
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that suggests this measure of performance does not necessarily lead to the best ‘outcomes’, both for 
the developers that want a positive decision and the LPAs to ‘shape places’ (Adams and Tiesdell, 2012).   
 
Overall, the findings from the three main parts in this section (4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3) have demonstrated 
that; 1) SPs viewed the principle of the NPPF as a positive attempt to simplify the planning system; 
however, that in practice this simplification led to increased policy uncertainty and greater challenges 
to planning professionalism from stakeholders as the planning system had become more flexible, 
interpretative and negotiable; 2) LPAs and planners are in a weaker position to negotiate planning gains 
with developers on behalf of their communities’ post-2010 because of viability considerations; 3) the 
small potential pay-offs of piecemeal planning deregulations were viewed as far outweighed by the 
harm such policies could cause to localities; and 4) the speed of the planning application process is a 
poor measures of planning performance when compared with the quality and sustainability of the new 
developments being produced. These practice-based criticisms revolved around professional, technical 
and public interest planning concerns, such as for sustainability, design and communities. The main 
argument here, returning to Ellis (2015), is that national policy deregulations/targets means planning is 
less powerful in relation to the market and so offers fewer opportunities for planners to make 
progressive interventions and counter neoliberal reforms that seek to water-down their professional 
autonomy, skills and objectives. Together these structures clearly delineate the boundaries of agency. 
 
In practice, this structural context of pro-development national planning policy reform, deregulation 
and performance had the potential to clash with the parallel and wider public sector governing strategy 
of ‘localism’. The next section therefore moves on to examine the experiences and responses of PMs 
to developing forms of ‘community’ and ‘economic’ localism in relation to planning practices post-2010.  
 
4.2 Practicing Community and Economic Localism Post-2010 
 
RQ2) What has localism meant in practice for local planning authorities and their relationships with 
local communities? 
 
RQ3) What have national planning policy reforms and localism post-2010 meant in practice for the 
economic and collaborative approaches of LPAs to strategic planning and housing policy and delivery? 
 
This section is subdivided into four main parts on localism and Local Planning Authorities (4.2.1), Local 
Communities (4.2.2), Strategic Planning (4.2.3) and Housing Delivery (4.2.4) respectively. The rationale 
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for this focus is that together these represent and encompass the key change areas for planning 
practices under the latest forms of community and economic scalar governance and localism post-2010. 
 
4.2.1 Localism and Local Planning Authorities 
 
This section examines how the PMs have experienced governance under localism in relation to their 
LPA. Overall, the main criticisms of localism by the practitioners follows the literature that the rhetoric 
and claims of local ‘empowerment’ did not match the reality of how the Coalition Government actually 
implemented localism as a policy post-2010. This research does not discuss the previous New Labour 
brand of ‘New Localism’ but acknowledges that the principle of ‘localism’ as a governing approach had 
been gathering momentum within Westminster over the past few decades, and increasingly received 
cross party and sectoral support as a necessary counterbalance to the legacy of centralism in UK politics.  
 
Firstly, the planning literature warns that such abstract and malleable concepts as ‘localism’ can support 
political agendas as ‘empty signifiers’; similar to ‘spatial planning’, ‘urban renaissance’, ‘sustainable 
development’, ‘smart growth’ etc., which can be suitably stretched and adjusted to give various 
meanings and legitimacy to a wide range of specific policy programmes as needed. In practice, coalition 
localism can be explained as the continued use of post-political terminology by government to achieve 
broad appeal and capture a breadth/diversity of policy; that is it can be conceptualised as a “cloak” to 
wrap around a package of reform measures that support specific agendas within these broad principles.  
 
In other words, ‘the very fuzziness of the word ‘localism’ and all the baggage that surrounds it renders 
it a quintessentially post-political term. Localism is a feel good term that is hard to argue against and it 
therefore becomes difficult to refute policies that are said to be founded upon it, rendering opposition 
difficult to mobilise’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2014, p. 49). When evaluating localism in this context 
it is worth drawing on DeFilippis et al. (2006, p.675) that various forms of neoliberal reform are not 
necessarily about ‘the weakening of the state per se’ but rather the ‘re-articulation of the roles and 
goals of the state’ within which community ‘play an active role’, in this case for restructuring planning.  
 
Moreover, the Big Society and localism agendas provided a similar political appeal associated with 
populism, which positions the rights of mass society as in opposition to the interests of a small group 
of elites. Such broad appeals to democratic populism can be observed through the justifications for 
localism by then Communities Secretary (2010-15) Eric Pickles in 2010 at the Queen’s Speech Forum: 
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“So when people ask me about my priorities in government, I have 3 very clear priorities: localism, and 
we’ll weave that into everything we do from parks to finance to policy. My second priority is localism, 
and my third is…localism…Because we like the folks. We don’t think we know better than they do. And 
we trust them to know what’s best for them. So we are determined to wrest control from the bureaucrats, 
the quangos, and central government departments. Taking power pushing it as far away from Whitehall 
as possible” (no page).  
 
Despite claims that the NPPF formed ‘a key part of the government’s reforms to make the planning 
system less complex and more accessible’ (DCLG, 2012) and that the Localism Act would ‘shift power 
from the central state back into the hands of individuals, communities and councils’ (Pickles, 2010); the 
SPs countered that the system was more complex and rigid for local decision-making than before 2010:    
 
“So I think in a nutshell, I think planning reform in 2010 took away some of the local 
decision-making powers if you like in terms of where we can go, and made the whole 
system more complicated than it was before…there is a view to some extent that the idea 
of localism is a good one, but the extent to which it has actually been successful is limited; 
because there is this wish from central government to do all sorts of things that don’t 
necessarily fit with the local agenda…I think Planning Permission in Principle, extension of 
Permitted Development Rights, etc., we are almost back to where we started. Which takes 
away from the whole localism argument really; because it takes more and more out of the 
hands of local government and puts more and more control into the hands of central 
government and the development industry” (SP2, Rural, South East).  
 
PMs expressed the central tension between the government’s ostensible commitment to localism and 
their related set of planning reform goals around efficiency, deregulation and growth, which effectively 
served to cancel each other out in practice (“we are almost back to where we started”). For the SPs, the 
view that more control was being taken away from LG and passed on to central government and the 
development industry served to discredit the policy claims and motivation for local ‘empowerment’. 
 
Pickles ended his Queens Forum speech making the case that “[localism] will free up local government 
from the shackles of central government control. And it will continue the overhaul of the planning system: 
to put the community back in charge of how their area develops…this means there has never been a 
better time to be involved in local government. No one working in local government signed up to be told 
what to do for the rest of their lives by Whitehall. So there is a real opportunity for councillors today: 
• to have much more fulfilling, rewarding careers 
• to exercise genuine choice and power 
• to change the face of their neighbourhoods 
• to actually make a difference to people’s lives 
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Local government will no longer be the poodle of central government. And together, we are going to be 
part of the most radical shake up of power there has been for generations” (2010, no page, emphasis).  
 
In contrast to strong government rhetoric that localism would ‘free the shackles on local government’, 
it was clear from the SP accounts that in practice ‘actually existing’ localism had not heralded a radical 
shift in power from the central to the local scale for LPAs. Indeed, six years after Pickles speech, rather 
than exercising ‘genuine choice and power’, planners and their councillors felt that they had less control 
over local development and decision-making as localism was de facto secondary to the NPPF in practice:   
 
“Well, the national agenda sort of overrides everything really, there is not a situation where 
the national agenda might set the scene but then therefore you are allowed through the 
local situation to put a flavour on it. The national picture very much sort of almost dictates 
what goes on” (SP1, Urban, South East).  
 
“So in terms of the localism agenda it hasn’t really, the reality has been very different from 
the rhetoric at that time, in that actually there is more restrictions now, and pressure in 
terms of delivery and potential control from central government than there was previously” 
(SP5, Mixed, South West).  
 
“I think localism is just nonsense really. The Localism Act raised what was believed to be a 
realistic spectre of local communities being able to make their own decisions, when the 
reality is no it isn’t. And I think Eric Pickles described it as ‘muscular localism’ when he 
overruled another local decision or called it in and allowed it anyway. So you can make your 
local decisions as long as they are within a framework the government is happy with, which 
isn’t truly localism but was raising this spectre” (SP23, Rural, Yorkshire and the Humber).  
 
The linguistic phrasing of localism as a “spectre” by SP23 is telling; taking this spectre metaphor, localism 
appeared genuinely real for a short time early on and from a distance at the national level, but soon 
disappeared under closer inspection when decisions had to be made about specific local developments. 
 
These findings suggest that PMs perceive LAs as remaining ‘the poodle of central government’ under 
localism, following the planning literature that localism represents a form of neoliberal governmentality 
whereby LPAs are being managed at a distance through ‘technologies of government’ post-2010 
(Davoudi and Madanipour, 2013). Indeed, local autonomy and funding was ‘incentivised’ only as far as 
such plans and actions worked within the rational confines of the national agenda (Clarke and Cochrane, 
2013). In this context, the general feeling among SPs was that the NPPF, and particularly the five-year 
land supply and objectively assessed need, had neutered the localism agenda for LPAs, despite 
147 
 
acknowledging some government commitment to localism in the form of neighbourhood planning 
(discussed in the next section). 
 
Additionally, practice concerns were raised that the actual task of implementing and reconciling the 
national policy reforms and vaguely defined commitment to localism fell onto LPAs and planners; which 
was exacerbated by the conspicuous government refusal to openly acknowledge (even ignore) that 
their pro-development policy reforms and localism agenda had the strong potential to clash when 
pursued simultaneously by local councils. This was a key concern for SPs:  
 
“[T]he fudge between localism and neighbourhood planning and growth and all, you know, 
whilst then saying everybody must meet their needs through the NPPF is, well, it is slightly 
dishonest really; promising communities greater influence over planning, but then in that 
time making councils meet their needs and looking for more [housing], but not really being 
open about it” (SP17, Urban, South East).  
 
However, despite the widespread understanding among PMs that localism had been a secondary 
concern in relation to national policy and growth, SP14 argued that these issues are not simply tensions 
between national and local policy. Rather they highlighted a more complex set of relationships and 
politics of planning, with the real tensions being between ‘preservation versus growth’ manifesting at 
the local/community scale, but not necessarily between national and local government policy agendas: 
 
“Well, yeah it [parallel growth and localism agenda] is a real tension, but I think again it is 
over simplistic to say it is a tension between national policy and local policy. It isn’t. The 
tension is between the needs of the country and the needs of a locality, which the local 
authority and the government are both as one on, versus the wishes of some local people, 
who are very loud, and vocal, and vote…I think that ‘preservation versus growth’ is the 
tension, whether it is expressed as national versus local, or politicians versus residents, or 
whatever, it is always going to be the tension. That is what creates the delays, and it’s what 
creates the compromise, and it’s what creates the difficulties, it’s not the planning system, 
it’s just life and the world around us” (SP14, Rural, East Midlands). 
 
Indeed, this tension between ‘preservation’ and ‘growth’ sits right at the heart of Conservative politics. 
This ideological party division is most sharply exemplified in southern England, where it is ‘particularly 
problematic for Conservative Governments committed to a neoliberal growth model premised on the 
competitive success of the south-east but whose core electoral support is often located in areas marked 
by strong development pressure and high levels of opposition’ (Tait and Inch, 2015, p.11). In this way, 
localism as a policy agenda represented a fine balancing act for the government between objectives.  
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As a result of the strong undercurrents of preservation vs growth within English planning and localities, 
the localism agenda exacerbated the challenges of getting an up-to-date Local Plan in place in a number 
of cases. Even where planners and members appreciated the need to promote growth to regain ‘control’ 
over development through planning policy, they had to negotiate community politics and resistance:   
 
“If we had our way we would have had a Local Plan two years ago; but it was local people 
who didn’t want it, it wasn’t the local council. It was local people who didn’t want a Local 
Plan that had that scale of development…our big issue here is we need to get a Local Plan 
in place because it gives us back control over development. We want, we know we need 
some growth, we have got a draft Local Plan which has got 6,000 homes in it. The one 
which we tried to put forward two years, that the local people wanted us to put forward 
two years ago, had 4,000 homes in it. So we have come a long way, and we have taken our 
members with us, just can we take the local people with us as well? That is going to be the 
difficult part. We have worked really, really hard on our councillors, and they know we need 
to get this plan through, but they are going to face a lot of opposition from local people; 
and it is the local people whose own children can’t afford to live locally, and can’t get jobs 
locally, that are the ones who are saying, “Well we don’t want any change”…Everyone is 
happy to see development, as long as it’s somewhere else” (SP14, Rural, East Midlands).  
 
Such practice-based accounts underscore the challenge that even where central and local government 
objectives are aligned to deliver growth through planning policy, local community politics introduces 
antagonism into local planning processes. This also highlights that national policy structures and local 
agency are not always necessarily in conflict with one another; national and local government politics 
can also be complementary depending on their goals and ‘landscapes of antagonism’ (Newman, 2013). 
 
The role of the planner in this context is to inform/support the members and work with the community 
to develop a local plan with sufficient growth but that is also politically acceptable at the local scale. 
This was not a national vs local planning policy tension as the council understood the need for growth; 
rather it was the national state growth strategy vs the specific local community politics played out 
within the local state territory. This politics of localism characterises local planning and development 
across England post-2010 and suggests a stronger role for collaborative planning theory (Healey, 1997a).  
 
Thus the main role for planners in this policy context was to both deliver growth through adherence to 
the NPPF and national housing agenda, as well as simultaneously trying to understand and build upon 
what was meant by or required of councils within the wider localism agenda. As one planner explains:  
 
“Other key things that have changed is really that relationship between the localities in 
which we [councils] are planning and communities becoming quite strong local activists, 
and we are almost the piggy in the middle. So the government have a very clear agenda 
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here, which is they want more housing, but they also talk about localism, and we are trying 
to weave the path through it which is quite challenging” (SP6, Rural, South East).  
 
Such practice accounts highlight LG planners’ understandings of being ‘stuck in the middle’ of the 
potentially conflictual positions between national growth and local preservation, played out at the local 
scale, whilst having to careful weave a path to find the appropriate balance between the two agendas. 
This supports the role of the planner as ‘mediator’ between various stakeholders in order to reach a 
‘consensual’ position, in this case between local preservation and growth. Again, this suggests that the 
logics of collaborative planning theory developed over the last two decades have been gradually 
internalised into planning practice, with planners understanding their role as finding a suitable local 
position for stakeholders whilst not necessarily seeking to impose their own position (Healey, 1997a).    
 
Importantly, as Allmendinger (2016) contends, the Coalition was initially less certain about its policy 
approach and confident about extending the traditional Conservative neoliberal policy agenda in the 
early stages 2010-2012. During these formative stages, the government attempted to build the image 
of ‘compassionate Conservatism’ through communitarian/populist appeals to Big Society and localism, 
particularly following 13 years in political opposition and fallout from the 2008 GFC. However, from 
circa 2013-2016, the Cameron-led governments strongly returned to their traditional policy approach 
based on state deregulation and private sector-led economic growth and away from Big Society localism.      
 
The PMs keenly understood the developing policy trajectory of the government for planning; noting 
the transition from a broader communitarian ‘empowerment’ approach in the early stages, towards a 
more confident assertion of planning deregulation, growth and ‘responsibilisation’ during later stages:   
 
“I think the new [2016 Housing and] Planning Bill going through Parliament at the moment 
has taken a slightly different shift in the sense of it’s now broadening out into lots of other 
areas and more what I call deregulation type of stuff. So there wasn’t really, because you 
can’t really argue that introducing neighbourhood plans is deregulation; that is more 
around localism. So we have moved from perhaps a so called localism agenda to much 
more of a deregulation agenda…It’s all about taking the control away from local authorities 
and giving people who want to do development greater freedom to do it without the yay 
or nay of their local council” (SP1, Urban, South East).  
 
“We are not hearing ‘Big Society’ mentioned anymore, and even ‘localism’ really, and you 
look at what is coming down the track and it is ever more centralisation…it will be, “You 
[councils] make the difficult decisions, here is the resource, the limited resource to do it but 
you wanted localism; you wanted to command authority, you have got it, you need to make 
the decision now. It is yours, not ours”. I think there is a heavy dose of that going on. The 
more that difficult decision-making could be fronted by local government the easier it is for 
central government to withstand it [criticism]” (SP16, Mixed, West Midlands).   
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These understandings of unfolding and developing government policy agendas, and their implications 
for practice, suggests the SP/PMs role as ‘reflective practitioners’ (Schön, 1987) aware of their position 
within wider governing approaches, and alluding to externalised changes being ushered by successive 
waves of neoliberalisations and reforms that seek to devolve responsibility and risk onto the local scale. 
 
Beyond the claims made for LG, the Localism Act was primarily aimed at empowering local communities 
through making the planning system more inclusive and accessible, along with the NPPF, and elevating 
the neighbourhood scale as the site for community governance. This forms the focus of the next section.    
 
4.2.2 Localism and Communities 
 
This section moves on to examine the understandings and experiences of PMs to ‘community localism’ 
within their LPA context, particularly through a focus on neighbourhood planning (henceforth NP) as 
the flagship policy of the Localism Act. It should be noted therefore that these accounts only represent 
one stakeholder perspective on NP and not the views of the communities actually involved in the 
process. Nonetheless, as LPAs have a ‘duty to support’ NP groups, they are a key agent within the local 
networks of community planning and so their views and roles merit attention (Parker and Salter, 2016a). 
 
One core rationality behind NP as a policy agenda was that if communities were more involved and 
empowered within the planning process, and crucially received a share of the benefits of development, 
they would be more likely to accept growth within their locality (Open Source Planning, Conservative 
Party, 2010). This ‘incentivised’ policy was applied to NP groups through receiving a larger 25% share 
of Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) as opposed to 15% for those without NPs, and to LAs more 
generally through the New Homes Bonus (NHB; jokingly termed the ‘Boles Bung’ after the Minister for 
Planning at the time) that provided additional funding for new housing construction over a set period. 
This approach to govern local actions indirectly can be explained through governmentality theory, with 
localism as a specific form of ‘spatial liberalism’ seeking to influence empowered actors to adjust their 
own conduct towards the governing end of facilitating development (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013).   
 
Indeed, the Government’s summary document ‘A Plain English Guide to the Localism Act’ (DCLG, 2011) 
is strongly framed in pro-development terms for community engagement to influence the location and 
design of new housing and business development, but not to question the necessity for development: 
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‘Neighbourhood planning will allow communities, both residents, employees and business, to come 
together through a local parish council or neighbourhood forum and say where they think new houses, 
businesses and shops should go – and what they should look like…Local communities will be able to use 
neighbourhood planning to grant full or outline planning permission in areas where they most want to 
see new homes and businesses, making it easier and quicker for development to go ahead’ (p. 12). 
 
These government discourses and policy agendas gradually developed out of the growing concerns that 
one of the key factors in the decline of new housing supply over the past couple of decades in England 
has been community opposition to house-building and development more generally. In this context, 
NP was introduced as a policy tool to ‘overcome this opposition by devolving limited powers to 
communities to influence development’ based on the rationale that ‘giving communities the right to 
draw up neighbourhood development plans would secure their compliance with a pro-growth agenda 
and increase the number of sites allocated for housing’ (Bradley and Sparling, 2017, p. 106).   
 
Ludwig and Ludwig (2014, p. 245) present a practitioner perspective of localism that argues ‘behind the 
rhetoric of the neighbourhood planning discourse is a covert political objective of enabling local 
economic development by facilitating private sector-led growth (through ensuring fewer local objections 
to development proposals and more planning approvals)’. They are therefore concerned with the 
‘dangerously misplaced emphasis on empowering localities’ through NP and argue instead for a policy 
approach that ‘facilitates genuine community engagement’ within local development processes. 
Similarly, Bradley (2015, p. 97) argues that the ‘state strategy of localism seeks to harness the benefits 
of collective participation while limiting its impact on the current political settlement’. These literatures 
highlight the tensions between government policy claims to ‘empowerment’ and their localism agenda.  
 
Here insights from governmentality and post-political theory can help explain the Coalition approach 
to localism and NP. For the former, NP potentially involves bypassing the local state towards governing 
through the actions of responsibilized communities; that is, as a governmentality strategy to achieve 
state objectives (increased housing delivery) through advanced liberal democracies (Rose and Miller, 
1992, Rose, 1993, Rose, 1999). Indeed going back to SP1, “we have moved from perhaps a so called 
localism agenda to much more of a deregulation agenda…It’s all about taking the control away from 
local authorities and giving people who want to do development greater freedom to do it without the 
yay or nay of their local council” (Urban, South East); and in the words of Pickles, “It [Localism Act] will 
empower local people giving them more power over local government” (2010, no page). Whilst for the 
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latter, such policy can be explained as attempts towards limiting, displacing, deferring or diffusing the 
politics of housing development, or depoliticising it, within the planning system (Allmendinger, 2017).   
 
In this context, however, only SP9 explicitly identified with the government logic that local communities 
would respond more positively to development when they had more control over the process. They 
explained that although a number of their local parishes had complained bitterly and fought hard 
against planning applications for housing pre-Local Plan adoption, when they came to produce their 
own neighbourhood plans they allocated housing sites in addition to their settlement requirements:   
 
“[T]hat sort of rationalises that it is all about control…they [local community group] wanted 
to demonstrate through their neighbourhood plan that they were in control, and hence why 
they have allocated more than they necessarily needed to do to satisfy the numbers we 
have in our Local Plan and the settlement hierarchy. It is a real case of human nature there, 
and so the government got it right in saying that people want to be in charge of their 
destiny” (SP9, Mixed, West Midlands).  
 
More generally, PMs identified three key challenges around NP. Firstly, the need to explain to their 
communities that NP was not a tool for resisting development but for helping to shape their locality. 
Secondly, the need to align community group neighbourhood plans with the LA Local Plan (process) 
and national policy requirements (basic conditions). Thirdly, the lack of internal technical expertise and 
resources within some communities that wanted to undertake NP, and the capacity of LPAs to support 
such groups and maintain responsibility as the qualifying body particularly under austerity conditions. 
SP19 highlighted a typical problem for the SPs in relation to the first two challenges:  
 
“[W]e have got quite a lot of neighbourhood plans at various different stages here. And 
inevitably neighbourhood planning was seen as the way of stopping development probably, 
I think many are seeing it as a way of focussing and controlling development within their 
villages. Again, that sort is sort of tricky when we are in a position where we have said, 
“Well to meet our local housing numbers, this is the quantum of development your village 
needs to take”. And they are saying, “OK, that’s quite painful but we’ll take it there [site]”, 
and they are then developing the neighbourhood plan. And we are now coming back and 
saying, “Well we have got to find more housing sites so we need another 1,000 across the 
villages, so you are going to have to take some more”. And they are saying, “Well, we have 
got a neighbourhood plan that says that it is that site, not that site”. So there is some 
politics, with a small p, around how we work with villages to get them to understand that 
it isn’t about stopping growth” (Urban, West Midlands).  
 
In contrast to practitioner concerns that NPs cannot be considered a ‘pro-growth’ policy tool that will 
deliver more housing, the government has claimed (without much supporting evidence beyond a few 
hand selected cases) that localities with NPs are delivering 10% more housing than the figure required 
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by their Local Plans (DCLG, 2016). However, the government has been criticised for their quantifiable 
fixation with numbers based on NP uptake and completion status over more qualitative assessments of 
what NP policies are attempting and actually delivering for different places and people across England, 
which is crucial to the future of ‘community’ planning (Parker et al., 2017b, Wargent and Parker, 2018). 
 
The general sentiment among the SPs was that NP represented a positive addition to the planning 
system; however, a number of PMs were sceptical of the value of statutory NPs over other ‘community 
planning tools’, particularly given the uneven power relations between community actors and the 
specific technical and constrained nature of NP. SP36 made the case that alternative participation 
mechanism could be more effective for meeting community objectives; especially where communities 
simply wanted to become involved with a particular development project or based on a specific issue, 
which could involve working with the council or the Local Plan process, rather than unnecessarily being 
directed towards the costly and challenging production of a statutory land-use planning document:     
 
“[W]hen new groups come to [the council] we do a whole thing with them about, “Are you 
sure you want to do a plan? If there is a big development happening, let’s get you more 
involved in the pre-app”. We have other things in [the city], we have got something very 
good called the Neighbourhood Planning Network, every area has got planning groups…So 
we say to people, “That is what you really want to influence, and then by the time you have 
done a plan through the planning process the development could have been built. So if you 
are actually interested in the slightly softer things like housing policy there may be other 
community plans or other tools”. So before people start off now, we try to be much more 
explicit about, “What are you trying to achieve, what do you think you are trying to achieve, 
because let’s make sure a statutory land use plan is the right tool”…because our Site 
Allocations document allocates loads of sites for housing and everything else. Actually if 
you are interested in that particular site, how it can be designed, how it will be laid out, the 
mix of housing, then you don’t need a whole land use plan” (SP36, Urban, South West).  
 
Whilst this case potentially represents a more ‘pragmatic’ approach to community engagement, the 
academic literature highlights the potential for instrumentalism and the colonisation of NP processes; 
whereby community objectives are captured by dominant interests, or ‘rescripted’ by LAs, expert 
consultants or independent examiners, which do the work of the state at a distance by course-
correcting and re-rationalising neighbourhood plans (Parker et al., 2015). More research is therefore 
needed on the role of different LPAs in supporting or limiting NP groups (See Parker and Salter, 2016a).       
 
In response to this context, Parker et al. (2017a) highlight the importance of the ‘institutional framing’ 
of the NP process. Specifically that the existing terms of engagement imposes a series of procedural 
rules, stage-points, and coproduction limits; framed by requirements that neighbourhood plans must 
meet or exceed the level of growth set out in the council’s Local Plan and other NPPF ‘basic conditions’. 
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This institutional framing means ‘localist empowerment is definitively subordinate to the Government’s 
growth agenda’, with NP then forming ‘an example of participatory design which attempts to control 
from a distance and represents a linked effort to de-politicise planning’ (Parker et al., 2017a, p. 455).   
 
Similarly, Vigar et al. (2017, 423) found that NP in practice was not meeting its potential to ‘create 
spaces for agonistic debate about very-local place futures’; not least because of the emotional 
associations and affective politics involved in planning work within localities and communities. Instead, 
their research shows that rather than seeking to present different views, opinions and knowledge about 
place futures, which form the prerequisites to democratic participation and debate; process managers, 
intermediaries and citizens shied away or silenced such debates in favour of ‘cosmetic consensus’ to 
preserve community capital around the neighbourhood plan. In order to overcome these challenges, 
the institutional design of NP needs to address the shortages of knowledge, capacities and resources 
at the local level, along with more robust and innovative methods for community involvement that can 
facilitate agonistic debate (Vigar et al., 2017). In the context of austerity, LPAs may not have enough 
capacity or resources to support their communities without greater external government provisions.    
 
These studies also highlight the nature of the third challenge identified by the SPs in this research:  
 
“I think this is part of the tension that the government is saying they want communities to 
do something, but they do not have the same expertise that the local authority have if they 
were doing the plan, and we have to look at it differently beyond the light-touch…again in 
terms of the resourcing issues, it’s bad enough trying to resource a Local Plan, never-mind 
trying to resource the many neighbourhood plans we have; because if we are going to have 
to be more forensic about it, we may as well do them ourselves” (SP6, Rural, South East).   
 
Despite these important concerns about the motivations, resourcing and institutional framing of NP, 
Bradley and Sparling (2017, p. 106) found that ‘neighbourhood planning is emerging as the proponent 
of sustainability and social purpose in the English housing market, in conflict with the corporate interests 
of a liberalized housing development market’. Such findings highlight the potential for ‘citizen-planners’ 
(Parker et al, 2018) to achieve counter-hegemonic outcomes through progressive engagements within 
the tightly constrained participatory spaces that work within the grains of neoliberalism to use localism 
and NP in ways unintended by government objectives (Williams et al., 2014, Featherstone et al., 2012).       
 
Overall, the SPs understood community localism through neighbourhood planning as ‘good principles’ 
for participation in planning, but in their current form suffering from a number of practical and political 
challenges; not least the potential to clash with the ‘strategic’ national housing and growth agendas 
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pursued in other planning reforms. Having evaluated the community credentials of localist governance 
from the perspective of PMs, the next section moves on to evaluate their experiences and responses 
to key functions for strategic planning under national policy reforms for ‘economic’ localism post-2010. 
 
4.2.3 Localism and Strategic Planning  
 
The purpose of this section is to present practitioner evaluations of the practice changes for strategic 
planning and cross-boundary collaboration under the shifts towards ‘economic’ localism post-2010. The 
removal of the Regional Government (herein RG) architecture in 2010 by the Coalition in favour of a 
localist governing approach marked a significant change for approaches to strategic planning in England. 
As part of their localised economic development approach, the nine regions were replaced by 39 Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (henceforth LEPs), which were claimed to be more closely aligned with ‘natural’ 
local economic geographies known as ‘Functional Economic Areas’ (FEAs) rather than ‘administrative’ 
areas. This policy approach matured over the period 2010-2016 as the emphasis gradually shifted from 
LEPs towards city-regions, combined authorities and city/devolution deals (termed ‘economic’ localism).    
 
Shortly after the Coalition was formed, then Secretary of State Eric Pickles made a speech in July 2010 
outlining the government’s rationales for the abolishment of the regional tier of government in England:   
 
“In our first two months in government we have demonstrated our commitment to localism, 
decentralisation and rolling back regional government in England. We have announced the 
abolition of Regional Development Agencies, abolished the Regional Strategies, ended funding for 
the Regional Leaders’ Boards (the successors to the Regional Assemblies) and are closing the 
Government Office for London. We have taken these steps because they are right in principle and 
as part of a fundamental transfer of power from central Government down to local councils and 
down further to local communities. We have done so to reduce spending on bureaucracy and 
protect front-line services against the backdrop of an unsustainable budget deficit and national 
debt. We do not believe the arbitrary government regions to be a tier of administration that is 
efficient, effective or popular. Citizens across England identify with their county, their city, their 
town, their borough and their neighbourhood. The case for elected regional government was 
overwhelmingly rejected by the people in the 2004 North East Referendum. Unelected regional 
government equally lacks democratic legitimacy, and its continuing existence has created a 
democratic deficit…We are making good progress with our programme of radical reform to reduce 
the burden of bureaucracy on local authorities and businesses, including removing the inflated local 
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government performance regime and doing away with the unnecessary regional tier…I believe 
that the original intentions behind the establishment of the Government Offices for the Regions 
(to join up different Departmental teams outside London into a ‘one stop shop’) have been lost. 
Such functions are no longer necessary in an internet age and given the Coalition Government’s 
commitment to genuine decentralisation and devolution of power…We should be clear: The 
Government Offices are not voices of the region in Whitehall. They have become agents of Whitehall 
to intervene and interfere in localities, and are a fundamental part of the ‘command and control’ 
apparatus of England’s over-centralised state” (Pickles, 2010, emphasis added).  
 
The main government justifications for removing regional government centred around three claims; 
they lacked democratic legitimacy and popularity, they were inefficient and overly bureaucratic, and 
they were part of the problem to resolving ‘England’s over-centralised state’, as opposed to the solution 
of localism. The additional contention was made that regions did not hold the same emotional affective 
dimension for citizens as their local towns and neighbourhoods, and so these scales should be further 
empowered. Figure 15 shows the previous regional government structure in England (1997-2010) and 
figure 16 illustrates how the governance of strategic planning was reorganised into the (now) 38 LEPs.  
 
The purpose here is not to provide an appraisal of the previous regional government in England (for 
this see Baker and Wong, 2013, Swain et al., 2013) nor to present an evaluation of LEPs since 2010 (see 
Pugalis and Bentley, 2013, Pike et al., 2015). Rather it is to present practitioner reflections on the 
changes to strategic planning impacting their practices post-2010, particularly in relation to Coalition 
claims that scalar reform from regionalism to localism would improve democracy, efficiency and growth. 
It is not possible to present the full scope of the empirical data here, suffice to say the findings suggest 
that PMs have mixed views about the removal of regional government and the effectiveness of their 
replacement by LEPs and city-regions, tending to highlight different strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach in terms of economic governance, (spatial) politics and democracy within their LA contexts. 
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Figure 15 – Regional Government in England (1997-2010)  
 
Source: House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee Fourth Report, 2007. 
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Figure 16 – Local Enterprise Partnerships in England (2010 - )  
 
Source: LEP Network Website 
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Taking these government claims and criticisms of strategic planning before localism as a starting point, 
SP7 presented a counter to one of the arguments for the removal of RG put forward by Pickles (2010), 
that “the original intentions behind the establishment of the Government Offices for the Regions (to join 
up different Departmental teams outside London into a ‘one stop shop’) have been lost”. Instead, SP7’s 
account suggests the almost self-fulfilling prophesy that the ‘one stop shop’ for ministers outside of 
London was indeed lost, but only after the removal of the RG Offices. There was no evidence to suggest 
that the internet had replaced such intermediary relationships at the regional level, but rather the 
assumption that decentralisation means less contact with as well as less control from the central state:    
 
“In the previous government, where you would have a network of Regional Government 
Offices…what used to happen was that before any national consultation or national 
legislation change was issued, the Government Offices would speak to their local contacts 
and, you know, say ‘Look the government ministers are thinking about this, what do you 
reckon?’. And there would be a little sense-checking…the civil servants in the Government 
Offices would get that, because it’s not all about London, the situation in the Midlands and 
the North East and North West is very different. So the civil servants in the Regional Offices 
would feed that back to the ministers and the mandarins at Whitehall, and say ‘Well 
actually, have you thought about this?’…So what came out in the consultation was the 
more refined version, but that doesn’t happen anymore” (SP7, Urban, East Midlands). 
 
“[T]he Government [Regional] Offices in the North East closing down was a big one for us, 
everything goes through Whitehall now, it would never come up [to the North East]” (SP25, 
Major Urban, North East). 
 
Despite the strong criticisms by the Coalition that RG was overly bureaucratic and undemocratic, the 
evidence suggests that regional-level civil servants provided a useful linking role between Whitehall and 
localities to informally discuss policy changes and provide early feedback on consultation and legislation. 
Under localism, the capacity for the central government to informally ascertain regional and local level 
views on policy from across the country, particularly concerning strategic and spatial governance, was 
undermined. In the new devolved system, only core city-regions with elected metro-mayors could have 
potentially similar intermediary access to Whitehall, a situation that could ironically be less democratic 
for localities as a whole to gain interaction and support from government. Arguably, the government 
have fallen into the ‘local trap’ in which the ‘local’ is uncritically conflated or used interchangeable with 
‘democracy’ (Purcell, 2006), and confusing local ‘empowerment’ and ‘abandonment’ through localism. 
 
The ‘ineffectiveness’ and ‘high cost’ criticisms of regions may be valid, as one of the main ‘practical’ 
outcomes of a very time consuming and resource intensive process was effectively to determine local 
housing figures. In this sense, having housing figures decided at the local scale may have saved the costs 
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of having regional institutions; however, this has caused a significant amount of political tension and 
conflict that regional governance could have managed as a strategic-level arbiter and decision-maker:   
 
“My experience on Regional Spatial Strategies and the Regional Development Agency was 
that sometimes authorities would struggle to get what they wanted because there had to 
be a position that was suitable for the whole region. And I felt that some authorities that I 
was in, I was aware were struggling to get their messages across, and struggling to get 
what they wanted in Regional Spatial Strategy. And it seemed like the only thing that people 
were concerned about was the housing numbers…So you had a document that has taken 
quite a lot of research, a lot of time and consultation to prepare, but actually really the nub 
of it was ‘what is the figure for your authority?’” (SP38, Major Urban, North West). 
 
“Well with the regional planning of course that required cooperation between all the 
organisations involved, and I think that was so well embedded that it worked well; and it 
certainly helped to overcome some of the conflicts between neighbouring districts. You 
know, District A not wanting a regional employment site and so therefore trying to push it 
onto District B, and that sort of thing. So there was in a sense a built in dispute resolution 
process which I think we all found rather useful” (SP9, Mixed, West Midlands).  
 
“I think regionalism to localism in terms of the loss of that strategic level has been difficult 
for us, because it causes some conflicts that perhaps we shouldn’t have had to have with 
neighbouring authorities. In terms of neighbouring authorities’ ambitions…being very 
much…‘growth at any cost, just come to us’” (SP5, Mixed, South West).  
 
“People working in local government, you are almost fighting against the boundaries, that 
you are working within in a system that isn’t ostensibly sensible, and it causes a huge 
amount of issues. I mean Norfolk is probably a really good example because actually we 
make the current system work pretty well. We co-operate across boundaries and the two 
tiers, and it’s impossible to quantify, but the constant negotiation, compromise, lowest 
common denominator politics that goes on, must be an incredible brake on the economy…It 
seems like localism, and fair enough there should be a bit of democratic accountability, 
people shouldn’t necessarily feel they are being dumped on, but isn’t there also a strategic 
responsibility on the government to lead on such matters?” (SP35, Urban, East of England).  
 
“[F]rankly, I think everybody in this part of the world, they mourn the death of the regional 
plans; because okay it wasn't perfect, but it settled a lot of issues that then could have 
really focused people on implementing and delivery. We have spent the last five years 
[under localism] mucking about basically” (SP40, Mixed, North West). 
 
The SPs expressed the value of RG to provide strategic leadership and conflict resolution; however, in 
terms of the pragmatism and politics of representation and decision-making, the LEP and city-region 
structures were viewed as more appropriate than regional ones for promoting shared cross-boundary 
agendas based on businesses and stakeholders operating within the same localised and situated FEAs:      
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“I think that city-region, almost a Functional Economic Area, doesn’t quite match here; but 
that type of level of governance and partnership works more effectively. Because…big 
players within the city, are they going to want to sit round a table with the big players from 
Leeds and Sheffield? And with the councillors from those different authorities, there is going 
to be too many people. But then, if you slim the number down, you lose that connection 
and understanding of the local area…I think South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire works [as 
a city-region scale], but once you merge them there is just too many issues to deal with; 
and there will be thousands and thousands of businesses across that area as a whole, and 
then how are a dozen or so of those supposed to represent that business community? You 
can’t. And that is the thing that you have got to realise as well, that at a regional level you 
get caught in this real awkward situation of, ‘So who do you get around the table to be the 
decision makers?’. So you might go, “Oh we have got to have someone from the Humber, 
someone from North Yorkshire, someone from West Yorkshire, someone from South 
Yorkshire”. Well, that seems fine, but then those authorities fight between each other over, 
‘Well, who is going to represent us?’. And if you just say, “Oh it is largely the big cities in 
those areas”, well how does the rural voice then get heard? This is what happened at 
Yorkshire Forward. So then they have a community group set up for the rural areas. So they 
get a seat at the table. But then you start working it through and you have suddenly got 25 
people sat round the table, and you don’t get much agreed and much taken forward when 
there is that number [of interest stakeholders]. Whereas here in the [LEP] boards you will 
be talking a dozen round the table; and I think that gives the confidence that you have got 
enough opinions, but actually there is a small enough number to be able to usually come 
to a consensus and actually take things forward” (SP26, Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber).  
 
These expressed practical improvements to local economic governance potentially support the claims 
made by Pickles (2010) that ‘we want to encourage and celebrate local leadership, ingenuity, and 
enterprise…to get councils and entrepreneurs working together…based on our trust in local leaders to 
deliver’. In this sense, stakeholder negotiations over local economic priorities may be more efficient 
post-2010. However, for SP31, the shift from regions to LEPs had not changed the overall ‘priorities’, 
and in practice the reforms had served to delay strategic planning in the locality for a number of years:   
 
“When the RDA was abolished here we were on the cusp of agreeing an MAA3, and beneath 
that an action plan that set out a list of the priorities, which never got signed-off because 
the RDA was abolished; and that fell into disrepair because there was nobody to take over 
and there was nowhere to take that list of activities and priorities…looking at some of the 
things the LEP are funding now, they are almost straight out of the MAA. So it was just an 
unfortunate delay, and we could have been here five years ago with some of the things that 
we are now doing. So it’s just unfortunate because the priorities are the priorities and they 
haven’t changed. So things like investment in transport infrastructure, investment to 
support house building, commercial floor space, business support, and those sorts of things 
were all part of the conversation with the RDA” (SP31, Urban, North West).  
 
                                                          
3  Multi-Area Agreements (MAAs) are voluntary agreements between two or more top-tier or unitary local 
authorities, their partners and Government. The aim of an MAA is to achieve collective outcome-based targets 
with a view to improving economic prosperity. 
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Overall, the SPs largely split into ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ camps concerning the effectiveness, geography and 
integration of RG and LEPs, based on their LPA context and personal experiences with each structure(s). 
This highlights a key finding/theme running throughout the analysis chapters; that the most important 
factors in determining specific experiences and responses to (planning) reforms are local contextualities. 
 
Here the main SP planning concerns around LEPs was managing and implementing the overly ambitious 
‘economic vision’ and growth aspirations of their Strategic Economic Plans (henceforth SEPs). The 
general case was made that LEPs are not operated by professional strategic planners in the same way 
as RG, and so their SEP economic visions were largely left to LAs to implement and make ‘work’ despite 
the lack of strategic and land-use technical evidence and knowledge necessary to inform LPA Local Plans:   
 
“Well it is interesting to see about how LEPs have influenced things; because at the end of 
the day although they are business-led, the business leaders haven’t got a skill set that they 
can apply; their day job isn’t in regional planning or sub-regional planning, it’s in running a 
business. So although they can exert a certain discipline over how we work, the work has 
got to be done by the local authority at the end of the day. We have taken the lead on doing 
the economic strategy and we have taken the lead on looking at house building and the 
barriers” (SP9, Mixed, West Midlands).  
 
“LEP economic ambitions, as set out in SEPs, I think in many places are very unrelated to 
the actual empirically evidence-based employment sort of projections and planning 
processes. So you’ve got an immediate tension in-built there” (SP7, Urban, East Midlands). 
 
“I think for us, the big problem is the ambition of our politician and our regeneration 
colleagues which is manifested in the SEP, Strategic Economic Plans, which from our 
perspective as planners is barking. It is not predicated on evidence, it is predicated on 
ambition, and there is no rationale for that ambition other than we want to grow massively. 
So I think as councils we try and work together and try and rationalise that…and it doesn’t 
work because it is not a sound vision” (SP25, Major Urban, North East). 
 
“I mean the Local Enterprise Partnership in the North-East hasn’t really set out things like 
your travel-to-work areas or your housing market areas, that’s been done at the local level. 
So the local authorities have all done their work on that, and so that was probably already 
in place to be honest by the time that the Local Enterprise Partnership was in place…the 
Strategic Economic Plan…I sort of remember it being prepared and the local authorities 
were aware and contributing into that; but I think you have got to almost always make a 
distinction between economic policy documents and spatial planning land-use documents 
to some extent; because there are overlaps but they tend to have slightly different purposes. 
So planning policy documents will have to create policies and have a vast amount of 
supporting specific evidence-base and a spatial focus. Whereas an economic policy 
document is as much a kind of bidding document, showpiece document, aspirations for the 
regions as much as it is to steer policy and understanding” (SP33, Rural, North East). 
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Similarly, SP27 explained that “all of the evidence base that has influenced the Strategic Economic Plan 
on household growth, employment growth, where that is likely to take place, has all been commissioned 
and driven by the city-region Heads of Planning…[so] although we are planners we are influencing that 
broader economic and LEP agenda” (Major Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber). Likewise, SP37 explained 
that the Liverpool LEP will put out their growth strategy to the LAs, but they won’t “get involved in the 
detail then of land use allocations and things, that will be down for us to sort out” (Major Urban, North 
West). Whilst SP40 explains that the Cheshire and Warrington LEP has had “a more peripheral role 
certainly in terms of the statutory planning functions” because it has not really grappled or particularly 
understood them; meaning that the LEP influence on the council Local Plan “has been fairly modest so 
far” (Mixed, North West). Whilst these findings highlight some potentially problematic disconnects and 
overlaps between LPA statutory land-use planning and LEP SEPs for economic governance, they also 
suggest that LPAs may have greater autonomy over local economic strategies under localism post-2010. 
 
Further concerns raised issues over the previous experiences and knowledges required to meaningfully 
participate in strategic planning conversations, and which ultimately decide key investment priorities:     
 
“You have got [planning] officers attending [LEP boards] who have got 20, 30, 40 years’ 
experience, and some members equally who are quite intelligent people that are well 
versed in how to win hearts and minds. And then you get somebody come along who makes 
widgets, who happens to be quite vocal in the local Chamber of Commerce and Trade, and 
has got themselves into the position of being on a LEP board for heaven’s sake; but actually 
then get there and thinking, ‘What the hell am I doing here?’. It really has been a bit of a 
shock I think in terms of those type of people who are on that board, but actually they are 
in positions of making decisions for allocating or bidding for huge sums of money” (SP23, 
Rural, Yorkshire and the Humber). 
 
SP37 also alluded to issues around the motivations of some private-sector actors for attending the LEP, 
with some members such as the Peel Group developers becoming ‘concerned’ when certain (their) 
development proposals had not been “prioritised highly enough” in the SEP and LA Local Plans, such as 
the Wirral Waters and Liverpool Waters projects (Major Urban, North West). This underscores the need 
for distinction between public and private sector actors in processes that form the politics of planning. 
 
The finding here suggest that LPAs and planners are still taking the lead on operationalising economic 
growth, housing and transport plans and strategies; with LEPs focussing more on being promotional 
and marketing vehicles with aspirational economic visions, and as a mechanism to develop partnerships 
and attract funding bids. In this sense, LEPs could be considered more entrepreneurial and (internally) 
competitive than regions. Indeed, some places did express they had strong links between LPAs and LEPs:   
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“Oh definitely [the LEP and council priorities are aligned]. A prime example is our LEP 
produced the Humber Spatial Plan, but that was basically pulled together from all the work 
each individual local authority had done within their own statutory plans. And of course it 
had to be big or visionary, so there were extras put in there; but whenever any of those 
extras were put in there was that assurance that it was going to align with where [council] 
saw ourselves heading. So there was always a very close alignment in terms of the LEP 
priorities and the respective local authorities” (SP26, Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber).  
 
“Norfolk and Suffolk share a LEP, we have had to work strongly with them on economic 
development in the last four or five years. We have a very good LEP and it has close links 
with the local authorities. So joint working between ourselves and the LEP has meant that 
we have worked jointly on many different projects. So there is a good level of trust there. 
So when it came to actually putting together a devolution bid there was good links where 
people know each other well which is part of the game, both at the political and officer 
level, for people who have that history of working together” (SP8, Mixed, East of England).  
 
The extent to which localism/LEPs have changed the nature and delivery of strategic planning in England 
post-2010 is still unclear and questionable; however, the evidence suggests that strategic and economic 
planning work is still being “done by the local authority at the end of the day” (SP9). This forms one of 
the most significant changes from regionalism to localism, as LPAs no longer have strategic planning 
work and evidence conducted at the regional level and passed down for implementation; rather they 
have to determine and solve these economic and strategic issues themselves with some ‘light touch’ 
economic strategy guidance and funding from LEPs. On the one hand, these reforms may have freed 
LPA planners from RG to enact their own strategies, empowering them to have a bigger impact on their 
localities; whilst on the other hand it has responsibilized them to deliver their own localised solutions 
and future without any further government guidance, power or funding to mitigate socio-spatial risks.     
 
Moreover, these findings also suggest that for a number of smaller and more peripheral predominantly 
rural LPAs, the difference between RG and LEP governance was negligible in terms of attracting funding; 
whether operating under a regional or localist system, their priorities were too far down the ‘food chain’:   
 
“[O]ur problem is that our employers are mostly relatively small. We haven’t got the Rolls 
Royce’s that Derby has or the Boeings that Sheffield have. We have people that are in the 
supply for them but they are much, much smaller firms. So investing in our infrastructure 
to enable our sites in the [council] isn’t going to bring the same bang-for-bucks that the LEP 
would get by rebuilding some railway land outside Derby or a flattened ex-coking works on 
the outskirts of Sheffield and Rotherham. The cost per job is higher. So because it’s smaller 
firms, so it doesn’t have the gloss, and because it’s smaller sites the cost per job is higher. 
So we are always going to be lower down any LEP or other funding agency whatever it may 
be, whether it be a RDA, a LEP, or a government department directly, we are always going 
to be lower down the list for getting funding for our schemes…[the] City Region largely 
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focused on the big stuff too, inward investment, international investment, and so on. It is 
what’s on their radar far more than a few million quid to get 500 jobs in a quarry in the 
[council]; for our local economy that’s of tremendous importance, on their scale it’s not. So 
we are down the food chain” (SP14, Rural, East Midlands, emphasis added). 
 
The uneven outcomes of localist economic and spatial governance strategies post-2010 have formed a 
key area of debate in the literature. For Harrison and Heley (2015), there ‘remains a noticeable silence 
in city-region debate concerning how rural spaces are conceptualised, governed and represented’, 
whereby ‘a paralysis of city-region policymaking has ensued from policy elites constantly swaying 
between a spatially-selective, city-first, agglomeration perspective on city-regionalism and a spatially-
inclusive, region-first, scalar approach which fragments and divides territorial space along historical 
lines’ (p.1113). The tensions between these back-and-forth scalar policy/governing approaches leads 
to a more fragmented and complex picture of spatial planning structures and practices across England, 
particularly in the most recent context of ‘disorganised devolution’ (Shaw and Tewdwr-Jones, 2017).     
 
These broader national debates around economic strategy were being mirrored by local actors under 
localism; as SP10 puts it, “there is an issue about what do you do in a Local Enterprise Partnership like 
this, do you build and invest in your successors, or do you try and tackle the worst areas?” (Urban, South 
West). It is argued that such debates permeating within responsibilized localities to negotiate sink or 
swim economic politics in the context of strained resources represents externalised neoliberalisations. 
 
Finally, beyond the specific structures, the overarching strategic planning practice concern here was 
the lack of any national level economic strategy, particularly for infrastructure investment, resulting 
from the ‘laissez faire’ free-market approach taken by successive UK Governments. PMs contrasted the 
UK to the strategic planning approaches taken across Western Europe, where national governments 
typically play a larger interventionist role in planning to help shape and deliver development projects:      
 
“I think we are still, despite what the Blair government said, locked into a very laissez-faire 
non-interventionists approach in this country. Northern European, Sweden, Germany, 
Holland, Denmark, etc. they are much happier for the state to provide that vison and 
direction on how to both plan and grow your cities, but also in terms of having it linked to 
a clear economic strategy. We don’t even have an economic strategy in this country” (SP21, 
Urban, North East).  
 
“[T]he vast majority of local authorities, and those who would look at [regions] now, would 
go, “Well, what we really want is strategic clarity, where are you going to invest as the 
government?”. And so instead of just saying this is all down to us and lobby for that 
[investment under localism], what the authorities would want is some clarity over their role 
and area in relation to national policy; ‘Are we going to benefit from considerable levels of 
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infrastructure funding?’. Because if we can, maybe we will be able to unlock a far higher 
level of growth…At the moment our strategic plan seems to be one of utterly laissez faire, 
that the growth pressures are concentrated on the South East, and it seems that five-year 
land supply rules the world in most of those areas…There isn’t a coherent process whereby 
you reconcile what your vision and longer term strategy is for the growth of the country 
against your infrastructure investment” (SP35, Urban, East England). 
 
However, despite general practitioner criticisms of the laissez-faire context, SP29 presented an example 
to argue that the market can only be shaped so far despite political intentions and planning strategies:  
 
“When I was working in Lancashire they extended the M65, which is the motorway that 
used to go from the east of Blackburn to Colne. So it kind of went across East Lancashire, it 
was a bit of a funny road, and then it just ended just east of Blackburn and you had to go 
on this horrible road around Blackburn to get across the M6 and Preston. So there was an 
incoming case made which said we should extend the M65 so it linked straight across to 
Preston, so you had this motorway that went from Preston and the M6 all the way across 
to Colne. The whole idea of doing this, later to what they were doing with the RSS, was to 
make access into East Lancashire easier for business. So business could get there and they 
could get their goods out down the M65 on to the M6…well the way it actually worked out 
was it didn’t make it easier for businesses to get their goods out; but it made it easier for 
people who had money to get out, move into Chorley, Preston, South Ribble, and commute 
back into work. So you took all the people who had money out of East Lancs, they all moved. 
So you got a great boost to the housing market in Chorley, but all their expenditure went 
with them, and actually East Lancs didn’t benefit at all. And it’s an example of how you can 
only shape the market so far” (SP29, Major Urban, North West). 
 
Whilst this is a specific local example, it demonstrates the neoliberal logic that market forces drive 
investment and development, and the state can only influence these processes to a certain extent. The 
market-led localist growth strategy adopted by the Coalition was based on these economic rationales 
that the government should not attempt to structure or redirect market forces, but rather local markets 
and businesses should determine where is most suitable to their needs and to boost development. This 
supports the theoretical links between localism and neoliberalism outlined by Rogers (2015). It also 
demonstrates and reflects the arguments of the neoliberal New Right and as outlined by Pickles (2012):       
 
“There is no greater responsibility, no higher priority for this Government than to get the nation 
back on track towards renewed, long-term, sustainable growth…Now in the past, supporting 
growth might have been seen as a job for the Treasury and Business Department. But we simply 
don’t have that luxury today…Not least because localism and growth are two sides of the same 
coin. You can’t engineer, can’t manufacture growth through nationally-dictated plans and 
blueprints. However well-meaning, however expertly devised, Regional Development Agencies 
simply didn’t deliver…Instead of trying to impose growth from Whitehall, we want to encourage 
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and celebrate local leadership, ingenuity, and enterprise…This means making tough decisions and 
putting the cash where it can make the biggest difference – not where it’s most expedient, or will 
appease the most people” (No page, emphasis added).  
 
Greater acceptance of neoliberal economic rationales at the local scale, consistent with market-led 
localism over previous forms of state intervention and regional planning, potentially represents one of 
the most significant dimensions of Coalition policy and governance reforms. That is to say, the further 
embedding of externalised neoliberal logics into local governance approaches and structures. If this is 
the case, it has both positives and negatives, with stronger localities being unleashed to take charge of 
their own growth whilst marginalised places lose support networks and opportunities for development. 
 
Localism and the NPPF also changed the nature of cross-boundary collaboration post-2010. The findings 
suggest that, as would be expected, the most effective collaboration under localism was found in places 
that had a history of collaborative working, representing a path dependency that allowed certain places 
to continue their approach more easily despite the potentially disruptive effects of government reforms.    
 
One key practice challenge for LPAs under the new NPPF and localist landscape was working out what 
exactly was expected of the ‘Duty to Cooperate’. The NPPF paragraph 178 states that ‘Public bodies 
have a duty to cooperate on planning issues that cross administrative boundaries, particularly those 
which relate to the strategic priorities set out in paragraph 156. The Government expects joint working 
on areas of common interest to be diligently undertaken for the mutual benefit of neighbouring 
authorities’. Needless to say, the specifics of how this duty to cooperate would actually work in practice 
and how it would be enforced left a lot to be desired at the local level, despite being the second most 
common reason for Local Plans being found ‘unsound’ at examination (after insufficient housing figure).        
 
As with the NPPF, SPs did not disagree with the principles of ‘cooperation’, but rather had concerns 
about what a duty to cooperate actually entails in practice given the diversity and complexity of LG 
structures, politics, economic objectives and community pressures. The national policy requirement for 
collaboration around ‘common interest’ that is of ‘mutual benefit’ to adjoining LPAs was tempered by 
whether this meant reaching a full agreement or simply a more formal dialogue, which in many cases 
amounted to ‘ad hoc’ cross-boundary decision-making and arrangements:      
 
“The Duty to Cooperate works to some degree, but then you get all sorts of politics that 
sometimes comes in as well. So that is by no means a perfect system; and it is a Duty to 
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Cooperate, it's not a Duty to Agree, so even then you are not necessarily going to get the 
right outcome” (SP40, Mixed, North West). 
 
“I mean I have to say up until 2010 or so I would like to think the city council was fairly 
happy with the way the planning system worked. The structure of regional guidance did 
provide a high degree of certainty about what should be delivered, and it did provide for an 
agreed distribution rather than relying now on the ad hoc arrangements of the Duty to 
Cooperate. So we were in many respects quite happy with the top-down approach rather 
than the system we are now in” (SP10, Urban, South West). 
 
In terms of collaborating for growth, the empirical evidence here suggest that relationships are more 
important than structures. Furthermore, that the political control of different LPAs is not necessarily 
the main determinant of the level of collaboration between them, but the history and willingness to 
find joint solutions to cross-boundary problems. This suggests that whatever governance structures the 
government seek to implement (regions, LEPs, combined authorities, neighbourhoods etc.) it is people 
(agency) that make them ‘work’ and not vice versa. These findings suggest government should spend 
more time facilitating relationships/partnerships between LPAs, rather than deterministically searching 
for the perfect spatial scale of governance (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2013). However, this is not to 
deny the (structural) importance of Functional Economic Areas, Travel-to-Work Areas and Housing 
Market Areas that potentially present a more practical/functional basis for strategic and collaborative 
governance than traditional administrative boundaries. That is, structures and agency go hand in hand. 
 
In this context of economic localism, Greater Manchester arguably represents the most developed and 
successful sub-national LG collaboration project in England. It was argued here that the structures and 
politics were not necessarily the main factor contributing to their collaborative governance, but rather 
what counted was the actors and relationships that had developed there over a considerable time:    
 
“[T]he model, the way of working in Greater Manchester, it requires a lot of discussion, 
requires a lot of sign up, requires all of the leaders in all the authorities being comfortable 
about what we are doing. That has worked, that is partly been because key people have 
been around a long time, Richard Leese has been Leader of Manchester for 20 years, 
Howard Bernstein has been the Chief Executive for around about the same period. They are 
pretty key to how all that works in my view. There are good relationships between the Chief 
Executives and they meet regularly. The Wider Leadership Team, which is Chief Executives, 
plus other Leaders, that is the Chief Constable, Chief Fire Officer, all that kind of stuff, they 
meet twice a month formally, they meet more than that informally, and the Leaders also 
meet fairly regularly as well. They don’t play politics; so the Leader of Trafford isn’t playing 
politics, it’s not Tory versus Labour, they have all got Greater Manchester’s interests at 
heart in that arrangement…And like a lot of these things, at the end of the day it is down to 
relationships; you can create all sorts of structures, but at the end of the day things work 
because of the relationships which exist” (SP29, Major Urban, North West, emphasis).  
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Similarly for SP8, the emphasis on ‘trust’ and a ‘history of working together’ that form ‘part of the game’ 
was the most important factor for the success of the New Anglia LEP in contrast to areas where they 
had failed to bed into local governance, highlighting that relationships between stakeholders can be 
considered as more centrally important for collaborative governance in places over their set structures.  
 
A similar case for the importance of local relationships was made in East England, where political and 
professional commitment was mobilised locally to create a ‘Joint Strategic Planning Unit’ to address the 
housing numbers and distribution in Cambridgeshire after the removal of the regional government:   
 
“I think importantly, as political as well as a professional view, there was a commitment to 
the work the Strategic Unit [SU] was doing. So I think to an authority, to every authority, 
when the results of that [SU report] came out we all adopted the [housing] figures that 
came out because we were party of that exercise. They weren't figures put upon us. They 
were figures that we had generated ourselves, but importantly there was a willingness for 
everybody to openly engage in that and work with it when the numbers came out of that…It 
goes back to the political will to carry on growing. So there was a political commitment 
from all of the authorities, even though they are different [political] colours, which is quite 
unique; and, dare I say, part of it is built on the almost necessity for Cambridge and South 
Cambridgeshire to work together. Because I have already picked up that effectively for 
Cambridge to meet its needs, with a fairly tight inner boundary and Green Belt, there has 
been a lot of working between Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire. But also, on the back 
of that, we have all been involved in those conversations as well…I don't know if it is 
necessarily unique but certainly unusual there is a commitment from all of the authorities; 
and without that commitment from all of them to talk together and work together, we 
wouldn't have the shared views that we have at present” (SP18, Rural, East England).  
 
The importance of relationships in overcoming political barriers to collaborative governance under 
localism was also expressed in the context of Oxfordshire. In relation to the planning approaches in 
Cambridgeshire, one PM with experience working in both LPA contexts explained the ‘key differences’:   
 
“[T]here is a long history there of collaborative working, I think all of the councils, 
Cambridge is Labour, South Cambs is Conservative, and the County mainly Conservative; 
but had come together with the small subset of things that everybody agreed needed 
sorting, which was mainly transport and infrastructure. So had very successfully been able 
to lobby for funding, they put aside all their other differences, but really worked successfully 
together on the things that they could. And they got, the Greater Cambridge City Deal was 
the same size award as Manchester got, which is a really big deal, £500 million. Whereas I 
think they [Oxford] got £30 million…But over here, you have got four other councils around 
Oxfordshire, different political persuasion, quite a history of not getting on. And in 
Cambridgeshire there was also a lot of collaborative working with the health sector and 
the university in this, “What are the things we all agree need fixing? We’ll come together 
and lobby government and have a stronger voice over x”. That working together is not as 
well developed here…all those elements that helped Cambridge and South Cambridgeshire 
work together, they are not all in place in the same way…I think they see we need to 
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collaborate more and speak with one voice, and support each other more, and it is coming. 
But I think the reason why there isn’t a shared history, or shared service, or coming together, 
Oxford has always been the Labour authority for a long time, in amongst David Cameron’s 
patch and things like that. So it is just the relationships are not there in the that way, and 
the other councils have leaned towards more natural neighbours, organisations, politically 
easier to collaborate with I think, historically” (SP17, Urban, South East, emphasis added).  
 
Likewise, in the context of Lancashire, local politics has been secondary to the leadership consensus for 
achieving funding for growth through collaboration, highlighted in the local negotiation of the City Deal:  
 
“[The City Deal] has happened with a different political party in charge, because the 
Lancashire County Council was Conservative, it is now Labour, Preston has gone from 
Conservative to Labour, South Ribble is Conservative and Chorley has switched as well now 
to Labour. So despite that it has still happened” (SP34, Urban, North West). 
 
It can be suggested, therefore, that whilst it is politically easier to collaborate with neighbouring LGs 
led by the same political party, in the cases where this has been overcome for collaboration around 
growth, politics has been less important than the commitment and relationships between LAs/agents: 
 
“So when you start to discuss things across a wider area, political views of members about 
certain world issues tend to vary, which doesn’t make life particularly easy in a planning 
sense. Although it has to be said, both the Labour party in [city] and the rural Conservative 
parties generally are both pro-growth. So whereas a lot of areas were very resistant to the 
levels of growth that were proposed in the old Regional Spatial Strategies [RRS] before Eric 
Pickles scrapped them; actually the local authorities worked collectively back in 2007 to 
effectively slightly increase the ambition in the RSS, and the targets that were in there were 
very much in line with the local aspirations” (SP35, Urban, East England).  
 
It can therefore be suggested that the antecedent histories, politics, geographies and institutional 
structures of localities are equally as important as the policy/scalar/governance reforms themselves for 
shaping outcomes. Again, it is not being claimed that the findings from these cases are generalizable 
across LPAs in England, but rather that these accounts present a broadly representative geographical 
mix of practitioner evaluations on policy/spatial/governance reforms under the Coalition/Conservative 
Governments. Some views will necessarily be unique to the LPA cases and specific SPs within this study, 
but other views may present more fundamental issues for (strategic) planning. These findings highlight 
the complexities and interplay of a combination of factors for shaping local outcomes in response to 
externalised reforms (neoliberalisations). The next section now examines the localisation of housing 
policy and delivery in England post-2010 before presenting a discussion section to close the Chapter.   
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4.2.4 Localism and Housing Delivery 
 
Arguably the most significant and contested policy reform in this period was the ‘localisation’ of housing 
policy and delivery to LPAs from the strategic regional level post-2010. Previously housing figures had 
been calculated and distributed to individual LPAs by their regional government. The post-2010 system 
is characterised by the need for LPAs to meet an ‘Objectively Assessed Need’ (henceforth OAN) based 
on the forecast demographic housing needs within the locality, and to provide a continuous supply of 
land to support housing development through demonstrating a ‘Five Year Land Supply’ (herein 5YLS). 
The political rhetoric around the removal of regional government and shift to localism seemed to 
promise greater local control over housing numbers, which LPAs with restrictive planning approaches 
interpreted as an opportunity to put downward pressure on their figures; however, the new system 
under the NPPF resulted in LPAs being forced to accept more housing to satisfy their OAN and 5YLS.  
 
These reforms were highly contentious because in nearly all cases the localised OAN and 5YLS housing 
targets were (significantly) higher in a number of South-East locations (typically with strong market 
pressures and local resistance) than the housing figures set out in the previous regional distributions. 
This ‘locally-imposed’ increase in housing was politically abhorrent for elected members and planners 
in LPAs that had hitherto practiced a restrictive planning approach within their locality. Furthermore, 
for a significant number of tightly bounded town and city LPAs, and those containing large areas of 
environmental protection, the new higher housing targets could not be fully accommodated within 
their administrative boundaries. This resulted in a reliance on neighbouring authorities to meet their 
unaccommodated housing need, but without any strategic level coordination or resolution mechanism. 
In practice, these situations often created strong local political tensions between neighbouring councils.   
 
As a result, these tensions were often (deliberately or otherwise) left unresolved until the Local Plan 
examination process for individual local councils; with the most common reasons for plans being found 
‘unsound’ being inadequate housing target provision based on OAN/5YLS over the plan period and a 
failure to provide evidence of meeting the duty to cooperate primarily in regard to local housing issues: 
 
“[T]he removal of the regional level and the loss of the housing figure for each area means 
that we have spent huge amounts of time and money looking at housing numbers, which 
has delayed the production of the Local Plan. And it means that in the examination you 
have quite a big focus on the housing numbers when it should have been decided 
somewhere else. I think, you know, many years before there should be a figure set and that 
is what you plan for; and that would remove all those issues at every single examination. 
But that has been one of the largest implications of the removal of the regional planning 
level for us” (SP4, Rural, East England).  
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The case was made that when LPAs were provided with a housing figure from the regional level it was 
‘politically helpful’ because local actors could then pass the blame upwards for hard political decisions:  
 
“There needs to be some structure there, and it’s just not working, I think, at the 
moment…I'm not saying it was perfect before, it wasn’t; but I do think it put the whole 
planning and delivery in reverse for a while, by scrapping the regional spatial strategy and 
the targets that everybody had in those plans. And the helpfulness of always having 
somebody to blame from above, politically, actually it was a kind of get out. But it is so 
much harder for councils to commit to their numbers; and the capacity, and the fighting 
and the energy that is locked up in the process we have now is wasteful. It is slowing it 
down, it is not really serving, in my view, the planning process, the communities we are 
trying to plan for now and in future, particularly well” (SP17, Urban, South East).  
 
Moreover, beyond the pragmatic local political advantages of receiving a housing figure from above for 
councillors to redirect blame for housing development; the wider experience of the ‘slow’ and ‘painful’ 
process of LPAs being involved in the production of a larger-than-local strategy over many years (2004-
2010) only to have them abolished before many regional spatial strategies (RSS) were even completed 
had undermined members political faith in strategic planning and made them reluctant to ‘try again’: 
 
“The very strong message we are getting though from the politicians is they don’t want to 
see another Regional Spatial Strategy thank you very much; because it took up an awful lot 
of effort, took many, many years to actually agree, and didn’t really make that much of a 
difference anyway in the big scheme of things because the government abolished it” (SP22, 
Major Urban, North East).  
 
This expressed lack of faith in strategic planning in England at both the national and local political levels 
has potential implications for deprofessionalisation, particularly as a number of experienced ‘spatial’ 
planners have since left the profession/system and are unlikely to be replaced either through planning 
schools or training within remaining strategic practice settings under such localist economic governance. 
It also brings into question whether the removal of RSSs and RG was as much politically motivated at 
the national and local levels as technically and economically justified as a ‘failed’ policy programme. 
 
These practice challenges around the localisation of housing numbers became particularly acute in 
cases where urban LPAs could not meet their OAN housing figure within their own tightly constrained 
boundaries. Often such urban councils were penned-in by greenbelt and greenfield land under the legal 
authority of neighbouring LAs, meaning such constrained councils effectively became reliant on their 
surrounding neighbouring authorities to help assist with their ‘housing shortfall’. As the need to meet 
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OAN had typically increased the housing figures for LPAs across the board, few councils demonstrated 
a willingness to take on more housing from other places (critically undermining the Duty to Cooperate).  
 
Furthermore the irony was that the urban areas with the most potential for growth were also the ones 
most constrained by historic administrative boundaries and greenbelt designations to prevent urban 
sprawl into the countryside. As such, the status and extent of greenbelt protection/designations around 
urban (growth) areas became a widely controversial and emotive issue for planning during this period:  
 
“[W]e are relatively constrained in terms of our boundary…and we have limited areas of 
Greenbelt for expansion…we are proposing to release about 350 hectares of Greenbelt so 
that our Development Plan can accommodate the [council] housing need, which is about 
51,000 as the figure that we can actually accommodate within [city], but our actual 
housing need is 89,000…the [OAN] argument for us is only meaning that we have had to 
go into the Greenbelt; but whether it is 69,000, 79,000, 89,000 or 109,000 it doesn’t really 
make a lot of difference because you could build on every bit of Greenbelt in [council] and 
you still wouldn’t hit the number…and so that leaves a big number that need to be found 
from outside…[which] becomes more of a problem for our neighbours…the reality of it is 
they [combined authority] love talking about economic growth, “fantastic”, but dealing 
with the housing that goes with it, “oh, we don’t want to talk about that”…so the only 
reason you are doing a Local Plan is to deal with the Greenbelt…[but] the public don’t like 
the release of Greenbelt, mainly because the government isn’t very clear on what the role 
of the Greenbelt is and that it can be released if you have pressing needs…So that is problem 
number one” (SP11, Major Urban, West Midlands). 
 
“We are doing quite a lot of work on urban intensification. We are doing a very detailed 
pieces of work about how we can up - so we have already got a trajectory of housing 
delivery, we have got planning permissions already granted for about 20,000. We are trying 
to find another 12,000 through inefficient use of land, converting industrial to residential, 
reconfiguring roads and areas. So we are trying to do an urban intensification, over and 
above the sites we have already allocated, to max out what you can do in the urban area 
to minimise what you need to splurge out into the Greenbelt and beyond…there is quite an 
interesting debate because the adjoining authorities particularly have got this real sense 
that you must protect the Greenbelt. The issue for [council] is that we would rather see 
development on the edge of [city] than jump over the Greenbelt. Because the problem with 
jumping the Greenbelt is the transport and sustainability needs, because most people still 
choose to come in and work in [city], so the further away you put people and housing the 
harder it is to make their transport sustainable” (SP36, Urban, South West). 
 
“So, for example, Luton is completely constrained and an economic generator with 
nowhere to put housing, so how does it then have a sensible conversation with an adjoining 
authority to say, “We have 11,000 houses and we don’t know where to put them?”. The 
adjoining authority is going to say, “Well you can’t put them here, we have our own need”, 
so how are you going to resolve that?” (SP6, Rural, South East).  
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At the same time, the central government and development industry continued to strongly argue that 
the sluggish pace of development is a direct result of cumbersome planning regulations and procedures. 
However, the SPs made the point almost unanimously that developers controlled both the speed and 
delivery of housing sites, and not LPAs or the planning system. From their perspective, the main delivery 
challenge was that developers would only build to the pace of their business model to ensure high local 
house prices and sales values; even where LAs had an up-to-date Local Plan and had allocated land with 
planning permission above the required level to meet OAN/5YLS for development within their boundary:  
 
“[T]he development industry are trying to stop plans getting adopted, because that is in 
their interest to sort of gain control of supply, and when they control the supply that washes 
back into the planning process. So they are controlling [housing] delivery. It’s not planning 
or the plan preparation that’s actually controlling supply, its developers; and I think the 
government have, you know, patently just failed to tackle that” (SP7, Urban, East Midlands). 
 
Here it is suggested that volume developers have enough power and legal tools to subvert planning 
policy and practices that attempt to influence more control over housing supply and delivery. It was 
frequently argued that the government’s assessment that the planning system is a persistent barrier to 
housing development presents a partial view of the problem and ignores the practices and business 
models of volume housing developers that stand to gain from land banking and transactions (holding 
onto land with permission as a reserve in the development pipeline or expecting an increase in value) 
and paced delivery rates to maintain housing scarcity and product value (Cochrane et al., 2015).  
 
These findings are consistent with the academic literature. In the context of housing development in a 
Sustainable Urban Extension (SUEs) within a UK growth region, Cochrane et al. (2015) explain “Spatial 
plans that, on paper, appeared to present resolutions to strategic problems have not proved a sufficient 
catalyst [on their own] to impel on-site delivery” and “there is little evidence that private house-builders 
have any particular interest in meeting housing need, nor that their business model would encourage 
them to do so”; which highlights the “continuing gap between ambitions to use planning as a driver of 
development and delivery in practice” (p. 13). This has strong implications for practitioners, in terms of 
professionalism and public trust, that are attempting to direct change in an ostensibly ‘plan-led’ system.  
 
It was also frequently acknowledged by the PMs that LAs do not actually build the houses but get the 
blame for slow delivery and under-supply. From the SPs perspective, the developers are in control of 
the supply of housing and work according to their business model and not OAN/5YLS housing targets 
or the Local Plan. The lack of mechanisms for councils to use to incentivise or discipline landowners and 
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developers to increase delivery rates was a key theme, with the power to enforce financial incentives 
through taxes and for local Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs) being frequently proposed solutions:  
 
“Now that results in us [local councils] not getting as many houses built as we have given 
planning permission for, and we can’t force a builder to build them. Now I’ve suggested to 
central government, since they tend to use legislation to correct people’s behaviour, well if 
you really mean business; what you would say to a developer is, “You have got planning 
permission to build 1000 houses”, and then you would say, depending on the size of the 
site, we [government] would say, “We believe you should build 500 in the first year and 500 
in the second. And to make sure that you do, at the end of the first year council tax at the 
rate of 20% becomes payable on the first 500 houses, and at the end of the second year 
council tax becomes payable on the second 500”. You now have a real incentive to build 
these houses and then sell them, because that way the purchaser takes over the council tax 
requirement and not you [the developer]…But whilst government are very interested in that, 
they have been reluctant to actually do it because that would seriously piss-off Barretts, 
Persimmons and the other big housing developers…So government hasn’t as yet shown 
that they are willing to help us” (SP3, Urban, South East).   
 
“To be frank, we [local councils] either need to be given genuine power and money to be 
able to get involved in the development industry and actually effectively be developing 
ourselves, or at least investing in development ourselves, and that is gradually coming from 
government, but very, very, very gradually. Or the system needs to be changed so that as 
planning, as regulatory authorities, we have the genuine ability to make someone build, to 
control and supply more actively. So, yeah, we actually would welcome some sort of system 
whereby a contract was put in place at the point of permission. That if a planning 
permission was granted due to lack of supply particularly, so if it was granted on the basis 
of a five-year land supply, then there should be a contract in place that the site is coming 
forward and will be built within a defined time period; and if it isn’t, they lose the 
commission or they pay significant penalties. We need to have either the carrot or the stick, 
and at this point we don’t really have either” (SP15, Urban, West Midlands).   
 
“I have fed back in a number of government consultations the CPO process. All right, so you 
give permission for someone to build some houses and then they sit on that permission; 
but they dig a drain and discharge the conditions so the value of that land is retained. Quite 
simply, if they do not build the houses within a given period of time, and I don’t just mean 
the length of the planning permission, then you could ratchet that down a bit more. I just 
think the local government should be able to CPO at half the market value. Then as a house 
builder you are going to say, “I’m not just going to sit on this piece of land because the 
longer I sit on it, ultimately, it is going to be worth 50% less”. But I just feel there is too 
much lobbying by the Home Builders Federation and the private sector that the 
Government are a little blindsided, because the problem is always the planners” (SP26, 
Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber).  
 
These points highlight a need to strengthen planning agency by providing policy mechanism/tools to 
boost negotiation with volume developers; however, this approach goes against the current tide of 
national planning reforms which has weakened the capacity of planners through policy deregulations 
such as viability assessments and PDRs. Nonetheless, the PMs also expressed some sympathy with 
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developers over the difficulties of purchasing land at a reasonable/viable price through the land market, 
also noting the problem of typically high financial expectations of landowners to sell for development: 
 
“I would want to see…the Mayor having strong CPO powers…we give these sites permission 
in principle for those landowners, and we give them three years; and if after three years 
they have not been built then the Mayor should have the power to take the site off 
them…[because] I can point to two examples where we have had developers who have put 
money into bids to buy sites, and they basically need to pay more than the actual market 
value; because we have done our own market value, so we know what it costs and we know 
what they have offered, and the landowner won’t sell. So that is a huge frustration, because 
it is those sites that are sitting there that are a blight to residents, that the developer wants 
to build, and the landowner won’t sell” (SP39, Major Urban, North West).  
 
In this context, SPs emphasised the need for a strong strategic body or actor, such as a Combined 
Authority or Elected Mayor, to enforce a system of local CPOs (see ATLAS) to hold land owners and 
developers to account for delivery; and to support atomised, weakly-resourced and deregulated LPAs 
under austerity localism, largely operating without strategic planning institutions and policy tools post-
2010. SP26 was the most critical of the way that national policy served to problematize the role of LPAs 
in development delivery whilst ignoring the crucial role of developers and landowners in the process: 
 
“[T]he latest consultations they [government] did on…a technical planning consultation on 
the NPPF…they stated they were considering introducing a delivery test. And that delivery 
test was only going to be imposed on local authorities. And I was like, ‘Right so we have 
given them the permissions, what more can we do, how have we failed the delivery test?’. 
We cannot make the developer build their houses unless we are the landowner and we 
have got some contractual agreement in place. Yet there was no reference at all about, 
‘Well we need to look at who actually should be delivering’, and that is the developer or the 
landowner. No reference to the delivery test being imposed on them and any sanctions 
falling on them in any way. I was just aghast” (SP26, Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber).  
 
This ‘housing delivery test’ for LPAs has subsequently been developed by national government in the 
2017 Housing White Paper and revised 2018/9 NPPF; however, whilst these documents pay slightly 
more attention to the role of developers and landowners in the process, there has been much less 
emphasis and specified policy obligations placed on these actors. This issue of housing build out rates 
was also dealt with in the Letwin Review (MHCLG, 2018) that considered that ‘the homogeneity of the 
types and tenures of the homes on offer on these sites, and the limits on the rate at which the market 
will absorb such homogenous products, are the fundamental drivers of the slow rate of build out’. It 
seems that there is some growing recognition within central government, particularly within the 
subsequent May-led Conservative Government, that there are a number of barriers to new housing 
supply and delivery beyond the planning system; such as the concentration of the top 10 volume house 
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builders in the UK means that they dominate new housing market supply, with SMEs relatively excluded 
from the market following the 2008 GFC; that the land market remains very opaque with owners 
expectations of values remaining high (above market value in a number of cases); and that the labour, 
skills and physical resources (such as bricks) within the construction industry are at a significantly low 
level to achieve the national target of 250,000 per annum. All of these remain important supply issues.   
 
Overall these issues are consistent with the UK neoliberal political economy approach to housing, which 
trusts market competition and efficiency for determining prices, tenures, types and delivery rates, and 
distrusts LPAs as an obstacle that cannot make effective interventions, only market ‘distortions’. This 
moves onto the wider picture, SP21 highlights the impacts of the cultural politics and financialisation of 
housing (policy) in England as key factors in the ‘housing crisis’, providing a counter-narrative to the 
government problematization that the planning system is generating contemporary housing problems:  
 
“I think it’s [the UK ‘housing crisis’] much deeper than that…We are forcing people into 
home ownership just because of pure economics, it doesn’t make sense…we have an 
overinflated housing market with values that are too high…What we do need is a good 
quality, if we had a great quality private rented sector that is well regulated then it has a 
massive role to play. Again it’s about that laissez-faire, non-interventionist approach in 
government. Just let the market rip people’s finances…there is a completely dysfunctional 
housing culture in this country and it’s not to do with planning, it’s to do with financing and 
regulation frankly, and we could make it a lot easier” (SP21, Urban, North East).   
 
Crucially, within the current neoliberal approach, there is little government criticism of property 
becoming a cultural form of ‘asset-based welfare’ supported by debt-fuelled financial instruments and 
markets (Doling and Ronald, 2010, Dorling, 2014). Drawing on governmentality, García‐Lamarca and 
Kaika (2016, p.313) argue housing debt mortgages are becoming a form of biopolitical ‘technology of 
power over life that forges an intimate relationship between global financial markets, everyday life and 
human labour’ using the ‘materiality of mortgage contracts as a means of forging new embodied 
practices of financialisation’. Whilst this has been the case since at least the 1950s, the main point here 
is that the politics, economics and practices of the UK housing and land markets are equally as 
important for constraining property development and generating a ‘housing crisis’ (however defined) 
as the technical regulation and contributions imposed by the planning system when devising new 
national reforms (Ryan-Collins et al., 2017, Bowie, 2017, Marcuse and Madden, 2016, Clapham, 2018). 
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4.3 Discussion  
 
The empirical findings here support the related academic literature that the relationships between LAs 
and public planners and their key stakeholders (local communities, elected members, developers and 
landowners, etc.) has been recast under the NPPF and (austerity) localism post-2010. The most 
significant reform challenges have taken the form of issues around interpreting and testing ‘simplified’ 
and ‘negotiable’ national planning policy, the threat of legal challenge and ‘planning by appeal’, 
negotiating the community and member politics of localism whilst supporting localised housing growth, 
delivering strategic planning through informal and localised cross-boundary collaboration, negotiating 
complex development viability assessments to gain (policy-compliant) planning obligations and 
providing a faster performing service; all in the context of post-crisis austerity marked by reduced 
resources and resilience. Often these issues framed the backdrop to attempts by LPAs to get a Local 
Plan in place in order to regain planning control over development within their boundary, which had 
been undermined by the presumption, 5-year supply, OAN, duty-to-cooperate and policy deregulations. 
 
However, such attempts to reconstitute the planner’s agency were not necessarily absolutely successful:   
 
“I have been working for quite some time now, so I reflect back over the years, and the 
changes that have happened, and some of the things that are happening now, would have 
been absolutely unthinkable a while ago. And to avoid getting depressed really, with the 
constant blaming of planning for a lot of things that are completely nothing to do with the 
planning system, I try to focus on what can I do locally? What influence can I have over this 
city and life for people positively? And probably spend time thinking about how we can get 
around the planning reforms. So that is, and I'm sure lots of my colleagues are in that mind-
set, you have to focus on what you can do. That is not to say, there are bits of the planning 
system that need a good shake up, absolutely, but the pendulum I think between the 
planning system operating in the greater good, to achieve the balance between 
development interests and in the public interest, has swung way, way too far. But, we are 
where we are” (SP17, Urban, South East, emphasis added).  
 
Such pragmatic responses by PMs, resigned to working within the confines of the system, but also 
seeking to carve out niches through which to effect positive local change, can be conceptualised as a 
form of ‘progressive localism’ (Featherstone et al., 2012); which represents the ‘interstitial politics of 
resistance and experimentation…within, across, and beyond formations of the neoliberal’ (Williams et 
al., 2014, p.2798), and more broadly the exercise of the ‘political’ (Mouffe, 1999) by planners. Whilst 
all of the planning practitioners in this research expressed genuine concerns for the development of 
progressive agendas aligned with advocacy planning (Davidoff, 1965) and ‘just cities’ (Fainstein, 2010), 
they also felt they had less power to influence the built environment and promote the public interest:     
 
179 
 
“I have been working in planning for over 25 years, and I think it has been one of the most 
difficult times in terms of the diminution of the planning system…I mean every public 
meeting I go to, people think that planners have got much more control and power than we 
actually have, so they are disappointed that we are not delivering what they want anyway; 
and I think the more the government go down this route then the less effective the service 
will be…I was at a public meeting two nights ago out in [locality], and this guy said, “I 
thought planning was meant to be about trying to help people”, and reducing inequality and 
promoting the social; and I said, “I think you are dead right. I would love to, but unfortunately 
we can’t”” (SP7, Urban, East Midlands, emphasis added). 
 
Such understandings by senior planners that they can’t promote alternative social and environmental 
agendas, even where they would like to do so, signifies an underlying acceptance of the neoliberal logic 
‘there is no alternative’. In this context, as Grange (2014) argues, “[w]e seem to be witnessing a crisis in 
planning, one of the clearest symptoms of which is loss of faith in the idea of planning” (p. 2670). For 
Grange (2014) this situation has arisen because the “current political interventions aimed at culture 
change in planning are deeply ideological”, and the political Left have not articulated an alternative 
progressive narrative since the 2008 GFC; together meaning that “planners today are left with few 
means to reinterpret how political power fundamentally structures society, or their own reproduction of 
it” (Grange, 2014, p. 2671). The findings here supports the literature that one of the main consequences 
of the sustained ideological critique of planning (Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014) and its continuous 
reform has been a move towards the ‘deprofessionalisation’ of public planners and the wider system:  
 
“[T]he changes that we have had in that period [2010-2016] - which actually in planning 
terms isn’t a long time - but actually the scale of what has changed in that period has been 
quite significant I think, and sort of seismic almost. You know, in terms of what used to be 
the 1947 Planning Act as a very solid foundation of ‘though shalt and though shalt not’, 
and then suddenly so many fundamental questions about things that had been assumed 
were almost sacrosanct etc. being challenged and being looked at in a very different way. 
So I think we have gone from a position where previously planning was almost perhaps 
more of a ‘dark art’. You know, done over here and actually let them [planners] get on with 
it, and not too much interference from the outside world…almost to seeing planning as any 
other service, and not this ‘sacred cow’ in terms of, you know, “There is so much at stake, 
and you can’t possibly interfere with the planning department”. Because unfortunately that 
is the representation that a lot of planning departments have, which is that they are full of 
the 1947 rule book, which says, “You have to do things like this otherwise the world will 
collapse on itself”. So quite challenging for practitioners, because that is a very different 
way of looking at it to how it has been dealt with previously” (SP6, Rural, South East). 
 
Such accounts support the claims made by Allmendinger (2016) that the 1947 Post-WW2 welfare state 
planning system is being replaced by forms of ‘neoliberal spatial governance’ which treat planning as 
any other state activity that should be open to deregulation and market forces. However, it is perhaps 
too early to reflect on this period, and the long-term implications of planning reforms 2010-2016 
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remain unclear and mixed with regards to their success for different stakeholders. For example, 
national government have benefited by reducing the national expenditure deficit and their public 
service funding responsibilities, LG may (yet) benefit from empowerment such as through the general 
power of competence and localism/devolution, developers have gained (financially) from national 
changes to viability and deregulation policy, and communities now have greater statutory power over 
planning policy through neighbourhood planning. So despite a number of significant practical planning 
challenges and national long-term strategic population, infrastructure and housing issues, we should 
be cautious not to argue point blank that all reforms in this period have been necessarily flawed. It is a 
political claim to state what constitutes ‘progressive’ developments in planning/development practices.  
 
It is not argued here that the national planning agenda pursued by the Cameron-led governments 2010-
2016 was necessarily mistaken or unscrupulous; the country remains in desperate need of economic 
growth, development and housing, and the NPPF, LEPs, City Deals, Devolution, etc., have all made an 
important contribution towards these ends. Rather the criticism is that this approach represents a 
partial economic understanding of planning, one that misunderstands its role in environmental and 
social place-making, sustainability, and quality of life. Planning has a key role in the strategic linking of 
development with infrastructure, transport and employment to create functional places for work, 
leisure and residence. Prescribing the role of planning as one thing (economic development) a priori in 
all situations is essentially removing the (local) politics of planning, through denying other political 
interpretations (i.e. that planning is about social justice). This is the failure of their planning agenda, 
whereby planners are forced into operating a neoliberal system only partially delivering for a select few. 
 
Cynical commentators might argue that this loss of faith in planning is the result of a deliberate ‘divide 
and conquer’ governing strategy that seeks to undermine the planning system (or NHS or Education) 
so that citizens lose faith in its current ability to achieve results, paving the way to justify further 
neoliberal reforms for efficiency, deregulation, individualism and privatisation to further ‘fix’ the system. 
This view was expressed by SP13 that it felt like the government was trying to “break the system”. In 
sum, the more that local communities and the national citizenry become disillusioned with planning in 
England, the harder it becomes for advocates to defend the value of planning through traditional 
justifications of the public interest and professional articulations of sustainable development in practice.  
 
The deprofessionalisation of planning requires counter-narratives from progressive academics, activists 
and practitioners to question and challenge neoliberal logics such as austerity and growth-first policy 
where they are at the expense of other progressive social goals. It also requires professional bodies, 
181 
 
such as the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) and Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA) to 
demonstrate and argue the case for the (economic) ‘value of planning’ (see Lord and O’Brien, 2017). 
 
Indeed, these findings suggest that even within such a changeable and more vaguely defined planning 
system, after a period of time and learning from experience, planners figure out how it operates and 
become more confident using it to deliver plans and development in order to ‘make the system work’. 
However, one critical perspective views consistent planning reform as a deliberate government attempt 
to confuse and undermine the planning system, in order to maintain planners as scapegoats responsible 
for broader social and economic development problems in England because it is ‘politically convenient’:   
 
“The planning system is always required, been needed to change from their perspective, 
because if they stop the change, and the certainty to the planners that this is the policy 
framework we are working in for a given period of time, then stuff happens. And it is 
happening now, because the NPPF has been in place for a few years, we are confident on 
how to work with it. So, actually permissions have been given, Local Plans are getting in 
place, so we are ticking all those boxes, and then where could the problem be now? The 
Government might realise, “Christ it’s us, we are not building. Right, so we need to say it is 
a problem with the planning system, that it needs to change again, because then if it is 
changed again it is going to take a while for local government to figure out what it means 
and get all their plans up-to-date. So we can just keep blaming them [planners], can’t we?”. 
If you look back at the history of the planning system, according to the media and according 
to government, it has never worked. Well I’m sorry, that is just a blatant lie, but it is very 
convenient. It is convenient to the politicians as well to be able to say it’s the planning 
system’s fault” (SP26, Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber).  
 
The critical sentiment among the PMs of being a scapegoat was summed up by SP31: 
 
“I get frustrated because there’s no one batting for the other side. The RTPI is never heard 
of…Who’s batting for the planning system? Who’s batting for the planners? Nobody seems 
to be. Nobody’s countering the rhetoric around the system being a block on development. 
And TV screens and column inches get filled with the house builders and the government 
saying, trotting out the fact that the system is broken” (SP31, Urban, North West).  
 
This follows the wider argument that the implications of this problematization of the planning system 
is greater than only the deprofessionalisation of the planning profession but extends and forms part of 
the much larger and longer-term progression of the neoliberal project and state restructuring in England. 
 
Critical planning (theory) is important because it is one of the key public service ‘front lines’ on which 
the battle for neoliberal state restructuring is being fought (or accepted) by LPAs and planners; that is 
to say, planning is ‘the last line of defence to space itself being neoliberalized’ (Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 
2014, p. 357). Resembling most critical planning theory (Sager, 2013), this analysis has demonstrated 
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the negative impacts of neoliberal reforms on planning and planners in England. However, although 
unevenly distributed and achieved, there has also been a number of positive outcomes of policy 
reforms (and austerity) in the forms of improved efficiency, customer service, innovation, self-
sufficiency, performance, delivery and local democracy that should not be discounted or underplayed.  
 
Neoliberal programmes of reform are not a challenge to planning in an absolute sense, that is, it is not 
attempting to remove planning completely, but rather seeks the reorientation of its functions and goals. 
Whilst a number of these policy reorientations are potentially problematic from a social justice and 
democratic planning theory standpoint, others can lead to wider improvements in the planning system:  
 
“While there has undoubtedly been some aversion to, or even hostility towards, the reorientation of 
planning, neoliberalism has also provided an opportunity for planners and planning for reinvention and 
relevance. Compared to the cruder deregulatory regimes under neoliberalism that sought to reduce 
planning, the ‘roll-out’ approach requires an interventionist form of planning even if that is different to 
the more traditional regulatory planning” (Allmendinger, 2017, p. 122).  
 
In this context, the introduction of localism and neighbourhood planning, whilst rooted within the wider 
neoliberal planning system, does provide planners with an opportunity to reinvent themselves as 
proponents of local democracy and community engagement (Parker and Salter, 2016b), which can build 
on collaborative planning theory and support ‘neo-advocacy’ practices (Parker and Street, 2017). So 
whilst the findings in this research support the arguments that English planning is in ‘crisis’ (Ellis and 
Henderson, 2016), this masks some of the potentially positive outcomes of austerity, localism and the 
NPPF, with regards to long-standing planning theory concerns with efficiency, democracy and delivery. 
 
This chapter has presented empirical data on the national planning policy reforms/deregulations and 
localism agenda enacted under the Cameron-led Coalition and Conservative Governments 2010-2016. 
It has focussed on the ‘effectiveness’ of these latest reforms from the perspective of management-level 
planning practitioners and formed explanations drawing on a neoliberal structure-agency framework. 
The next chapter presents the empirical data and analysis on local authority planning under austerity in 
England post-2010. These austerity reforms were enacted during the same period as the NPPF and 
localism and were heavily interrelated in practice (but separated here for clarity of structure/argument).  
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Chapter 5 - Local Authority Planning under Austerity Post-2010 
 
“If we don't get a grip on government spending, there will be no growth…I have done everything I can 
to move Britain out of the financial danger zone…[but] cutting budget deficits can never be just an 
exercise in economics…Just as we should never balance the budget on the backs of the poor, so it is an 
economic delusion to think you can balance it only on the wallets of the rich…Everyone in our society 
has had to make a contribution towards dealing with the debts”  
George Osborne (no date). 
 
‘Neoliberal responsibilisation involves the offloading of responsibility from the formal institutions of 
the state to individuals, communities and localities in the name of self-reliance and resilience’ 
(Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015, p. 95). 
 
This Chapter is divided into three main interrelated data-driven sections on the various experiences and 
responses to austerity for Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) across England. The first section examines 
Local Planning Responsibilisation: Resilience, Self-Sufficiency and ‘Commercialisation’ (5.1); the second 
evaluates Social-Spatial Development and Localised Responses: Structures, Contexts and Politics (5.2); 
and the third probes Managing Austerity Planning: Practice Culture Change and Service Restructuring 
(5.3). These sections seek to address research questions four, five and six and research objective 4:  
 
RQ4) In what ways have local planning authorities experienced, and responded to, the demands of 
austerity (urbanism/governance/localism) as imposed by central government since 2010? 
 
RQ5) What are the financial/budget and capacity/resilience pressures on planning services, and how do 
they relate to the impacts of austerity on local authorities (landscapes of antagonism) more generally?  
 
RQ6) To what extent have austerity logics been internalised or resisted by local authority planning 
managers? How have these austerity measures shaped LPA practice cultures and structures? 
 
RO4) To present practitioner evaluations of public planning under austerity in relation to the diversity of 
local contexts, structures and geography of LPA planning across regions in England 2010-2016. 
 
Firstly a few paragraphs are necessary here to set up the context for the following findings and analysis 
presented in this chapter. The most significant is that according to the National Audit Office report on 
the ‘Financial sustainability of local authorities 2018’, ‘Government funding for local authorities has 
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fallen by an estimated 49.1% in real terms from 2010-11 to 2017-18. This equates to a 28.6% real-terms 
reduction in ‘spending power’ (government funding and council tax)’ (NAO, 2018). These figures 
highlight the substantial fiscal reductions that have taken place since the introduction of the national 
austerity agenda by the Coalition Government in 2010. Despite a number of high-profile domestic and 
international political changes in this period up to 2018, not least Brexit and Trump, austerity has been 
continued by the May-led Government and remains a core practice challenge to councils across the UK.  
 
The experiences and responses of LPAs to austerity are explored here because despite being a national 
level structural reform agenda, ‘[t]he actual detail of how austerity is strategically and operationally 
implemented and managed is very much a devolved process to urban spaces and state agencies’ (Fuller, 
2017, p. 745). Following their localist approach, the Coalition government did not dictate how or where 
savings should be made but rather left the responsibility to each LA to determine how they will respond 
to austerity; that is so long as they achieved their imposed budget reductions, maintained their core 
services, and did not pass on significant costs to their local communities (such as rises in council tax or 
public service fees). Here austerity was not only about cuts but also restricting the size and reliance on 
public sector employment and services with the intention to concomitantly boost the role of the private 
sectors in these areas of employment and service delivery; following neoliberal thinking that ‘big 
government’ serves to ‘crowd out’ the market for investment opportunities and that bureaucracy is 
inefficient and produces poor outcomes in terms of effective management and allocation of resources. 
This attempt at sectoral rebalancing from public to private sector dominated local economic activity 
across regions the in England demonstrates how austerity can be seen to fit within a wider process of 
state restructuring in the UK post-2010. So whilst austerity can be understood as a form of Statecraft 
with the Coalition and Osborne positioning the challenge in terms of it being ‘everyone’s responsibility 
to reduce the deficit’, the austerity agenda was about much more than simply ‘balancing the budget’.  
 
Given the stated research design (Chapter 3) there is a focus on the ‘geography’ of austerity. In this 
respect the findings suggest that regional variation was important generally, but not specifically; with 
more wealthy LPAs (with regards to tax base, expenditure on public services and other assets/reserves) 
and predominantly rural authorities across regions sharing more in common with likewise high value 
councils regardless of whether they were based in the north, middle or the south of the country. The 
rural-urban classification highlighted some important differences, with cities with high social costs also 
having strong economic opportunities to grow and generate revenue, but also being heavily dependent 
on the physical constraints of Green Belt, heritage and collaboration with neighbouring authorities. As 
expected the economic ‘value’ and ‘structures’ within LAs played a crucial role in responses to austerity. 
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Lastly the emphasis on LPA senior management is because they are tasked with the role of constantly 
reconfirming austerity institutions, ‘through enactments of social control and coordination of market 
and bureaucratic values within the organisation, and guiding the daily practices of officers’ (Fuller, 2017).  
 
The next section develops the argument that LPAs have been forced (responsibilized) into developing 
new ‘commercialised’ strategies consistent with ‘growth-dependent’ planning (Rydin, 2013) to manage 
reduced resilience and achieve financial self-sufficiency in the context of significant austerity cutbacks.  
 
5.1 Local Planning Responsibilisation: Resilience, Self-Sufficiency and ‘Commercialisation’ 
 
RQ4) In what ways have local planning authorities experienced, and responded to, the demands of 
austerity (urbanism/governance/localism) as imposed by central government since 2010? 
 
The purpose of this section is to present the resilience, self-sufficiency and commercialisation pressures 
faced by LPAs in response to austerity. It is argued that this represents a neoliberal shift in responsibility 
for economic development and service provision, and the risk of financial default, to the local scale.  
 
The empirical findings presented here strongly support Bailey et al. (2015) and Hastings et al. (2015), 
that whilst efficiency measures initially proved to be effective responses to budget cuts in the early 
phases of austerity, these budget saving strategies became increasingly exhausted over time, with 
Planning Managers (PMs) arguing that further cuts would likely be ‘unsustainable’ in the future. 
Moreover, as the most achievable efficiency savings became exhausted, PMs were forced to consider 
alternative service delivery models and more radical innovations consistent with longer-term budget 
sustainability strategies. In the later stages of austerity (circa 2013-16), the only options that appeared 
available were advancing into new areas for commercial income generation or else face the political 
consequences of retrenchment in non-statutory/discretionary service areas. At the local government 
level, planning services were particularly susceptible to having their budget/resources reduced relative 
to other council services, but whilst also having more responsibility to deliver revenues through growth.  
 
The overall argument presented here is that these conditions form a neoliberal ‘responsibilisation’ 
strategy (Hastings et al., 2015) that seeks to download responsibility from the national to local scale; 
and that whilst the resilience narrative of LG survival/adaptation seems to hold true thus far in response 
to austerity (Shaw, 2012, John, 2014), the potential for a future ‘punctuated shift’ in local services 
(Gardner, 2017) and residualisation/marginalisation (Hastings et al., 2015) remains a significant threat. 
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In this context, critical questions are to be asked regarding the (long-term) impacts of the emerging 
shifts to commercialised and self-sufficiency strategies for the future of LG and role of planning services.  
 
Firstly, the context of austerity meant that LPAs needed to develop a mix of efficiency, retrenchment 
and growth strategies to manage their budget reductions and maintain service capacity and resilience. 
In general, PMs stated that some good efficiency savings had been made to ‘keep their services going’ 
in response to austerity; however, that the prospect of being forced into making further budget 
reductions would significantly impact the capacity and resilience of their services. It was expressed that 
early efficiencies were achieved through incremental budget reductions and service changes, but that 
subsequently a ‘step change’ innovation was increasingly required in order to develop more complex 
long-term growth-based revenue strategies or face the political costs of service retrenchment. Notably 
these changes had to be achieved within the strict time frame before the total removal of government 
Revenue Support Grant (RSG) in 2020 and whilst maintaining the core front-line planning services: 
 
“[A]s an authority over umpteen years now we have done what all authorities have done, 
we have salami sliced budgets down, we have taken tens of thousands of pounds out here, 
and £20,000 out there, and bits and bobs we can take out. Latterly we have started moving 
into income generation areas as well. So for instance, our department is looking at 
delivering commercial services on a private basis. So a simple example of that is our 
arboriculture team will provide a service to you to have your tree chopped down. So we are 
looking at where we can make money in externalising services. We have looked at where 
we can charge more for things, some of the mandatory stuff, but also some things that are 
not mandatory like car park charging, some things that are discretionary. To give you an 
example, we charge developers for street naming and numbering, so things like that where 
we have introduced a charge where there wasn't one before…that is a big step we are 
taking, because having pared everything down to the bone and then being faced with 
another £2 million gap, there isn't anything left of significance to have a go at reducing. So 
it is either going to be reducing staff beyond the point where you could deliver services 
optimally, stopping doing some services, or doing that bigger thing like a local authority 
trading company. There is a step change in the way you can drive income by doing things 
you can't do just within the current local authority legislation. So we can't go and build 
houses, but we could if we got a local authority trading arm…that is our response to it but 
it has got to be swift, we are facing that pitfall in 2018/19” (SP16, Mixed, West Midlands).  
 
Whilst such changes demonstrate examples of commercial innovation within LPAs, PMs raised concerns 
over their ability to generate efficiencies and increased revenues from planning services whilst also 
maintaining enough staff and resources to provide those services and to justify the fees for them:   
 
“I suppose from a planning perspective, what I’m responsible for we had to save a lot of 
money over the last probably three, four, five years now since the Coalition came into being. 
First couple of years, that wasn’t too much of an issue, because there was quite a bit of fat 
within the department anyway. But it is starting to - and that could be done by bringing in 
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technology improvements, more efficiency. So that was fairly necessary really. And when 
the Government talked about efficiency, actually you could probably say, “Yeah, fair 
point”…[but] there is becoming an issue now about what more savings can truly be 
delivered.  And I think if much more comes out there is no doubt it will have to effect service 
provision. It’s not like we - I mean we have increased our charging opportunities, so pre-
application meetings we charge for all those now, charge for members to sit, charge for 
people to present to our planning committee as well. So we have become, I think, much 
cleverer in terms of drawing money in. But there still becomes that challenge of, ‘Well you 
have still got to have enough people there to then provide the service that is needed if you 
are charging for it’. And that is a tension, there’s no doubt about that. But I think, as local 
government, it should just be the accepted norm” (SP26, Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber).  
 
The understanding that these conditions should be accepted as the “norm” suggest that local councils 
and managers have resonated with the government’s austerity discourses, that the country is in a debt 
crisis and therefore money is going to be tight and difficult decision will need to be taken as the world 
has changed post-2008. Like all political agendas, there are both elements of truth and deception in 
such positions, nevertheless this supports the concept of ‘austerity realism’ identified by Davies and 
Thompson (2016) that practitioners have few options available but to manage the impacts of austerity. 
 
The findings here demonstrate the practical challenges faced by PMs to offer a more efficient and 
commercial planning services, as a means to make savings and raise incomes, but within the general 
context of a reduced internal capacity of staff, specialist skills and resources. It was stressed that as an 
LPAs internal capacity is reduced as a result of cutbacks, so is its ability to generate revenue from 
planning services over the short and long term, which is needed to support other areas of the council:   
 
“The income we get from planning application fees is not ring-fenced, but essentially the 
service operates on the basis that it will generate a certain amount of income per annum. 
So, you know, the income it might be there, the actual costs of the service are there, so 
every-time you cut the councils revenue into a service and you get rid of staff, your ability 
to generate the income goes down as well. And that gap between the two has been 
increasing in the last 10 years because as the number of applications is reduced, or you get 
less and less major schemes, you therefore cut your staff but also your ability to then 
generate income…the way that the performance policy is written at the moment, we have 
to refund fees if we don’t determine applications within a certain amount of time; so we 
are now going through the stage of actually putting more resources and staff into the 
service to ensure that we are not refunding fees. So, you know, we are looking at planning 
as basically we want to generate more income for the council through the planning fees 
but also, with that planning fee, then getting a development to happen; and then we are 
getting the New Homes Bonus, the business rates, the council tax. And planning is now seen 
as a strategy of getting the council out of the financial hole that it is going to be in, so it is 
about growth and income generation” (SP39, Major Urban, North West).  
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Overall, PMs concerns centred on the diminishing resilience of planning departments to withstand 
further budget reductions whilst still having the future capacity to deliver more than their basic services: 
 
“The big issue is one of resilience. We haven’t got the capacity. Well, you know, if somebody 
goes off and people call up and say who is dealing with their work, and we haven’t really 
got anybody who can…any further savings the performance would drop dramatically…I can 
see going forward, and almost the way the council is funded now, that we have that base 
funding left that can provide just a ‘bread and butter’ service, and actually anything that 
we want to deliver over and beyond that is funded separately” (SP5, Mixed, South West). 
 
SP concerns that continued austerity would result in planning departments only being able to provide 
a ‘bread and butter’ service in the future forms a key area of debate around institutional resilience in 
the academic literature (Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013, John, 2014, Hastings et al., 2015). The findings 
here suggest further cuts may potentially lead to a spiral of decline for weaker LAs as their (financial) 
resilience and internal capacity (staff, resources, specialisms) become eroded to unsustainable levels. 
It also raises questions around whether such work then has to be contracted out to the private sector, 
particularly given the proliferation of planning consultancies during the same period (Parker et al, 2018).  
 
In relation to academic debates around the future of LG under austerity, this research positions itself 
with Gardner (2017) that ‘local authorities may indeed be resilient, and change processes appear 
incremental, but it is too early to rule out the possibility of a punctuated shift in public services’ (p. 165). 
In other words, simply because LAs have managed to survive austerity to date, that does not mean that 
this is a sustainable long-term approach for local public services in England. In this respect, Gardner 
makes the significant point that although the ‘national punctuation’ of resources through austerity has 
so far been translated into ‘pragmatic’ and ‘incremental changes’ for service delivery at the local level; 
‘the ideational changes may be building the potential for more radical alterations in the future’ (p. 151). 
Only time will tell if this is the case, but findings here suggest the LG ‘resilience’ narrative still holds true.  
 
The main empirical findings presented in this section are that planning departments have become more 
deeply embedded within the wider financial ‘self-sufficiency’ (economic prosperity) corporate agendas 
of their LA under austerity, and that this has taken the expression of increasing efforts to promote new 
forms of (growth-dependent) revenue generation and developing strategies for ‘commercialisation’: 
 
“My view on planning, and the way I have tried to position it…is at the heart of that city 
growth agenda, and if we get the planning right with that positive enabling role, it can help 
to deliver on those broader agendas like how does a local authority become self-
sufficient…because of austerity and the need to do things more cheaply and find savings 
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and raise income, we have had a particular focus on how to make the planning service 
more business-like, more commercial” (SP27, Major Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber). 
 
“Government’s drive for local authorities to become more self-sufficient financially…that’s 
new to us, and new to planners historically, linking now the driving of local authority 
revenues and the planning process…almost the commercialisation of the planning system 
because we have to grow our local tax base…and for the politicians, it’s wholly new, they 
are just unaccustomed to thinking commercially” (SP31, Urban, North West). 
 
“What we are trying to do is to really build on how do we encourage business growth in the 
district, economic growth…that obviously is something that is very much in our leader’s 
mind…because we need to be able to underpin our finances going forward. So it’s not just 
really about planning is it? It is the wider prosperity agenda” (SP19, Urban, West Midlands). 
 
In this context, PMs have had to adapt to manage not only the financial and service pressures within 
their own departmental remit, but to now consider and act according to the broader corporate financial 
strategy of the council. This was marked by a growing conscious recognition within council management 
that planning is an ‘income generating’ service, leading to increasing pressure and internal ‘scrutiny’ for 
PMs to simultaneously make large budget reductions and simultaneously raise incomes for the council: 
 
“For us at [local authority], [austerity] has meant a significant challenge, and it’s really a 
domino effect. So the reduction, the significant reduction in our government settlement as 
a local authority, means there is significant pressure on every service area in the council. 
And generally, in terms of how the city council has operated and functioned, if you are a 
service area that brings in an income then you are the subject of some considerable scrutiny. 
In terms of increasing that income and lowering the costs, and trying to redress that 
balance as far as you possibly can, which is very difficult to do…the current government 
settlement for last year was £2.2m for the council and that will be by the end of the MTFS, 
the Medium Term Financial Strategy period, so I think by 2019/20 that will reduce to 
£22,000. It is a 99% reduction in our government settlement over that period…means that 
it is huge decisions about what direction we go in as an authority and how we do things, 
and that filters down across the whole authority. We are no different, and because we bring 
an income in we are under that additional level of scrutiny” (SP13, Urban, East Midlands).   
 
In this way, PMs experienced pressures to cross-subside other statutory functions which could not be 
readily open to commercialisation, such as local plan-making and policy, from parts of the service that 
could increase revenues, such as Development Management. Such strategies were viewed as necessary 
in order to cross-subsidise statutory service areas both specifically within their planning departments 
and across council services more generally (such as the need to support education and social care).  
 
The core theme of the planning services ‘commercialisation’ agenda is the emphasis on generating 
(new) revenues from local council planning services and assets in order to respond to budget reductions. 
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However, this was problematic for PMs because not all of their typical eight LPA service areas; (1) 
Building control; 2) Development Management; 3) Planning Policy; 4) Environmental Initiatives; 5) 
Economic Development; 6) Community Development; 7) Economic Research; 8) Business Support) are 
amenable to being opened up to processes of commercialisation. Whilst Development Management 
and Economic and Business related service functions quite clearly have the scope to become more 
commercially orientated, it is harder to find a ‘client’ to charge (and hence find new revenue streams) 
within the Community Development (despite private consultants charging for advice on neighbourhood 
planning) and Environmental Initiatives service areas. Likewise, it is hard to determine a clear ‘customer’ 
of the Local Plan and planning policy. As such, the council have to bear the expensive democratic 
engagement and technical-judicial requirements necessary to form a robust evidence base but have no 
obvious private ‘client’ to charge for against its production and implementation (beyond council tax).  
 
One PM, working for a city council in South-West England, explained that their Planning Service costs 
£5.5 million and generates £5.8 million, leaving them with a net budget of only £300,000. These fine 
margins between costs and revenues has meant that the department is completely reliant on money 
coming in from fees through various charging mechanisms, such as pre-application advice, capital 
projects and Building Control. The Policy Team costs the overall department £757,000 but has almost 
no mechanisms through which to charge a fee to a specific client. Therefore, that policy work is only 
tenable because the Development Management service costs £2.6 million but raises £2.9 million. In 
practice, planning policy was not being paid for from the overall council budget, but rather through 
cross-subsidy using other planning services revenues. These findings suggest that planning policy is now 
becoming more dependent on the overall external service demand and performance of the department; 
“If the fees went down what struggles is not the Planning Team, it is the fact that it is subsidising the 
Policy Team, so there is a lot of cross-subsidy going on. So because the Development Management fees 
are healthy in [city] I can support a Planning Policy Team” (SP36, Urban, South West).  
 
SPs, particularly urban and city PMs, made the case that what had changed under austerity was that 
now every council project needed to attract a fee to justify undertaking a piece of work and that 
everything they do must be predicated on a clear business case and economic uplift. These practice 
changes towards the primacy of economic considerations under austerity governance were contrasted 
to the expressed previous degrees of flexibility and professional discretion to develop projects: 
 
“So there’s almost no money, there’s nothing left in the Planning Division that I can have 
doing things just because we think they are the right things to do. I have to be sure that I’ve 
got a way of paying for them. And that is what has changed over the last few years; because 
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in the old days [New Labour] you would have had some general revenue money coming in 
that gave you flexibility about how you prioritised work and what there was to do. Now I 
have to be sure that it can be paid for some way or another” (SP36, Urban, South-West). 
 
“[W]hat is driving that model now is you have got to prove the GVA uplift, the economic 
uplift…I think there has definitely been a shift towards spending that money on things that 
shows the economic return, and it is harder to justify investing just on the basis of making 
somewhere a nicer place to live or to look better, because you have got to show the 
economic rationale for it, and how that leads to more jobs or more investment” (SP27, 
Major Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber). 
 
These findings suggest that in the context of financial constraint and the legal requirement for LAs to 
set a ‘balanced’ budget (one in which costs and revenues are aligned so as not to accrue debt), planning 
services and projects now have to ‘follow the money’ to make things happen. The potential implications 
are that policy and project work, that are “the right things to do” from a professional standpoint, are 
becoming relegated to operating within the confines of the LPAs commercial strategy/business model.     
 
In arguing that LAs have become more commercialised under austerity post-2010, this is not to argue 
that ‘commercialisation’ is a new phenomenon within public sector institutions. Shifts towards more 
‘entrepreneurial’ forms of urban governance (Harvey, 1989) and economic logics around New Public 
Management (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994) in public service management and delivery have been 
developing since the 1970s. Austerity policy post-2010 represents an extension of these economic 
logics in the context of a rejuvenated post-crisis neoliberalism. So whilst these trends are not necessarily 
new, one of the key differences now is that all councils have to be entrepreneurial under localism in 
order to respond to austerity or else risk financial collapse (Bailey et al., 2015, Kennett et al., 2015).  
 
Under the previous New Labour Governments 1997-2010, public services ‘Modernisation’ and ‘Best 
Value’ agendas firmly rooted New Public Management thinking into LG and planning practices around 
efficiency, performance, and customer services (Sanderson, 2001, Newman, 2001). These government 
policies represented ‘roll-out’ neoliberal strategies to reform these institutions/actors with mixed 
overall success (potentially because stakeholders had enough discretionary space to mediate changes). 
For PMs, the scale, scope and highly localised responsibility and risk for dealing with austerity post-
2010, however, resulted in a context beyond simply complying with and implementing new national 
reform initiatives at the local level to a matter of public organisational survival (Hastings et al., 2015).  
 
In this context, council planners had less scope to shape how they responded to austerity localism, 
because much more was at stake than getting designated as ‘poorly performing’ under the previous 
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targets-based audit regime. Post 2010, the combination of national policy reforms and austerity created 
the ‘perfect storm’ (Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013) conditions of mutually reinforcing financial 
hardship and statutory requirements necessary for all councils to support growth as a means to achieve 
their own self-sufficiency and to maintain control over development within their locality. These 
challenges were underscored by the constant threat of further financial and policy reform by central 
government that created uncertainty in the short-to-medium term and further bolstered the reform 
discourses for change in practice culture, such as being seen to be ‘Open for Business’ (Inch, 2017).    
 
The empirical findings in this research support the critical literature that austerity has become the new 
‘normal’ or default state for public sector services, rather than as an emergency response to economic 
‘crisis’. For McBride, ‘there is a clear trend to render austerity policies a permanent, constitutionalized 
response to economic challenges ‘for all seasons’’ (2016, p.5). In this context, the (post-political) 
decisions over continued austerity measures are removed from liberal democratic politics and 
relocated behind the power relations that embed neoliberal practices and policies as ‘normalised’, 
which then filter into the micro-practices of the LAs. McBride (2016) terms this ‘Constitutionalizing 
Austerity’, one that can be understood as a form of neoliberal post-political governance (Swyngedouw, 
2014a). This situation is conceptualised here as a more mature (end) stage of the ‘Root and Branch’ 
restructuring of the (welfare) state by austerity that Taylor-Gooby (2012) warned of early on in the 
developing social policy agenda of the Coalition Government.  
 
However, austerity was not a new policy tool or concept introduced into UK politics by the Coalition in 
2010, rather it has long matched “the ideological, managerial and fiscal perspectives of the new right 
and other governments committed to the containment of social expenditure” (Mowbray, 1983, p. 238). 
The political discourses for a smaller, leaner, smarter state that can “do more with less” outlined by the 
Cameron-led governments post-2010 (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012, Lowndes and Gardner, 2016) is 
only the latest reiteration of long-standing New Right perspectives on the nature and role of the state. 
Nonetheless, as (Hill, 2015, p. 50) argues, contemporary austerity in the UK is different to the Post-
WW2 ‘socialised austerity’ that emphasised individual restraint as a means to support civic investment 
as part of the developing welfare state between 1945-50. Rather the austerity measures implemented 
in the 1980s and the post-2010 iteration can be viewed as a neoliberal approach to state austerity.  
 
As with previous rounds of neoliberal state austerity and planning reforms, this latest round of post-
GFC austerity has served to perpetuate the long-standing national reform agendas promoting a culture 
towards ‘planning positively for development’. These reform discourses have been developing since the 
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1970s but has taken its latest expression in the NPPF and the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development. There has long been a sustained national policy pressure for LPAs and PMs to better 
support business and their customers, however, under austerity this approach also requires further 
efficiencies, practice innovations and the search for commercial activities to generate (new) incomes. 
Together these pressures drive LAs towards the ‘growth-dependent’ planning model (Rydin, 2013). 
 
Given the necessity for planning departments to raise incomes, as a means to cross-subsidise policy 
functions and continue to employ specialist staff among other things, one of the most typical responses 
has been charging for pre-application (pre-app) services. Such ‘new’ revenue streams, or more 
accurately more recently utilised charges, have formed a core response to increase Development 
Management fees and respond to austerity. In all cases, the informants reported that they had made 
use of pre-app charging to support their revenues. This is likely explained by the fact that this was a 
relatively easy strategy to adopt and implement into practice across the board. Pre-app charging could 
be introduced by any council, as opposed to the specific contextual factors that proved critical to the 
particular responses and successes of other LPAs to austerity. These factors include the amounts and 
values of public building and land assets, private-sector investment within the local economy, the local 
council tax base, levels of community social deprivation, and so on (further discussed in Section 5.2). 
 
As one PM explained, the advantages of doing pre-apps is that the developers are effectively paying 
the council “before the clock is ticking”. The point was made that this is also beneficial in procedural 
terms, because when the application is then formally submitted, the council need to spend less time 
processing it because the proposal has already been “polished”. Overall this meant that the developer 
is effectively paying twice for two services now, the first for consultation and the second for the decision 
process. This was positive for LPAs because it also meant that applicants were also submitting a better 
version of their application that is quicker to determine because the pre-app planner has already done 
most of that work. In addition, the pre-app fee has also covered most of the cost of processing the final 
submitted planning application. As a result the cost advantage was stated that the planning department 
is “already kind of ‘quids in’ I suppose before we get to the application” (SP6, Rural, South East).  
 
One potential new revenue generating strategy for ‘high-value’ LAs was to develop a council-owned 
trading company using the new provision of the General Power of Competence under the Localism Act 
(2011). These quasi-public bodies could effectively mimic land and development promoters, such as 
Richborough Estates or Gladmans, but for council land and assets; providing a particularly effective 
strategy for LAs with sizeable public land and property assets. Alternatively a council trading company 
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could be used to pursue joint-ventures with local developers to take shared risks and ownership of 
projects. One PM explained the motivation and rationale for developing one such trading company:  
 
“The Engine of the North is like a delivery company for the council. So the council has quite 
significant land holdings and essentially, historically councils haven't always been very 
good at doing land development, it varies enormously but it's often been a bit of a weakness. 
So the idea of Engine of the North is it is a wholly owned company but it is a separate 
company. It's a separate legal entity. So some of the council's assets are assigned to that 
company, and the company is then there to promote their development in the way that 
Richborough Estates, or Gladmans, or any other land promoter would do…I think it's really 
good because it does mean that you do have that opportunity for the authority to be able 
to get its land holdings out there and developed… [Engine of the North] was just that, trying 
to give [council] a bit more commercial edge and that degree of independence. So when a 
council, and it's quite right for a public authority, you are hide bound by a lot of prescription 
in terms of the way you operate, in terms of your procurement, all those sorts of things. As 
a private company, you have much greater freedom to go and get bits of advice and you 
can operate in a different way. You can operate more flexibly. You can operate more 
commercially” (SP40, Mixed, North West). 
 
In this case, the primary rationale for developing a council-owned trading company was expressed as 
the desire to act more like a private company that could operate with more independence, flexibility 
and commercially with its assets and investments than a LG can because of its legal public body status. 
The shift to more effective commercialisation strategies therefore required a break away from the 
statutory laws, rules and procedures that govern the acceptable behaviour of public bodies. It is worth 
noting, however, that the secondary rationale was closely aligned with protecting the public interest in 
the development of public council-owned land. This case suggests that even where PMs are being 
forced towards developing commercial ‘growth-dependent’ strategies, they remained concerned with 
how such strategies could be aligned to benefit their local community and based on the public interest:  
 
“I mean we could perhaps just as easily have done a procurement exercise and found a 
preferred development partner [rather than use the council-owned Engine of the North]. 
So we could have teamed up with Gladmans or some other developer, and that would have 
had all the same benefits. But we thought well actually far better to do it as a wholly owned 
company because then any developed benefits go directly back to the residents. So if we 
had done a deal with whoever, some other promoter, obviously they would take their slice 
of the value and spend it wherever. They could spend it on a corporate yacht if they want 
to. Whereas the model that we have is that any profits are pretty much ploughed straight 
back into the community. Because it is, if you like, the community's assets, then if it has 
benefited by being developed, then that benefit goes directly back into paying for 
infrastructure services and all the rest of it. So that was part of the thinking. It was a little 
bit paternalistic I suppose, but it's just thinking ‘Well we don't really want somebody else 
running off with what is essentially council taxpayers’ money’” (SP40, Mixed, North West). 
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Drawing on the theoretical framework, the need for LPAs to respond to external neoliberalisations and 
the structures of austerity through more commercial practices is still subject to planners using their 
agency to enact actions for the ‘public interest’ and in line with their professionalism that forms a key 
part of ‘trust’ in planning (Swain and Tait, 2007, Tait, 2011, Parker et al., 2014). In this respect planners 
are both agents and mediators of neoliberal reforms. This also supports the literature on ‘progressive 
localism’ (Williams et al., 2014, Healey, 2015) in which Coalition localism is both a controlling and 
empowering policy context, whereby agents are directed towards working within the confines of 
neoliberal structures, but that can also develop their own agendas in ways unintended by government.   
 
In this context of commercialisation, the Localism Act (2011) presents the limits to commercial activity 
for councils when exercising the ‘general power of competence’:  
 
‘Limits on doing things for commercial purpose in exercise of general power: 
(1) The general power confers power on a local authority to do things for a commercial purpose only if 
they are things which the authority may, in exercise of the general power, do otherwise than for a 
commercial purpose. 
(2) Where, in exercise of the general power, a local authority does things for a commercial purpose, the 
authority must do them through a company. 
(3) A local authority may not, in exercise of the general power, do things for a commercial purpose in 
relation to a person if a statutory provision requires the authority to do those things in relation to the 
person’ (Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 4, p.20).   
 
These statutory limits provide some safeguards against LPAs becoming fully ‘commercialised’ service 
delivery bodies; however, some degree of cation should also be taken to the exact nature of these 
quasi-public actors. Numerous studies have demonstrated deepening neoliberal logics and investment 
strategies within public institutions and infrastructure provision. Sager (2013) draws attention to the 
ways that private investment in public infrastructure, such as motorways and airports, is used as a 
means to generate investment opportunities and sustained revenues; such as tollbooth charges for 
upgraded roads and retail and hotel complexes allied to airports. Evidence for neoliberal logics entering 
into the public sector are also expressed in Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), which utilises private capital 
to develop public services as investment opportunities in order to harness favourable public repayment 
revenues over decades and transfer private risk through public contracts (Musson, 2009, Raco, 2013).   
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The findings here support the Financial Sustainability of Local Authorities report produced by the House 
of Commons (HoC) Public Accounts Committee, that ‘revenue pressures have led to changes in the 
nature of capital spending with authorities focussing more on schemes intended to generate future 
revenues. Many are investing less in physical assets, such as libraries, museums and parks, and spending 
more on commercial investments, often involving investing in property’ (2016, p. 3). These changes raise 
questions over whether local (planning) authorities are being forced into becoming ‘developers’, with 
clear business models/longer-term investment strategies, and for the future delivery of public services. 
This would mark a return to this role for LG prior to the 1980s shift towards ‘enabling’ development.        
 
Furthermore, whilst LG revenue spending on services has fallen since 2010-11 under austerity, capital 
spending has seen a slight increase in real terms for LAs as a whole. Capital spending is used to pay for 
local assets such as leisure centres, libraries and roads. However, this ‘overall increase masks changes 
in the purpose of capital spending as authorities now focus increasingly on using their capital 
programmes to generate revenue returns rather than solely to provide services’ (HoC Committee of 
Public Accounts, 2016, p. 4). It is interesting to note that whilst LG current revenue spending has been 
drastically reduced according to austerity fiscal policy, that capital spending has been maintained and 
slightly increased is more in line with an economic stimulus approach to ensure that investment is 
sustained during low growth conditions associated with economic recession. So the picture of budget 
reductions is not so clear-cut, but critically may be explained by the objective to shrink the public sector.      
 
Overall, the report expressed strong concerns over the limited information and appreciation within the 
government on the uncertain and cumulative impacts of LG shifts to commercial activities and self-
sufficiency as responses to austerity, and particularly the risks these could present the sector over time:  
 
‘The Department [Communities and Local Government; DCLG] expects authorities to become more 
‘entrepreneurial’ as it encourages local government to become largely self-financing. But we are 
concerned that the Department appears complacent about the risks to local authority finances, council 
tax payers and local service users arising from the increasing scale and changing character of 
commercial activities across the sector. The Department does not have good enough information to 
understand the scale and nature of authorities’ commercial activities or which authorities are placing 
themselves at greatest risk and it does not use the information it does have to give it a cumulative picture 
of risks and pressures across the sector’ (HoC Committee of Public Accounts, 2016, p. 3).  
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The empirical findings in this research support the Committee of Public Accounts report. This section 
presents some initial findings on these issues; however, further research is needed on the scale and 
impact of commercial activities on LAs and planning services to develop a more complete evaluation.   
 
Indeed, practical concerns were expressed around the potential limits to the commercialisation agenda. 
These were based on normative distinctions between commercialisation and privatisation in practice. 
PMs emphasised that the statutory requirements and nature of the public sector ‘ethos’ effectively 
limited how ‘commercially’ LAs and planning services could function and compete when compared with 
private sector (planning) actors, such as consultancies and third-party providers: 
 
“[T]he cost of providing just the Development Management service, so that is just the 
people that deal with the planning applications and the administrative support, and some 
of that committee cost, the amount of income I generate more than covers the cost of 
providing that service. So that is used to fund Enforcement elements and fund, although it 
doesn’t fully do this, some of the Policy work. So, all of a sudden, if a private company looks 
and does a detailed analysis on that DM activity, they could quite easily turn round and say, 
“Well, actually, we could do all that activity for, I don’t know, maybe £200-300 grand less 
than what the local authority is doing it for”. And I will have to say, “Well yeah, I could do 
that. I am doing that, but who is going to pay for all these other bits then?” If they [company] 
want to take all this stuff as well then fair enough, but they don’t want to have any of that 
stuff because there is no income to be generated” (SP26, Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber). 
 
SPs made the case that planning departments could attempt to operate more purely on a business 
model through managing expenditure and revenue accounts; but ultimately there are things that LAs 
‘have to do’ and cannot get away from given their role as public service providers. These additional 
requirements and services effectively obstructed their ability to compete with private sector providers 
focussed only on revenue streams, even if planners only wanted to focus on income and cost savings. 
 
As the concept is used here, commercialisation is a process that is shaped by externalised reforms, but 
developed from ‘within’ LAs, through the internalised discourses and actions of LG senior management 
(planners). This is subtly different to processes broadly labelled as ‘privatisation’; which can crudely be 
conceptualised as the material shift/transfer of service delivery away from public to private provision. 
Under commercialisation as defined here, public service delivery stays with the LG, but the nature and 
objectives of public services more strongly reflect economic logics that mirrors private-sector practices. 
 
Furthermore, the pace and scope of austerity and reforms created both significant financial and policy 
uncertainty within planning departments; effectively inhibiting local councils from developing ‘effective’ 
and ‘sensible’ long-term ‘resource management strategies’ in the same way as private businesses:  
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“[T]here is a whole range of things that actually mean you can’t sensible plan just how you 
are going to do business, never-mind working through the nature of delivering on what the 
government actually want us to do…No business could operate on the basis that we [local 
government] are expected to operate, in terms of managing budgets and resources in a 
sensible and cost effective way” (SP7, Urban, East Midlands). 
 
Such restrictions on councils to compete were not limited to the private sector. One example supported 
the disciplining ideology of neoliberalism to weaken the role of local state and open up spaces for public 
and third sector actors under Big Society Localism. In this case, the council had to reallocate its funding 
to other external actors in order to capture the value that they were not allowed to develop themselves: 
 
“So a lot of my work is supporting Heritage Lottery Bids and, for example, there is a big 
Heritage Lottery Bid at the minute to support growth in the rural area of [council], but we 
have had to hand all that over to Groundwork Trust because we can’t recover our costs. So 
it is stacked against local authorities even if you bid, we got £3.3 million, and we can’t touch 
that because we are not allowed to recover our costs. So we hand it onto Groundwork Trust 
who are a charity and they can recover all their costs. It’s really difficult. We were recently 
meeting with Heritage Lottery and they were saying, “Well why aren’t councils bidding for 
Heritage Lottery funding anymore?”, and, “Well, we can’t because there are no resources 
to do it, and we can’t recover costs”” (SP25, Major Urban, North East). 
 
Crucially, the national government strategy of devolved responsibilisation also had to be enacted by 
LPAs as a means to reduce their costs and transfer pressures downwards to their ‘customers’. This 
highlights the scaling effects of austerity localism, as responsibilisation is double-devolved by the local 
state in order to respond to structural reforms (Peck, 2012). SP31 explained how they had adjusted 
their minor applications process in order to transfer the costs and risks for delays away from the council: 
 
“[T]hrough our delegations we have become much more disciplined in how we deal with 
the minors; so we won’t accept an application that’s missing information, we won’t book 
it in, we won’t process it until it is dead right, so the clock doesn’t start until we are happy 
with it, and then we’re getting into very much a process of principles as opposed to fine-
detail just because of cost. So we are becoming much more commercial. And I can see a 
point coming where you move more towards self-service, that says, ‘Look if the application 
fulfils these criteria, these five or six things, then it goes through the self-service portal’; 
and then if there is a snag it comes into the people, almost like car insurance on the phone 
or something, you will do it yourself if you fulfil these certain things, but the cost will be on 
you the applicant. So if you are going to find an architect or an agent it’s that relationship 
that is key before you enter the planning system, and if you get to that point in the planning 
system and you’ve fulfilled all the criteria, you then go off into a fast track; and you do it 
yourself and it’s down to you then in terms of being answerable to any check in the future. 
You are liable, so if you haven’t built it according to plans or whatever then you’re then 
liable. So I think it would be like that in future with a block of minors you will have a self-
service portion, then you will have a light-touch council portion, and hopefully a much 
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smaller portion which is heavier-touch from the council as that is where your cost is and so 
you are going to minimise that” (SP31, Urban, North West).  
 
In this future approach, planning applications that fulfil the basic criteria can go directly to a self-service 
portal, only requiring council staff/resources directly when there is a problem. It is likely that these 
‘responsibilisation’ strategies (Hastings et al, 2015) will become more widespread across council 
(planning) services as technology advances and budget pressures increase the need for LAs to devolve 
downwards to reduce pressures on service demands. This is notwithstanding the fact that austerity-
driven changes may well provide a better overall customer service despite this transfer of responsibility. 
 
As well as customers, this responsibilisation/risk was also devolved by LPAs to some of their specialist 
staff, which were now having to demonstrate that they could (re)cover their employment costs through 
additional external work to justify their positions within the department in austere times. Just as council 
planning projects now need to generate their own revenue streams to justify being undertaken, council 
staff were also being subjected to the same economic logics of austerity. One PM, working for an urban 
authority in the North East, explained that they had overseen a 50-60% reduction in their staff. A 
situation that had resulted in some staff, particularly within specialist areas such as Conservation and 
Ecology, having to generate their own income through various means in order to maintain their position; 
“So to keep some of my staff employed to do statutory services they have to get income into the 
authority. So that may be doing consultancy work for other authorities, or consultancy work for private 
individuals and communities, or whatever, which is another challenge” (SP25, Major Urban, North East). 
 
The findings here therefore suggest that the neoliberal logics of transferring responsibility and risk are 
being downloaded and internalised by public institutions and actors. In such cases, the responsibility 
for ensuring secured employment is shifted downwards again from the LPA to the individual level and 
placed on specialist staff to maintain their position through additional commercial activity rather than 
being directly funded by the council. It can thus be suggested that planning staff are essentially 
becoming personally tied into council commercialisation strategies, as the discipline of self-sufficiency 
is placed on the responsibilized actor to think and act in a rational way to maintain their job (Clarke and 
Cochrane, 2013). This follows governmentality theory and the subjectification of the conduct of actors. 
 
Similarly, SP27 faced this challenge with their regeneration staff, which the council could no longer 
afford to fund their positions (Major Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber). Such staff were now dependent 
on generating an income through securing various funding bids in order to maintain their posts within 
the department. In the context of austerity, they explained the financial tensions between knowing that 
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there was a big capital pot available to bid for projects; weighed up against the resources necessary to 
assemble an expert team that could develop a credible business case for the funding; and the risk that 
such resource-intensive bids had no guarantee of securing any funding. This situation was contrasted 
with the previous regeneration model that had delivered a lot for the city centre, based on an officer-
led approach paid for by the council that worked with partners to develop large Regional Development 
Agency and European funding bids. Despite greater reliance on funding, reduced staff/resources meant 
less could be ‘risked’ for such bids under austerity governance; leading to the criticism that only well-
resourced LAs could risk bidding for capital funding at the expense of other more needing councils. This 
supports the shift to forms of ‘tournament financing’ by public institutions under austerity (Peck, 2012). 
 
Overall, the findings here support the critical planning literature that a neoliberal ‘austerity localism’ 
governing approach was adopted by the government post-2010 to transfer responsibility and risk away 
from the national government downwards to local councils, some of which then subsequently had to 
be further double-devolved onto their staff, communities and customers. This can be seen through 
changes to the planning application process to pass on “liability” to the applicant and the pressures on 
LPA specialist staff to generate their own external revenues to justify their employment. Austerity as a 
state strategy can therefore be understood as more than about cutbacks to reduce the deficit but as 
part of the Cameron-led government’s claims to create a smaller, ‘smarter state’ (Lowndes and Gardner, 
2016) supported by leaner councils that provide only essential services and light-touch regulation. It is 
too early, however, to make any forgone conclusions about what this means for the future of state-
society-market relations in the UK; these reforms may create more resilient national and local states by 
making them more self-sufficient in the long-term. In this sense we should not assume that the growing 
shift towards public commercialisation strategies are necessarily a problem for LPAs or wider society. 
In many respects, such responses represent innovative advances in LG services and self-sufficiency. 
 
Indeed the long-term implications of the emerging and established LA responses to austerity are not 
entirely clear at this stage. A pro-development culture shift in approach, especially within LAs that 
previously prescribed a narrow restrictive strategy for planning, can necessarily be considered a positive 
outcome of austerity in a country that desperately needs more housing and infrastructure. It is worth 
stating that this is not a criticism of the logics and practices of the private sector, which plays a 
significant role in the economy delivering development (Adams and Tiesdell, 2012). Rather it is the 
criticism of the public sector imitating the private sector too closely. Despite being a core function, 
planning should never become solely an enabler of private market activity (Fordham, 1990), even if this 
is the primary goal in national policy. This is even more salient in the context of austerity where the 
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significant pressures for growth-dependent revenue is elevated to priority status, potentially relegating 
traditional professional and ethical concerns with local democracy, social justice and the environment 
that have dominated planning theory literatures (Fainstein and DeFilippis, 2015, Allmendinger, 2017).   
 
5.2 Social-Spatial Development and Localised Responses: Structures, Contexts and Politics 
 
RQ5) What are the financial/budget and capacity/resilience pressures on planning services, and how do 
they relate to the impacts of austerity on local authorities (landscapes of antagonism) more generally? 
 
The purpose of this section is to present the empirical data and examine to what extent there is an 
uneven geography of socio-spatial development under ‘austerity localism’ governance following the 
literature (See Beatty & Fothergill, 2013, Hastings et al, 2017) and whether this is in line with the existing 
regional disparities across England (Martin, 2015). The findings here also highlight how LPA E&Rs to 
austerity reforms are dependent on their institutional structures, antecedent contexts and local politics, 
amongst a number of other factors. Most notably, the specific amounts and values of public building 
and land assets, private-sector investment within the local economy, local council tax base, relative 
levels of community social deprivation regionally and nationally, and so on, within the LPA cases. It 
takes the critical position that austerity localism is serving to further extend and embed socio-spatial 
inequalities between places across England as a result of the national government laissez faire approach 
to planning and development post-2010 which follows a strategy of roll-back neoliberalism (Peck, 2010). 
 
Here the most significant implication of moving towards a commercialised growth-dependent planning 
model is that a pro-development approach becomes the only goal of planning, leaving environmental 
and social policy, and directing development to sustainable locations through ‘place-making’, as 
secondary concerns. Rydin (2013) argues that the problem with the growth-dependant planning model 
is that it often does very little for social and environmental objectives, or ‘just sustainability’, a situation 
that is exacerbated when such a model is applied universally across LPAs in England. Whilst growth-
dependent planning can be a workable model for specific contexts and projects, it should not be 
considered the only option. Other planning models should be utilised across different places and times 
alongside market delivery to achieve the best planning outcomes for all (Fainstein, 2010). It is in this 
context that planning commercialisation is potentially problematic, rather than being a priori in all cases.  
 
The most ‘typical’ response was for councils to try and ‘grow their way out of austerity’. At the LA level, 
this encapsulated the economic logic of investing in areas with the most potential for growth in terms 
of employment or Gross Value Added (GVA) to the local economy. In this way, LPAs are pushed towards 
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localised growth strategies that mirrored the Coalition’s economic approach of ‘backing the winner’ by 
investing in projects that provide the most ‘bang for your buck’. Going back to Pickles (2012, no page) 
that “Instead of trying to impose growth from Whitehall, we want to encourage and celebrate local 
leadership, ingenuity, and enterprise…This means making tough decisions and putting the cash where it 
can make the biggest difference – not where it’s most expedient, or will appease the most people”. The 
discipline of austerity localism and post-crisis neoliberalism localised responsibility and risk for the 
future economic development of places; with the likelihood that many relatively disadvantaged places 
would not be able to compete under such a model without some form of support. Indeed, the policy 
approach enacted by the Coalition post-2010 leads O'Brien and Matthews (2015) to conclude that we 
are now living in a ‘post-regeneration’ age. On the one hand this is local ‘empowerment’ for future 
growth, but on the other it is a politics of ‘abandonment’ (Davies and Pill, 2012, Raco, 2013) that sees 
the people and places most in need of public services and regeneration left to solve their own problems.  
 
At the heart of this empowerment/abandonment dualism is the uneven ability of LAs across England to 
boost development and generate fees for self-sufficiency. Contextual factors such as the dynamics of 
the local economy, community politics and attributes of the natural and built environment within and 
across councils (i.e. their local market and physical/social conditions) directly influenced their capacity 
to enact commercialised growth strategies. In such cases, a LA may want to grow, but does not have 
the sufficient land (value) or market interest to deliver; and, as a result of the new LG financial 
settlement underpinned by growth-based revenue, incentives and competitive bidding, fall even 
further behind those councils with more available resources and investment opportunities. It is in this 
sense that austerity localism further exacerbates the unequal socio-economic geography in England: 
 
“So that whole thing about development, retaining business rates by 2020…there’s two 
sides to it, isn’t there? You achieve all that business rate growth in yourself, you are 
financially self-sufficient, or you don’t and you are stuffed because all the government 
money has gone. So that puts the pressure on the planning authority to be positive about 
growth from the corporate level. From the very top the corporate message is, ‘We want 
the benefits of growth and we need to make sure the planning authority is doing all it can 
to deliver growth’” (SP27, Major Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber). 
 
Furthermore, even where pro-development (culture) changes are accepted by LPA staff and elected 
council members, this may still not be enough in many cases to overcome the various physical/natural 
and political/social barriers to responding to austerity through the ‘growth-generated revenue’ model: 
 
“[T]here are districts that are almost 75% Greenbelt or whatever, and so their prospects of 
getting further development is pretty limited, but also the local people don’t want it. So 
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how on earth they fund themselves then through business rate retention, or New Homes 
Bonus, or CIL, or whatever, I don’t know; because it is all geared now towards growth-
generated revenue that makes up the difference from what we are losing from the Revenue 
Support Grant. So there are some winners and losers” (SP9, Mixed, West Midlands). 
 
This system of local ‘winners and losers’ under austerity localism undermines a more sustainable and 
equitable approach to funding planning and development across the country. This is critical for social 
justice and public interest perspectives because ‘localized austerity is a recipe for yet more marked 
forms of uneven socio-spatial development, rather than simple convergence’; with the places most 
(likely to be) impacted generally already being known because ‘[t]he resulting landscape of austerity 
urbanism may be uneven, but it will not be entirely chaotic or unpatterned’ (Peck, 2012, p. 647-8).       
 
The PMs were keenly aware that if they could not ‘grow themselves’ out of austerity, then they would 
be forced to make otherwise politically unacceptable decisions for (discretionary) service retrenchment: 
 
“Every council that I know of is adopting the same type of strategy, they are trying to grow 
themselves out of the current economic circumstances; they are defining themselves then 
with the reduction in grants, so this council has got to save £126 million over the next four 
years…So the only way to close the gap…if we can’t meet the budget gap from income 
generation, then we are only going to be able to meet it from service reduction…politically 
not acceptable really” (SP37, Major Urban, North West). 
 
The most extreme cases highlighted the sheer challenges of incentivising and facilitating development 
in weak land markets necessary to generate revenues using the growth-dependent model (Rydin, 2013):  
 
“[W]hat you are probably seeing is a pragmatic approach by the council which says that, 
‘Well given the value in that land…’, and it may be the councils land in this case, the council 
essentially will sell the land for £1. Now can you imagine selling land for £1 there [points to 
the South East on map of England]. So effectively we put a line on a spreadsheet that says 
its £1, so we sell the land for £1, and the value that the council gets from that land is 
essentially what it gets through the door in terms of business rates or New Homes Bonus 
or council tax. So there is nothing in the land, there is no capital receipt, it’s essentially we 
are giving the land away for nothing; on the basis that that’s the only way you will see 
development in some cases, but not all, in some parts of the borough that are significantly 
deprived where we are keen to promote regeneration” (SP39, Major Urban, North West). 
 
These challenges stand in stark contrast to the strongest LPA cases of ‘managing growth, not decline’:   
 
“Our challenges are managing growth, not decline…Meaning for the whole of my duration 
down here, and I came down here as I say in the back-end of 2008, I haven't seen any signs 
of austerity at all. That's not to say that it's not difficult for some people, I'm not making 
that point, but we are in a very atypical place, and we have seen a lot of private sector 
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investment as well, so it's quite different…We have seen public sector cuts but we have 
generated new income to the point where for the next two years we are not making any 
more cuts in either council; because we have taken budgets out early and we have changed 
what we do, but actually we are delivering more with fewer people…Other places, big Mets, 
it is harder if you are trying to find cutting £100 million out of a big budget. It’s harder than 
cutting three, four, five million, and we have been doing it for a long time, so we have cut 
about £10 million out of the two authorities' budgets…We are small districts but we are 
still doing fantastic things, and we are still willing to spend £30 million to buy [local site] 
and lead the development ourselves. If austerity was driving us to just be cautious, watch 
every last penny, you wouldn't dream of doing things like that. So there's a willingness to 
invest, generate returns, do new things” (SP20, Mixed, South East). 
 
“It [austerity] isn't so critical, and the council probably has the best council tax base in the 
north of England. So, you know, we are very fortunate in that you have large council tax 
revenues; that don't entirely cover the costs, but it does mean the council is far less 
dependent on grants and other, particularly what people used to call the ‘funny money’, 
various programmes and that sort of thing. A lot of that is down to, well partly it's because 
we have got the council tax base, we have got land holdings, and because market interest 
is high…we are selling it at good market rates. So we sold a site…that went for several 
million…The council is fortunate in that it has some fairly extensive land holdings…It is a 
very different context [to other local authorities]” (SP40, Mixed, North West).  
 
These findings suggest that having a high council tax base, high private sector and market investment 
interests, and council-owned public land and building holdings offer the most effective ‘protective 
factors’ against austerity. However, these are not conditions that LPAs can easily develop over the short 
or long-term; for example, LPAs can only go so far in influencing market forces and actors to invest, 
land ownership may not be transparent, fragmented or already monopolised by private actors, and 
council tax depends on the wider employment status and affluence of the local population. These 
protective factors have not been newly developed and deployed by LPAs per se but represent their 
antecedent conditions pre-GFC and austerity. This highlights the role of ‘path dependency’ (Gains et al., 
2005) in shaping the available responses to austerity for LPAs and how they have experienced reforms.   
 
As would be expected, the LAs that can be described as ‘high value’ (with respect to having various 
combinations of the key local characteristics of a high GVA, high council tax base, low population 
dependency costs, high market interests, large land holdings, etc.) were the least impacted by cutbacks. 
They had the most options available to respond to austerity in effective or innovative ways, regardless 
of their regional context. It is therefore argued that whilst overall regional variations in the impacts of 
austerity are important in absolute terms, a more nuanced focus shows that LG ‘value’ provides a 
clearer picture with the geography of austerity more closely matching the pre-existing economic 
geography of England. For example, high value rural LAs in the North West had more in common with 
high value rural councils in the South East and others across the country, than with their neighbouring 
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councils or wider sub-region. Equally, the relatively ‘low value’ urban councils all had similar problems 
in responding to austerity, despite these being typically more pronounced in the north of England.  
 
Despite austerity impacting the north of England to a greater extent than the south of England in 
general terms, this masks the local variations that suggest austerity is further entrenching pre-existing 
inequalities between relatively affluent and disadvantaged LAs in England. The perverse consequence 
is that LG planning becomes more difficult and less well-resourced in precisely the localities most in 
need of socio-economic regeneration and growth to generate funding to meet cutbacks. The findings 
here support the literature that some LPAs have a much greater capacity to raise revenues and support 
their communities in the context of austerity. Most worryingly, the places and people most in need of 
regeneration and supporting services are situated within the local councils with the least capacity to 
respond to austerity through growth-led strategies (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, Hastings et al., 2017). 
 
Whilst there is nothing wrong with trying to achieve the best economic results from the (supposedly) 
decreasing amount of public money available to invest into a project or place, it does potentially move 
the planning rationale away from traditional concerns for promoting social and spatial justice (Davidoff, 
1965). Thus, whilst economic growth is a necessary and positive goal for the development of advanced 
liberal societies, the type and distribution of growth is significant to avoid further socially polarised and 
economically unequal communities and places across England (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, Gardiner et 
al., 2013, Hastings et al., 2017). Indeed, the sustained Coalition and Conservative rhetoric for nationally 
‘rebalancing the economy’ through developing local economic growth, devolution deals and the 
‘northern powerhouse’, have been significantly hampered by the parallel national austerity agenda 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012); and without more political and financial support, seem unlikely to have 
any meaningful impact for changing the persistent UK spatial economic inequality (Martin et al., 2016). 
 
Most notably, the largest and (relatively) well-resourced councils pursued more ambitious commercial 
strategies that sought to ‘rent out’ their core and specialist services to surrounding smaller councils, as 
well as offering a service to assist with processing their planning applications. This formed part of a new 
‘business model’ to more closely mimics the operations of a planning consultancy. SP27 explained that 
they were starting to develop a model of the city becoming a “planning centre of excellence”, where 
they can charge out their specialist services, such as landscape, design and policy to assist smaller 
authorities with some of their work and create new income streams. Such a model builds on the 
understanding that austerity has significantly reduced the internal staff capacity and access to technical 
specialists within the majority of councils, particularly for the smaller and relatively lower-value LPAs:    
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“We are doing a piece of work with…a business transformation part of Capita, to advise us 
on commercialisation…and they are helping us with things like how you get your charging 
right, and can we potentially start to provide a service for other authorities. So it is not 
inconceivable that we could start doing planning applications for surrounding authorities…I 
think you will start to see the bigger local authorities becoming more commercial, and the 
smaller local authorities shrinking their planning teams and just buying in the expertise 
when they need it, rather than trying to operate a very small specialist service themselves” 
(SP27, Major Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber). 
 
Such emerging commercial strategies highlight the potential for innovative entrepreneurial approaches 
to managing planning services in the future in the context of fewer resources resulting from austerity 
(Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013, Raco and Moreira de Souza, 2018). They can provide access to the 
resources of other councils in order to address internal capacity and resilience issues on a more formal 
basis, and to staff with a greater range of skills and experience across LG boundaries. This represents 
the potential ‘scaling’ effects of austerity, as the strongest and largest LAs manage to maintain their 
resources and prosper in harsh economic conditions, and smaller councils become reliant on them for 
specialist services and other capacity challenges. These arguments for the scaling effects of austerity 
also extend to individuals; Pill and Guarneros-Meza (2017) highlight ‘austerity’s multi-scalarity’ through 
the emergence of ‘hybrid officers’ as the combinations of front-line actors working across third sector 
and public institutions in response to austerity-driven local governance transformations. In the bigger 
picture this means recognising that austerity has international, national, local and individual dimensions.  
 
Such models could potentially represent a new local government service hierarchy, optimally suited to 
city-regions, that concentrates specialist resources and services in key areas that can be accessed when 
necessary by smaller councils. This could produce efficiencies for smaller councils and generate incomes 
for larger authorities. However, this does raise the question of how smaller and low-value authorities 
can access such specialists and core resources in localities that do not have a proximate ‘centre of 
planning excellence’ to mitigate budgetary pressures (Etherington and Jones, 2009). Nonetheless, in 
the context of severely reduced capacity and resilience, such commercial strategies can be considered 
positive local responses and innovations to the challenges faced by many local planning departments. 
 
Overall, these findings support Peck that ‘[t]he devolution of austerity is driving a sharp wedge between 
those cities that can feasibly go it alone and those that, by virtue of local economic fragility or high 
poverty rates, have no real option but to downsize municipal government and retrench public services’ 
(2012, p.633). This may be the future ‘sink or swim’ landscape of English LPAs under austerity localism. 
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Furthermore, it was clear from the empirical data that the institutional ‘structure’ of LAs played an 
important part in the types and severity of pressures faced by austerity. Whether a council was a 
standalone unitary authority or part of a two-tier county and district structure was significant because 
unitaries had the additional responsibility for funding education and child and adult social care services; 
which were the services under the greatest financial pressures from high demand and the key political 
priorities for protection. For the two-tier district councils, responsibility for these services still resided 
with the country council, and so they have been relatively sheltered from these more significant 
financial pressures. Therefore these findings suggest that the strength of pressures for budget savings 
and revenues expected from (planning) services seem to be greater within unitary and county councils: 
 
“[I]t would be a complete nightmare to my mind had [the council] been a unitary authority 
and had to deal with those social services pressures and the education pressures, all those 
funding issues. And so the fact that the County council is there means the County council 
has rather more serious budget problems than the district councils, and so to a certain 
extent it insulates us, but that is only because that is where the big expenditure is” (SP35, 
Urban, East of England). 
 
“I think planning has been better protected in districts, so where you have got a two tier 
local government, district authorities have a tendency to protect planning to a reasonable 
extent. So yes we have been through significant austerity and significant cuts as an 
authority, but generally speaking planning is actually reasonably well protected” (SP15, 
Urban, West Midlands).  
 
“[W]e are not like the County council at the moment, which has gone through tremendous 
financial issues and quite frankly will probably go bankrupt in two years if they don’t sort 
themselves out. They are going through various redundancy packages, massive service cuts 
at the moment which are upsetting a lot of people, but they have got to do it; and so they 
are having to adjust now to reflect the austerity that is coming in, we have not been in that 
position” (SP30, Rural, North West).  
 
“Whether that level of efficiency [imposed on planning services] has been applied across 
local authorities and into more sensitive areas, so children, young people service, adult care, 
that type of stuff, has always been a moot point; because if you get something wrong there, 
when you hear of Baby P and things like that, then clearly the senior managers and the 
members are going to be very reluctant to hive significant chunks of funding off their 
budgets. However, when you look at our budget as a council, I think we have halved it in 
terms of our revenue cost, and it has come down from about £450 million to just over £200 
million now. But all that’s happened is the percentage of that budget has just massively 
increased in terms of adults’ and children’s services. So you arguably, for the future savings 
that are needed, you could probably just close the Regeneration Department; so not just 
planning, above that, you would still be short. So there is becoming an issue now about 
what more savings can truly be delivered. And I think if much more comes out there is no 
doubt it will have to affect service provision” (SP26, Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber). 
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These education and social care cost pressures within unitary authorities resulted in an even sharper 
focus on the need for planning services to go beyond self-sufficiency to revenue generation strategies, 
particularly in more deprived localities that had higher levels of social and health related problems 
within their population. The findings suggest this situation was different for district councils, potentially 
because of a mixture of factors; including that they were protected by their county from the harshest 
service budget pressures, have less ‘urban’ problems to address within their local population and 
demand for such services, and can typically raise more local revenues being rural and affluent in nature. 
In contrast, one PM, working for a low-value urban unitary authority in the North West, explained that 
the financial strategy of the council had to be ‘growth-based revenue’ in order to meet these growing 
service demand pressures; making the point that, “You know, like a lot of other councils within five years 
there won’t be a council there, because if you take out what the council has to spend on schools and 
social care services then the council won’t have anything left to do the streets and the bins” (SP39). 
 
Research by the National Audit Office (NAO, 2018) estimates that 10% of single tier (unitary) and county 
councils with social care obligations have less than three years’ financial reserves left if they continue 
to routinely deploy them at current rates to cope with increasing service demands under austerity. 
Furthermore, a survey conducted by the County Councils Network (CCN, 2018), a special interest group 
of the Local Government Association (LGA) which represents all 27 county councils and 9 county unitary 
authorities (collectively responsible for service delivery to 27 million people), found that a third of these 
would struggle to balance their budgets for 2019-20 without extra funding, with this figure rising to 
two-thirds by 2020-21. This is based on the latest CNN budget analysis estimates that county councils 
face a £3.2 billion gap between income and costs over the next two years primarily caused by projected 
extra demand for social care services and government cutbacks. Indeed, the Revenue Support Grant 
(RSG) for county councils will have decreased by 93% by 2020, faster than any other council type, with 
the CNN arguing the government’s ‘hand to mouth’ funding approach is unsustainable in the long-term.  
 
A case in point, and potential window into the future, is that in February 2018 Northamptonshire 
County Council became the first local authority in two decades to issue a Section 114 notice because it 
was unlikely to be able to balance its books and was therefore at risk of being unable to set a legal 
budget for 2018-19. Despite dogmatically following the government guidance on how to restructure 
towards a new model of ‘next generation’ councils under austerity, this means the county was 
effectively declaring bankruptcy. Indeed, it seems very possible that a number of English LAs may soon 
join the US city municipalities that have had to file for bankruptcy under the conditions of austerity 
urbanism (Peck, 2012). Patrick Butler, social commentator for the Guardian newspaper, reported that:   
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“The clean steel and glass lines of One Angel Square were supposed to enshrine the modernising 
dynamism of its owners, Northamptonshire county council. Instead, the £53m headoffice is more likely 
to end up as a symbol of one of the biggest municipal failings of recent times…One Angel Square is likely 
to be put up for sale, three months after it was formally opened by the communities secretary, Sajid 
Javid. A fire sale of assets is the only way to keep the council afloat, say officials, though even this 
temporary fix may not be enough to save it…The irony is not lost on some observers that the first local 
authority to go bust under austerity is not the profligate Labour municipality of media caricature, but a 
Tory-run council in the heart of middle England…Furthermore, it has crashed after rigid adherence to 
the Tory ideological rulebook for local government. Northamptonshire embarked on a “next generation” 
reform plan in 2014. Services would be outsourced or turned into profit-making companies. The council 
would drastically shrink in size and be run like a business. “The old model of local government no longer 
works,” it declared. The grand plan failed at a cost, say critics, of more than £50m on consultants and 
rebranding. Expected efficiency savings did not materialise, some privatised services have since been 
hauled back in-house and the scheme’s political architects, including the then council leader Jim Harker 
and the then chief executive Paul Blantern, have departed. After years of freezing council tax bills on 
principle, the authority has raised them by 6%…Northamptonshire faces huge structural pressures. The 
number of residents aged over 65 will increase by an estimated 28% by 2024 and record numbers of 
children are being taken into care…Government cuts have obliged Northamptonshire to make £376m of 
savings since 2010 and it estimates that another £111m must be cut from annual spending by 2021. 
How it will do this while maintaining the services it must legally provide is unclear.…Even a skeleton 
service may not be enough to balance the books in the long term” (11th February 2018). 
 
Beyond the importance of LG institutional structures, the academic literature suggests that austerity is 
predominantly an ‘urban’ crisis, with towns and cities being home to the main targets of austerity 
policies for budget reductions/savings aimed at the sections of the population most dependent on 
public sector employment and welfare support: ‘[C]ities are disproportionately reliant on public services; 
and in the sense that they are ‘home’ to many of the preferred political targets of austerity programs—
the ‘undeserving’ poor, minorities and marginalized populations, public-sector unions and 
‘bureaucratized’ infrastructures. Cities are therefore where austerity bites’ (Peck, 2012, p. 629).  
 
This urban funding crisis is set against government policy that also prioritises core cities and city-regions 
as the ‘engines of the national economy’ with the most potential to achieve growth, highlighting the 
government’s vision to reform towns and cities across England into lean, competitive and private-sector 
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driven urban spaces. However the picture is more complicated, with a number of medium-sized 
secondary urban cities and towns having structural constraints to growth, such as constrained LA 
boundaries or their historic built environment, meaning that the relationship of the rural and urban to 
income growth through development is more complex and notwithstanding issues of rural deprivation. 
 
Rural LPAs have been impacted by austerity, but they also tend to be district councils that are relatively 
more protected by their county council than unitary and city authorities and with less social costs and 
more available and desirable land for large scale developments. For example in one city situated in the 
East Midlands, SP13 made the case that surrounding rural councils with greenfield land could generate 
more growth through large housing developments and planning application fees than the urban centre:  
 
“[O]ne of the upsides that many of my colleagues in the surrounding districts have in my 
position [planning manager] is that, I bring in £350,000 a year in income, they have been 
bringing in £2m in income; because they have been getting these 500 houses on greenfield 
sites cropping up and just being pinged in speculatively, but it means at least they are not 
under pressure from an income perspective. I think also in terms of how we operate, it is 
because the service is under this continuous pressure which makes it very difficult. Add to 
that the fact that as a district, as I’ve said, we have very tight, small boundaries; we don’t 
really have the ability, because of the size of us, for schemes to attract large planning fees. 
So we don’t get a new agricultural building which is a maximum fee somewhere in the 
middle of nowhere, which has got very little impact on anybody and is quite easy to deal 
with. We haven’t got the luxury of having areas of land like that where we can attract those 
sorts of fees; our sites tend to be smaller but much more involved because they are in a 
tight urban context. A huge number of our buildings in the city are listed, so all applications 
for those buildings have no fee, take a lot of work, take a lot of time, mean you have to 
have a highly qualified conservation officer, means we have to have a highly qualified city 
archaeologist. A lot of other authorities pool these resources county-wide because they 
don’t have that level of issue. So, comparatively speaking, we are an expensive authority, 
if you want to call it that, because of the nature of our district and because of the nature 
of the fees that we get for the work that we get” (SP13, Urban, East Midlands).  
 
These ‘urban’ funding pressures were representative of the broader challenges facing many medium-
sized secondary and tertiary urban areas outside the eight core cities in England, with high-cost 
boundary and conservation/heritage challenges that impact their types of development and fees. This 
suggests that the ability for LPAs to develop revenue-based growth strategies in relation to rural and 
urban contexts are not so straightforward; whilst urban areas certainly have the most potential for 
growth and employment in general terms, they typically have higher built environment and social costs 
and less desirable land when compared to rural areas, particularly in regard to housing development.   
 
Again, the tension between general and context specific responses to austerity is raised here, this time 
in relation to urban and rural contexts. The evidence presented here does not claim to represent all 
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‘types’ of LPAs and responses, rather this analysis aims to highlight some of the general and particular 
responses to austerity within a number of different geographical contexts across England. These can 
then begin to shape understandings of austerity in relation to planning practices for future research.   
 
In terms of the political differences between the LA cases, there was some evidence to suggest that 
Conservative-led councils valued maintaining low council tax and public service costs and quality of life 
considerations under austerity. Similar anecdotal evidence suggested that Labour authority councillors 
and leadership typically placed stronger emphasis on affordable housing and protecting social provision:  
 
“I'm not quite sure what the future of local government finance looks like. Of course, 
certainly this council has not put council tax up; we took advantage of the council tax freeze. 
You would expect that, it is a Conservative run council, that was national policy, and our 
members are always reluctant to increase council tax. So, you know, at the moment the 
way councils fund themselves there are few variables” (SP16, Mixed, West Midlands).  
 
“I do think that austerity has had an impact, because inevitably district councils have had 
their budgets cut and there is a limit to the extent that we can increase our income. Both 
[local councils] prides themselves on not having raised fees and charges and in some 
circumstances. Well in [local council], for example, currently has free public car parking 
right across the district, provides a free garden waste collection service and has one of the, 
if not the lowest, council tax in England. And they are proud of that and that is what they 
think is important for the community in times of austerity. The consequence of that though 
is there is less money available to employ staff. So there are consequences of that. 
[Neighbouring] district council similarly, although they do charge for car parking and for 
garden waste, they pledged not to raise their fees and charges. And over the last three 
years, or probably longer than three years, have had the biggest reduction in their level of 
council tax. Or one of the biggest reductions in council tax of any council in the country, 
and last year actually reduced their council tax for the same reasons. You know, what they 
are concerned about is the money in people pockets and again the inevitable consequence 
of that is the council has to make a fair amount of savings” (SP2, Rural, South East).  
 
Despite tentative evidence for different political priorities under austerity conditions in this research, 
this seems a reasonable postulation that different places and political members have different service 
priorities when enacting budget cuts. The evidence here suggests that political tensions predominantly 
gained expression through competing Conservative agendas for national growth and local conservation, 
rather than one fundamentally between Labour and Conservative councils per se. This is likely because 
at the time of the research the overwhelming majority of LAs in England were Conservative-run councils:  
 
“[T]here is a huge disparity between what is coming from a Conservative-led government 
in terms of what we need to do, the numbers of housing and the crisis that we are in, and 
that it is the planning system’s fault that we are in that position. However, at grassroots 
level in a lot of the rural districts, which tend to be Conservative-led councils with 
212 
 
Conservative majority members sat on their planning committee, they are the members by 
and large which are refusing the highest percentage of planning applications. So the 
national message is not getting to their grassroots politicians, and that is a significant 
problem, and that is quite often going against officer recommendation. So it is not the 
planning system, or the planning officers, or the planning authority that is having that 
impact, it is the politicians that are making the decision at planning committee. And that I 
think is something the government need to really look at quite seriously, because that is as 
much of an issue as anything else” (SP13, Urban, East Midlands).  
 
“I can understand the need for the government to want to incentivise delivery, and they 
want to sort out the political log-jams in authorities that want to avoid some of the really 
difficult decisions. The irony is, I think a lot of those areas are actually the leafy Tory Shires 
where local politicians are being very resistant” (SP7, Urban, East Midlands).  
 
One government proposal for LAs to mitigate budget cuts and generate efficiencies was for them to 
develop cross-boundary ‘shared services’. Given the diminished capacity and pressures on planning 
services, PM needed to consider potential moves towards more cross-boundary, joint-working and 
shared services arrangements to overcome individual council shortfalls. However, despite shared 
services being regarded as an effective response to austerity for LAs in general terms, a number of PMs 
explained that this was more challenging to implement for planning specifically. In one case, this was 
because planning is not a major staffed area that could generate the sufficient efficiencies and cost 
savings necessary to justify the organisational and political transaction costs of moving to a shared 
arrangement. In one case (SP34), even where three councils had a history of working together and had 
produced a joint Local Plan, this was still not considered worth losing their individual local autonomy, 
along with the politics that the two rural councils had concerns that the urban council would ‘take over’ 
the local planning agenda. Furthermore, these political concerns to maintain planning decision-making 
autonomy proved to be expressed even more strongly for their Development Management services:   
 
“I think the view with shared services is that to really make efficiencies and generate big 
savings it is some of the big major staffed areas. So Revenues and Benefits, lots of staff, IT 
could be another one, maybe where you could pool some of those corporate services. With 
planning, we have looked into it, the obvious one was on the policy-side; we have worked 
together on the Joint Plan, so why don’t we just go one step further and combine the 
teams?...Although saying that what do you do, you combine three [council] teams of say 
five staff on average, and your saving is maybe two managers? But looking bluntly, OK it is 
so many tens of thousands a year saving, but I think that there wasn’t that big carrot there 
for those authorities I don’t think in terms of major savings. So it is not live at the moment 
on the table. We discussed the same with Development Management and that is even more 
[politically] sensitive” (SP34, Urban, North West).  
 
This suggests that whilst austerity has driven efficiency and innovation within planning departments, it 
has not necessarily provided the sufficient (financial) motivation and (political) traction to embrace a 
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fully shared services agenda; particularly given the LA politics around housing and growth since 2010. 
Even where councils had created collaborative governance arrangements across their administrative 
and county boundaries and implemented a comprehensive strategy to merge ‘back-office’ services to 
make savings, control over key frontline services such as planning remained with each individual council.  
 
One PM explained that a cross-boundary district and county LG arrangement to make back-office 
savings, the ‘Vision 2020’ Partnership, had been successful. They explained that this was because the 
back-office transactional services such as finance, legal, IT, human resources, and revenue and benefits 
services are “the kind of things that can be the same everywhere and don’t need to be tailored to specific 
local needs” (SP2). This partnership for sharing the costs of these functions has allowed the four 
participating councils to make and project significant savings, which was then reinvested back into 
maintaining front-line services or simply to deal with further government cutbacks. For SP2, the vision 
partnership represented innovation and bravery to work across local council and county boundaries to 
make savings, although that planning services remained individual and more controversial for sharing:  
 
“[I]n terms of front-line services, planning is the only service that is not shared…I think 
planning will probably be kind of the last bastion of individuality in terms of the councils. 
Both of the councils, and the other two that are in the [Vision] 2020 Partnership, are very 
clear that they want to maintain their own identity and they want to deliver services that 
are appropriate to their particular area. And I think planning inevitably is seen as the key, 
probably the most important local service that a district council provides. I think that there 
is scope to share specialist officers in the planning service, and its right that because of the 
nature of planning you need people who know the area to deal with the issues in that area. 
But in both councils we have for instance specialists in conservation, environment, natural 
heritage and so forth, and I suspect that over the course of time we will find it harder and 
harder to recruit those jobs to have them in-house. We currently have to buy in expertise 
in those areas from time to time depending on the complexity of the issue. So I think it is 
highly likely that over the course of time those resources will become shared, because that 
is about technical expertise rather than local knowledge. But I think it will be some time 
before there is a fully shared planning service” (SP2, Rural, South East). 
 
These findings suggest that whilst collaboration on planning projects, such as local plan-making, was 
perceived to have benefits under austerity; the political costs weighed against relatively moderate 
savings deterred moves towards more fully shared planning and development management services. 
 
Overall, the findings in this section are as expected, that local geographies, structures, contexts and 
politics play a key role in shaping how LPAs have experienced and responded to austerity. They also 
highlight the core role of the local economy and land markets, particularly private sector demand and 
investment, for LPA capacity to develop growth-dependent planning models. The implications are that 
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without any regional or national redistribution mechanisms to support more ‘marginalised’ LPAs (e.g. 
weak local economies, high social costs, traditionally more dependent on government funding, public 
sector employment and welfare protections), they will fall further behind exacerbating uneven social-
spatial development across England. This supports Berry (2016) that ‘the growth model supported by 
policy elites in the post-crisis period sustains patterns of wealth distribution similar to those which 
pertained in the pre-crisis period, albeit with inequality arguably more pronounced as financial and 
property wealth remains largely intact while earnings are held down and redistributive mechanisms are 
withdrawn’ (p. 110). The next section moves on to examine the role of PMs in making government 
austerity reforms ‘work’ in practice through discursive and structural changes within their LPA services.   
 
5.3 Managing Austerity Planning: Practice Culture Change and Service Restructuring 
 
RQ6) To what extent have austerity logics been internalised or resisted by local authority planning 
managers? How have these austerity measures shaped LPA practice cultures and structures? 
 
The main argument presented in this section is that planning managers (PMs) are playing a key role in 
the (re)production of austerity at the local scale as a result of their senior ‘frontline’ position and 
relationships within the wider council leadership. Whilst some PMs perceived and embraced the 
changes associated with austerity reforms enthusiastically, such as greater efficiency, innovation, self-
sufficiency and a positive approach to development, others were more reluctant and concentrated on 
the necessity to respond in order to sustain the service, support growth and continue to meet their 
communities’ needs as best possible. Here the differences between these PM’s understandings and 
approaches to austerity have been termed as ‘enthusiastic reformers’ and ‘reluctant pragmatists’ 
respectively. It is argued that despite these contrasting personal positions, each are having to make the 
system reforms ‘work’ and so become ‘agents’ in the neoliberalisation of their LPAs to varying extents 
through the internalisation of austerity logics into their practice cultures. This is not to argue, however, 
that such practice changes are necessarily ‘bad’ outcomes as many potentially represent positive steps 
forward in LA service delivery; rather it is to evaluate the management of austerity within various LPAs.  
 
The findings in this section support the literature that emerging shifts towards commercialisation within 
English LPAs form part of the broader expression of planning ‘culture change’ in the UK (Inch, 2017). 
These culture changes are associated with, and reinforced by, the various national government policy 
reforms enacted over the previous two decades in the UK, focussed on performance, speed, efficiency, 
customer service and supporting growth in planning (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006) and within LG as 
modernised, joined-up governance partners and ‘enablers’ more generally (Wilson and Game, 2006). 
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This follows Gains et al. (2005) that there is a ‘path dependency’ to the reform of English LG. In this 
sense, despite being a radical shift in LG finances and management, austerity can be seen as a 
continuation of this trajectory for planning under a neoliberalized political economy (Allmendinger and 
Haughton, 2013). This section is therefore partly a response to increasing calls in the academic 
literature for planning research to focus on the ‘cultural dimension’ of reform (Grange, 2014, Inch, 2012, 
Inch, 2017). These findings tentatively provide some preliminary evidence/examples of contemporary 
practice culture change within English LPAs; however, more research is needed to make stronger claims. 
 
Preliminary evidence for changing practice cultures within the LAs cases was the ‘growing recognition 
and acceptance’ demonstrated by (planning) service managers, elected members and the corporate 
leadership that they needed to adopt a pro-growth stance in order to respond effectively to austerity: 
 
“Within our leading members, both the leaders of the councils and the planning and 
economic development portfolio holders, so the cabinet councillors, there is a real 
acceptance that they have to go for growth; and that’s the way forward both in terms of 
what is good for [the region] and ‘UK plc.’ as people like to say. So there is an acceptance 
of that, but also now recognition that a lot of government finance particularly at district 
level is going to come from New Homes Bonus and in the future from Business Rates, and 
if you are looking for a reasonable future for the local authority you have to keep those 
streams coming through. So there are quite a lot of things that are pushing you in the 
direction of more growth” (SP8, Rural, East of England).  
 
Practitioner language on ‘acceptance’ and ‘recognition’ is potentially telling because it suggests that a 
form of ‘pragmatic consensus’ for growth has taken a long time to develop and become internalised by 
council actors despite their initial reservations. Although not part of the theoretical framework heuristic 
deployed here, the insights of discursive institutionalism theory can be used to suggests that these 
‘discursive’ responses to austerity have taken a number of years to become fully ‘codified’ into the 
‘deeper frames of reference’ of LA (planning) leadership and to find expression in ideational changes 
supportive of growth that have created a new ‘sedimented’ practice culture (Hay, 2006, Schmidt, 2010). 
 
The necessity for LPAs to set their own fees to a level that could recover the costs of operating planning 
services and achieve self-sufficiency was a commonly recurring theme across the cases. However, PMs 
demonstrated some sympathy with the government’s reluctance to raise or allow locally set fees 
without some link to improved efficiency and performance, and their views were heavily couched in 
terms of the need to deliver the most efficient service possible to ‘customers’. This suggests they had 
internalised the (neoliberal) discourses of performance and efficiency as the criteria that should be 
attached to funding increases for the sector. However, they also balanced this New Public Management 
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framing with concerns for the public interest. This supports Clifford (2012, p.553) that ‘planners are 
redefining the customer concept as they embed it in practice in ways which are far removed from the 
traditional model of the ‘sovereign customer’…[that] draw on older conceptions of planning serving 
society which form a key part of their professional identity, resulting in a weakening of the customer 
concept’. In this way, planners are both agents and mediators of neoliberalism at their local institutional 
scale, uneasy to abandon their professionalism but governed towards enacting practice change/reform.  
 
The Coalition encouraged these changes through policy tools that provided financial incentives for LAs 
in exchange for local development (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). The introduction of the New Homes 
Bonus (NHB) and partial localisation of Non-Domestic (Business) Rate Retention both offered LAs 
financial incentives to encourage delivery of more houses and employment development respectively. 
In the context of pro-development national policy, localism and austerity self-sufficiency reforms, these 
additional policy tools placed further pressure on LPAs to change their practice culture towards growth. 
The PMs were acutely aware that such incentives were designed to exert central control and modify 
local practices and conducts through ‘bribery and blackmail’ towards supporting the national agenda: 
 
“So they [central government] have done an awful lot of work trying to encourage us [local 
authorities] and…that’s bribery if you like, we are being bribed into doing it, but we are also 
being blackmailed into doing it [promoting development]” (SP3, Urban, South East). 
 
“[T]here is an awful lot of things going on and change. So we are having to change the way 
in which we are sort of conducting ourselves in terms of overall corporate changes and 
moving towards a business model that is far more growth orientated in terms of the way 
in which we operate. When maybe two years ago we might have said to certain 
developments, “not a chance”, and now the stance is “why not?”” (SP6, Rural, South East). 
 
In these cases, the previous approach based on planning restraint has been ‘layered’ over, although not 
completely replaced, by a pro-development practice culture; which support the New Institutionalism 
theory conceptualisations of ‘sedimentation’ (Clifford, 2016). They also highlight how the ‘conduct’ of 
local agents are shaped to towards certain governing ends as outlined in governmentality theory. As 
well as post-political theory claims for ‘a conscious and deliberate role for planners in not just supporting 
but also rolling out and helping constitute strategies of depoliticization…[and] the changing role of 
planners from a progressive function, underpinned by agreed values and an apolitical self-perception, 
to a narrower, partisan, pro-growth and development sensibility’ (Allmendinger, 2017, p. 192). Each of 
these theoretical explanations are viewed here from a broader structure-agency theory perspective 
dependent on national-local state power relations and driven by the goals of neoliberal ideology.  
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The findings here suggest that austerity has helped to accelerate practice culture changes within LPAs. 
Paragraph 187 of the NPPF states that ‘Local planning authorities should look for solutions rather than 
problems, and decision-takers at every level should seek to approve applications for sustainable 
development where possible. Local planning authorities should work proactively with applicants to 
secure developments that improve the economic, social and environmental conditions of the area’. This 
outlines the government’s expectations for local planning and provides the (externalised) policy logics 
being transferred onto planners. It can thus be suggested that whilst LPAs have been receiving national 
policy messages along these lines for some time now, the ‘crisis’ politics of austerity has internalised 
these logics and prioritised the need for such culture changes to a much greater extent than previously. 
 
In effect, austerity seems to have been a much more effective ‘roll-out’ neoliberal programme of reform 
for achieving culture change than target/audit regimes attempting to embed performance, competition, 
collaboration and growth or cruder ‘roll-back’ deregulatory reforms trying to bypass LGs altogether. 
These findings are potentially enhanced by the conceptual insights of governmentality theory, through 
which governments in advanced liberal democracies can be more effective at achieving their goals of 
governing by modifying the conduct of individual agency to their desired ends (Foucault et al., 2008, 
Dean, 2010). The Coalition managed to download the personal responsibility for ‘deficit reduction’ onto 
LAs and individual actors, as a highly successful form of (neoliberal) political statecraft (Gamble, 2015).   
 
Some attempts to categorize LA responses to austerity are emerging in the practice/applied literature. 
In their case study of local government financial resilience in Austria, England and Italy, Barbera et al. 
(2017) demonstrate how the interaction of environmental conditions and vulnerabilities produced 
different patterns of financial resilience over time. They classified these different LG responses to 
austerity into three groupings, ‘self-regulators’, ‘constrained or reactive adapters’ and ‘contented or 
powerless fatalists’ (p. 675-679). This research does not explicitly adopt a typology of local management 
agency responses, but does also suggest three potential groupings, ‘enthusiastic reformers’, ‘reluctant 
pragmatists’ and ‘counter-conduct agents’ that can provide a useful heuristic to be further developed. 
One reason for this is that regardless of the personal and political beliefs of individual PMs, these were 
effectively moot in terms of the necessary financial responses needed across the board. In other words, 
LAs in England have to operate within the context of ‘austerian realism’ (Davies and Thompson, 2016). 
 
Furthermore, Fuller (2017) highlights that austerity institutions have been characterised by high staff 
turnover through restructuring programmes, with those strongly aggrieved having voluntarily left, 
being forced out of the council or eventually complying with the new agendas; “[t]he construction of 
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austerity institutions is interwoven with significant management and officer turnover following the 
restructuring of the council. This can be situated within the context of long-term pro-business 
management models seeking to foster entrepreneurship and innovation, and organisation initiatives 
designed to indirectly reduce expenditure, as well as promote revenue-generating activities” (p.757). 
This suggests either the removal or strategic management of those ‘not on board’ with the corporate 
agenda and with ‘outdated’ values/attitudes to those needed to cope with ‘contemporary’ planning.  
 
In his case study of Edinburgh City Council, Inch (2017) demonstrates how such planners that were 
reluctant towards the ‘necessary’ practice culture changes were characterised as ‘dinosaurs’. In other 
words, planners that expressed reservations to the logics of austerity were ‘particularised’ (Žižek, 2000) 
as the misunderstanding of a small group of out-of-touch individuals within the profession; effectively 
presenting and containing such views as marginalised positions, rather than constitutive of underlying 
and widespread concerns about the impacts of austerity. This suggests that power is used to promote 
the discourses around the need for change by the council leadership whilst also seeking to downplay 
or displace dissent within council staff through means outlined in post-political theory. However, there 
was only tentative and partial evidence to support such claims to internal LA power relations in this 
research, given the predominant focus on structures rather than on individuals or institutions per se.  
 
Broadly, the PMs with the most positive accounts can be characterized as ‘enthusiastic reformers’ that 
strongly embraced the government agenda and were already working to get the best outcomes in the 
new context of austerity localism. The more sceptical PMs could be termed ‘reluctant pragmatists’; 
they accepted the need to respond to austerity through growth, efficiency and retrenchment, but were 
more critical of the logics of austerity as a strategy that could be used to improve public services. Finally, 
there was little evidence here for PMs that could be termed ‘counter-conduct agents’ based on 
governmentality theory (Dean, 2010). Again, this is likely because after dealing with austerity for six 
years since 2010, any resistance had become weakened and less vocal as the ‘reality’ of austerity had 
become discursively/institutionally embedded within LAs  (Davies and Thompson, 2016, Clifford, 2016).  
 
Whilst a more developed typology/categorisation would undoubtedly provide a useful tool for further 
conceptualising planning agency under austerity, this was not possible in this study beyond the three 
simplified roles presented here. Further research taking the individual or institutional level as its main 
empirical focus may serve to develop such models and expand our theorisations in such areas. However, 
there is the danger of overly-simplifying or pigeonholing PMs into ‘boxes’ that fail to fully reflect the 
complexities of their professional backgrounds, understandings, motivations, values, relationships, 
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contextual settings, and so on. The findings here support the literature that LPA E&Rs to national 
reforms are heavily contextualised as they are mediated by local agency, meaning that the LG cases 
have not explicitly been developed into a typology as this may strip them of their local contextuality. 
The same challenges therefore apply when trying to categorise planning agency without taking account 
of these institutional and structural forces. An academic ‘model’ forms a simplified presentation of the 
world to aid understanding, but they can also mask as much as they reveal depending on the level of 
analysis being undertaken. Therefore caution has been taken here not to claim any clear classifications.  
 
This follows Guba and Lincoln (1982) that ‘it is virtually impossible to imagine any human behaviour that 
is not heavily mediated by the context in which it occurs. One can easily conclude that generalizations 
that are intended to be context free will have little that is useful to say about human behaviour’ (cited 
in Farthing, 2015, p. 84); and Gioia et al. (2013, p.16) that “the single most profound recognition in social 
and organizational study is that much of the world with which we deal is essentially socially 
constructed…Studying social construction processes implies that we focus more on the means by which 
organization members go about constructing and understanding their experience and less on the 
number or frequency of measureable occurrences”. Nonetheless a number of LPA E&Rs here were cross-
cutting, such as efficiency, retrenchment, capacity/resilience, commercialisation and self-sufficiency.   
 
Returning to the empirical data, drawing on the two most extreme examples for one of the strongest 
enthusiastic reformers and the closest offering to a counter-conduct agent demonstrates the scope of 
the debates around the impacts of austerity presented within the 40 LPA cases. As one of the strongest 
examples of an enthusiastic reformer, SP20 understood austerity as the ‘creative’ power driving 
innovation and as the government employing ‘nudge theory’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) to modify 
local practices. Moreover, they claimed they were already following this path, and that austerity has 
only accelerated these trends rather than acting as the overall or single driver motivating local reform:   
 
“It pains me to say it really, but Eric Pickles, the bête noir of local government, was not 
wrong on a lot of this stuff. That there was, I wouldn’t say fat, but there were things that 
we could change to offset the loss of funding…So forcing change, because if you don't you 
go out of business or you are making people redundant, actually that's been incredibly 
creative…[Austerity] was more nudge theory, that they [Government] haven't taken all the 
money away. They have taken a certain amount, and we have been willing to respond and 
innovate, not complain about it, but get on and make changes…What austerity has forced 
us to do, whether it's cuts to public funding, has driven innovation absolutely. It's made us 
think beyond the box…but austerity was not, hasn't been the driver for any of this stuff at 
all” (SP20, Mixed, South East, emphasis added).  
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This finding was unexpected and suggests that consecutive planning reforms promoting efficiency and 
business approaches had already taken hold in a number of well-resourced LPAs, such that austerity 
served as an additional catalyst. However, whilst public sector/planning reforms in the UK have been 
pushing in this direction for some time, austerity was generally expressed as the main driver for changes 
across the board in the other cases. Perhaps more importantly, such cases highlight that whilst some 
LPAs are being ‘nudged’ in this direction by government, others are being pushed into such a model.      
 
In contrast, SP13 was the most critical of the austerity reforms, and hence the closest offering to a 
‘counter-conduct agent’ by providing a reflective critique on privileging financial savings and income 
generation over the more fundamental values and costs of planning. They explained that previously the 
council accepted that although planning services generated an income, it still needed to be heavily 
subsidised because of the nature of the service. Whereas the emphasis has shifted onto how to increase 
planning services revenues, with planning management now having an annual ‘income target’ that is 
significantly above what the department can typically generate per annum. SP13 argued that such a 
target was ‘crazy’ because it goes beyond their control to influence local development and fees to that 
extent. For them, the general implication of austerity was a shift to an overly financial focus of planning:  
 
“[T]he general implication, I think, of austerity…is probably too much focus on the financial 
side, from my perspective. And I think arguably some authorities are possibly in this position 
already, but you could soon get into the position of just trying to simply exist as cheaply as 
possible and ultimately, at the end of the day, what is the point? Why are we here? And it 
is that kind of, ‘You may as well not exist if that’s the MO’, because there is a reason why 
we are here and there is a cost to it [planning services]” (SP13, Urban, East Midlands).  
 
These more critical accounts were far detached from the positive framings of enthusiastic reformers. 
In contrast SP27, for example, presented the commercialisation agenda as an opportunity for “making 
sure the local planning authority is seen as a supporter of growth and helps developers and investors to 
achieve what they want, rather than being seen as regulatory tick this policy box”; as part of a wider 
culture shift towards “more of a focus on the customer and what we deliver” that was already underway 
and only “accelerated by the austerity agenda” (Major Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber). The empirical 
findings here demonstrate the differences in understanding and responses, but further research would 
be valuable for determining what impacts these different types of situated planning management 
(agency) have for specific outcomes, such as the number of permissions granted, percentage saving 
targets achieved, use of commercial services, new revenues generated, staff turnover/well-being, etc.    
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SP9, a PM working for a borough council in the West Midlands, provided another enthusiastic reformer 
account of the necessary “culture changes” that they had overseen in the years following austerity. This 
account was typical of the type of ‘positive’ culture change the enthusiastic reformer were attempting 
to foster within their planning departments across the LPA cases. For SP9, the economic development 
potential of the Planning and Development Management service led them and the council to initiate a 
strong push to be “an open door for developers to encourage development and to give a welcome, as 
well as work towards a ‘yes’”. This was to counter the long-standing “bad reputation” the council held 
concerning development, leading to a transformation process with the aim to “change the culture of 
our approach”. The interesting point here is that whilst austerity was not the “original motivation” for 
culture change, which was stated as the LPA having a ‘bad reputation’ for supporting development, 
budget pressures acted as the catalyst for promoting such change. This suggests that it is harder to 
ignore or resist the calls for reform and culture change under the ‘crisis’ conditions of austerity than 
during the ‘good times’, even if the same messages for efficiency and growth were still being promoted.   
 
SP9 explained that the situation had developed within the department because case officers were being 
heavily criticised by elected members and the local community, leading them to feel “beleaguered and 
undervalued”. In response, the transformation process emphasised the importance of getting to a ‘yes’ 
for a development; “because that was the prime principle of planning to say yes unless there were very 
good planning reasons for saying no, and to work positively with planning agents and applicants towards 
that end. To give a service in other words”. SP9 echoes the NPPF presumption in favour of sustainable 
development as the “prime principle of planning” and expresses New Public Management logics by 
explaining the rationale that “that service was being paid for through the planning fees, so there was 
an expectation there that we should be delivering positively” (SP9). This could potentially be explained 
by their previous employment experience working in the private sector as well as for councils, although 
it also potentially highlights the synergies between budget and policy reforms to foster culture changes.      
 
Reflecting on the success of this transformation within their planning department, SP9 believed the 
approach had ‘largely worked’; albeit with some ‘backslide’ over the last year fostering the need to 
‘keep momentum going’ against “the human nature for people to revert to type”. This evaluation was 
based on planning agents feeling that “there had been a considerable change for the positive in the way 
in which we approached things”, which was understood as “a real measure of success” for the council. 
The ‘positive’ culture change that SP9 was attempting to embed internally within their department, and 
demonstrate externally to developers and planning agents, was clearly expressed as supporting 
development; “I’m a great believer in being positive about development…people want to put their 
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money where they know it is going to be successful, and if it is too difficult, or they have not got a warm 
welcome, then why would they bother?”. Here local planning agents had influenced practice changes 
by stressing that a ‘welcome approach’ was a key developer consideration, which further “reinforced 
the fact that we should be heading down that pro-development route” (SP9). This supports Gunn and 
Hillier (2014) that external actors, in this case local planning agents, play a role in mediating LPA reforms. 
 
Returning to the example of the council attempting to set up a ‘planning school of excellence’ (to rent 
out core services and undertake work on behalf of other LAs) provides insight into the leadership 
challenges to embed culture change. Here the challenge is that PMs have to promote a commercial 
model, which ‘makes sense’ as a response to austerity at the senior management and corporate level, 
to their staff that are reluctant and not accustomed to working in such commercial and flexible ways:  
 
“It is really interesting [renting out resources], but although at senior level and as managers 
we can see that is a real positive, because instead of just having to keep on cutting posts 
we can try and develop a more commercial model that helps to pay, to us that makes sense; 
but for the staff who are used to working in a certain way, to staff who are not used to 
doing that, they are like, “Well, no, I work for [Council A]. Why do I want to go and process 
a planning application for [Council B]?” (SP27, Major Urban, Yorkshire and the Humber). 
 
The counter-case was made, however, that whilst planning resources and specialist staff could often 
be maintained within large urban authorities, and therefore could potentially be rented out, this does 
not necessarily mean that their surrounding rural areas, which would most likely be in need of these 
resources at certain peak times, could actually afford to pay for these services from larger authorities:    
 
“[W]e have got an urban design and heritage specialist, because of the city scale we 
operate I can still afford to pay for that…so no I’ve not needed to do that [share specialist 
staff]. Who knows, in the future? But most I find are like North Somerset, I can use them as 
an example, they have got nobody anyway, and they have got no money to buy it even if I 
said, “Well do you want to pay for two days of [planning staff]” (SP36, Urban, South West). 
 
There was some evidence here to suggest that PMs regarded it as their role to get their staff ‘on board’ 
with the broader council corporate agenda for growth. This had to be achieved through explaining that 
planning services had changed, particularly increasing in importance within the overall council, and that 
as a result a different approach was required to support development as a means to foster growth:  
 
“[W]e need town planning, and we certainly need it in today’s market because we need 
more properties to be built; and there are planners, I mean I have had heated discussions 
with some of my own planners here because, you know, some of them just regard their role 
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in life to prevent development…and I think our planners here now realize that we have to 
build and we have to develop” (SP3, Urban, South East).  
 
“Now I’m a planner by profession, but I cause a few concerns with my planning policy 
colleagues because I tend to take some different views on land use and things like that from 
time to time; because I’m here to do planning, but I’m also here to get investment, and jobs 
and those things” (SP37, Major Urban, North West). 
 
These findings are corroborated by Anna Rose, president of the Planning Officers Society. She explains 
business development skills are becoming increasingly more relevant and that this is “a completely new 
thing for local government to see a planning authority as a business” (Planning, Issue 2044, p. 18). From 
this perspective, commercially-minded planners must now demonstrate a sharper emphasis on treating 
customers with respect and showing empathy and understanding towards their business needs to win 
them over through planning services. Such changes raise questions around the skills that are considered 
most valuable within the planning profession going forward, with economic and business knowledge, 
such as around development viability, potentially becoming more prized by LPAs under austerity.   
 
SP6 provides a ‘case study’ of the most innovative commercial strategy found in the 40 LPA cases. As a 
Director responsible for Planning Services and working for an affluent rural authority in the South East, 
they represented the strongest example of the innovation and leadership necessary to develop a 
commercial and customer-focused approach that could both recover the costs and make a profit from 
planning services. In an effort to make efficiencies and save costs, they conducted an analysis that found 
the council was spending over £600 determining average household applications when they only 
generate a fixed fee of £152 set by central government. From this, they implemented a ‘systems review’ 
based on the need to understand the “true costs of planning” and to make “the system fit the fee” 
determined by the government. The first step, and one of the most difficult barriers in creating a leaner 
system, was overcoming the “expectation culture”, whereby parish councils and communities would 
expect constant updates from the council on all planning matters rather than using the Planning Portal 
website. This suggests that austerity-driven ‘cultural change’ has to progress first before more material 
changes are enacted, or in Peck’s terms ‘[b]udget cuts…may prefigure structural reforms’ (2012, p. 640).    
 
The case of SP6 demonstrated that the role of the Chief Executive was critical in the transformation 
process; through continually pushing for greater efficiency and speed in the average application process, 
supported by the increasing interest of the council leadership in planning services for generating savings 
and revenues. These findings and other recent studies demonstrate the progress towards addressing 
the previous concerns raised by Geddes and Sullivan (2011) that ‘leadership, specifically ‘local political 
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leadership’…[i]s a neglected but significant element of local governance and neoliberalization’ (p.391). 
It also highlights the need for more research on institutional and cultural change within planning from 
an agency perspective which could not be addressed fully within this broader study of LPA austerity.  
 
SP6 made clear that these council leadership and management concerns emphasised the customer’s 
rather than the council’s time, and the need to get to a ‘yes’ quickly. This was achieved through 
developing an algorithm that could determine whether an application meets all the basic criteria to 
make a provisional decision within 20 minutes. The need to reduce costs and simplify the average minor 
planning application process was contrasted with the more important complex major applications for 
large housing developments. This was based on the understanding that energy and resources should 
be focussed on these because they have the most impact on the physical local community and actually 
generates substantial money for the council. This was framed in terms of the need to “differentiate the 
business services”. This strategy to reform planning services involved creating a district-wide Local 
Development Order (LDO) for household applications, which meant that as long as the applicant had 
certified the conditions and informed their neighbours, the council would process it within 10 days (only 
taking two in practice). However, the LDO strategy was only the first phase of the new business model.     
 
Following on from this, SP6 explained that the second phase involved the council commissioning six 
consultants to process minor applications on their behalf in order to provide more choice, speed up the 
system and gain a commissioning fee. As a result of these strategies, “so our headline figures are we 
have gone from a net cost of £1.5 million in the DM [Development Management] area to around a 
£400,000 surplus”. This case presents an example of how LPAs can move past reactively responding to 
austerity cutbacks towards proactively getting ahead of the total removal of the RSG in 2020 and self-
sufficiency. The final step focussed on selling their approach to other councils to assist them with their 
efficiency and cost savings; “hopefully we will get other local authorities that are interested in learning 
from us and paying us to help them do it; so that is part of the business model, we get them to pay for 
what we have spent a lot of time and energy doing to help them get the same efficiency” (SP6). Whilst 
this is potentially a positive step for LPAs sharing resources, it also highlights their uneven capacities.     
 
Overall, such new business models demonstrate evidence for opportunism by larger and more affluent 
LPAs to capitalise on the widespread need for financial efficiencies across the sector, particularly for 
those councils in ‘a spiral of decline’ that now have fewer planners and an inefficient operating system. 
As a clear LPA front-runner in commercial and cost saving innovations, SP6 exemplifies the emerging 
strategies taken by strongly resourced authorities that are seeking to rent their resource capacity, 
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specialisms and knowledge to surrounding councils for a fee comparable to planning consultancies. The 
rationale for these new business models were expressed as new ‘opportunities’; “Now for us that could 
be an opportunity, because maybe we could run their planning service for them. So our view is, ‘Well 
why couldn’t we be a qualifying body in someone else’s district and do their business, if they are a poorly 
performing authority, why wouldn’t we pick up the slack as an opportunity?”” (SP6). Such examples of 
practice culture changes and service reorganisations potentially provide a preliminary window into how 
local authority planning could be funded, designed, operated and delivered in the future in England. 
 
These findings suggest that PMs have a significant role in fostering pro-development culture change, 
getting their staff ‘on board’ and shaping local responses and reconfirmations of austerity governance. 
This supports Fuller (2017) that austerity decision-making was concentrated within the corporate 
management level of the LG; and the key role for ‘senior management to constantly reconfirm austerity 
institutions’ (p. 759), specifically through formulating ‘discursive institutions’ based on market and 
bureaucratic values that seek to ‘guide the daily practices of officers’ (p. 761). This is consistent with 
the literature that responsibility for governing austerity has been devolved from national to local level 
actors to implement the reforms (Peck, 2012), signifying the role of PMs as agents in neoliberalisations. 
 
Following Gardner (2017), these results highlight that ‘[u]nderstanding differentiation in the objectives 
and motivations of change agents is especially useful in a local government context, because it takes 
into account that actors will have differing levels of power and divergent motivations or political 
positions, affecting their desire to promote change or maintain stability’ (p. 153). They therefore make 
an empirical contribution that can provide a potential foundation for future research into the ways that 
austerity is practiced, resisted or reproduced by different agents within LAs and their planning services.  
 
These findings also suggest that practice culture changes were being developing into material changes 
to the departmental planning service structures. The rationale behind these material changes to LPAs 
were both to produce efficiencies through service integration and to ensure that such services were 
more effectively tailored to the needs of their customers and business clients. It is argued that these 
strategies represent the ‘material’ dimensions to austerity that build on and reinforce the ‘discursive’ 
practice culture changes towards ‘positive’ pro-development planning as the main objective of reforms. 
 
Here SPs highlighted the increasingly important role of restructuring departments to save resources, 
take a more joined-up strategic approach to economic strategy and provide a business-focussed service:     
 
226 
 
“[T]he teams much more multi-disciplinary; more a sort of crossover between Development 
Management, Planning, and Regeneration. So they all sit together as one team now, and I 
think that has been very successful. It is trying to encourage people with different skill sets 
working more across the board…So inevitably as resources diminish and as the service gets 
tighter, the principle is what you don’t want to be doing is working in silos…there are still 
too many local authorities that have a local planning team that is split, with one team doing 
the development plan, another team doing the economic strategy, another team that does 
planning management, and they never talk to each other. They just do their thing, and it is 
just not a coherent way of going about business” (SP11, Major Urban, West Midlands). 
 
“So when I’m talking to developers, I can say “tell me what you need and I can get a meeting 
with”, because they are all under my remit. I can say, “I can deliver you your highways, I 
can deliver your strategic planning, I can deliver your development management. I have 
got education jobs for skills, so if you want training and access to colleges I can do that”. 
And then we are very, very clear about it all, and how it is all about growth. So all they are 
set up to deliver is growth, and to support developers to deliver growth; because that is 
pretty much how they are all prepped, because that is what gets us income, and that is 
what enables us to deal with the [budget] challenges” (SP29, Major Urban, North West).  
 
“So we need to be marrying up our planning strategy with our economic strategy much 
more closely; with a view to the fact that we are planning for business growth, and with 
that comes new development and business rates, we are generating money that will come 
to the council for us to spend” (SP30, Rural, North West). 
 
These findings support the new institutionalism theory outlined by Hay (2006) that ‘ideational change 
invariably precedes institutional change’ (See also Gardner, 2017). This indicates that such material 
institutional changes (physical service restructuring) within LPAs become prioritised only after the 
discursive (practice culture) changes that drive them have become embedded within individual agency. 
Albeit one important caveat being that the immediate efficiencies and reductions in the early stages of 
austerity (circa 2010-2013) were predominantly concerned with ‘surviving’ the budget reductions, 
rather than the more deliberate attempts to create integrated and commercial planning services during 
the later stages of austerity (circa 2014-2016) observed in this research. Whilst more supporting 
evidence is needed, one potential explanation is that institutional structures are more ‘fixed’ and always 
playing catch up with the latest reforms and discourses (governing rationales) that shape agency. The 
findings here suggest practice culture changes have been internalised within LA council leadership and 
planning management, which have gradually been translated into restructurings for planning services.    
 
Such strategies for departmental reorganisation primarily aimed to provide a more integrated planning 
services with a sharper focus on delivering development to raise incomes in response to austerity. Such 
changes were also justified by the need to develop a service approach that could counterbalance the 
tendency for different built environment professionals to ‘pull in different directions’ when they work 
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independently. This was based on the rationale that a Highways officer has a different professional 
background, skill set, and development priorities to that of a Strategic Planner, or a Development 
Management or an Economic Growth officer. In this context, SP29 understood their role as the strategic 
management needed to coordinate the work of different professionals within the council to ensure 
that the sum of these different views on a specific development all add up to the ‘whole’ of growth:   
 
“They [built environment professionals] are all looking for slightly different things out of 
the development in their kind of pure professional area of expertise, so my role is to bring 
all those people together and say, “Actually we have got a single outcome that we want, 
which is how to get this development up and running”. So your role, from your professional 
area, is to deliver that single outcome; and that means everyone is aiming in the same 
direction, and it is all about getting growth and development, and making sure that we are 
making joined-up decisions” (SP29, Major Urban, North West). 
 
Here planning services had been restructured to create a single ‘functional service area’ that brought 
together ‘strategic housing’, ‘strategic growth’, ‘economic growth’, ‘town centres’, and ‘sustainability’ 
to work much more closely when making decisions and delivering services. These findings suggest 
tentative evidence for a shift towards a new role for planning directors and managers, one where their 
main role is as the strategic coordinator of different planning service areas and professional actors 
towards the shared objective of supporting development. Such a model means they play a more 
strategic role coordinating local stakeholders and the different built environment professionals within 
the council to “see the bigger picture” and ensure the service is “connecting all those dots together” to 
provide a more integrated service (SP29). This supports the role of planners as ‘facilitators’, ‘mediators’ 
and ‘enablers’ between different stakeholders developed in Collaborative planning theory (Healey, 
1997a, Innes and Booher, 1999). They also echo the third-wave ‘network’ and ‘joined-up’ governance 
approaches outlined in the public management reform literature (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017). Such 
changes have been advocated through government reforms in the UK since the 1990s and go beyond 
simply being developed as responses to austerity; however, it is likely cuts accelerated these processes.      
 
The overall rationale for restructuring and merging related planning and development departments was 
the expressed need to provide a better service to developers that is efficient, integrated and proactive:  
 
 “So I think putting the three together [Housing, Regeneration and Planning Services] gives 
us an opportunity to shape things. I will also have some highways in there, which again is 
helpful, because when you are talking to developers and others what you need to be able 
to offer them effectively is a one-stop discussion about all of the issues. So you are not 
sending them off here, there and everywhere” (SP37, Major Urban, North West). 
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These restructuring strategies were also expressed as positive changes for dealing with capacity and 
resilience challenges going forward. The value of this approach was expressed as the ability to create a 
more interdisciplinary planning department team, where staff have a wider skill set and can therefore 
work across a number of different service areas when necessary. SP11 explained that a development 
management officer could help with a planning policy document to unlock growth on a particular site, 
or regeneration staff could be used to process planning applications. The rationale was expressed as 
developing greater capacity within the department; “so peak time for planning management you have 
the capacity there to put people in to help that out, or on the Local Plan or whatever, you can get people 
to support. So it is a good future approach really” (SP11). These practice changes towards integrated 
departments and cross-trained staff were also seen as advantageous in terms of providing PMs with 
greater flexibility to manage large projects and peak workflows and more resilience for budget planning:   
 
“[I]n terms of future budget planning…delivering something like a Local Plan for example is 
a big, big push for a number of years. Then you wouldn’t do one again. So what you will 
tend to see is teams expand and contract, to reflect major projects or pieces of work like 
that. And you may buy in extra staff or have temporary contracts and things. So you want 
committed staff, but also you need flexibility to deal with the financial pressures” (SP17, 
Urban, South East).  
 
These planning services reorganisations have also been largely implemented to respond to austerity by 
reducing posts and employment costs for the council. They also form part of a wider trend in the way 
planning services have been combined under one senior level manager or ‘strategic director’ to also 
include Regeneration, Housing and Economic Development services. These more subtle changes in the 
employment titles, remit and expected roles of planning managers potentially provide insights into the 
trajectory of local authority and planning management going forward as the ‘rules of the game’ change.    
 
Finally, one unanticipated finding was that PMs found recruitment one of their key practice challenges 
in this period of austerity; however, not necessarily because of a lack of resources but the actual 
number of available planners within the public sector system and coming through planning schools. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest this recruitment challenge was the case regardless of whether the 
LPA was high or low value in terms of its economy and resources. Some cases provided anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that the prestige of working for ‘a big urban authority’ or within a ‘scenic rural 
setting’ as counter-reasons for why they have been able to attract planning candidates to their LG area:     
 
“Interesting at one of the DCN [District Council Network] meetings I went to down in 
London a few weeks ago, when we were talking about the change to fee setting and those 
sorts of arrangements. There was a rhetoric coming from the civil servant guy that was 
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leading this conversation saying, “We have been told more resources are needed, and you 
seem to be telling me that you don’t need money”. And a couple of us pointed out, “Yeah, 
actually you need to look at what we are saying”. The resourcing issue that we have faced 
as a council, actually for most of us in the room, and there was probably 30 or 40 of us 
there, it has not been a resourcing issue of not being able to put funding into the planning 
service. The resource issue is actually there is often not the people to bring into the sector, 
as a consequence of closing down planning schools, there is a consequence of cutting back 
on training, there is a consequence of growth booming in other sectors and people moving 
about…The resource issue is not necessarily one of cash, it is one of getting somebody to 
sit on the chair. We have expanded our services” (SP30, Rural, North West).  
 
This unexpected finding suggests that for district councils facing less severe financial budget gaps, the 
issue of capacity in planning services was about more than funding. In these cases, the deeper problems 
around planning capacity resulted from the broader impacts of austerity on LG and the wider public 
sector. Concerns were raised that austerity had devalued the public sector, making LG planning far less 
attractive to potential candidates than the opportunities in the private sector. Smaller councils also 
expressed concerns that they could not compete with larger LAs in their region for fees and lifestyle.  
 
Moreover, a significant number of older and more experienced senior planners had left the profession 
following the budget and staff cutbacks in this period, exacerbating these recruitment challenges. This 
raised practical concerns about the loss of organisational memory, tacit knowledge, specialist skills and 
experience within public sector planning. It can thus be suggested that the underlying problems are 
more complex with deeper practice challenges around capacity facing the majority of LPAs than simply 
pressures of funding/resources and the ability to compete with private sector planning employment. In 
this context, the most common response to recruitment and skills challenges was by far the decision of 
LPAs to invest in ‘growing their own’ planners for the future with some also paying for university courses: 
 
“We are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit good quality planning staff now. One 
would have thought that post-recession there would be a lot of people who were maybe 
made redundant from the planning profession that wanted to come back in; but I don’t 
gain any impression that is the case. And, because private sector and larger local 
authorities are recruiting, it means district and borough councils like ours always come at 
the bottom of the pecking order. We can’t compete on the same salary levels or the 
conditions of service with the private sector and bigger local authorities; and that has 
always been the case and now is no different, but we have had to recruit posts once 
someone has left and have found that very, very difficult. You know the quality of applicants 
has been low and quite poor, and I don’t think it’s down to what our expectations are, i.e. 
that they are too high. I just think there is a papacy of good quality candidates that are 
prepared to come to an area like [locality]. So we are very much trying now to just grow 
our own and take a longer-term view and creating a career structure that allows good 
individuals to progress” (SP9, Mixed, West Midlands). 
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Taken together, these changes to practice cultures, professional roles and skills, material restructuring 
and recruitment go to the heart of the future of local authority planning and professionalism in England. 
On balance, the evidence suggests that more integrated, joined-up and cross-trained planning services 
and staff can be considered a positive innovation resulting from austerity pressures; particularly for the 
overall self-sufficiency agendas of local councils and the new range of positions and skills that are 
expected from both planners and managers. However, concerns that austerity has devalued the public 
sector (Bach, 2012), meaning that LG is a less attractive option for newly qualified planners, and the 
overwhelming corporate emphasis and reliance on a growth-dependent planning model, suggests the 
autonomy for planners to enact more traditional social and environmental goals may be undermined.  
 
5.4 Discussion  
 
Overall this chapter has attempted to present the reader with a range of PM experiences and responses 
to austerity within their LPA context, based on the empirical data collected from the 40 cases. The 
decontextualised analysis demonstrated the cross-cutting themes of practice culture changes towards 
commercialisation of LA practices to generate revenues in order to achieve financial self-sufficiency; 
whilst the contextualised analysis highlighted the importance of local structures, contexts and politics. 
The findings here support Bailey et al. (2015) and Hastings et al. (2015), that whilst efficiency measures 
initially proved to be effective responses to budget cuts in the early phases of austerity, these budget 
saving strategies became increasingly exhausted over time, with PMs arguing that further cuts would 
likely be ‘unsustainable’ in the future. Moreover, as the most achievable efficiency savings became 
exhausted, PMs were forced to consider alternative service delivery models and more radical 
innovations consistent with longer-term budget sustainability strategies. In the later stages of austerity 
(circa 2013-16), the only options that appeared available were advancing into new areas for commercial 
income generation or else face the political consequences of retrenchment. At the local government 
level, planning services were particularly susceptible to having their budget/resources reduced relative 
to other council services, but whilst also having more responsibility to deliver revenues through growth. 
 
One of the main empirical findings presented here was that planning departments have become more 
deeply embedded within the wider financial ‘self-sufficiency’ (economic prosperity) corporate agendas 
of their LA under austerity, and that this has taken the expression of increasing efforts to promote new 
forms of (growth-dependent) revenue generation and developing strategies for ‘commercialisation’. 
The overall argument presented here was that these conditions form a neoliberal ‘responsibilisation’ 
strategy (Hastings et al., 2015) that seeks to download responsibility from the national to local scale; 
and that whilst the resilience narrative of LG survival/adaptation seems to hold true thus far in response 
231 
 
to austerity (Shaw, 2012, John, 2014), the potential for a future ‘punctuated shift’ in local services 
(Gardner, 2017) and residualisation/marginalisation (Hastings et al., 2015) remain a significant threat. 
In this context, critical questions need to be asked regarding the (long-term) impacts of the emerging 
shifts to commercialised and self-sufficiency strategies for the future of LG and role of planning services.  
 
This shift towards ‘growth-dependent’ (or revenue-dependent) planning (Rydin, 2013) was the aim in 
all of the LPA cases, however, the ability for all councils to operate on this model was criticised. Indeed, 
the LAs that can be described as ‘high value’ (with respect to having various combinations of the key 
local characteristics of a high GVA and private sector investment, high council tax base, low population 
dependency costs, high development market interests, large public land holdings, and so on) were the 
most able to develop new revenue streams and innovative coping strategies for alternative service 
delivery models, and as a result were the least impacted by cutbacks. The opposite was generally the 
case for relatively ‘low value’ LAs that struggled to attract private sector investment and development 
on the grounds of weaker land market values, viability and other higher risk concerns. In other cases it 
was their tight administrative urban boundaries, high level of greenbelt or natural protected land, 
physical morphology or built environment and heritage that prevented large amounts of additional 
development and hence income being generated through planning fees, NHB, CIL, council tax, and so 
on. The findings here support the literature that the geography of austerity matches the pre-existing 
economic geography of England and that, rather than lifting-up weaker performing local economies, 
the sink or swim approach of austerity localism is further entrenching this uneven geography within 
England. This provides a critique of the neoliberal laissez faire approach to planning and development. 
 
Here the most significant implication of moving towards a commercialised growth-dependent planning 
model is that a pro-development approach becomes the only goal of planning, leaving environmental 
and social policy, and directing development to sustainable locations through ‘place-making’, as 
secondary concerns. Rydin (2013) argues that the problem with the growth-dependant planning model 
is that it often does very little for social and environmental objectives, or ‘just sustainability’, a situation 
that is exacerbated when such a model is applied universally across LPAs in England. Whilst growth-
dependent planning can be a workable model for specific contexts and projects, it should not be 
considered the only option. Other planning models should be utilised across different places and times 
alongside market delivery to achieve the best planning outcomes for all (Fainstein, 2010). It is in this 
context that planning commercialisation is potentially problematic, rather than being a priori in all cases. 
So whilst the long-term implications of the emerging and established LA responses to austerity are not 
entirely clear at this stage, the critical concern was developed that the significant pressures for growth-
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dependent revenue under austerity may mean this is elevated to priority status, potentially relegating 
traditional professional and ethical concerns with local democracy, social justice and the environment 
that have dominated planning theory literatures (Fainstein and DeFilippis, 2015, Allmendinger, 2017).       
 
Whilst such shifts towards more commercialised councils can be viewed as a positive for local self-
sufficiency, it should be noted that simply because LPAs are acting more commercially this does not 
mean that more development activity is actually taking place; rather it just means they are more reliant 
on such activity for self-sufficiency. Indeed, a number of the LPAs in this study that have attempted to 
adopt growth-dependent business models still fail to attract the necessary investment and cannot 
provide funding or infrastructure support to developers; instead then having to sell public land cheaply 
or waiving planning obligations. So the proposition is that a commercial approach by LPAs to support 
development is not the same thing as achieving investment and funding for or from that development. 
The SPs in this study highlighted how stalled major developments often just needed the seed funding 
for infrastructure, such as an access road or contamination works, to kick-start some projects. However, 
LPAs were often reliant on sub-national funding from LEPs, City/Growth Deals or Devolution to deliver 
such infrastructure to support growth, typically having very few local resources themselves to invest in 
projects and suffering from the wider lack of national funding available to support them under austerity.     
 
These findings also support the literature that LG corporate and senior management are the main 
actors tasked with the role of continuously reconfirming austerity institutions, through enactments of 
social control and coordination of market and bureaucratic values within the organisation that guide 
the daily practices of officers (Fuller, 2017). Whilst PMs were responsible for promoting and delivering 
practice culture and organisation changes within their department, either enthusiastically or reluctantly, 
they still rationalised their approaches around delivering for their locality and the public interest. This 
supports Harris and Thomas (2011) that there are now competing logics in the British Planning System, 
between ‘the logic of professional judgement exercised in the public interest typical since the 1940s, and 
the logic of performance targets and efficiency which has grown since the 1980s’ (Clifford, 2016). It also 
remains to be seen whether commercialised pro-development approaches and delivering the public 
interest will necessarily clash once these practices become more embedded within the planning system.  
 
Arguably the planning profession seems likely to attract people that would be uneasy or resistant to 
accepting such a pro-development framing for planning given their professional training and education 
within planning schools, which have been particularly influenced by collaborative planning theory over 
the past two decades (Healey, 1997a, Healey, 2003), along with long-standing traditions in the public 
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interest and environmental sustainability (beginning with public health and quality of life). Despite this 
conjecture, to have any significant scope to exercise agency, an LPA would have to have an up-to-date 
Local Plan with a demonstrable five-year land supply that also meets its objectively assessed need; a 
relatively sustainable financial settlement and asset base with healthy local revenues (that could afford 
legal challenge or resist financial incentives); prove the demonstrable harm of proposed development 
given the shift for the presumption in favour of sustainable development; have the specialist knowledge 
and skills to negotiate development viability necessary to provide adequate planning contribution; and 
have the support of their local community. In practice, the cases only met a few of these criteria in a 
mixture of various combinations. This meant that the prospects of planners at any level in LG resisting 
such changes were severely limited. In sum, the deck was stacked heavily against local planners, and 
elected members and communities, to enact any meaningful local determination that was counter to 
the national fiscal consolidation and planning growth agendas, despite the political rhetoric of localism. 
 
It is in this sense that by being forced into ‘making the system work’ through the powerful structures 
of national policy, localism and austerity, that local government planning practitioners have become 
the agents of their own neoliberal reform governing their conduct to new ends of efficiency and growth. 
Such changes to public planning practice cultures, professional roles and organisational restructuring 
that seek a more integrated, joined-up and cross-trained planning services and team can be considered 
positive innovations/opportunities resulting from austerity pressures; particularly for achieving local 
self-sufficiency and developing the new range of positions/skills that are expected from both planners 
and managers. However, they also raise fundamental questions about the future of the profession, and 
more research is need on the changes to institutions and individuals within local government planning.   
 
Eventually, as Peck (2012) argues, the combination of layering (sedimented) neoliberal externalizations, 
downloading strategies and austerity measures together present a fundamental challenge to urban 
local governance; ‘Neoliberalism operates as an ideological frame – one that defines, in effect, the 
politically tractable solution space from which ‘mainstream’ remedies can be sought. And where it is 
matched with advanced forms of externalization and down-loading (legacies, also, of earlier rounds of 
neoliberalization), the cost of austerity measures quickly cascade down to the state and local level, 
raising the real prospect of (local) state failure’ (p. 630-1). This brings us to the overall argument that 
whilst the planning reforms in the period 2010-2016 have built upon and extended earlier rounds of 
neoliberalisations in the English planning system, effectively embedding externalisations for efficiency, 
performance, responsibility and risk; the additional and simultaneous impacts of contemporary post-
crisis austerity on local authorities and planners has exacerbated deepening neoliberal internalizations.  
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The post-2010 reforms built on top of previous neoliberalisations of planning and local government, 
that served to force the neoliberal approach to planning forward by advancing/extending its influence 
on LPAs across England, and therefore can be seen as a continuation of a state-led neoliberal approach 
to planning that developed in the 1980s and continued to various extents by New Labour until 2010. 
However, what makes this period so important is the depth and scope of austerity being enacted at the 
same time as fundamental planning reforms to both national policy (NPPF) and scalar governance 
through localism/devolution. So whilst the approach of the Cameron-led Governments 2010-2016 does 
not mark a break from the neoliberal political economy that emerged in the 1980s, it does demonstrate 
a significant period of change that has challenged fundamentals as a ‘paradigm shift’ in public planning.  
 
Ironically, responsibility and risk are not experienced by elite political and corporate actors in the same 
way as those ‘empowered’ local actors that they are forced upon; the former attempt to offload costs 
and download responsibility for their actions, whilst claiming that the latter need to take more 
responsibility for their locality and themselves or else embrace the costs of economic and social failure. 
These are not the foundations of a planning system delivering ‘sustainable development’ or one that 
will drive economic growth outside of the core cities in England. These are the contradictory conditions 
of ‘creative destruction’ whereby neoliberalisation is sowing the seeds for the next ‘crisis’ by strengthen 
socio-economic inequality across the country, the long-term consequences of which are yet to be seen. 
 
This chapter has presented the empirical data on the experiences and responses of local government 
planning managers to the national austerity reforms enacted under the Cameron-led Coalition and 
Conservative Governments 2010-2016. It has presented practitioner evaluations of public planning 
under austerity (localism) in relation to LPAs across England. Now that the empirical findings have been 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5, the focus can now turn to presenting the conclusions to the research.    
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 
This research has presented empirical findings on how local authority planning managers in England 
have experienced and responded to the national planning reforms and austerity measures introduced 
under the Cameron-led Governments 2010-2016. This final conclusion chapter has three main sections; 
the first reviews the empirical findings to the research questions set out at the start of this project (6.1), 
the second reflects on the challenges and limitations of the study (6.2); and the third presents the 
researcher’s ‘final thoughts’ on the research (6.3). Together these bring this thesis to its conclusion.  
 
6.1 Research Questions and Closing Positions  
 
The purpose of this section is to summarise the empirical findings for each of the research questions 
underpinning the thesis and their relation to the theoretical framework that informed the approach:  
 
RQ1) In what ways have local planning authorities experienced, and responded to, the planning system 
reforms and policy deregulations introduced by the central government since 2010? 
 
Beginning with RQ1, the empirical data and findings can be summarised into four key messages. Firstly 
SPs viewed the principle of the NPPF as a positive attempt to simplify the planning system (something 
that the majority agreed was much needed); however, that in practice this ‘simplification’ led to 
increased policy uncertainty and greater challenges to planning professionalism from stakeholders as 
the planning system had become more flexible, interpretative and negotiable; Second LPAs and 
planners are in a weaker position to negotiate planning gains with developers on behalf of their 
communities’ post-2010 because of stronger national policy and development emphasis on viability 
considerations combining with the need for growth-dependent planning (Rydin, 2013) under austerity 
and more delivery incentive-based and competitive ‘tournament’ funding (Peck, 2012); Third the small 
potential pay-offs of piecemeal planning deregulations through permitted development rights that did 
deliver additional housing units were viewed as far outweighed by the harm such policies could cause 
to localities through poor design, loss of employment and challenges to plan-making (place-making); 
and fourth that the speed of the planning application process is a poor measures of planning 
performance when compared with the quality and sustainability of the new developments being 
produced. These practice-based criticisms revolved around professional, technical and public interest 
planning concerns, such as for sustainability, design and communities that need time to be properly 
addressed, particularly when dealing with major development projects that have a larger local impact.  
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Overall these findings support Ellis (2015) that national pro-growth policy and deregulations mean that 
planning is less powerful in relation to the market and so offers fewer opportunities for planners to 
make progressive interventions and counter the neoliberal reforms that seek to place growth, efficiency 
and speed above practice-based concerns with design, sustainability and public interest/obligations 
(professionalism). These national structures served to delineate/bound local planning agency and show 
the extent of power asymmetries between national and local government within the planning system.  
 
RQ2) What has localism meant in practice for local planning authorities and their relationships with 
local communities?  
 
In terms of RQ2, despite government claims that localism would ‘free the shackles on local government’, 
PMs expressed that in practice ‘actually existing’ localism had not heralded a radical shift in power from 
the central to the local scale, with both planners and councillors feeling they had less control over local 
development as localism was de facto secondary to the growth agenda (NPPF) in practice. Additionally, 
PMs understood community-level localism and neighbourhood planning as embodying ‘good principles’ 
for local empowerment but suffering from practical and political challenges; not least the potential to 
clash with the ‘strategic’ national housing and growth agendas and austerity cutbacks that had taken 
on renewed planning policy emphasis post-2010. They emphasised their difficult position as the middle-
ground between upholding national policy/agendas and attempting to meet the (diverse) needs of the 
local communities as walking the ‘tightrope between the NPPF and localism’. PMs expressed that this 
had caused a lot of distrust between their LPA and communities as the promises and mixed-messages 
of localism had to be explained and negotiated at the local scale. This was exacerbated by also being a 
time when a number of LG services were having to be ‘streamlined’ or removed in order to make 
financial savings, issues that also caused contention within and between LPAs as well as stakeholders.  
 
RQ3) What have national planning policy reforms and localism post-2010 meant in practice for the 
economic and collaborative approaches of LPAs to strategic planning and housing policy and delivery?  
 
In terms of RQ3, PM evaluations of the effectiveness of the shift from strategic planning under a 
regional governance framework to a localist economic governance approach based on LEPs and city-
regions was mixed and heavily dependent on LPA context (landscapes of antagonism, Newman, 2013). 
The PMs were less explicitly critical of the government claims for the need to shift to economic localism, 
most likely because the context of austerity and incentive-based funding meant that growth was the 
only option for some LPAs to secure self-sufficiency going forward. Although the PMs did express some 
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concerns about the potentially problematic disconnects between statutory land-use planning and 
economic strategies (Strategic Economic Plans) and between LPAs and LEPs. The Duty to Cooperate 
was also regarded as an ineffective tool for promoting cross-boundary collaboration under localism, 
with the findings showing that those with a history of (institutional) collaboration pre-2010 were the 
most likely to continue to make best use of the new system. It was also widely unclear what was 
expected with the phrasing ‘a duty to cooperate, not a duty to agree’ being commonplace. It is yet to 
be determined whether combined authorities and city regions can deal with these collaboration 
challenges between LPAs, particularly given the contention around housing allocations and greenbelt.  
 
By far the most contested policy reform in this period was the ‘localisation’ of housing policy and 
delivery to LPAs from the regional strategic level post-2010. It was strongly argued that planners do not 
control the delivery of housing, and that the problem is also developer’s business models that seek to 
exert control over housing supply and value and over-inflated landowner expectations to sell their land. 
At the more strategic level the point was frequently raised that strategic planning and housing policy in 
England needs a coherent national plan and structures to both deliver economic competitiveness and 
sustainable place-making. Here the examples of planning approaches across Western Europe were 
compared to the ‘laissez-faire’ and non-interventionist UK neoliberal growth model under localism. 
 
RQ4) In what ways have local planning authorities experienced, and responded to, the demands of 
austerity (urbanism/governance/localism) as imposed by central government since 2010?  
 
In terms of RQ4, the main finding here was that planning departments have become much more deeply 
embedded within the wider financial self-sufficiency and economic prosperity corporate agendas of 
their LG institution under austerity, which has predominantly taken the expression of increasing efforts 
by PMs to promote revenue generation and commercialisation strategies. This was most evident in the 
challenge of cross-subsidising across planning department functions, with planning policy and project 
work becoming more dependent on the overall demand and performance of the development 
management service as the main revenue generator, as well as reliance of areas that could be more 
easily adapted to fee charging such as pre-application services. SPs emphasised that what had changed 
under austerity was that now every council project needed to attract a fee to justify undertaking a piece 
of work and that everything must be predicated on a clear business case and economic uplift in the 
context of extreme financial constraint/margins and the legal requirement for LAs to set a ‘balanced’ 
budget (i.e. that planning services and projects now have to ‘follow the money’ to make things happen). 
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RQ5) What are the financial/budget and capacity/resilience pressures on planning services, and how do 
they relate to the impacts of austerity on local authorities (landscapes of antagonism) more generally?  
 
In terms of RQ5, the findings support the academic literature (Hastings et al., 2015, Bailey et al., 2015) 
that efficiency measures proved to be effective responses to budget cuts in the early phases of austerity, 
with SPs agreeing they were largely necessary to an extent; however, that these strategies became less 
effective over time (law of diminishing returns). As the achievable efficiency savings became exhausted, 
PMs were forced to consider alternative service delivery models and more radical innovations 
consistent with longer-term budget sustainability strategies or else face the political consequences of 
retrenchment in non-statutory/discretionary service areas. Across the board, the PMs stated that good 
efficiency savings had been made, however, the prospect of being forced into making further 
reductions would significantly impact their capacity/resilience going forward. This follows the literature 
that whilst the resilience narrative of LG survival/adaptation seems to hold true thus far in response to 
austerity (Shaw, 2012, John, 2014), the potential for a future ‘punctuated shift’ in local services 
(Gardner, 2017) and residualisation/marginalisation (Hastings et al., 2015) remains a significant threat.  
 
The findings also demonstrated that local geography, contexts, structures and politics play a key role in 
shaping how LPAs have experienced and responded to austerity; and the core role of the local economy 
and land markets, particularly private sector demand and investment, for LPA capacity to develop 
growth-dependent planning models. The implications are that without any regional or national 
redistribution mechanisms to support more ‘marginalised’ LPAs (e.g. weak local economies, high social 
costs, traditionally more dependent on government funding, public sector employment and welfare 
protections), they will fall further behind exacerbating uneven social-spatial development across 
England. This argument followed Berry (2016) that ‘the growth model supported by policy elites in the 
post-crisis period sustains patterns of wealth distribution similar to those which pertained in the pre-
crisis period, albeit with inequality arguably more pronounced as financial and property wealth remains 
largely intact while earnings are held down and redistributive mechanisms are withdrawn’ (p. 110). 
 
RQ6) To what extent have austerity logics been internalised or resisted by local authority planning 
managers? How have these austerity measures shaped LPA practice cultures and structures?  
 
Lastly, for RQ6 the findings highlight how PMs, through their senior role and relationships with the 
wider council leadership, are being forced into playing a role in the (re)production of austerity at the 
local scale. Whilst some PMs perceived and embraced the changes associated with austerity positively, 
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such as greater efficiency, innovation, self-sufficiency and a positive approach to development, others 
were more reluctant and concentrated on the necessity to respond to sustain the service, support 
growth and continue to meet the needs of their communities as best possible. Provisional evidence 
suggested that internalised/discursive practice culture changes towards delivering a pro-development 
customer service had been further developed by implementing material changes to the physical 
structures and functions of planning departments to respond to the demands of austerity and growth. 
 
Closing Positions  
 
These findings provide a perspective which indicates the normalisation of a planning system in a near 
constant state of (neoliberal) reform, one constantly grappling with new policy initiatives and the 
legacies of previous iterations. This presents an uncertain, destabilising and complex acting space for 
planning practitioners as well as for developers and local communities, a context which Parker et al. 
(2018) term ‘fragmentation’ and a cycle of ‘perma-reform’ of change in the English planning system. 
This project has provided some new insights into these ‘important’ but ‘poorly understood’ questions 
concerning ‘the types and understanding that local planning officers actually need in this environment’ 
and ‘how a fragmentary planning system is navigated in practice’ (Parker et al., 2018, p.7). This work is 
important because the primary goals of planning as an activity is a strategic and long-term assessment 
of land-use and societal needs now and in the future (Rydin, 2011); however, the uncertainty created 
by national policy-spatial-institutional reforms fosters a short-term pragmatic management approach 
as practitioners have to ‘relearn’ the rules of the game, potentially at the expense of attempts for 
sustainable development and integrated strategies prioritising strategic planning and public interest. 
This comes back to the PMs desire for more clarity on the national strategic planning and housing policy 
approach in England, codified in a coherent national plan and with appropriate (funding) structures to 
both deliver economic competitiveness and sustainable place-making over the medium to long-term.  
 
These findings also demonstrate that the LAs with the strongest antecedent economic sub-markets, 
public assets and net social tax bases have found it much easier to adapt to austerity conditions and 
pursue effective (commercialised) coping strategies. These LPAs have experienced negotiating fast-
paced and difficult budget and structural changes, but not the ‘organisational crisis’ that threatens 
planning departments within councils that have high social care and housing benefit costs and low 
development market demand to stimulate local investment, revenue and planning obligations. The LG 
capacity challenges being faced across England means that ‘geography matters’ when examining these 
reforms. Most worryingly is that austerity localism seems to be exacerbating the existing uneven 
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economic and social geography of England (Martin, 2015), as only the ‘strongest’ LPAs can adapt to the 
‘sink or swim’ conditions of austerity urbanism/governance (Peck, 2012). The findings also suggest that 
planning managers (and the council corporate leadership more widely) have become complicit in the 
production and reproduction of austerity at the local institutional level consistent with Fuller (2017) 
and are key (although not necessarily willing) agents in austerity governance at the local scale. These 
follow one of the main concerns in the literature that the growth revenue-dependent approach become 
the only goals of planning, leaving environmental and social policy, and directing development to 
sustainable locations through ‘place-making’, as secondary concerns in their practice (Rydin, 2013). 
 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research  
 
As with all research, there were a number of different theoretical lenses, methodological positions and 
research design approaches that could have been adopted and deployed to undertake research in this 
disciplinary area. The decisions that were made throughout followed the researcher’s specific readings 
of the literature and judgements based on their positionality and world view that values practice-based 
research through a neoliberal lens. However, a number of studies on the same area and conducted at 
the same time have taken different approaches. For example, in his case study of city government under 
austerity in England, Fuller adopts a ‘pragmatist sociology’ approach ‘to examine the construction and 
deployment of discursive institutions seeking to control the behaviour of actors, including reducing 
critique, with the intention of legitimising austerity programmes. Such discursive institutions establish 
semantic links between the discursive aims of those seeking to control and the pragmatics of the 
everyday lives of those subject to such institutions’ (2017, p.745). Similarly, Lowndes and Gardner (2016) 
investigate local governance changes under austerity through an institutionalist theoretical framework, 
whilst Peck (2012) examines austerity governance through neoliberal structural accounts and Gamble 
(2015) views austerity as a form of political ‘statecraft’. Likewise, contemporary research on localism 
has been undertaken using governmentality (Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015), democratic theory on 
collaboration and agonism (Parker et al., 2017a, Bradley, 2015) and post-political theory (Haughton and 
Allmendinger, 2013). It is argued that each of these different theoretical approaches adds strength to 
the wider literature by presenting a plurality of perspectives and explanations of practice. Again, this 
follows the researcher’s conviction that ‘there is no one planning theory that we can assimilate and take 
into practice. Instead, there are a range of competing ideas and theories that will, to greater or lesser 
degrees, correspond to our values and views of the world’ (Allmendinger, 2017, p. 27). In sum, there are 
a number of different ways that this research could have been conducted in the design of this study. 
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During the completion of this project a number of related research work in the planning literature have 
highlighted the increasing number and role of private consultants in the English planning system (Parker 
et al., 2018). In the UK, LG planning policies and practices have witnessed significant changes since 2010, 
with practitioners being pulled in different directions by austerity measures, the localism agenda and 
increased emphasis on housing supply and viability within the NPPF and associated deregulations such 
as permitted development rights. Taken together these changes have created a number of new practice 
challenges for public planners, which have increasingly been taken-up by the rise in private consultancy 
work and associated privatisation within the system (Parker et al., 2018, Linovski, 2018, Hurl, 2018).  
 
These studies mark an important avenue in future planning practice research; however, they only began 
to emerge during the closing stages of this project, and so one limitation is that this study could not 
benefit fully from their insights. Despite this, the findings here and elsewhere highlight that more work 
is needed on the impacts of privatisation and the related commercialisation of LPAs on the planning 
system and practices going forward. For example, Bel et al. (2018) examine inter-municipal cooperation, 
mixed public/private delivery and contract reversals as three alternatives open to local governments to 
help assist markets for public service delivery as a dynamic process and address a wider array of public 
goals beyond cost efficiency concerns. However, whilst this study and others emphasises wider changes 
in the system through the ‘commercialisation’ of English LPAs under austerity localism (See also Jones 
and Comfort, 2018), we should also be aware that Whitfield (2002) was writing about the ‘Impact of 
privatisation and commercialisation on municipal services in the UK’ at the turn of the 21st Century 
under New Labour, highlighting that these trajectories have longer histories than the post-2010 reforms.   
 
More research is needed to understand the long-term impacts of austerity on planners and planning 
services. Even if local planning authority funding and resources return in the medium term, which 
appears unlikely in the context of Brexit, the practice culture and organisational changes in the period 
2010-2016 may continue to shape practices over the long term. More attention also needs to be given 
to the claims and outcomes of planning reforms, particularly for how they reshape the planning 
profession, the boundaries between the local state and markets and the integrity of local democracy. 
 
The findings from the 40 LPA cases here support the literature that experiences and responses to 
reforms are heavily mediated by context; however, further research is needed on how local contexts 
are mediating austerity, localism and policy reforms to reshape planning practices at the fine-grained 
level. Such new work with a focus on ‘agency’ is necessary to understand how planning cultures are 
responding to these changing institutional and practice environments which is under-researched in the 
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literature (see Grange, 2014 and Inch, 2017). This would fit neatly with a number of the emerging and 
developing work on institutional changes within English planning authorities resulting from reforms. 
Whilst this research touched upon institutional change from a broad structural perspective, such 
professional agency accounts of institutional change would build on these findings. Despite these 
limitations, this is also a strength given that one of the core contributions of this project is that it is one 
of the first empirical qualitative ‘national’ study on planning and austerity reforms in England post-2010.   
 
Further research on state-led ‘neoliberalisations’ of planning are needed to evaluate the cumulative 
impact of reforms on the objectives and outcomes of local practices that have developed and waxed 
and waned under different political leadership since the 1970s. This may be particularly salient for the 
next decade, as Brexit threatens to remove a number of pieces of EU legislation and regulations for 
environmental protection and EU Structural Funding for social cohesion and regeneration in depressed 
economic regions. It is not clear that these international protections and funding will be taken up by 
the UK national government. It is also unclear whether English devolution will regain the momentum 
developing between 2014-16, a domestic issue that will be more important under a post-Brexit UK 
given the need to secure economic competitiveness beyond traditional trading partners in the EU. It 
therefore seems likely that these conditions of high practice uncertainty and fragmentation will only 
become further exacerbated under such undefined national and international political conditions. The 
May-led Government remains rooted within neoliberal ideology and has been largely overshadowed 
by Brexit. This is at the same time as the latest national policy changes have been produced in the 
revised 2018/19 NPPF. All of these issues should be subjected to both empirical and theoretical scrutiny.   
 
6.3 Final Thoughts  
 
In March 2018, two years after the original target date, Britain had eliminated the deficit on its day-to-
day budget, the target originally set by George Osborne when he imposed austerity on public services 
in 2010. On the news that the UK is now running a surplus of £3.8bn on its current budget, Osborne 
posted on the social media twitter that “We got there in the end - a remarkable national effort” and 
Cameron responded with a message saying “It [austerity] was the right thing to do” (BBC News, 2018). 
Indeed, the Cameron-led governments did reduce the budget deficit from £143.5 billion in the financial 
year 2010/11 to £76.6 billion in the financial year 2015/16, a reduction of £66.9 billion over this period. 
However, the record of austerity policy on UK national debt tells a different story. General government 
gross debt was £1,651.9 billion at the end of the financial year ending March 2016 (representing 87.8% 
of UK GDP); however, this figure was £1,214.5 billion (76.3% of UK GDP) at the end of the financial year 
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ending March 2011. This means that the UK national debt increased by £437.4 million under the fiscal 
economic austerity policies pursued so fervently under the Cameron-Osborne governments 2010-2016.  
 
The ideological success of austerity can therefore be seen in political terms through creating a smaller, 
leaner state (Lowndes and Gardner, 2016) with a much reduced public sector employment, consistent 
with the ambitions of neoliberal elite actors such as Cameron; rather than to reduce national debt, 
which arguably was never the real intention behind austerity as a form of ‘statecraft’ (Gamble, 2015). 
As at September 2018, the current Chancellor Phillip Hammond has only signalled that the government 
may end the austerity drive on government spending and investment in the 2018 Autumn Statement 
‘if economic conditions continue to improve throughout the year’. Clearly, whilst the economic success 
of austerity is highly debatably within academic circles, its political success as a form of UK statecraft is 
undeniable. This is crystallised by the Conservative Cabinet commitment to austerity post-Cameron.  
 
In terms of looking to the future, despite the strong political discourses that have operationalised 
austerity as a ‘normalised’ and accepted working conditions within the public sector in times of financial 
hardship (Farnsworth and Irving, 2018), the project of austerity will eventually undermine its own 
legitimacy as crisis conditions begin to dissipate and expose its political and ideological underpinnings. 
In the same way as other neoliberal policy strategies, austerity must continually evolve in order to 
maintain legitimacy and deflect criticism (Peck, 2010). Its hegemony can never be fully completed as a 
state project (Rancière, 1999, Mouffe, 2005), regardless of its ideological and discursive dominance at 
national and local scales since 2010. In moving on to the question of what next for UK austerity, some 
comfort can be taken that; ‘economic statecraft in the UK cannot continue to use the 2008 financial 
crisis as a legitimising pillar indefinitely. As an idea, austerity is perennial, but only really functions as a 
response to crisis. Austerity is not in itself a permanent way of economic life, and the economic order 
that it seeks to defend and promote must develop new ways of justifying its existence eventually, 
including in a clear demonstration of its ability to create genuine prosperity’ (Berry, 2016, p. 111).      
 
This understanding of politics and hegemony provides some comfort to progressive academics and 
activists. However, despite austerity measures only being able to sustain short policy cycles of intense 
political ‘crisis’ justifications and economic legitimacy, the consequences appear set to be reproduced 
at the local level for at least the near future. The ideological/discursive power of austerity (prudence, 
responsibility, autonomy, and other claims to living within our means and having ‘no alternatives’) to 
influence individual conduct means that austerity continues to be performed at the local municipal level 
in a number of different ways even after the national government has ceased to explicitly promote 
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deficit reduction measures under the May/Hammond administration. These deficit discourses have 
persisted following the resignation of David Cameron after the 2016 EU Referendum and the removal 
of George Osborne from the government cabinet and his subsequent stepping-down from formal 
politics. To borrow from Deas and Ward (1999), the song of austerity has ended but the melody lingers.  
 
These findings beg the question whether Coalition and Conservative era austerity and planning reforms 
can be reversed, and whether this would be desirable given the changes, both positive and negative, 
that have already been embedded in the system and practice cultures in England. It is not possible to 
say if the scope and depth of austerity logics has become so firmly entrenched into local government 
institutions and planning practices that they cannot be reversed. For example, a new Labour 
government, particularly under Jeremy Corbyn, could signal the end of the UK national government 
commitment to austerity policy; however, whether planning practice could return to a stronger focus 
on professional understandings of sustainable development and public interest rather than commercial, 
managerialist or privatised agendas is questionable. As the findings here demonstrate, the ideational 
and discursive damage may have already been done as the conduct of planning managers and new 
planners entering the system may now be hardwired into accepted conducts and practice cultures. 
Particularly given the proliferation of planning consultancies and their growing influence on practice.  
 
Peck (2012, p.651) cautions that ‘if austerity defines a new normal, it is a state of normalcy at the very 
cusp of crisis’. Indeed whilst local government and public planning may have now arguably been set on 
a new trajectory (Taylor-Gooby, 2012), this new state is fragile at best, and the potential for the political 
to emerge around a new funding landscape always remains as a future possibility. The planning 
literature on post-political theory demonstrates that government attempts at reform are not always 
successful, and dissatisfaction and resistance can be found in many forms at different spatial and 
organisational scales. A case in point is the widespread and well-publicised resistance to the draft NPPF 
in 2011, which led to it being significantly amended before its adoption in 2012. In this case, a number 
of alternative roles for planning, particularly environmental conservation, were brought to the fore to 
challenge the overly pro-growth narrative being presented (Allmendinger, 2016). More recently the 
dominance of viability considerations has been slightly softened within national policy through the 2018 
NPPF; and the need for LPAs to have some basic level of resourcing to support developers has gained 
recognition resulting in a 20% increase in fees so long as this is reinvested back into planning services. 
 
Overall, the core argument of this thesis is that the neoliberal reallocation of responsibility and risk 
through linked policy, localism and austerity reforms has been key to the unfolding state and society 
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restructuring in England post-2010, with planning further becoming both a punch bag for, and agent of, 
neoliberalism. However, that through planners professional capacities and skills, planning agency ‘is in 
many respects the last line of defence to space itself being neoliberalized’ (Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014, 
p. 357). This is to say that whilst national policy and funding ‘structures’ work to circumscribe and direct 
the scope and remit of planning practices, the agency of planners remains to pursue their own agendas 
in places based on their professional training, ethics and close relations to representative democracy. 
 
The more provocative critical claim is that the particular scope, scale and temporal context of austerity, 
localism and planning reforms in England post-2010 represents more than a neoliberal ‘business as 
usual’ approach, but rather a more fundamental set of (post-crisis) changes to the professional roles of 
public planners and objectives of the planning system. This is deliberately to challenge the reader 
(whom is presumably reading this because of their concern for progressive planning) to be political and 
recognise that planning forms one key ‘front’ in part of a much broader and longer-term political project 
centred on variegated neoliberal governing attempts at public sector state restructuring. In this sense 
it is partly a call to action and warning that this is about more than just the technical operation and 
funding of the planning system but more fundamentally market-state-society relations that have far 
reaching impacts for society and sustainable development (that manifest such as in the ‘housing crisis’). 
 
In conclusion, it seems likely that the current UK Conservative Government will continue to deploy 
neoliberal policies and initiatives in an ongoing attempt to (re)shape the conduct of individuals, 
communities and councils through national policy reforms in England for at least the near future. Only 
time will tell if the Cameron era proves to be a ‘transformative’ moment in planning history as predicted 
by Taylor-Gooby (2012) and outlined at the very start of this thesis (indeed it is easy to overstate the 
long-term importance and impact of events at the time without having enough distance to enable a  
clearer perspective). Finally, it is paramount that critical academics continue to work on these areas 
and to hold power to account as part of a broader commitment to society. Planning is, after all, about 
creating a sustainable future, and planning academics have a responsibility to practitioners and society.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Participant Email Template 
 
Hello [name], 
 
My name is Mark Dobson and I am a PhD planning researcher at the University of Reading. My research 
is focused on the experiences of senior planning practitioners, and responses of local governments, to 
austerity and planning reforms since 2010. It is concerned with examining the changing nature of 
planning in England as part of the wider public service reform agenda through informed practice-based 
insights into the realities and pressures of contemporary local government planning.  
 
Given your experience and senior position as [position and council] I am emailing with regards to a 
potential meeting with you at the council? I am conscious of your time and would appreciate no more 
than an hour interview.  
 
The interview will not be overly structured, but as an example of the themes that I would like to cover: 
Austerity - the impacts of funding cuts and uncertainty over future finance settlements on planning 
provision and services e.g. level, quality, difference compared to pre-2010 and concerns for the future. 
Planning reform – the challenges faced in responding to national government statutory policy and 
agendas e.g. NPPF and Localism/Devolution and the impact of these on planning practices, relationships 
with stakeholders and delivering local plans and agendas. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Kind Regards, Mark Dobson. 
Real Estate and Planning Department 
Henley Business School 
University of Reading. 
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Appendix B  
 
Research Participant Information and Consent Sheet 
Researcher information: Mr. Mark Dobson – Email:   
What is the study?  
This research project is being conducted in fulfilment of a PhD in Real Estate and Planning at the 
University of Reading. 
Why have I been chosen to take part?  
Your views are being sought based on your professional knowledge and experience in local government 
and planning.  
Do I have to take part?  
It is entirely up to you whether you participate. You may also withdraw your consent to participation at 
any time during the project, without any repercussions to you, by contacting the researcher’s 
supervisor using the contact details below.  
Dr Emma Street -            Dr Steve Musson –   
What will happen if I take part?  
You will be asked to take part in an interview regarding your professional experiences of planning 
reform and austerity in the Cameron-led Coalition and Conservative Government period 2010 and 2016. 
The interview will be recorded as a memory aid to assist the researcher. 
What are the risks and benefits of taking part?  
The researcher does not intend to collect any confidential data from you in this study. The record of 
your interview will only be seen by the researcher and supervisor listed in this sheet. The findings will 
be written up in the student researcher project which will not be published but will be available in the 
University library and therefore accessible to students and staff.  
What will happen to the data?  
The data from your interview will be combined with that of other local government planners with a 
view on synthesising the experiences of planning reform and austerity on local government planning in 
different social-spatial contexts across England. The names of interviewees will not be referred to in 
the written report. Instead a general identifier and the region in which their local authority is situated 
will be used in the report.  For example:  
“Planner X working in the South-East of England made the important point that…However this 
experience did not seem to be evident for Planner Y based in the North-West of England. Instead they 
highlighted that…” 
The records of this study will be kept private. A record of interviewee identities will be kept, however 
the notes of interviews will be separated from this, coded and stored securely to preserve anonymity.  
If you would like to see interview notes prior to them being integrated into the written project, please 
let the researcher know so that this can be arranged. Research records will be stored on a password-
protected computer and only the student researcher will have access to the records. Once the final 
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report has been submitted and subject to external examination, interview recordings, records and 
transcribed interview notes will be destroyed.  
What happens if I change my mind?  
You can change your mind about taking part in the research at any time without any repercussions.  
Simply inform the student researcher of your intention to withdraw from the study using the contact 
details on this page. 
What happens if something goes wrong?  
In the unlikely case of concern or complaint, you can contact the student’s supervisor Dr Emma Street 
by email or by phone   
Where can I get more information? If you would like more information at any stage of the research 
process, please contact either the student researcher or supervisor using the contact details on this 
page. We do hope that you will agree to your participation in the study. By taking part in an interview, 
you are consenting to its use by us as part of the project. This application has been reviewed following 
the procedures of the School of Real Estate & Planning Research Ethics Committee and has been given 
a favourable ethical opinion for conduct. 
Consent Form 
Project title: Planning Reform under Austerity: Experiences and Responses of Local Authority 
Management Planners in England.  
I have read the Information Sheet relating to this project. 
I have had explained to me the purposes of the project and what will be required of me, and any 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to the arrangements described in the 
Information Sheet in so far as they relate to my participation. I understand that my participation is 
entirely voluntary and that I have the right to withdraw from the project any time, without giving a 
reason and without detriment.  
I have received a copy of this Consent Form and of the accompanying Information Sheet. I voluntarily 
agree to: Please tick as appropriate 
 
I consent to take part in a research interview  
 
I consent to this interview being recorded 
  
Name: ................................................................... 
 
Signed: .................................................................. 
 
Date: ..................................................................... 
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Appendix C 
 
Interview Guide - Initial Questions:  
 
Local Authority and Planning Context: 
Can you briefly outline: 
• The key challenges that your department/authority has faced in the last couple of years?  
• The specific planning and development issues/pressures that are important locally? 
 
Planning Resources and Budget (Austerity): 
• Can you outline how your planning department budget has changed over the last 5 years? 
• What service efficiency strategies have been introduced to save money and resources? 
• Is the planning service budget ‘protected’ for statutory functions?  
• Have budget changes been offset by changes in planning income? E.g. the impact of financial 
incentives such as the New Homes Budget? 
• Has your authority introduced charging for pre-application discussions and other services? If so 
how effective has this proved?  
• Are there any discretionary services that can no longer be freely provided by the department?  
• How have funding reductions affected the performance of planning?  
• In what ways has the planning service been affected by austerity and resource changes?  
• What are the practical impacts of uncertainty over the future finance settlement on planning?  
• What has austerity meant for the internal capacity of the planning department? (E.g. in terms 
of staff numbers, expertise, recruitment or reliance on external consultancies in your authority).   
• What has austerity meant for the level and quality of planning services and delivery/outcomes 
that can be provided by the local authority?  
• What has austerity meant for the capacity to plan for growth/infrastructure in your authority? 
(E.g. ability to raise revenue, relationships with key development actors, lead regeneration).  
• What strategies have been used in your authority to maintain and improve planning services 
and outcomes in the context of reduced resources and financial uncertainty? (E.g. outsourcing 
planning functions, cross-boundary collaboration, alternative service delivery models, etc).  
• Overall how has austerity effected the role and capacity of local government planning? 
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Planning Reform and Practices: 
• How have you experienced and responded to the planning reforms introduced by the Coalition 
Government in the period 2010-15? The NPPF and most significant impact on practice? 
• What have been your experiences of ‘Localism’? What has it meant for your practice/locality?  
• How do you evaluate the latest wave of reforms to planning against the New Labour regional 
spatial planning approach? I.e. more efficient, administrative or democratic planning system?  
• What are your thoughts on local government organisation and cross-boundary collaboration?  
• In general how do you think planning service/practice has changed over the last 5 years? 
• Has there been an increase in the use of external resources over the last 5 years and if so in 
which areas have they provided support? E.g. policy evidence base, S106 negotiations etc. 
• Have collaboration arrangements or resource sharing of specialist skills with neighbouring 
authorities increased in the last five years?  
• Has there been an increase in experimentation with Alternative Service Delivery Models?  
• Has there been an increase in Planning Performance Agreements (PPAs) or other such delivery 
arrangements to reduce pressures on decision-making timescales and quality?  
• In your experience has the continued national government emphasis on reforming conditions 
for Local Plan and decision-making proved effective at the local scale?  
• In your professional experience what have been the key positive and negative consequences 
of the planning system reforms enacted under the Coalition Government 2010-2015? (e.g. 
NPPF, Five Year Supply, Localism, New Homes Bonus, Permitted Development Rights, LEPs).  
• What are your professional reflections both positive and negative of the previous regional 
spatial planning system compared with the localism and devolution agendas?  
• What has localism meant and has it changed your planning practices? 
• What have been the challenges of practicing and delivering planning at the local scale in the 
context of uncertainty surrounding constant and wholesale planning reform particularly in 
regard to managing strategic (long-term) planning issues? 
• What is your professional understanding of the national agenda for planning and centralisation 
of planning powers and functions with regard to the relationship between central and local 
government and potential tensions between national and local community agendas?  
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Strategic Planning and Housing: 
Given that one of the core rationales behind the regions was to remove inter-regional competition 
between geographically proximate places and foster collaboration based around a spatial planning 
policy framework, from your perspective, how has cross-boundary competition and collaboration been 
impacted by the localism and devolution agendas? How do you evaluate the latest approach to strategic 
planning in England since 2010 based around Local Enterprise Partnerships and Combined Authorities? 
Thoughts on what spatial scale is most effective to intervene and coordinate economic development? 
Shift away from traditional bounded spaces such as administrative boundaries based on the full national 
coverage of places through regions and LEPs toward fluid relational spaces based on selective networks 
of functional relationships characterised by the approach of George Osborne to devolution deals. From 
your practical understanding and local government experience how do you evaluate and reflect on the 
effectiveness of national government policy solutions introduced since 2010 to ‘streamline’ the planning 
process and increase housing delivery and economic growth? Such as City Deals, the New Homes Bonus, 
Community Infrastructure Levy, Permitted Development Rights, the NPPF and Five Year Land Supply, the 
requirement to have a Local Plan in place by 2017 etc. What has been the impact of local communities 
being given increasingly more input in making planning policy through localism and neighbourhood 
planning? What do you think these agendas mean for local politics of planning and for housing?  
 
Funding Local Planning Services and Infrastructure: 
How significant is development viability and the capacity to seed fund and unlock infrastructure locally? 
How is the planning service allocating, prioritising and investing resources given the uncertainty of the 
future financial settlement through the removal of the revenue support grant, shift to 100% business 
rate retention, increasing pressure to raise council taxation and the inability to set planning fees locally? 
Given the significant reductions to local authority budgets what has austerity meant for the internal 
capacity of the planning department in terms of staff numbers and expertise, recruitment and reliance 
on external consultancies in your authority? In response which transformation strategies have been 
considered or implemented in your authority to maintain and improve planning services such as 
outsourcing planning functions to the private sector, increasing cross-boundary collaboration and 
resource sharing, experimenting with alternative service delivery models, developing external trading 
companies, etc.? What has this meant for the capacity to plan and deliver growth and infrastructure 
and the level and quality of planning services that can be provided by the local authority? 
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Appendix D 
 
First Phase NVivo ‘Organising’ and Sub’ Code Framework: 
 
 
 
 
